339 ideas
| 22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The role of the wise person is to meditate on the truth, especially the truth regarding the first principle, and to discuss it with others, but also to fight against the falsity that is its contrary. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.1.6), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 14 | |
| A reaction: So nice to hear someone (from no matter how long ago) saying that wisdom is concerned with truth. If you lose your grip on truth (which many thinkers seem to have done) you must also abandon wisdom. Then fools rule. |
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
| 22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
| A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated. |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10) |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12) |
| 21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
| A reaction: Notice that this is 'superfluous' rather than 'wrong'. But ten people can lift a piano which could have been lifted by eight. Note that this is 150 years before Ockham. |
| 22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: There is no better way of uncovering the truth and keeping falsity in check than by arguing with people who disagree with you. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (On the spiritual perfection of life [1268], 26), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
| A reaction: Not the sort of attitude you associate with medieval scholastics, who are presumed to be dogmatists. How many modern philosophers actually have the courage to follow this advice? |
| 13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2 | |
| A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition. |
| 11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
| A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence. |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
| 23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
| A reaction: Amazing how many modern thinkers fail to grasp this simple distinction. However, the truth is not quite the same for all if diverse persons are expressing a single truth with different concepts and languages. The word 'facts' is helpful here. |
| 20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying' | |
| A reaction: It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1). |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Good itself as taken in by mind is one truth among others, and truth itself as goal of mind's activity is one good among others. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
| A reaction: A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation. |
| 22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The word 'true' expresses the conformity of a being to intellect. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
| A reaction: I believe in a 'robust' theory of truth, but accept that the concept of 'correspondence' has major problems. So I embrace with delight the word 'conformity'. I offer the world The Conformity Theory of Truth! 'Conform' is suitably vague. |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
| 23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: In syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must follow too. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q19 6) | |
| A reaction: This asserts the necessity of logical consequence, which he derives from Aristotle. |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
| 11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city. |
| 22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Being is inherently intellect's most intelligible object, in which it finds the basis of all conceptions. ...All of intellect's other conceptions must be arrived at by adding to being, insofar as they express what is not expressed by 'being' itself. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
| A reaction: I like the word 'intelligible' here. We might know reality, or be aware of appearances, but what is intelligible lies nicely in between. What would Berkeley make of that? I presume 'intelligible' means 'makes good sense'. |
| 15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly the notion of multitude. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I Q11 ar2 ad4), quoted by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 1.5 | |
| A reaction: This is one of the best things I have read on 'being'. It is the Aristotelian recognition that we can only study being by studying identity, and that this leads on to wider metaphysics. Other approaches to being are dead ends. |
| 21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: All natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore God does not exist. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
| A reaction: Not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. So the possibility of naturalism (assuming the human will can be further reduced to nature) was a clear option in the thirteenth century. In reply Aquinas cites his Fifth Way. |
| 4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: The discovery that a single brain lesion can erase all knowledge of man-made artefacts, or all knowledge of animals, suggests that these categories somehow hard-wired into the brain - that we all have a set of 'memory pigeonholes'. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.190) | |
| A reaction: Presumably something can become 'hard-wired' through experience, rather than from birth. The whole idea of 'hard-wired' seems misleading about the brain. What matters is that the brain physically constructs categories. |
| 16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Being is delimited into different genera in accord with different modes of predicating, which depend on different modes of being. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' [1266], V.9.890), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
| A reaction: I like this. When people say that predication is the way we divide things up, and go all linguistic-relativist about things, they forget how closely language not only describes reality, but arises out of, or is even caused by, reality. 'Grue' is silly. |
| 16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has existence-as-white. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], IX.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2 | |
| A reaction: It seems unavoidable to refer to the whiteness as 'it'. It might be called the 'adverbial' theory of properties, as ways of doing something. |
| 11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
| A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples. |
| 11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100) | |
| A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas. |
| 13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3 | |
| A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195) |
| 17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um) | |
| A reaction: [From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different? |
| 16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, and all lower forms, and it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q76 4c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.1 | |
| A reaction: He says brutes and plants also have a single soul. Pasnau says this is Aquinas's most distinctive doctrine, because other thinkers postulate a whole hierarchy of substantial forms. |
| 16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'. |
| 11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist? |
| 11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95) | |
| A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful. |
| 11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
| A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything. |
| 11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
| A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion). |
| 11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
| A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient. |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
| 22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Our imagination and senses grasp only the outer properties of things, not their natures. ...Understanding, however, grasps the very substance and nature of things, so that what is represented in understanding is a likeness of thing's very essence. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is exactly the picture I endorse for modern science. Explanation is the path to understanding, and that must venture beyond immediate experience. |
| 23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
| A reaction: This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain. |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1) | |
| A reaction: [Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'. |
| 21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
| A reaction: A clear distinction, which is hard to deny, though there are lots of borderline cases. Self-evident to genius, and self-evident to future genius. Self-evident to almost everyone. Goldbach's Conjecture may be self-evident but unknowable. |
| 22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: For present in us by nature are certain initial truths everyone knows, in which lie potentially known conclusions our reasons can draw out and make actually known. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
| A reaction: Note that these are truths rather than concepts, but that they have to be 'drawn out' by reason. This is Descartes' view of the matter, where the 'natural light' of reason is needed to articulate what is innate, such as geometry. |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. E.g. Man is an animal, because animal is included in the essence of man. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
| A reaction: Aquinas focuses on the essence of the subject, where Kant embraces the whole concept of the subject. Is it self-evident that we are genetically related to apes? Yes, to a geneticiist. Is that part of human essence? No. So Kant wins. |
| 22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: What the mind takes in is not some material element of the agent, but a likeness of the agent actualising some potential the patient already has. This, for example, is the way our seeing takes in the colour of a coloured body. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.1) | |
| A reaction: This is exactly right. Descartes agreed. It works for colour, but not (obviously) for cheese graters. |
| 4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Despite their variety, each sense organ translates its stimulus into electrical pulses; rather than discriminating one type of input from another, the sense organs actually make them more alike. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.174) | |
| A reaction: An illuminating observation, which modern 'naïve realists' should bear in mind. Secondary qualities are entirely unrelated to the nature of the input, and are merely 'what the brain decides to make of it'. Discrimination is in our neurons. |
| 4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The sequence of events in the brain for perceptual recognition is first identifying a rough class for the object, then a name, then a location, then some associations, and finally an emotion. | |
| From: report of Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.181) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be one of those places where neuro-science trumps philosophy. You can't argue with empirical research, so philosophical theories had better adapt themselves to this sequence. The big modern discovery is the place of emotion in recognition. |
| 20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for these prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are in the intellect or reason. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q56 a5 obj3), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind III 2.2 | |
| A reaction: A gem of a quotation for Zagzebski's thesis, that knowledge is defined in terms of the intellectual virtues. The only virtues of perception are in focusing and paying attention to features. Good eyesight is a biological 'virtue', I suppose. |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: All our knowledge comes through our senses, but that doesn't mean that everything we know is sensed. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 18) |
| 4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: It has become clear from research that there is no clear dividing line between a memory and a thought. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.308) | |
| A reaction: This always struck me as an obvious criticism of Descartes, when he claimed that memory was not an essential part of the 'thinking thing'. How can you think or understand without memory of the different phases of your thoughts? No memory, no mind! |
| 22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
| A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's. |
| 11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
| A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas. |
| 4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: No one knows if animals are conscious. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155) | |
| A reaction: This is a report from the front line of brain research, and should be born in mind when over-confident people make pronouncements about this topic. It strikes me as important to grasp that animals MIGHT not be conscious. |
| 4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Scans show there is no such thing as a pain centre; pain springs mainly from the activation of areas associated with attention and emotion. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 12) | |
| A reaction: Most brain research points to the complex multi-layered nature of experiences that were traditionally considered simple. We can be distracted from a pain, and an enormous number of factors can affect our degree of dislike of a given pain. |
| 4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: The main sections of the brain, including the cerebral cortex, are visible within seven weeks of conception, and by the time the child is born the brain contains as many neurons - about 100 billion - as it will have as an adult. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17) | |
| A reaction: Of interest in the abortion debate, and also in thinking about personal identity. However, it seems clear that the number of connections, rather than neurons, is what really matters. A small infant may well lack personal identity. |
| 4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Brain size in primates is closely associated with the size of the social group in which the animal lives. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.257) | |
| A reaction: Intriguing. Humans can have huge social groups because of language, which suggests a chicken-or-egg question. Language, intelligence and size of social group must have expanded together in humans. |
| 4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection are all separate components of consciousness, and the quality of our experience varies according to which and how many of them are present. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.300) | |
| A reaction: Philosophers like to emphasise 'qualia' and 'intentionality'. This remark slices the cake differently. 'Attention' is interesting, dividing consciousness into two areas, with some experience fading away into the darkness. Hume denied self-awareness. |
| 4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: A huge volume of evidence suggests that consciousness emerges from the activity of the cerebral cortex, and in particular from the frontal lobes. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.298) | |
| A reaction: Dualists must face up to this, and even many physicalists have a rather vague notion about the location of awareness, but we are clearly homing in very precise physical substances which have consciousness as a feature. |
| 4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Connections in a baby's brain probably give the infant the experience of 'seeing' sounds and 'hearing' colours - which occasionally continues into adulthood, where it is known as 'synaesthesia'. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19) | |
| A reaction: A fact to remember when discussing secondary qualities, and the relativism involved in the way we perceive the world. If you have done your philosophy right, you shouldn't be surprised by this discovery. |
| 4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Scans show that a sub-section of the visual cortex called V5 - the area that registers movement - lights up during blindsight, even though V1 - the primary sensory area that is essential for normal sight - is not active. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.307) | |
| A reaction: The whole point of blindsight is to make us realise that vision involves not one module, but a whole team of them. The inference is that V1 involves consciousness, but other areas of the visual cortex don't. |
| 22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| Full Idea: Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
| A reaction: This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience. |
| 9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Mental activity combines two activities which in the senses are distinct: exterior perception in which we are simply affected by what we sense, and interior imagination in which we create images of things that are not, and never have been present. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
| A reaction: Geach cites this thought to show that he is anti-abstractionist, since mind creates images, and these can arise from things which have not been experienced. Any defence of abstractionism must allow an active power to imagination. |
| 9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality. |
| 9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities? |
| 9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Our mind both abstracts the species from images when it attends to the general nature of things, and understand the species in the images when it has recourse to the images in order to understand the things whose species it has abstracted. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: Geach claims that the second half of this idea means that Aquinas is not an abstractionist, but he seems to be explictly abstractionist about the way in which we create higher level concepts from lower ones. |
| 9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level. |
| 9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary. |
| 10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we can take into our consideration the natures of the species without the individual conditions. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad4) | |
| A reaction: There might be a threatened circularity here, in trying to decide which features to ignore and which to retain. If we saw a hundred horses with a white nose blaze, we still wouldn't be sure that this was essential to a horse. Innate notions of species?? |
| 22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| Full Idea: Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12 | |
| A reaction: This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual? |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: cf Nietzsche |
| 22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to say that that which is the principle of intellective activity, what we call the soul of a human being, is an incorporeal, subsistent principle. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q75 2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
| A reaction: Note 'subsistent' rather than 'existent' (capable of independence?). This identifies the immortal soul with the conscious mind. 'Principle' is an odd word, presumably with roots in Aristotle. It seems to be an Aristotelian 'form' [morphe]. |
| 20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If God's divine influence stopped, every operation would stop. Every operation, therefore, of everything is traced back to him as cause. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], III.67), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: If the systematic interraction of mind and body counts as an 'operation', then this seems to imply Occasionalism. |
| 4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.187) | |
| A reaction: This is only a speculation, but it is an effect which can be caused by brain injury, and dualists should face the possibility that this evidence (prized by many dualists) can have a physical explanation. |
| 4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: The pattern of brain activation during, say, a word retrieval task is usually similar enough among the dozen or so participants who typically take part in such studies for their scans to be overlaid and still show a clear pattern. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't surprise me, though it could be interpreted as supporting type-type identity, or as supporting functionalism. Armstrong and Lewis endorse a sort of reductive functionalism which would fit this observation. |
| 4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: The nuts and bolts of thinking - holding ideas in mind and manipulating them - takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.312) | |
| A reaction: Keep this firmly in view! Imagine that the skull is transparent, and brain activity moves in waves of colour. Dualism would, in those circumstances, never have even occurred to anyone. |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
| 4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Babies show emotion dramatically, but the areas of the brain that in adults are linked to the conscious experience of emotions are not active in newborn babies. Such emotions may therefore be unconscious. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19) | |
| A reaction: Traditionally, 'unconscious emotion' is a contradiction, but I think we should accept this new evidence and rethink the nature of mind. Not only might emotion be non-conscious, but we should even consider that rational thinking could be too. |
| 4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: We try to manipulate our emotions all the time, but all we are doing is arranging the outside world so it triggers certain emotions - we cannot control our reactions directly. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to throw a very illuminating light on a huge amount of human behaviour, such as going to the cinema or listening to music. The romantic movement encouraged direct internal manipulation. Compare sex fantasies with viewing pornography. |
| 4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.195) | |
| A reaction: A nice warning against assuming that rationality is operating when a frog feels hungry and 'decides' to have lunch. We should take comfort from the fact that humans are NOT this stupid, and philosophers should try to accurately describe our gift. |
| 22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The intellect first apprehends the quiddity of a thing. ...Then it acquires the properties, accidents and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. It must proceed from one compounding or dividing of aspects to another, which is reasoning. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q85 5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Tracking the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for full knowledge) is closer to Quine's naturalised epistemology than to the standard analytic approach to the concept of knowledge. |
| 10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: To cognize that which is in individual matter, not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter that the phantasms represents. Thus we come to a degree of cognition of immaterial things. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Reply) | |
| A reaction: This offers abstraction as a kind of inference to best explanation which takes us beyond immediate empirical experience to what is behind it. Aquinas thinks the concepts and explanation are spiritual, but they may be generalities and essences. |
| 10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Of the thing understood all that is within the actually understanding intellect is the abstracted intelligible species. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Art2) | |
| A reaction: Abstraction is never supposed to be a luxury bolt-on, but is always seen (in this tradition, and presumably in the modern one), as essential to the intellect, and its way of coming to understand the world. Aristotelian definition is behind this idea. |
| 10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Intellect can abstract mathematical species from sensible matter, both individual and common. Yet it cannot abstract such species from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intelligible matter. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
| A reaction: The idea is that common intelligible matter lacks underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found. |
| 9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Objects of mathematics abstract from perceived matter both in particular and in general, though from thought matter (substance as underlying quality) only in particular and not in general. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a thoroughly abstractionist view of the way in which humans create mathematics. Aquinas explicitly denies the Platonic view that the numbers already have abstract existence, awaiting our discovery. |
| 10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The apple is not part of the nature of the colour, and so nothing prevents one from understanding the colour while understanding nothing of the apple. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
| A reaction: This helps to clarify why the procedure of 'ignoring' features is possible. It suggests that some features might be too entangled with the substance (too essential?) to be thus ignored. I can't think of an example, though. Why not?! |
| 10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Abstracting takes place in two ways: by composition and division, understanding something to be not in another or to be separated from it; and by a simple and unconditioned consideration, understanding one thing while not considering the other at all. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
| A reaction: The second way is by 'ignoring', which he says cannot contain error. The first seems to be considering some mode of a thing to be actually separate from the thing, which could clearly be erroneous. Ignoring makes to commitment to a unity. |
| 10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Quantities such as numbers and dimensions, and also shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be considered without their sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
| A reaction: His account relies on underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found (presumably because a substance is the epitome of a unit). |
| 9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The agent mind must itself turn to images, and produce by its own power in the receptive mind a representation as to species of whatever the images represent as individual. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
| A reaction: Unlike much of this section, this sentence supports Geach's claim that Aquinas agrees with him - that the mind creates its concepts, rather than 'abstracting' them from experience. |
| 11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102) | |
| A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention. |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is compelled by its ultimate goal (to achieve happiness), but not by the means to achieve it. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.07) |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will can avoid actually willing something by avoiding thinking of it, since mental activity is subject to will. In this respect we aren't compelled to will even total happiness, which is the only perfect good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 07) |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Will's object is what is good, and so it cannot will anything but what is good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.06) |
| 23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The will is the rational appetite. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 4) | |
| A reaction: Defining the will in terms of reason sounds more like an Enlightenment optimist than a medieval theologian. I suspect that for him it is tautological the reason is involved, if only the reason can make decisions. Hobbes prefers to ruling appetite. |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
| 22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A human being's good is existing in accordance with reason, while what is bad for a human being is whatever is contrary to reason. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q18.5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
| A reaction: For anyone who thought Kant invented the idea that morality derives from reason. This idea of Aquinas is a fairly precise echo of the stoic view (which influenced Kant). Is there a circularity? Is it irrational because bad, or bad because irrational? |
| 22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end but also knowing it under the aspect of the end and the relation of the means to that end. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-I.Q132), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 4 | |
| A reaction: We don't talk much now about 'perfect' knowledge of something, but I suppose this is the necessary and sufficient conditions. If you complete the checklist, your knowledge should be perfect (if the list is right). |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
| A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |
| 4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
| Full Idea: Noradrenaline is an excitatory chemical that induces physical and mental arousal and heightens mood. Production is centred in an area of the brain called the locus coeruleus, which is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure' centre. | |
| From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 30) | |
| A reaction: It seems to me very morally desirable that people understand facts of this kind, so that they can be more objective about pleasure. Pleasure is one cog in the machine that makes a person, not the essence of human life. |
| 23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The good of any virtue …is referable to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the common good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 5) | |
| A reaction: Michael Sandel has recently lamented to fading of the concept of 'the common good' from our moral and political life. In which case this thought of Aquinas takes on great importance. I certainly like it. It seems to apply to courage, for example. |
| 8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance). |
| 23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: There must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good, and this virtue is legal justice. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 6) | |
| A reaction: This concept of legal justice is underpinned, for Aquinas, by the concept of natural law, which has divine backing. Positive law could hardly fulfil such a major role, given that it could be corrupt. |
| 22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The passions may incite us to something against reason, and so we need a curb, which we name 'temperance'. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia 2ae Q61 a.3), quoted by Philippa Foot - Virtues and Vices II | |
| A reaction: I am increasingly unclear what 'reason' means in contexts like these. It seems to mean no more than the awareness of greater goods than the indulgence of passion. Without that awareness, high intelligence couldn't produce temperance. |
| 23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are 'adjusted' when they are made equal. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 1) | |
| A reaction: Even if you say justice is giving people what they deserve, rather than mere equality, they must still be equal in receiving like for like. Legal justice implies equality before the law (except for monarchs?). |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: There are many differences of degrees among men, for instance, some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be alloted to them. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 4) | |
| A reaction: An objection (3), but Aquinas endorses it in his reply. In 58.10 he says striking a prince is worse that striking a commoner. The shift to the idea that everyone is supposed to be equal before the law has been slow, and we are not quite there yet. |
| 23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q91 2) | |
| A reaction: It is not enough merely that God decrees eternal laws. It is also necessary for us to use reason in order to participate. I'm not sure what reasoning process is involved. |
| 22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q94.2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
| A reaction: No mention of God, but you feel the divine presence in the background. He also cites 'eternal law'. No coincidence that the atheist Hobbes rejected natural law. Personally I would offer an atheistic defence of natural law, based on human nature. |
| 22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not unconditionally a law, but is rather a perversion of law. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
| A reaction: Only a belief in natural law can give a basis for such a claim. Positivists will say a tyrannical law is unconditionally a law like any other, but a bad one. |
| 7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Aquinas argued that on three conditions war can be justified: first, that there is a just cause; second, that it is begun on proper authority; and third, that it is waged with right intention, for 'the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil'. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II) by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: But see also Idea 7292. Nowadays we are rightly suspicious of all three conditions. Evil people seem to think their cause is just; authority has often been seized by violence, or is being abused; and people seem confused about what is good or evil. |
| 5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In Aquinas's view the fertilized egg is not, either at the moment of conception or for quite a while afterwards, endowed with an immortal soul. In fact, technically speaking, it is not even human. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.20 | |
| A reaction: It is pointed at that therefore Aquinas does not give good support for modern Catholic views on abortion. There is certainly no reason why a human zygote should be ensouled from the start, as God may do this whenever He wishes. |
| 16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Bodies are those substances in which one finds three dimensions. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q18.2c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2 | |
| A reaction: Pasnau points out that this extensional view of physical bodies was a commonplace long before Descartes. Presumably there are also non-dimensional substances (such as angels?). |
| 11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
| A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation. |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Even a sufficient cause doesn't always compel its effect, since it can sometimes be interfered with so that its effect doesn't happen | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 15) |
| 15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The centre of a circle is directly opposite any designated point on the circumference. In this way, whatever is in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it even though past or future with respect to another part of time. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.66), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 2 c | |
| A reaction: A nice example of a really cool analogy which almost gets you to accept something which is actually completely incomprehensible. |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The divine law commands certain things because they are good and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 2) | |
| A reaction: This is a fifty-fifty response to the Euthyphro dilemma, but it seems to leave the theological puzzle of the source of the goodness which is prescribed because it is in fact good. |
| 21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
| A reaction: Depends on his definition of self-evidence (Idea 21250), which needs knowledge of the essence of the subject. Anselm required 'understanding' of the concept. One might understand the existence criteria without knowing the whole essence. Anselm wins. |
| 5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: To those who assume the existence of a necessary being, and would only know which among all things had to be regarded as such a thing, one could not answer: This thing here is the necessary being | |
| From: comment on Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A612/B640 | |
| A reaction: See Aquinas in Idea 1431. Kant makes a nice point. You might turn out to be the necessary being? How could you tell? You only know that there must be one lurking somewhere. I could be a slug. Aquinas makes a huge leap to God. |
| 21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of). |
| 21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation. |
| 21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)? |
| 21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections. |
| 21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success. |
| 20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Aquinas describes the ultimate end of human life as the Beatific Vision, a state that is simultaneously the enjoyment of perfect happiness and a perfect revelation of truth. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 4.2 | |
| A reaction: I like that a lot, even though my idea of the revelation of truth is very distant from that of Aquinas. Ignorant happiness is not much of an aspiration. |
| 22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| Full Idea: Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas does not think that there is a 'spiritual matter' that angels or disembodied souls have as one of their components, but rather that they are separated forms that configure no matter at all. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
| A reaction: 'Separated forms' sounds like the modern concept of abstract entities, meaning that souls and angels exist in the way that platonists believe numbers exist. How else might Aquinas have understood them? |
| 16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Heretics are wolves …and therefore ought to be eradicated. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Sentences [1264], IV.13.2.3sc), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
| 23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
| Full Idea: Aquinas infers from Aristotle that intellectual understanding is the only operation of the soul that is performed without a physical organ, so that only human souls, and not animal ones, can be immortal. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I, q75, a3, resp) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Reason' | |
| A reaction: This shows why so many thinkers are desperate to hang on to dualism, of some sort. Interesting that he only claims partial dualism. |
| 1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Even if soul achieves well-being in another life, that doesn't mean I do or any other human being does. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli [1272]) |
| 4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: In order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them, and they may render more copious thanks to God for it, it is given to them to see perfectly the punishment of the damned. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], III Supp Q94,1), quoted by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals I.§15 | |
| A reaction: This has probably been repudiated by the Church of England. Justice should be seen to be done. Presumably you mustn't gloat, or you join them. |
| 21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: If one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name God means that He is infinite goodness. If therefore God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1) | |
| A reaction: This is not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. I love the way he states the opposition's arguments so lucidly. The modern problem usually talks of God's omnipotence, rather than infinity. His formulation allows that there might be undiscoverable evil. |
| 21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: As Augustine says, God would not allow any evil to exist in his works, unless he were to bring good even out of evil. It is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He allows evil to exist and out of it produces good. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep) | |
| A reaction: Are God's powers so limited that He could not have achieved an equal amount of good without having to indulge in some evil first? |