27 ideas
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
Full Idea: The notion of evidence generally plays a much more significant role in internalist epistemologies than it does in various forms of externalism. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Prop..') | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that this is because evidence needs a certain amount of interpretation, whereas raw facts (which externalists seem to rely on) may never even enter a mind. |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Two well know slogans (popularised by Carl Sagan) are 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence', ...and 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence'. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Absence') | |
A reaction: [Sagan was a popular science writer and broadcaster] The second one is something like Hume's argument against miracles. The old problem of the 'missing link' for human evolution embodied the first idea. |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Does the sudden realization of a heretofore unrecognized possibility count as evidence? | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Evid..') | |
A reaction: [Nice use of 'heretofore'! Why say 'previously' when you can keep these wonderful old English words alive?] This means that we can imagine new evidence ('maybe the murderer was a snake'!). Wrong. The evidence is what suggests the possibility. |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
Full Idea: At a certain level of detail, almost any claim is unprecedented. How likely is 'Matilda won at Scrabble on Thursday with a score of 438 while drinking mint tea'? But there is nothing particularly unbelievable about the claim. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Extraordinary') | |
A reaction: A striking idea, which rules out the simplistic idea that we can just assess evidence by its isolated likelihood. Context is crucial. How good is 438? What if she smoked opium? What if there is no Scrabble set on her island? |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
Full Idea: An ancient rule in law is that a criminal conviction needs evidence of two independent witnesses, but in history it is assumed that a document deserves the benefit of the doubt if it cannot be independently verified. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Interp..') | |
A reaction: [compressed; McGrew's full account qualifies it a bit] A nice observation. One might even be suspicious of the two 'independent' witnesses, if there were lots of other reasons to doubt someon's guilt. A single weird document is also dubious. |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have been attracted to the view that, strictly speaking, what counts as evidence is not a set of physical objects or even experiences, but rather a set of believed propositions. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Prop..') | |
A reaction: This may be right. However, as always, I think animals are a key test. Do animals respond to evidence? Even if they did, they might need to 'make sense' of what they experienced, and even formulate a non-linguistic proposition. |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Taking evidence as propositional may trade one problem for another. If the bloodstain isn't evidence, but 'this is a bloodstain' is evidence, then what serves as evidence for the belief about the bloodstain? Is there an infinite regress? | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Prop..') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I quite like evidence being propositional, but then find this. I'll retreat to my beloved coherence. I do not endorse Sellars's 'only a belief can justify a belief', because raw experience has to be part of what is coherent. |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
Full Idea: The testimony of a number of independent witnesses, none of them particularly reliable, who give substantially the same account of some event, may provide a strong argument in its favor. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Testimonial') | |
A reaction: A striking point. It obviously works well for panicking people in a crowd during an incident. Does it also apply to independent scientists who are known to cheat? They may not collaborate, but may all want the same result. |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Evidentialism comes in both narrow and wide forms depending on whether evidence is taken to consist only of propositions or of a wider range of items. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Evid..') | |
A reaction: [He cites Conee and Feldman for the wide view, which is not restricted to beliefs] You can hardly rely on occurrent beliefs as evidence, so we often have good knowledge with forgotten justification. But such knowledge has been 'weakened'. |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
Full Idea: Data do not quite speak for themselves, which speaks against a naive form of falsificationism according to which even the slightest mismatch between theory and evidence suffices to overturn a theory. | |
From: Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Interp..') | |
A reaction: [He cites Robert Boyle wisely ignoring some data to get a good fit for his graph] |
21202 | The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The strong nuclear force has a range of 10^-15 m, considerably larger than the range of the weak force. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is because the bosons transmitting the weak force (W+, W-, W°) are much heavier than the gluons of the strong force. |
21211 | If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: If some reaction is not observed when there is apparently nothing to prevent it occurring, it is an indication that a conservation law is in operation. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 07) |
21209 | Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In QED an electron constantly emits and reabsorbs virtual photons and these photons constantly create and reabsorb pairs of virtual electrons and positrons, and so on. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: 'And so on'! These virtual particles have energy, and hence mass. |
21212 | The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The Higgs field has the property of having a nonzero value in a state without particles, the vacuum state. Other fields are assumed to have a value zero in a vacuum state. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 09) | |
A reaction: This seems to make a big difference to our concept of a field, since it has a measurable reality even when there are no particles. So it isn't just a geometrical frame for locating particles. |
21201 | A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The word 'field' is simply a shorthand way of saying that a physical property is assigned to the points of space and time in a region. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is disappointing because I had begun to think that fields were foundational for modern ontology. Turns out they are operational abstractions (according to Martin). Note that a field extends over time. |
21205 | Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: Although standard particles are assumed to be structureless, many physicists believe that if distances could be probed down to 10^-35 m structures would be discovered. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: Such probing is said to be probably impossible. And does the division then come to a halt? Aristotle's meditations on this are not irrelevant. |
21203 | Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The uncertainty principle states that energy conservation can be violated, but only for a limited period of time. As the energy violation increases, the time period within which 'borrowed' energy has to be 'paid back' decreases. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is the only reason modern physicists ever seem to mention the uncertainty principle. You can ask why this debt must be paid, but it seems to be hidden where the laws of physics may not even apply. |
21207 | The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The 'exclusion principle' initially stated that no two electrons in a system could simultaneously occupy the same quantum state and thus have the same set of quantum numbers. The principle actually applies to all fermions, but not to bosons. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
A reaction: This principle is said to be at the root of atomic structure, making each element unique. What exactly is a 'system'? Why does this principle hold? How do you ensure two women don't wear the same dress at a party? |
21204 | The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: As presently formulated, the standard model is two theories. One operates in the sector of strong interaction, and the other in the sector of the electromagnetic and weak interactions. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: The first is Quantum Chomodynamics (QCD). The second is Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). Interesting that the weak interaction is included in the latter, which (I take it) means there is an electro-weak union. Interactions are the heart of the model. |
21208 | Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The picture of a particle spinning like a top is sometime useful, but it is not consistent with the idea of the electron being point-like. In fact there is no analogy for spin in non-quantum physics. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
A reaction: If we take this stuff literally then it blow traditional metaphysics to bits, because an electron has properties without being a substance. In what sense can an electron 'have' properties if it is a point? In interactions they cease to be points. Eh? |
21210 | Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: A cloud of virtual particles always surrounds a charged particle. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: Here's a nice fact for aspiring Buddhists to meditate on. |
21206 | The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In quantum theory, the full set of quantum numbers defines the state of the particle and, along with its mass, determines its properties. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) |
21213 | String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: Unlike the standard model, with its 19 free parameters (including the masses of quarks, coupling constants and mixing angles), string theories have a single free paramater: the string tension. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 10) | |
A reaction: This must be one feature in favour of string theory, despite its problems. |
21200 | An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In the modern sense 'element' means a substance that cannot be decomposed by the methods of chemistry. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) |