11 ideas
5438 | Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Ricoeur distinguishes a hermeneutics of tradition (e.g. Gadamar), which interprets sympathetically looking for hidden messages, and a hermeneutics of suspicion (e.g. Nietzsche, Freud) which sees hidden drives and interests. | |
From: report of Paul Ricoeur (works [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.249 | |
A reaction: Obviously the answer is somewhere between the two. Nietzsche's suspicion can be wonderful, but Freud's can seem silly (e.g. on Leonardo). On the whole I am on the 'tradition' side, because great thinkers can rise above their culture (on a good day). |
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars). |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions. |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality. | |
From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) | |
A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self. |
6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. | |
From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me. |
6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure. | |
From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself. |
1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates. | |
From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) |
1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |
Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source. | |
From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas) |