Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, Melissus and Carl Friedrich Gauss

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8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Actual infinities are not allowed in mathematics - only limits which may increase without bound [Gauss]
     Full Idea: I protest against the use of an infinite quantity as an actual entity; this is never allowed in mathematics. The infinite is only a manner of speaking, in which one properly speaks of limits ...which are permitted to increase without bound.
     From: Carl Friedrich Gauss (Letter to Shumacher [1831]), quoted by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.7
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
     Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
     A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
     A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Being is one.
     From: report of Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b23
     A reaction: I can only really understand this in terms of physics, as the belief that ultimately there is one simple theory which explains everything. That project doesn't look terribly promising, despite the lovely simplifications of modern physics.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as real motion, but there only appears to be such.
     From: report of Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.4.3
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus]
     Full Idea: There is no need for void to be the cause of all change, because it is perfectly possible for a plenum to alter qualitatively (which is something Melissus overlooked).
     From: comment on Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214a27
     A reaction: In modern physics this presumably gives us fluctuations in a force field. Motion is like a cat being digested by a python. The atomist claim that emptiness is needed if anything is to move still has intuitive appeal.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus]
     Full Idea: If Nothing existed, in no way could anything come into being out of nothing.
     From: Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B1), quoted by (who?) - where?