267 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
| 12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: From Aristotle to Hegel, logic was the philosophical category of ontology's dominion over language. The mathematization of logic has authorized language to become that which seizes philosophy for itself. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 8) |
| 9808 | Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy's role consists in informing mathematics of its own speculative grandeur. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.11) | |
| A reaction: Revealing the grandeur of something sounds more like a rhetorical than a rational exercise. How would you reveal the grandeur of a sunset to someone? |
| 12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998]) | |
| A reaction: Too good to pass over, too crazy to file sensibly, too creepy to have been filed under humour, my candidate for the weirdest remark I have ever read in a serious philosopher, but no doubt if you read Lacan etc for long enough it looks deeply wise. |
| 12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy has been released from, even relieved of, physics, cosmology, and politics, as well as many other things. It is important for it to be released from ontology per se. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 3) | |
| A reaction: A startling proposal, for anyone who thought that ontology was First Philosophy. Badiou wants to hand ontology over to mathematicians, but I am unclear what remains for the philosophers to do. |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
| 12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Consensus is the enemy of thought. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice slogan for bringing Enlightenment optimists to a halt. I am struck. Do I allow my own thinking to always be diverted towards something which might result in a consensus? Do I actually (horror!) prefer consensus to truth? |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| Full Idea: The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell. There are four axioms: (p∨p)→p, q→(p∨q), (p→q)→(q∨p), and (q→r)→((p∨q)→(p∨r)), plus Substitution and Modus Ponens rules. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by GE Hughes/M Cresswell - An Introduction to Modal Logic Ch.1 |
| 12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: 'Transitivity' signifies that all of the elements of the set are also parts of the set. If you have α∈Β, you also have α⊆Β. This correlation of membership and inclusion gives a stability which is the sets' natural being. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
| 12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: The axiom of choice actually amounts to admitting an absolutely indeterminate infinite set whose existence is asserted albeit remaining linguistically indefinable. On the other hand, as a process, it is unconstructible. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: If only constructible sets are admitted (see 'V = L') then there is a contradiction. |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The axiom of Reducibility ...is crucial in the reduction of classes to logic, ...and seems to be a quite legitimate logical notion for Russell. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.4 | |
| A reaction: This is an unusual defence of the axiom, which is usually presumed to have been kicked into the long grass by Quine. If one could reduce classes to logic, that would destroy the opposition to logicism in a single neat coup. |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell adduces two reasons against the extensional view of classes, namely the existence of the null class (which cannot very well be a collection), and the unit classes (which would have to be identical with their single elements). | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Structure and Ontology p.459 | |
| A reaction: Gödel believes in the reality of classes. I have great sympathy with Russell, when people start to claim that sets are not just conveniences to help us think about things, but actual abstract entities. Is the singleton of my pencil is on this table? |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.72), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics III.2 |
| 12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) | |
| A reaction: This will because logic will have a distinct theory within each 'topos'. |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Russell call 'if...then' implication, when the material conditional is a much better account; C.I.Lewis (in founding modern modal logic) preserved Russell's confusion by creating 'strict implication', and called that implication. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.177 | |
| A reaction: [A compession of Quine's paragraph]. All of this assumes that logicians can give an accurate account of what if...then means, when ordinary usage is broad and vague. Strict implication seems to drain all the normal meaning out of 'if...then'. |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In Mr Russell's idea of implication, if twenty random sentences from a newspaper were put in a hat, and two of them drawn at random, one will certainly imply the other, and it is an even bet the implication will be mutual. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by C.I. Lewis - A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori p.366 | |
| A reaction: This sort of lament leads modern logicians to suggest 'relevance' as an important criterion. It certainly seems odd that so-called 'classical logic' should contain a principle so at variance with everyday reasoning. |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell did not view logic as an uninterpreted calculus awaiting interpretations [the modern view]. Rather, logic is a single 'interpreted' body of a priori truths, of propositions rather than sentence forms - but maximally general and topic neutral. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
| A reaction: This is the view which Wittgenstein challenged, saying logic is just conventional. Linsky claims that Russell's logicism is much more plausible, once you understand his view of logic. |
| 12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Logic should first and foremost be a mathematical thought of what a universe of relations is. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: In 'Principia' a young science was enriched with a new abstract theory of relations, ..and not only Cantor's set theory but also ordinary arithmetic and the theory of measurement are treated from this abstract relational standpoint. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is accounting for relations in terms of ordered sets. |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
| 9812 | In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Only in mathematics can one unequivocally maintain that if thought can formulate a problem, it can and will solve it, regardless of how long it takes. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.17) | |
| A reaction: I hope this includes proving the Continuum Hypothesis, and Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't seem quite true, but it shows why philosophers of a rationalist persuasion are drawn to mathematics. |
| 12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Apparently - and this is quite unlike old Greek times - there is no single unified definition of number. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
| 12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Number is an instance of measuring (distinguishing the more from the less, and calibrating data), ..and a figure for calculating (one counts with numbers), ..and it ought to be a figure of consistency (the compatibility of order and calculation). | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
| 12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: There is a heterogeneity of introductory procedures of different classical number types: axiomatic for natural numbers, structural for ordinals, algebraic for negative and rational numbers, topological for reals, mainly geometric for complex numbers. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
| 12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Do we have to confer existence on numbers whose principle is to no longer consist of units? | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: This very nicely expresses what seems to me perhaps the most important question in the philosophy of mathematics. I am reluctant to accept such 'unitless' numbers, but I then feel hopelessly old-fashioned and naďve. What to do? |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: For Russell the real number 2 is the class of rationals less than 2 (i.e. 2/1). ...Notice that on this definition, real numbers are classes of rational numbers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 |
| 9813 | Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confne thinking within the ambit of finitude. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.19) | |
| A reaction: This would perhaps make Cantor the greatest thinker who ever lived. It is an exhilarating idea, but we should ward the reader against romping of into unrestrained philosophical thought about infinities. You may be jumping without your Cantorian parachute. |
| 12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: As we have known since Paul Cohen's theorem, the Continuum Hypothesis is intrinsically undecidable. Many believe Cohen's discovery has driven the set-theoretic project into ruin, or 'pluralized' what was once presented as a unified construct. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6) | |
| A reaction: Badiou thinks the theorem completes set theory, by (roughly) finalising its map. |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: Although Russell takes numbers to be certain classes, his 'no-class' theory then eliminates all mention of classes in favour of the 'propositional functions' that define them; and in the case of the numbers these just are the numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4 |
| 12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it (as they are for the Platonist). | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
| A reaction: See also Idea 12328. I file this to connect it with Hellman's modal (and nominalist) version of structuralism. Could it be that mathematics and modal logic are identical? |
| 12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: A Platonist's interest focuses on axioms in which the decision of thought is played out, where an Aristotelian or Leibnizian interest focuses on definitions laying out the representation of possibilities (...and the essence of mathematics is logic). | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 12323 for the significance of the Platonist approach. So logicism is an Aristotelian project? Frege is not a true platonist? I like the notion of 'the representation of possibilities', so will vote for the Aristotelians, against Badiou. |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic, ..and came close to identifying numbers with numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.148 | |
| A reaction: The point here is 'higher-order'. |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Frege, Russell and Whitehead were not realists about mathematical objects, and whereas Frege thought that only arithmetic and analysis are branches of logic, they think the vast majority of mathematics (including geometry) is essentially logical. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: If, in essence, Descartes reduced geometry to algebra (by inventing co-ordinates), then geometry ought to be included. It is characteristic of Russell's hubris to want to embrace everything. |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: What is missing, above all, in 'Principia', is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead's ramified theory of types worked not with sets, but with propositional functions (similar to Frege's concepts), with a more restrictive assignment of variables, insisting that bound, as well as free, variables be of lower type. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I don't fully understand this (and no one seems much interested any more), but I think variables are a key notion, and there is something interesting going on here. I am intrigued by ordinary language which behaves like variables. |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The Russell/Whitehead type theory reduces mathematics to a consistent founding discipline, but is criticised for not really being logic. They could not prove the existence of infinite sets, and introduced a non-logical 'axiom of reducibility'. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.6 | |
| A reaction: To have reduced most of mathematics to a founding discipline sounds like quite an achievement, and its failure to be based in pure logic doesn't sound too bad. However, it seems to reduce some maths to just other maths. |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In the system of 'Principia Mathematica', it is not only the axioms of infinity and reducibility which go beyond pure logic, but also the initial conception of a universal domain of individuals and of a domain of predicates. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.267) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.267 | |
| A reaction: This sort of criticism seems to be the real collapse of the logicist programme, rather than Russell's paradox, or Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. It just became impossible to stick strictly to logic in the reduction of arithmetic. |
| 12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Logic is definitional, whereas real mathematics is axiomatic. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 10) |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead are particularly careful to avoid paradox, and consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as quite a good argument. It is certainly counterintuitive that reality, and abstractions from reality, would contain contradictions. The realist view would be that we have paradoxes because we have misdescribed the facts. |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell insisted on the vicious circle principle, and thus rejected impredicative definitions, which resulted in an unwieldy ramified type theory, with the ad hoc axiom of reducibility. Ramsey's simpler theory was impredicative and avoided the axiom. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
| A reaction: Nowadays the theory of types seems to have been given up, possibly because it has no real attraction if it lacks the strict character which Russell aspired to. |
| 12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental theorem that 'there does not exist a set of all sets' designates the inexistence of Being as a whole. ...A crucial consequence of this property is that any ontological investigation is irremediably local. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) | |
| A reaction: The second thought pushes Badiou into Topos Theory, where the real numbers (for example) have a separate theory in each 'topos'. |
| 9809 | Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics inscribes being as such. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.12) | |
| A reaction: I don't pretend to understand that, but there is something about the purity and certainty of mathematics that makes us feel we are grappling with the core of existence. Perhaps. The same might be said of stubbing your toe on a bedpost. |
| 12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought decides it. And that decision orients thought essentially. ...It is when you decide upon what exists that you bind your thought to Being. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: [2nd half p.57] Helpful for us non-Heideggerians to see what is going on. Does this mean that Being is Kant's noumenon? |
| 12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: In Set Theory, the primitive name of Being is the void, the empty set. The whole hierarchy takes root in it. In a certain sense, it alone 'is'. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6) | |
| A reaction: This is the key to Badiou's view that ontology is mathematics. David Lewis pursued interesting enquiries in this area. |
| 12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: The saturation and collapse of the Euclidean idea of the being of number as One's procession signs the entry of the thought of Being into modern times. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) | |
| A reaction: That is, by allowing that not all numbers are built of units, numbers expand widely enough to embrace everything we think of as Being. The landmark event is the acceptance of the infinite as a number. |
| 9811 | It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: It is of the essence of being to appear. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.16) | |
| A reaction: Nice slogan. In my humble opinion 'continental' philosophy is well worth reading because, despite the fluffy rhetoric and the shameless egotism and the desire to shock the bourgeoisie, they occasionally make wonderfully thought-provoking remarks. |
| 12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Enlightened by the Cantorian grounding of mathematics, we can assert ontology to be nothing other than mathematics itself. This has been the case ever since its Greek origin. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be quite a strong feeling among mathematicians that new 'realms of being' are emerging from their researches. Only a Platonist, of course, is likely to find this idea sympathetic. |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| Full Idea: Trivially, the Identity of Indiscernibles says that two individuals, Castor and Pollux, cannot have all properties in common. For Castor must have the properties of being identical with Castor and not being identical with Pollux, which Pollux can't share. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], I p.57) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 2 | |
| A reaction: I suspect that either the property of being identical with itself is quite vacuous, or it is parasytic on primitive identity, or it is the criterion which is actually used to define identity. Either way, I don't find this claim very illuminating. |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: By analyzing the paradoxes to which Cantor's set theory had led, ..Russell brought to light the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (concerning such notions as truth, concept, being, class) are self-contradictory. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.452 | |
| A reaction: The main intuition that failed was, I take it, that every concept has an extension, that is, there are always objects which will or could fall under the concept. |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: The multiple relations theory of judgement proposes that assertions about propositions are dependent upon genuine facts involving belief and other attitude relations, subjects of those attitudes, and the constituents of the belief. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to require a commitment to universals (especially relations) with which we can be directly acquainted. I prefer propositions, but as mental entities, not platonic entities. |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When a judgement occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgement. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) | |
| A reaction: This is Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement, which replaced his earlier belief in unified propositions (now 'false abstractions'). He seems to have accepted Locke's view, that the act of judgement produces the unity. |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus | |
| A reaction: Morris says this is Russell's multiple-relations theory of judgement. The theory accompanies the rejection of the concept of the unified proposition. When I hear 'Socrates had a mole on his shoulder' I get the meaning without judging. |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When Russell moved to his multiple relation theory of judgement …he then faced difficulties making sense of the unity of sentences. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3A | |
| A reaction: Roughly, he seems committed to saying that there is only unity if you think there is unity; there is no unity in a sentence prior to the act of judgement. |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging, and we no longer have an incomplete symbol. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap | |
| A reaction: Personally I would have thought that you needed to know the meaning properly before you could make the judgement, but then he is Bertrand Russell and I'm not. |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs? |
| 12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: There can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1011b24) | |
| A reaction: The first sentence seems to be bivalence, and the second sentence excluded middle. |
| 9814 | All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: Like every great poet, Mallarmé was engaged in a tacit rivalry with mathematics. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.20) | |
| A reaction: I love these French pronouncements! Would Mallarmé have agreed? If poetry and mathematics are the poles, where is philosophy to be found? |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: For the philosophers of the Enlightenment politics is strictly the affair of humankind, an immanent practice from which recourse to the All Mighty's providential organization had to be discarded. | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], Prol) |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |
| Full Idea: The God of metaphysics makes sense of existing according to a proof, while the God of religion makes sense of living according to an encounter | |
| From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], Prol) |