325 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
| 2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, explanations, and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological relationships sorted out and clarified. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.066) |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
| 3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If we reduce one theory to another, we reduce the number of independent assumptions about the world. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.215) |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
| 4779 | For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
| A reaction: The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'. |
| 10369 | How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2 | |
| A reaction: I don't actually buy the idea that an event could just be an 'exemplification'. Change seems to be required, and processes, or something like them, must be mentioned. Degrees of fine-graining sound good, though, for processes too. |
| 8976 | If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim] |
|
Full Idea:
If Kim's events are just the ordered triple of |
|
| From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
| A reaction: You might reply that the object, and maybe the attribute, are concrete, and the time is natural, but the combination really is an abstraction, even though it is located (like the equator). Where is the set of my books located? |
| 8975 | Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons] |
|
Full Idea:
Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of |
|
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
| A reaction: Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property? |
| 8974 | Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons] |
| Full Idea: Kim's events are exemplifications by an object of an attribute at a time...It does not make events basic entities, as the three constituents are more basic, but it gives identity conditions (two events are the same if object, attribute and time the same). | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
| A reaction: [Aristotle is said to be behind this] I am more sympathetic to this view than the claim that events are primitive. If a pebble is ellipsoid for a million years, is that an event? I think the concept of a 'process' is the most fruitful one to investigate. |
| 8977 | Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim] |
| Full Idea: Since some tautologously universal properties such as self-identity or being such that 2+2=4 apply to all things at all times, that is stretching Kim's events too far. Candidate properties need to be realistically restricted, and it is unclear how. | |
| From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
| A reaction: You could deploy Schoemaker's concept of natural properties in terms of the source of causal powers, but the problem would be that you were probably hoping to then use Kim's events to define causation. Answer: treat causation as the primitive. |
| 8980 | Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim] |
| Full Idea: The criticism most frequently levelled against Kim's theory is that it results in an unacceptable plurality of finely differentiated events, because of the requirement for identity of the constituent property. | |
| From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 4.4 | |
| A reaction: This may mean that the Battle of Waterloo was several trillion events, which seems daft to the historian, but it doesn't to the physicist. A cannon firing is indeed an accumulation of lots of little events. |
| 2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days. |
| 3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa? |
| 2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011) | |
| A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason. |
| 2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course. |
| 13745 | Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is a mistake, or at least misleading, to think of supervenience itself as a special and distinctive type of dependence relation, alongside causal dependence, mereological dependence, semantic dependence, and others. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: The point, I take it, is that supervenience is something which requires explanation, rather than being a conclusion to the debate. Why are statues beautiful? Why do brains generate minds? |
| 13746 | Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation, not a 'deep' metaphysical relation; rather it is a 'surface' relation that reports a pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting dependency relation that might explain it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: I think the underlying idea here is that supervenience appeals to the Humean view of physical laws as mere regularities, but it is no good for those who seek underlying mechanisms to explain the patterns and regularities. Humeans are wrong. |
| 3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience opens up the possibility of a relationship that gives us determination, or dependence, without reduction (as beauty supervenes on physical properties, but can't be given a physical definition). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.223) | |
| A reaction: Beauty is a bad analogy, since it rather obviously involves a beholder. There is nothing more to a statue than a substance of a certain shape. There are no good analogies for this sort of supervenience, because it doesn't exist. |
| 2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
| Full Idea: A plausible criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is not real is the possession of causal power. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.119) |
| 3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Physicalists are fond of saying that physical facts determine all the facts. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
| A reaction: I totally agree with this slogan. As a view, it seems to me that it is reinforced by essentialism (see the ideas of Brian Ellis), which gives some indication of how facts are physically determined, and why there is no alternative. |
| 15456 | Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied). | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II | |
| A reaction: The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic! |
| 3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Resemblance or similarity is the very core of our concept of a property. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.219) |
| 3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Emergent properties are said to be irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge (as weight is a 'resultant' property, but the transparency of water is an 'emergent' property). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.228) | |
| A reaction: So weight is predictable, but transparency is a surprise? But presumably the transparency of water is totally predictable, once you understand it. Emergent properties are either dualist or reducible, in my view. |
| 2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085) | |
| A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour. |
| 3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
| Full Idea: For the emergentist why pain emerges when C-fibres are excited remains a mystery (a 'brute fact'), but such properties then take on a life of their own as 'downward causation'. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
| A reaction: I don't think there are any 'brute facts', except perhaps at the lowest level of physics. Whatever happened to the principle of sufficient reason? Is the mind like God - a causal source which is uncaused? |
| 3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Arguably, properties must be individuated in terms of their causal powers. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.230) |
| 16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity. |
| 16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9) | |
| A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck. |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
| A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay? |
| 16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'. |
| 16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
| A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'. |
| 16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V) | |
| A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like. |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
| 3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
| Full Idea: For counterfactuals there is the 'nomic-derivational' approach (which logically derives them from laws), and the 'possible world' approach (based on truth in worlds close to the actual one). | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.141) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'. |
| 530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
| Full Idea: There are two contradictory arguments about everything. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B06a), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Protagoras declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue either side of any question! | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 088 | |
| A reaction: This is perhaps the most famous sceptical argument in the ancient world (though, note, Protagoras is most famous for his relativism rather than his scepticism). It is, of course, wrong. The arguments are sometimes equal, but often they are not. |
| 2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
| Full Idea: We do not agree that every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people. | |
| From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 183c | |
| A reaction: I fully agree with this, but only because I have an optimistic view that rational people converge on the truth. |
| 1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
| Full Idea: Why didn't he start 'Truth' off by saying "A pig is the measure of all things", or "a baboon",…or " tadpole"? That would have been a magnificently haughty beginning. | |
| From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 161d1 |
| 14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another. |
| 3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is generally held that there are two broad categories of mental phenomena - qualitative states and intentional states (but what do they have in common?). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 23) | |
| A reaction: I am happy to accept this orthodox modern analysis. Putting it more simply: minds exist to enable experience and thought. I judge a priori that the two aspects are not separate. Qualia exist to serve thought, and qualia are necessary for thought. |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical… |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Experimentation presupposes mental-to-physical causation and is impossible without it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
| A reaction: So an epiphenomenalist can't do experiments? Kim implies that there is some special mental assessment of the feedback from physical events, but presumably a robot or a zombie could do experiments. Spiders do experiments. |
| 2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes). | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no. |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| Full Idea: A brief reflection makes it evident that most of our beliefs are generated by other beliefs we hold, and "generation" here could only mean causal generation. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, and yet implies an uncomfortable determinism, as if all our beliefs just happened to us. I don't claim proper free will, but I do say there is an element in belief formation which is just caused by bunches of beliefs. Call it character. |
| 3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Mental states are not the only things which exhibit intentionality - words and sentences can also refer to or represent facts or states of affairs. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 22) | |
| A reaction: This points to Searle's distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'derived' intentionality (see Idea 3465). We must now explain the difference between verbal intentionality and non-verbal intentionality (both as phenomena, and as information). |
| 3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
| Full Idea: There is referential intentionality (that some of our thoughts refer, or are 'about' something) and content intentionality (that propositional attitudes have content or meaning, often expressed by full sentences). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
| A reaction: So could these be the external and internal components of content? Which might be the causal/historical component, and the descriptive component? Which might be known by (indirect) acquaintance and description? |
| 2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
| A reaction: Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I. |
| 3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Are pains only sensory events, or do they also have a motivational component (e.g. aversiveness)? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 7) | |
| A reaction: A nice question. Given the occasional genuine masochist, and the way some people love tastes that others hate, it has always seemed to me that aversiveness was not a necessary property of pain. I couldn't train myself to like pain, though… |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Some mental phenomena - in particular, sensations like tickles and pains - do not seem to exhibit either reference or content. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
| A reaction: This could be challenged. These sensations cannot be had without a bodily location, and they give information about possible contact or damage. |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If inverted qualia, or absent qualia (zombies), are possible in functionally equivalent systems, qualia are not capturable by functional definitions. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.114) | |
| A reaction: The point here (I take it) is that we don't have to go the whole hog of saying the qualia are therefore epiphenomenal, although that is implied. How about a fail-safe situation, where qualia do it for me, and something else does the same for zombies? |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| Full Idea: If you crosswire your 'pain box' and your 'itch box', the functionalist says you are in pain if the inputs and outputs are for pain, even though the feeling is of an itch. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: If functionalists would indeed say this, then the objection seems to me almost conclusive. But they might well say that such simple crosswiring won't work. Itching won't produce pain behaviour - it lacks the correct function. |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Externalism about content would have the consequence that most of our knowledge of our own intentional states is indirect and must be based on external evidence. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.207) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a confusion, endemic in discussions of externalism. If what Shakespeare meant by 'water' is H2O, or Putnam means by 'elm' what experts say, the point is that their meanings are NOT part of their intentional states, which are bookmarks. |
| 3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: How do we know that we are angry rather than embarrassed? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
| A reaction: A very nice question, because the only answer I (or anyone?) can think of is that they are distinguished by their content. Event A is annoying, while event B is embarrassing. Either of those feelings is almost inconceivable without its content. |
| 3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is not always easy for us to determine what emotion (or even physical sensations) we are experiencing. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 18) | |
| A reaction: Confused sensations are, I would have thought, rare. Emotions, I think, are only confused when they are weak, and then a lot of the confusion is merely verbal. Our body and intuitions understand the feeling well enough, but we lack the vocabulary. |
| 3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Since Cartesian dualism implies causation from outside of the physical domain, this means there can be no complete physical theory of the physical domain. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.147) | |
| A reaction: This, I think, should be taken as a very strong argument against dualism, rather than as bad news for physics. Some exception might make the closure of physics impossible, but the claim that our brain is the exception looks highly suspect. |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be a mystery how such things could be known to us. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.130) | |
| A reaction: If a brain were asked whether it was conscious, it would presumably say 'yes', but (if epiphenomenalism were true) the cause of that would have to be brain events, and NOT information that it is conscious, which the brain could not have. Big objection. |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers doubt the coherence of the very idea of inverted or absent qualia. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) | |
| A reaction: The possibility of inverted qualia with identical brain structures strikes me as nil, but it would be odd to deny that qualia could be changed by brain surgery, given that insects can see ultra-violet, and some people are colourblind. |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
| A reaction: The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness. |
| 3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Its inability to explain the possibility of "mental causation" doomed Cartesian dualism. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 4) | |
| A reaction: This is a modern way of stating the interaction problem. Personally I am inclined to think that dualism was doomed by the spread of the scientific materialist view to every other corner of our knowledge except the mind. Plenty of causes baffle us. |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Logical behaviourism says any meaningful statement about mental phenomena can be translated without loss of content into a statement solely about behavioural and physical phenomena. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 29) | |
| A reaction: Also called analytical behaviourism. If we are supposed to infer the ontology of mental states from language, this makes me cross. Maybe we only discuss mentality in behavioural terms because we are epistemologically, and hence linguistically, limited. |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Behaviourism can be considered as an attempt to reduce the mental to the physical via definitional bridge principles (every mental expression being given a behavioural definition). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.217) | |
| A reaction: Effectively these would (if they had been discoverable) have been the elusive psycho-physical laws (which Davidson says do not exist). The objection to behaviourism is precisely that there is no fixed behaviour attached to a given mental state. |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Functionalists take a "realist" approach to dispositions whereas the behaviourist embraces an "instrumentalist" line. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 78) | |
| A reaction: A helpful distinction, which immediately shows why functionalism is superior to behaviourism. There must be some explanation of mental dispositions, and the instrumental view is essentially a refusal to think about the real problem. |
| 3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Mind-to-behaviour connections are always defeasible - by the occurrence of a further mental state. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 35) | |
| A reaction: But then an object's falling under gravity is always defeasible, by someone catching it first. This popular idea is meant to show that there could, as Davidson puts it, 'no psycho-physical laws', but I suspect the laws are just complex, like weather laws. |
| 3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The factors that determine exactly what you are doing when you produce a physical gesture include the customs, habits and conventions that are in force, so it is unlikely that anyone could produce correct behavioural definitions of mental terms. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 36) | |
| A reaction: This problem can be added to the problem that it is hard to specify behaviour without reference to mentalistic terms. The point is clearly right, as what I am doing when I wave my hand in the air will depend on all sorts of conventions and expectations. |
| 3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If it is an analytic truth that anyone in pain has a tendency to wince or groan, what about snakes? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 37) | |
| A reaction: Snakes do, however, exhibit what looks like 'I really don't like that' behaviour, and their rapid avoidance movements are identical to ours. On the other hand, I'm not quite sure what a snake does what it has a stomach upset. I see Kim's point. |
| 3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Is there even a loosely definable range of bodily behaviour that is characteristically exhibited by people when they believe, say, that there is no largest prime number? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 32) | |
| A reaction: This is a highly persuasive argument against behaviourism. Very abstract and theoretical thoughts have no related behaviour, especially among non-mathematicians. I probably believe this idea about numbers, but I can't think what to do about it. |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Most neurons, it has been said, are pretty much alike and largely interchangeable. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 76) | |
| A reaction: This fact, if true, is highly significant, because the correct theory of the mind must therefore be some sort of functionalism. If what a neuron is is insignificant, then what it does must be what matters. |
| 2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
| Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
| A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible. |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Machine functionalism requires a mental state to be a physical realisation of a Turing machine; causal-theoretical functionalism only requires that there be appropriate "internal states". | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.112) | |
| A reaction: Searle's objection to the Turing machine version seems good - that such a machine has an implicit notion of a user/interpreter, which is absent from this theory of mind. |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is by no means clear that any human could manage to do what Searle imagines himself to be doing in the Chinese Room - that is, short of throwing away the rule book and learning some real Chinese. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.100) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear how a rule book could contain answers to an infinity of possible questions. The Chinese Room is just a very poor analogy with what is envisaged in the project of artificial intelligence. |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: On the functionalist account of mental properties, just where does a mental property get its causal powers? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
| A reaction: That is the key problem. Something can only have a function if it has intrinsic powers (corkscrews are rigid and helix-shaped). It can't be irrelevant that pain hurts. |
| 3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Most antireductionist arguments focus on the unavailability of bridge laws to effect the reduction of psychological theory to physical theory (as found in reducing the gas laws to theories about molecules). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.216) | |
| A reaction: Reduction can, of course, be achieved by identity rather than by bridge laws. I would say that all that prevents us from predicting mental events from physical ones is the sheer complexity involved. Cf. predicting the detailed results of an explosion. |
| 2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017) | |
| A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible. |
| 3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The main obstacle to mind-body reduction is qualia. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.236) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am also impressed by Leibniz's Mill (Idea 2109). No microscope could ever reveal the contents of thought. How can it be so vivid for the owner, but totally undetectable to an observer? |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The most widely accepted form of physicalism today is the nonreductive variety, ...which combines ontological physicalism with property dualism. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.212) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that property dualism is actually in decline, but we will see. I have yet to find a coherent definition of property dualism. If being simultaneously red and square isn't property dualism, then what is it? Sounds like dualism to me. |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| Full Idea: In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66) | |
| A reaction: Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989. |
| 2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013) | |
| A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that. |
| 2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103) | |
| A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that? |
| 2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism". | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008) | |
| A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice. |
| 3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If one accepts the supervenience of mental on physical, this logically implies that there can only be one Cartesian soul, because such souls are physically indiscernible, and hence mentally indiscernible. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 10) | |
| A reaction: Not very persuasive. Brains are certainly discernible, and so are parts of brains. Egos might be mentally discernible. I don't find my notion of personal identity collapsing just because I espouse property dualism. |
| 3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The main argument for the physical supervenience of qualia, then, is the apparent conceivability of zombies and qualia inversion in organisms physically indistinguishable from us. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
| A reaction: Since neither zombies nor qualia inversion for identical brains seem to me to be even remotely conceivable, I won't trouble myself with the very vague concept of 'supervenience'. |
| 2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012) | |
| A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection? |
| 3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Token physicalism (as opposed to type physicalism) is a weak doctrine which simply says that any event or occurrence with a mental property has some physical property or other. It is not committed to reductionism. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 61) | |
| A reaction: Sounds nice, but it seems incoherent to me. How can something have a physical property if it isn't physical? Try 'it isn't coloured, but has colour properties', or 'not a square, but with square properties'. 'Not divine, but divine properties' maybe. |
| 3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
| Full Idea: From the emergentist point of view, the reductionists bridge laws are precisely what need to be explained. Why do these mental-physical correlations hold? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
| A reaction: Everyone is happy with the bridge laws from chemistry to physics, but no one knows (deep down) why those exact laws hold. We need to understand what consciousness is; its cause will then, I think, become apparent. |
| 3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The two best know attempts to analyse away mental states are Armstrong's causal conception of such states (e.g. pain is a neural event caused by tissue damage), and Smart's 'topic-neutral translation'. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 67) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong's view certainly seems to be missing something, since his 'pain' could do the job without consciousness. I take Smart's approach to be the germ of the right answer. |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| Full Idea: For the reductionist, no new causal powers emerge at higher levels, which goes against the claims of the emergentist and the non-reductive physicalist. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
| A reaction: I would say that all higher level causes are simply the sums of lower level causes, as in chemistry and physics. What could possibly produced the power at the higher level, apart from the constituents of the thing? Magic? |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If reductionism goes, so does the intelligibility of mental causation. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.237) | |
| A reaction: Quite so. Substance dualism turns mental causation into a miracle, but property dualism is really no better. If no laws connect brain and mind, you have no account. I don't see how 'reasons are causes' (Davidson) helps at all. |
| 2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002) | |
| A reaction: The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible. |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
| 2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095) | |
| A reaction: The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type? |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| Full Idea: My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102) | |
| A reaction: With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information. |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If an orange visual image is a brain state then, by the indiscernibility of identicals, some brain state must also be orange. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 64) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the Hardest of all Hard Questions: how can I experience orange if my neurons haven't turned orange? What on earth is orangeness? I don't believe it is a 'microproperty' of orange objects; it's in us. |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| Full Idea: How do you find out that you believe, rather than, say, doubt or merely hope, that it will rain tomorrow? | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
| A reaction: There should be a special medal created for philosophers who ask reasonable questions which are impossible to answer. They are among the greatest discoveries. |
| 2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It has been customary to distinguish between two broad categories of mental phenomena, the intentional and the phenomenal, without excluding those that have both (e.g. emotions). | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
| A reaction: This has become the conventional modern account of the mind. It seems a little too simple to say that the mind is characterised by two clearcut phenomena like this. I suspect that his picture will be modified in time. |
| 3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Commonsense psychology seems to have an advantage over scientific psychology: its apparent greater stability. Scientific theories seem to come and go. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
| A reaction: This seems to make the assumption that the folk are in universal long-term agreement about such things, which seems doubtful. See Ideas 2987 and 3410. |
| 3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
| Full Idea: There is the "theory" theory of commonsense psychology, and also a "simulation" theory, which says it is not a matter of laws, but of simulating the behaviour of others, using ourselves as models. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.123) | |
| A reaction: Using ourselves as models may be the normal and correct way to relate to people within our own culture, but we have to start theorising when we encounter (e.g.) suicide bombers. |
| 3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
| Full Idea: A culture that lacked our folk psychology would be unintelligible to us, and its language untranslatable into our own. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
| A reaction: Surely we can manage to discuss the processing life of a robot, without having to resort to anthropomorphic psychology? Its human-style behaviour will fit, but the rest blatantly won't. |
| 3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Freudian depth psychology has now almost achieved the status of folk psychology of the sophisticates. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.158) | |
| A reaction: You don't need to be a 'sophisticate' to laugh knowingly when someone makes an embarrassing Freudian slip. Terms like 'neurotic' are commonplace among modern folk. |
| 3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The Turing test is too tough, because something doesn't have to be smart enough to outwit a human (or even have language) to have mentality or intelligence. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
| A reaction: Presumably an alien with an IQ of 580 would also fail the Turing test. Indeed people of normal ability, but from a very different culture, might also fail. However, most of us would pass it. |
| 3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The Turing test is too narrow, because it is designed to fool a human interrogator, but there could be creatures which are intelligent but still fail the test. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
| A reaction: I think the key test for intelligence would be a capacity for metathought. 'What do you think of the idea that x?' Their thoughts about x might be utterly stupid, of course. How do you measure 'stupid'? |
| 3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
| Full Idea: States that have the same intrinsic properties - the same neural/physical properties - may have different contents if they are embedded in different environments. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.146) | |
| A reaction: This is a way of expressing externalism. It depends what you mean by 'contents'. I struggle to see how "H2O" could be the content of the word 'water' among ancient Greeks. |
| 3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The difference in the two types of 'water' in the Twin Earth experiment seem psychologically irrelevant, for behaviour causation or explanation. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
| A reaction: A rather important point. No matter how externalist you are about what content really is, people can only act on the internal aspects of it. |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If content is said to be 'covariance' with something in the environment, then the belief that there are horses in the field covaries reliably with the presence of horses in the field, but also the presence of horse genes in the field. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.192) | |
| A reaction: That's the end of that interesting proposal, then. Or is it? Looking at the field from a distance this is right, but down the microscope, the covariance varies. The theory lives on. |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The example of someone claiming "arthritis in my thigh" shows that the content of belief depends, at least in part but crucially, on the speech practices of the linguistic community in which we situate the subject. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.197) | |
| A reaction: Personally I find this social aspect to meaning to be more convincing that Putnam's idea that the physical world is part of meaning. It connects nicely with the social aspects of justification. |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| Full Idea: It is standard to take contents as truth conditions. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
| A reaction: This tradition runs from Frege to Davidson, and has been extended to truth conditions in possible worlds. Rivals will involve intentions, or eliminativism about meaning. |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| Full Idea: No external factors seem to be required for Fred's belief that he is in pain, or that he exists, or that there are no unicorns. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.198) | |
| A reaction: This is an extremely important observation for anyone who was getting over-excited about external accounts of content. Unicorns might connect externally to horns and horses. |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| Full Idea: An objection to the 'covariance' theory of content is that what you believe is influenced, often crucially, by what else you believe. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.193) | |
| A reaction: I can't think of a reply to this, if the covariance theory is suggesting that content just IS covariance of mental states with the environment. Externalism says that mind extends into the world. |
| 3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
| Full Idea: We attribute to a subject beliefs that are obvious logical consequences of beliefs already attributed to him. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'obvious'. Presumably they must be judged obvious to the believer, but only if they have thought of them. We can't believe all the simple but quirky implications of our beliefs. |
| 3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
| Full Idea: If someone says "I do and I don't like x", we do not take her to be expressing a literally contradictory belief. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
| A reaction: It might mean 'one minute I like it, and the next minute I don't', where there seems to be a real contradiction, with a time factor. You can't sustain both preferences with conviction. |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
| 3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
| Full Idea: All causal relations involving observable phenomena - all causal relations from daily experience - are cases of epiphenomenal causation. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation [1984], §2) |
| 3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
| Full Idea: A widely but not universally accepted principle is that causally connected events must instantiate a law. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.133) |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
| A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
| 3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Some laws are held to be 'strict', and others involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.143) |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |