9 ideas
6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
Full Idea: Science now reigns supreme all over the globe; but the reason was not insight in its 'inherent rationality' but power play (the colonising nations imposed their way of living) and the need for weapons. | |
From: Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975], 3), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of ridiculous relativism about science. What gave the colonisers their power if it was not more accurate knowledge of how to manipulate nature? |
18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
Full Idea: The view of Chomsky in 1957 that category mistakes are syntactically well-formed but meaningless is a very standard one. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm going off the idea that they are meaningless, largely because I am beginning to sympathise with the view that any composition of meaningful components is meaningful (even if blatantly false). |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
Full Idea: For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory containing the term. | |
From: report of Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 6.3 |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |
18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
Full Idea: In 1957 Chomsky argues that syntax is an independent field from semantics. …To support this claim he argues that the now-famous category mistake 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is grammatical but meaningless. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm tempted by the thought that this famous sentence actually is meaningful, although the meaning is fragmentary, and any proposition which can be assembled from it appears to be blatantly false. |
18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
Full Idea: Chomsky and his followers (whose position was labelled 'interpretative semantics') claimed that a sentence is first assigned a syntactic structure by an autonomous syntactic module, and this structure is then provided as input for semantic interpretation. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax [1965]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
A reaction: This certainly doesn't fit the experience of introspecting speech, but then I suppose good pianists focus entirely on the music, and overlook the finger movements which have obvious priority. But I don't know the syntax of the sentence when I begin it. |