8 ideas
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
19480 | Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt] |
Full Idea: Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place within it. | |
From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Put like that, the chief ancestor of this approach would be Leibniz, even though his central idea concerns substances. Heraclitus is the most famous ancestor of Process Philosophy. Powers are dynamic, but powers of what? |
19479 | Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt] |
Full Idea: On the reductionist view of processes, they are all 'owned' and we identify them by their owner (such as the murder of Caesar), ...but many processes (e.g. tornadoes, lightning bolts, the NY rush hour) lack a proper 'subject' altogether. | |
From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a fairly conclusive refutation of the view that processes are just objects changing their properties. |
19481 | Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt] |
Full Idea: Instead of very small things (atoms) combining to produce standard processes (snowstorms), modern physics envisions very small processes (quantum phenomena) combining to produce standard things. | |
From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 4 (i)) | |
A reaction: Though electrons seem to be distinct things with a fixed set of properties, so this is not a clear point. Where do fields come into it? Beware of citing quantum mechanics in metaphysics! |
19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction. | |
From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent') | |
A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either. |
19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation). | |
From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance') | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination. |