Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, Speussipus and Hilary Kornblith

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
     Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
     A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
     A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Speusippus suggested principles for each substance, including principles for numbers, magnitude and the soul. He thus arrived at no mean list of substances.
     From: report of Speussipus (thirty titles (lost) [c.367 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith]
     Full Idea: What is distinctive about externalist accounts of knowledge is that they do not require justification, at least in the traditional sense.
     From: Hilary Kornblith (Internalism and Externalism: a History [2001], p.2)
     A reaction: At least this gives animals the chance to know things, but I suspect that they never get beyond true beliefs. I'm sure humans have 'better' knowledge than animals.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, held that all things were governed by some kind of animal force, and tried to eradicate from our minds any notion of the gods.
     From: report of Speussipus (thirty titles (lost) [c.367 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.33