312 ideas
21405 | Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long] |
Full Idea: Cicero (drawing on Panaetius) treats wisdom as if its province were primarily a disinterested pursuit of knowledge. But earlier Stoics gave purely moral definitions of wisdom. | |
From: report of M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.11-20) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 5 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that after long discussion most ancient (and even modern) philosophers would conclude that it is both. The 'intellectualism' of Socrates hovers in the background, implying that healthy knowledge produces virtue. |
20871 | Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero] |
Full Idea: At the beginning of adolescence when our deliberative capacities are weak we decide on the way of life that we find attractive. So one gets entangled in a definite manner and pattern of life before one is able to judge which one is best. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.117) | |
A reaction: Hence it is important to have lots of means for bailing out of education courses, jobs, and even marriage. At least university postpones the key life choices till the early twenties. |
5893 | A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The wise man does nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, does everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly, not looking forward to anything as bound to come, is not astonished at any novel occurrence, abides by his own decisions. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxviii) | |
A reaction: Notice that the wise man never exhibits weakness of will (an Aristotelian virtue), and is consistent (as Kant proposed), and is patient (as the Stoics proposed). But Cicero doesn't think he should busy himself maximising happiness. |
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
Full Idea: Theos: god | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
5891 | Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Philosophy consists in the collection of rational arguments. [Philosophia ex rationum collatione constet] | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxxviii.84) | |
A reaction: A nice epigraph for this database. Philosophy is, I trust, a little more than that, because you don't just hide them away in a drawer. But if you arrange them nicely in a museum (a website, for example), not a lot more can be done. |
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: As our system grows in coherence, the interrelations between its parts becomes tighter and tighter;… at the limit contingent truth vanishes, leaving only necessary truth. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 14.7) |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32) |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, then the universe itself must be subject to this law. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.86) |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147) |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory as well as the coherence theory has the problem of more than one set of truths. Why can't two sets of propositions "fit the facts" equally well? | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2) |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Rescher complains that if coherence requires mutual entailment, then what is entailed is logically redundant, and the whole system is infected with mutual redundancy. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.1) |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: From the point of view of someone with a theory every other theory is false, because it cannot be added to the true theory. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2) |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: No matter how tight our account of coherence we have to admit that there may be more than one set of coherent propositions (as Russell pointed out (1907)). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2) |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38) | |
A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'. |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95) |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Realism in the theory of perception is that objects we perceive usually do exist, and retain some at least of the properties we perceive them as having. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.2) |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Why isn't certainty required for knowledge? Because we are often prepared to allow that someone does in fact have knowledge when the person is so uncertain they would not claim knowledge for themselves (the 'diffident schoolboy'). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 2.1) |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: In my view, once we admit that our beliefs about our sensory states are not infallible, incorrigibility would be a vice rather than a virtue. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be axiomatic among modern philosophers, and I certainly agree with it. |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The naïve direct realist holds that unperceived objects are able to retain properties of all the types we perceive them as having, which includes not only a shape and a size, but also a colour, a taste and a smell. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3) | |
A reaction: This I take to be a completely untenable view, if we are including the qualia of red, sweet or pungent among the properties. It seems uncontroversial that objects retain the capacity to cause redness etc. when they are unperceived. |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The scientific direct realist accepts the directness of our perception of the world, but restricts his realism to a special group of properties, ..not including those which are dependent for their existence upon the existence of a perceiver. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Dancy goes on to say that this distinction is a 'close relative' of Locke's primary/secondary distinction. Am I a direct realist or a representative realist about primary properties? Maybe the distinction dissolves as we unravel the true process. |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Direct realism is unlikely to be able to provide an explanation of perceptual error without collapsing into indirect realism. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3) | |
A reaction: If there is an error, there must be two things which don't match: the perception, and the reality. This seems to me a powerful reason for preferring indirect or representative realism. I like the idea that we make mental 'models' (rather than inferences). |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
Full Idea: The four standard reasons for preferring indirect to direct realism are introspection of our mental processes, the time-lag argument, the argument from illusion, and the findings of neuroscience. | |
From: report of Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Ultimately one's views about realism depend on one's views of the mind/brain, and it is the last of the four reasons that sways me. We know enough about the complexity of the brain to accept that it represents reality, with no additional ontology. |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Indirect realism holds that in perception we are indirectly aware of the physical objects around us in virtue of a direct awareness of internal, non-physical objects. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This may be a slightly prejudicial definition which invites insoluble questions about the ontological status of the internal 'objects'. It seems to me obvious that we create some sort of inner 'models' or constructions in the process of perception. |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Phenomenalism talks about actual and possible experiences, whereas idealism confines itself to the actual experiences. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5) |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The eliminativist idealist holds that there is no such thing as a material object; there is nothing but experience (idea, sensation). The reductive idealist holds that there are material objects, but they are nothing other than complexes of experience. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.6) | |
A reaction: Dancy says Berkeley was of the latter type. The distinction doesn't strike me as entirely clear. I can't make much sense of the words 'are' or 'exist' in the second theory. To say it is only experiences translates (to me) as 'doesn't exist'. |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Extreme solipsism only considers present experiences, but more relaxed solipsism may include past and possible future experiences. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5) |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The fact that a cow is not a horse is a candidate for a priori synthetic truth. It doesn't seem to be analytic, because you can know what a cow is without knowing what a horse is. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 14.3) |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19) |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There are three main families of theories of perception: direct realism, indirect realism, and phenomenalism. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.2) |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There is doubt about whether our experience of the world is such that we can conceive of the sort of separation of primary and secondary qualities which the scientific view calls for, and can understand what the world is like with no secondary qualities. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Dancy attributes these doubts to Berkeley (e.g. Idea 3837). I think what is claimed here is false. Obviously we spend our whole lives immersed in secondary qualities, but separating the different aspects is precisely what scientists (and philosophers) do. |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: For a direct realist our awareness of colour and heat can hardly be of a different order from our awareness of shape and size. Both sorts of properties are presented with equal directness. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3) | |
A reaction: This is a good objection to 'direct scientific realism', which claims direct apprehension of primary qualities alongside a totally relative view of secondary qualities. The best response seems to be to move to a representative view of primary properties. |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: An object such as a distant star can have ceased to exist by the moment at which we are directly aware of it. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.2) |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The question whether something which appears as datum should remain as accepted fact is one which is not even partially determined by its origin as datum. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.5) |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: If I stare at a white wall with my brain wired to a virtual reality computer, and it generates a white wall, we wouldn't say I am seeing reality. It seems that the wall itself must in some way cause my perception of it. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 11.4) | |
A reaction: But suppose the computer generated in my mind an image of the wall which was actually in front of me? And suppose the computer got its image from the identical wall next door, not from mine? And it was only judged identical because the architect said so |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: A perceptual belief that p can have as its main cause the fact that p. More general facts (all men are mortal; e=mc2) cannot be the main cause of my belief, even if they do function causally in some way. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 11.5) | |
A reaction: Note that the perceptual belief can be the "main" cause; it seems to me that most beliefs are caused by judgements, though I may normally accept beliefs which are directly caused by perception, if I have no reason to challenge them. |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Memory is not solely concerned with the past, let alone one's own past (I remember that I must be in London next week), and need not involve images (2+2=4). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I can hardly remember the future, so I presume I am remembering my past commitment to go to London, even if I visualise the future with me in London. The non-necessity of images seems right. I can remember the Mona Lisa without a precise image. |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Eliminative phenomenalism about memory holds that there is no such thing as the past, just certain present experiences; reductive phenomenalism holds that there is a past, but it is no more than a complex of those present experiences. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.4) |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Direct realism about memory believes the memory is the past. But the time-lag argument and various illusions are powerful here, suggesting indirect realism involving a memory image. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.2) |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22) |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: If perception is indirect as well as memory, this means there are two direct objects of awareness between the remembering mind and the original object. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.2) |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Foundationalism can get rid of the regress argument with one of three types of belief: those justified by something other than beliefs, those which justify themselves, or those which need no justification. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.3) | |
A reaction: A nice clear trilemma, and none of them will do, which is why foundationalism is false. I vote for Davidson's view, that only a belief can justify another belief. |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The internalist would claim that even if the belief is caused by the true fact to which it refers, it is also necessary that the believer believes that this is how their belief arose, and not some other way. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 3.5) | |
A reaction: I'm converted to internalism. If the belief is externally supported in the right way, then it may well be a true belief, but knowledge needs critical faculties, and justifications which can be articulated. |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Internalists such as Keith Lehrer tend to suggest that we adopt a coherence theory of justification but reject the coherence theory of truth. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I agree with Lehrer. Truth just isn't coherence, for all sorts of well known reasons (found in this database!). High coherence can be totally false. For justification, though, it is the best we have. |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The core of any form of foundationalism is the view that there are two forms of justification - inferential and non-inferential - and that non-inferential justification must be possible to avoid a sceptical regress. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The foundation may be non-inferential, but is it also non-evidential, or devoid of any support at all, apart from its own eloquent self? I can't buy that, I'm afraid. |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Foundationalists suppose we need not only basic beliefs, but also principles of inference to move to the more sophisticated superstructure. We may understand what justifies the basic beliefs, but what about the inference principles? | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3) | |
A reaction: Very nice question. Of course, you can't justify everything, but each part of a system can be scrutinised in turn by the other parts (with scrutinising principles tested pragmatically). |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Falsehood in a non-basic belief would be a reason to doubt the basic beliefs which support it, once we have admitted that basic beliefs can be false. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.3) | |
A reaction: The yearning for foundations arises from the yearning for certainty. If one embraces the fallibilist view of knowledge, as I do, then there is little motivation for foundationalism. |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Infallible beliefs must have vanishingly small content. No belief with enough content to support the superstructure in which we are really interested is going to be infallible. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I see no reason why a foundationalist should not be a fallibilist, rather than insisting on the infallibility of their basic beliefs. I don't, though, see how basic beliefs can count as knowledge. |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Coherentists feel that their approach provides a possible justification for induction, and offers a general stance from which the sceptic can be defused, if not rebutted. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3) | |
A reaction: These are two good reasons why I vote for coherentism (about justification, NOT about truth). Coherence is the main tool for leading us to the best explanation. |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: An idealist should perhaps be a coherentist, but there seems to be no reason why the coherentist should be an idealist; the link between the two is all one-way. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5) | |
A reaction: I don't see why an idealist shouldn't be a rationalist foundationalist, with a private reality full of certainties founded on simple a priori truths. Personally I'm an empiricist coherentist, this week. |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The coherentist idea is that justification and truth are not properties of radically different types. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 11.6) | |
A reaction: Oh. And I thought I was a coherentist. It take it that keeping coherence for foundations separate from coherence as truth is absolutely basic. The latter is nonsense. |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: If coherence is grounded in, and is trying to make sense of, a set of empirical propositions, this will eliminate some of the more fanciful sets of coherent propositions, such as the complete Sherlock Holmes stories. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, I suspect that embracing the coherence view of justification drives one back to empiricisim (pace Bonjour), because that is the most authoritative part of the pattern of beliefs. |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: One reading of the externalist approach may lead to a rejection of the belief condition for knowledge (in animals, perhaps). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.3) | |
A reaction: At this point the concept of 'knowledge' seems to disperse into the mist. This pushes me to a 'setting the bar high' view of knowledge. Otherwise plants will have it, and we don't want that. |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: How can a causal analysis of justification show that I know that all men die? | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I presume he means that inductive generalisations can't be purely causal. The claim that men are immortal is absurd because it is 'unconnected' to what actually happens. |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Causal accounts of justification do not allow for the possibility that a false belief may still be justified. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Good. If you switch to what you only think is the cause of your belief, you have gone internalist and ruined the party. You can't deny that a falsehood can be justified, or justification is vacuous. |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: An advantage of coherentism is that it directs attention away from the individual's struggle to achieve knowledge (the classical conception), and points to knowledge as a social phenomenon, shared, and increased by means of sharing. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This is exactly the view which I now embrace. Internal coherence is the basis, but that spills out into the community, and into books, and into the relativity of social acceptance. |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40) | |
A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing. |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: What is the point of arguing that justified belief is impossible, for if you were right there could be no reasons for your conclusion? | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 1.3) |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: In Probability Calculus probability is only assessed relative to some evidence. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.1) |
5879 | The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some think the soul is the heart; Empedocles holds that the soul is blood in the heart; others said one part of the brain claimed the primacy of soul; others say the heart or brain are habitations of the soul; while others identify soul and breath. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.ix.17-19) | |
A reaction: A nice survey of views. Note that many of them identify the psuché/anima with physical parts of the body; only the fourth option seems to be dualist. This is despite the contemptuous response to Democritus' atomist theory of soul. |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: As an inductive argument Mill's argument from analogy (other people have inputs and outputs like mine, so the intermediate explanation must be the same) is weak because it is based on a single instance. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 5.3) | |
A reaction: The argument may be 'weak' as a piece of pure logic, but when faced with a strange situation, one's own case seems like crucial evidence, like a single eye-witness to a crime. |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The analogy argument makes the error (as Wittgenstein showed) of assuming that mind is quite separate from behaviour, and yet I can understand what it is for others to have mental states, which is contradictory. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 5.3) | |
A reaction: It has always seemed to me that Wittgenstein is excessively behaviourist, and he always seems to be flirting with eliminative views of mind, so he was never bothered about other minds. Minds aren't separate from behaviour, but they are distinct. |
5884 | How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47) | |
A reaction: This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified. |
5887 | The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero] |
Full Idea: In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71) | |
A reaction: Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'. |
5886 | Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet discerns other things. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvii) | |
A reaction: The soul is a complex item which contributes many layers of interpretation to what it sees, so there is scope for parts of the soul seeing other parts. Somewhere in the middle Cicero seems to be right - there is an elusive something we can't get at. |
6029 | Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127) | |
A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true. |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the gods have no need of the sensible world, why mix up mind with water and water with mind, if mind can exist by itself without any need of matter? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.24) | |
A reaction: This question migrates into our puzzles about why a separate mental substance would be produced by evolution. If it is device physical systems use to promote themselves, mental substance is reduced to an inferior and dependent role. |
5885 | Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero] |
Full Idea: No beginnings of souls can be found on earth; there is no combination in souls that could be born from earth, nothing that partakes of moist or airy or fiery; for in those elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, or reflection. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvi.66) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but I think magnetism is an instructive analogy, which has weird properties which we never perceive in elements (though it is there, buried deep - suggesting panpsychism). Cicero would be disconcerted to find that fire isn't an element. |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 1.note) | |
A reaction: If the one true God announced that there is a real world out there, I might take that as a verification of the fact. |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: The foundationalist claim that there are inferential and non-inferential justifications is mirrored by the claim of logical empiricism (the verification principle) that all significant statements are either strongly or weakly verifiable. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 6.2) | |
A reaction: I take it to be characteristic of both to divide the support for something into two types, one of which is basic, and the other built up on the basics. The first step is to decide what is basic. |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: It is clearly possible to learn a language from scratch, because we have all done it, but if holism is true and the meaning of each sentence depends on the meanings of others, how did we do it? | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 7.2) | |
A reaction: The question of 'how did it ever get started?' actually seems to block almost every explanation of everything that ever happens. How do I begin to move my hand? |
21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03) | |
A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful. |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How wonderful is the power of eloquence! It enables us to learn and to teach. We use it to exhort and persuade, to comfort the unfortunate, to distract the timid and calm the passionate. It unites us in law and society, and raises us from savagery. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], 2.147) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Cicero would have been well aware of the doubts about rhetoric felt by Socrates (and possibly Plato). Cicero was probably the greatest Roman orator. |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Indeterminacy stems from an interplay between belief and meaning, as with a man who tells you he keeps two rhinoceri in the fridge and squeezes the juice of one for a drink each morning. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 7.4) | |
A reaction: I don't understand why an 'interplay' is called an 'indeterminacy'. Typical philosophers. Close examination will usually show whether the change is just in belief, or just in meaning, or in both. |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: One criterion for successful translation is that it show native beliefs to be largely true (Principle of Charity), and another is that it imputes to natives beliefs we can make sense of them having (Principle of Humanity). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 7.4) | |
A reaction: The trouble with such guidelines is that they always have to be 'all things being equal'. Sometimes the natives are really idiotic, and sometimes their attitudes seem quite inhuman. |
21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40) | |
A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires. |
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169. |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262). |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other. |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition. |
18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi] |
Full Idea: Dancy distinguishes three parts of the supervenience base of values: 1) those which ground the value ('resultance base'); 2) those which enable the ground to make something good ('enabling conditions'); 3) those which intensify or diminish value. | |
From: report of Jonathan Dancy (Ethics without Principles [2004], p. 170-181) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 5.2 | |
A reaction: I really like and admire this. Dancy has focused on what really matters about values (and hence about the whole of ethics), and begun the work of getting a bit of clarity and increased understanding. |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140) |
5890 | We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxvi.56) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a sensible and balanced attitude. Some people, particularly in a Christian culture, urge that feeling strong and painful compassion for others is an intrinsic good, but the commonsense view is that that just increases human suffering. |
5894 | All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero] |
Full Idea: All men are afraid of poverty, but not a single philosopher is so. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxi.88) | |
A reaction: Not a thought which is encountered very often in modern philosophy journals. If a person is to be 'philosophical' in the way they live, calm endurance of the vicissitudes and hardships of life has to be a key prerequisite. |
6031 | The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The whole essence of propriety is quite certainly consistency. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.110) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the key intuition on which Kant built his deontological ethical theory. However, opponents say the consistency requires principles, and these are the enemies of truly good human behaviour, which involves Aristotle's 'particulars'. |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
5895 | If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxvi.104) | |
A reaction: Aristotle disagrees (Idea 2823). In 1906 a huge number of people guessed the weight of a cow at a fair, and the average was within one pound of the truth. In our world the healthy workings of the group are warped by the mass media. |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We have robbers by the thousand, although they have the penalty of death before their eyes. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.86) |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some regard nature as an irrational force which merely imparts a mechanical motion to material bodies. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.81) |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Why should the gods not be apprehensive of their own possible dissolution? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.114) |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
Full Idea: I do not know whether, if our reverence for the gods were lost, we should not also see the end of good faith, of human brotherhood, and even of justice itself, which is the keystone of all the virtues. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.3) |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
Full Idea: God is not subject to obey the laws of nature. It is nature that is subject to the laws of God. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.77) |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Let us take it as agreed that we have a preconception or "an innate idea" (as I have called it) or a prior knowledge of the divine. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.44) |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There must be many wild and primitive peoples who have no idea of the gods at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.62) |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If one comes into a gymnasium and sees everything properly arranged and carried on in order, one does not imagine these arrangements to be accidental, but infers that there is someone in command whose orders are obeyed. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.15) |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If any man cannot feel the power of God when he looks upon the stars, then I doubt whether he is capable of any feeling at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.55) |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone were to take the celestial globe of Posidonius and show it to the people of Britain, would a single one of those barbarians fail to see that it was the product of a conscious intelligence? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.88) |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone thinks chance made the world, he should also think that if an infinite number of the letters of the alphabet were shaken together and poured out on the ground it would be possible for them to spell out the whole 'Annals' of Ennius. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.93) |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are we to find a divinity in every regular movement and in everything which happens in a constant order? If so, we shall have to say that tertian and quartan agues are divine because their course and recurrence is absolutely uniform. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.24) |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are the gods all exactly the same? If not, then one must be more beautiful than another. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.80) |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We agree the gods are happy, and no happiness is possible without virtue: there is no virtue without reason: and reason is associated only with the human form: then it must follow that the gods themselves have human shape. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.48) |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Did you ever actually see a god? Then why do you believe that gods exist? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.88) |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Time would fail me if I tried to list all the good men for whom things have turned out badly. So it would if I tried to mention all the wicked who have prospered. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.80) |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |
Full Idea: You gods say that the fault lies in the vices of mankind. But you could have endowed men with reason in a form which would exclude all vice and crime. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.76) |