12 ideas
7719 | European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead] |
Full Idea: The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. | |
From: Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929], p.39) | |
A reaction: Outsiders think this is a ridiculous remark, but readers of Plato can only be struck by what a wonderful tribute Whitehead has come up with. I would say that at least 80% of this database deals with problems which were discussed at length by Plato. |
10247 | We have no adequate logic at the moment, so mathematicians must create one [Veblen] |
Full Idea: Formal logic has to be taken over by mathematicians. The fact is that there does not exist an adequate logic at the present time, and unless the mathematicians create one, no one else is likely to do so. | |
From: Oswald Veblen (Presidential Address of Am. Math. Soc [1924], 141), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This remark was made well after Frege, but before the advent of Gödel and Tarski. That implies that he was really thinking of meta-logic. |
10656 | With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi] |
Full Idea: In Whitehead's theory of extensive connection, no boundary elements are included in the domain of quantification. ...His conception of space contains no parts of lower dimensions, such as points or boundary elements. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Achille Varzi - Mereology 3.1 | |
A reaction: [Varzi says we should see B.L.Clarke 1981 for a rigorous formulation. Second half of the Idea is Varzi p.21] |
15389 | In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons] |
Full Idea: There are no items in Whitehead's ontology called 'processes'. Rather, the term 'process' refers to the way in which the basic things - which are still events - come into existence and cease to exist. Whitehead called this 'becoming'. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Peter Simons - Whitehead: process and cosmology 'The mature' |
23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |
23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |
15247 | Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: On Whitehead's view, not only is a volitional sense of 'causal power' projected on to physical events, but 'perception in the causal mode' is literally ascribed to them. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 3.II | |
A reaction: This seems to be a close relative of Leibniz's monads. 'Perception' is a daft word for it, but in some way everything is 'responsive' to the things adjacent to it. |
16962 | Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine] |
Full Idea: Whitehead tried to avoid points, and make do with extended regions and sets of regions. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Willard Quine - Existence and Quantification p.93 |