8 ideas
5438 | Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Ricoeur distinguishes a hermeneutics of tradition (e.g. Gadamar), which interprets sympathetically looking for hidden messages, and a hermeneutics of suspicion (e.g. Nietzsche, Freud) which sees hidden drives and interests. | |
From: report of Paul Ricoeur (works [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.249 | |
A reaction: Obviously the answer is somewhere between the two. Nietzsche's suspicion can be wonderful, but Freud's can seem silly (e.g. on Leonardo). On the whole I am on the 'tradition' side, because great thinkers can rise above their culture (on a good day). |
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Axiomatising set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatisation. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.296) |
13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (works [1920], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Kit Fine refers somewhere to 'unrepentent Skolemites' who still hold this view. |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows: If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.293) |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
Full Idea: The initial foundations should be immediately clear, natural and not open to question. This is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inference, by it is not satisfied by the axioms of Zermelo, or anything else of that kind. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.299) | |
A reaction: This is a plea (endorsed by Almog) that the integers themselves should be taken as primitive and foundational. I would say that the idea of successor is more primitive than the integers. |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations, and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.300) |
19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic. |
19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept. |