1648 ideas
78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1141b03) | |
A reaction: Precious for what? Theoretical or practical? Note the implied rational and empirical routes to wisdom. |
5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wisdom studies none of the things that go to make a man happy, because it is not concerned with any kind of process. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1143b20) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very Platonic view, and not really consistent with Aristotle's overall metaphysics. It strikes me as simply wrong. Maybe all of reality is a process, and wisdom is then a maximum understanding of that process. |
548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Knowledge chosen for itself and for the sake of knowledge is wisdom, more than that which is chosen for results. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a12) | |
A reaction: Well something has to be for its own sake! But what about trivial knowledge? That question led Plato to the Forms. |
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle characterises wisdom as a search for explanations (aitiai, which can also be translated as 'causes') and explanatory knowledge (epistemé, knowledge why something is as it is). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 01.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.1 | |
A reaction: I think this idea might be a key one for modern philosophers, if they are searching for a metaphysics which can be integrated with modern science. |
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is the science of happiness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1690.03.23) | |
A reaction: That probably comes down to common sense, or Aristotle's 'phronesis'. I take wisdom to involve understanding, as well as the quest for happiness. |
19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the sciences and of the art of applying them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 0) | |
A reaction: 'Sciences' should be understood fairly broadly here (e.g. of architecture, agriculture, grammar). This is a scholar's vision of wisdom, very different from the notion of the wisest person in a village full of illiterate people. |
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151) | |
A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom. |
2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to spend their lives on. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Thomas Nagel - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.12 | |
A reaction: The explanation of why Aristotle values contemplation more highly than the moral virtues. |
103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The wise man can practise contemplation by himself (though no doubt he does it better with fellow-workers). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a32) | |
A reaction: It is hard to argue with this balanced view of the individual versus team concept of philosophy. |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The wiser one is, the fewer separate acts of will one has and the more one's views and acts of will are comprehensive and linked together. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.04.12) | |
A reaction: [letter to Landgrave, about Arnauld] It is unusual to find a philosopher who actually tries to analyse the nature of wisdom, instead of just paying lipservice to it. I take Leibniz to be entirely right here. He equates wisdom with rational behaviour. |
545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If a doctor were to have a theoretical account without experience, knowing the universal but not the immediate particular, he will often err in treatment. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a25) | |
A reaction: But acquaintance with particulars isn't the same as knowledge, which may require universals. |
19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's philosophy largely serves to justify and enable a coherent empirical account of the world. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.I | |
A reaction: A nice counter to the simplistic idea of Locke as empiricist and Leibniz as rationalist. Leibniz is explicit that science needs a separate 'metaphysics' to underpin it. Perkins says Locke constructs experience, and Leibniz analyses it. |
549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All men begin to philosophise from wonder, for example at the changes of the sun, or the incommensurability of the diameter (pi) | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0983a14) | |
A reaction: If it doesn't begin with wonder, what does it begin with? |
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is hard to make firm statements on these questions without having examined them many times, but to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 08b23) | |
A reaction: Suggesting that philosophy is more like drawing the map than completing the journey. |
1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each of us is able to give a logos about some part of nature and even though as individuals little or nothing is added to the truth, from all of us contributing together something grand comes about. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b04) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sees philosophy and science as group activities. |
2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although people can be made worse off by all other gifts, correct reasoning alone can only be for the good. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Preface to Universal Characteristic [1679]) | |
A reaction: How about a kind heart? Not everyone would agree with the remark, but philosophers should. |
19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is sanctified by having its streams flow from the fountain of God's attributes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.69) |
609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1059a13) | |
A reaction: So is philosophy just part of science - the bit that tries to explain the abstract instead of the physical? |
624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1074b28) | |
A reaction: Connects to the apparently unique human ability to reflect about our own thoughts. |
572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from dialectic in the manner of its powers, and from sophistry in the choice of life that it involves. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004b17) | |
A reaction: Note the separation of dialectic from the heart of philosophy, and the claim that philosophy is a way of life. |
22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1026a28) | |
A reaction: For Aristotle science is mainly finding the causes of everything. Does he think physical science is the way to study ethics and politics. Maybe, via essential natures and natural functions. |
2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatise on the basis of a few observations. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316a09) | |
A reaction: I totally approve of the idea that a good philosopher should be 'observant'. Prestige in modern analytic philosophy comes from logical ability. There should be some rival criterion for attentiveness to facts, with equal prestige. |
11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles [archas] and causes [aitias]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a02) |
17949 | Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Inquiry is the cause of philosophy. | |
From: Aristotle (Protrepticus (frags) [c.334 BCE]), quoted by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.120 | |
A reaction: The earlier part of the quote says philosophical thinking is inescapable (even if philosophy is impossible). I suppose we would call it 'curiosity'. |
12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle says that 'humans all desire by nature to understand'. The Greek word here is often translated as 'to know', but this can be misleading. It is not a piling up of known facts, ..but mastery of a field of knowledge, and explaining why. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980a22) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.1 | |
A reaction: I take this gloss of Annas's to be highly significant if we are trying to understand Aristotle, since it appears to be the single most significant remark from him of what his life's work was about. |
559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should not only be grateful to those in whose opinions we at all share but also to those who have gone astray, for even the latter have contributed something. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b12) | |
A reaction: Yes, but what have they contributed? Have they revealed lines of reasoning, or are they just a terrible warning? |
112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Most people are readier to submit to compulsion and punishment than to argument and fine ideals. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1180a05) | |
A reaction: How perceptively pessimistic. We must hope that the picture has changed now that we have fairly universal education. Some people may submit to argument, but NOT to fine ideals. |
13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, metaphysics is above all a science of the intelligible nature of being. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 4.3.1 | |
A reaction: [Their footnote gives two quotes in support] I could take this as my motto. We are not studying the 'nature of being', because we can't. We are studying what is 'intelligible' about it; my thesis is that the need for intelligibility imposes an order. |
16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Leibniz made a sustained attempt to combine a mechanistic physics with something like a scholastic metaphysics. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to me clear enough, and a lot of current philosophers seem to underestimate how Aristotelian Leibniz was. |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I claim to give metaphysics geometric demonstrations, assuming only the principle of contradiction (or else all reasoning becomes futile), and that nothing exists without a reason, or that every truth has an a priori proof, from the concept of terms. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 XI) | |
A reaction: For the last bit, see Idea 12910. This idea is the kind of huge optimism about metaphysic which got it a bad name after Kant, and in modern times. I'm optimistic about metaphysics, but certainly not about 'geometrical demonstrations' of it. |
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori, and not from the order of the phenomena alone. ... For the senses put nothing forward concerning metaphysical matters. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Nice instance of the aspirations of big metaphysics, before Kant cut it down to size. The claim is not far off Plato's, that by dialectic we can work out the necessities of the Forms, to which even the gods must bow. Are necessities really kept from us? |
22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18) | |
A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people. |
5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every idea is analysed perfectly only when it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.3) | |
A reaction: I take it he means metaphysical possibility, rather than natural, or we can't think about pigs flying. He probably has maths in mind. Seeing the possibility of something may well amount to understanding its truth conditions. |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The art of finding intermediate terms (the 'middle term') is the art of 'analysis'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.02) | |
A reaction: This proposal is straight out of Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics'. Nowadays we would say there was much more to analysis, the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions being the most obvious way of putting it. |
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz | |
A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded. |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject permits. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094b18) | |
A reaction: An excellent remark in the context of moral philosophy. There is a dream that moral principles might derive from pure reason, or consist of a single rule expressible in a few words, but daily life isn't like that, and morality is not likely to be. |
76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139b24) | |
A reaction: This is diametrically opposed to the Humean view, which takes the nature of each thing, and the laws which guide it, to be contingent. Kripke has pointed us towards necessities in nature. |
2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust). | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b01) |
11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle distinguishes between deductive reasoning (sullogismos) and demonstration (apodeixis). All demonstration is deductive reasoning, but not all deductive reasoning is demonstration. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk I.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 5.3 | |
A reaction: This sounds not far off the distinction between single-turnstile (formal proof) and double-turnstile (semantic consequence). Politis says, though, that the key point is the demonstration is explanatory. |
16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Leibniz actually characterises reason as the faculty for apprehending priori, necessary truths. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 | |
A reaction: No wonder it is called the Age of Reason when the claims are this grandiose. |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A reason is a known truth whose connection with some less well-known truth leads us to give our assent to the latter. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.17) | |
A reaction: This is plainly false, because you can have a reason for believing something, but still not give your assent to it, presumably because of counter-reasons. And a false belief could also be a reason, even to believe a truth. Tut tut. |
23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: And of responsible actions, some are done through habit, some through desire, and of these some through rational and some through irrational desire. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1369a01) | |
A reaction: Identified by Michael Frede, to illustrate reason having its own distinctive type of desire ('Boulesis'). I suspect that the rational desires are the morally good desires. |
1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09) | |
A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word. |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every account is either a definition or a demonstration. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a24) | |
A reaction: That is, it is either a summary of the thing's essential nature, or it is a proof of some natural fact, starting from first principles. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All reasonings are eminent in God, and they preserve an order among themselves in his understanding as well as in ours; but for him this is just an order and a priority of nature, whereas for us there is a priority of time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.192), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: This view is found in Frege, and seems to be the hallmark of rationalist philosophy. There is an apriori assumption that reality has a rational order, so that pure reason is a tool for grasping it. Lewis's 'mosaic' of experiences has no order. |
5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12) | |
A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states. |
3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Leibniz distinguished two fundamental principles of rationality - the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
5082 | Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 189a06) | |
A reaction: This does not seem to be entirely true. Sherlock Holmes reasons towards the particular. Nevertheless, we see what he means. Reason deals with universals, and reason derives principles and patterns from the particulars. |
2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165a01) |
1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some optimists think understanding arises only through demonstration, but say there could be demonstration of everything, for it is possible to demonstrate in a circle or reciprocally. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b16) | |
A reaction: I'm an optimist in this sense, though what is being described would probably best be called 'large-scale coherence'. Two reciprocal arguments look bad, but a hundred look good. |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To speak against reason is to speak against truth, for reason is a chain of truths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: Truth has a talismanic quality here (which it didn't always have). This is a lovely slogan for defenders of the Enlightenment. It forces modern critics of the Enlightenment (Adorno etc) to launch an attack on truth, which is a doomed line. |
2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30) | |
A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this. |
623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1074b11) |
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up. |
19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan). |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: General principles enter into our thoughts, serving as their inner core and their mortar. Even if we give no thought to them, they are necessary for thought, as muscles and tendons are for walking. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01.20) | |
A reaction: Famously, Leibniz identified sufficient reason and non-contradiction as the two foundational principles. Modern logicians seem less keen on this idea, but then they have less interest in how we actually think. |
19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The principle of contradiction is the principle of necessity, and the principle that a sufficient reason must be given is the principle of contingency. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95) | |
A reaction: [this paragraph is actually undated] Contradictions occur in concrete actuality, as well as in theories and formal systems. If so, then there are necessities in nature. Are they discoverable a posteriori? Leibniz says not. |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |
3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Leibniz assigns synthetic a priori status to the principle of sufficient reason, readily conceding that one can deny it without fear of inconsistency. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18 |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2) |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21) |
5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112) | |
A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths. |
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason says no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §32) | |
A reaction: I think of this as my earliest philosophical perception, a childish rebellion against being told that there was 'no reason' for something. My intuition tells me that it is correct, and the foundation of ontology and truth. Don't ask me to justify it! |
1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are not true at the same time. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b13) | |
A reaction: Principle of Noncontradiction |
11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle goes to great lengths to defend the principle of non-contradiction, and does not at all think that it is obviously true. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], logic) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 5.1 |
6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to be-in and not to be-in the same thing in the same respect. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1005b19) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is really discussing non-contradiction here, but this formulation is very close to Leibniz's Law (that two identical things must have identical properties). |
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Contrary things can be reasonably held …because the contrary positions will stand if what is said is true in one way, but not true in another. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1235b17) | |
A reaction: My strategy here is to clarify the unambiguous underlying propositions which are being expressed. There will then be either agreement, or flat contradiction. |
11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to say truly at the same time that the same thing both is and is not a man. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1006b33) |
1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Noncontradiction is for Aristotle the ultimate regulator of predication. In order for any predication to be significant it must refer to something definite and stable. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b13) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.152 |
4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108b33) | |
A reaction: A nice concept and definition. Note that it is being used about ethics (the mean), not just about pure logic or mathematics. |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad, as we see with health and sickness. But the contrary of bad is sometimes good, sometimes not, as we see with excess, opposed by both deficiency and moderation. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13b36) |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too, for if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not black. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a06) |
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Take, for example, "Callias is just", "Callias is not just", and "Callias is unjust"; which of these are contraries? | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 23a31) |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One member of a pair of contraries is sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411a02) | |
A reaction: This obviously requires prior knowledge of what the opposite is. He says you can infer the crooked from the straight. You can hardly use light in isolation to infer dark [see DA 418b17]. What's the opposite of a pig? |
1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are falsehoods which are contrary to one another and cannot be the case together e.g. that a man is a horse or a cow. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 88a29) |
608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With contradiction there can be no intermediate state, whereas with contrariety there can be. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1055b02) |
627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If all things are composed of opposites, how can the things of which the opposites are made be composed of opposites? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a23) | |
A reaction: A nice warning against being too simplistic in metaphysics. |
628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All things are not composed of opposites, because matter is not the opposite of anything. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a28) | |
A reaction: A nice counterexample |
19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Reason requires that we avoid multiplying hypotheses or principles, in somewhat the same way that the simplest system is always preferred in astronomy. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], 5) | |
A reaction: He offers this principle without mentioning Ockham, as if it were self-evident. |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It belongs to dialectic to survey equally all kinds of syllogism. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355a08) | |
A reaction: Since dialectic is central to philosophy, this implies that philosophers ought to be students of logic. This duty seems to me to be taken more seriously in the analytical tradition than in the 'continental' tradition. |
2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Dialectical arguments are those which, starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b03) |
2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who compete and contend in argument aim at five objects: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and the reduction of one's opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him say the same thing over and over again. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b15) |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The definition is an account, and every account has its parts, and there is an isomorphism between the relation of the account to the entity that it concerns and the relation of a part of the account to a part of the entity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b20) | |
A reaction: This makes a definition sound like a catalogue of parts, which is likely to miss something important, such as the overall form, or the function. Aristotle has much more to say on the subject of definition. Cf. Russell's congruence view of truth. |
10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One strays from the purpose of definitions if one confines oneself to a formal account and simply discards the material element. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036b20) |
10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes it the case that, if we call the account of something a 'definition', that thing is a unity? If 'two-footed animal' is the account of man, and a definition, why, then, is 'man' a single thing and not a plurality (viz. animal and two-footed)? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037b10) | |
A reaction: The obvious answer, I would have thought, is that we can think of man as a unity or as a plurality, depending on which aspect we are interested in. I see no problem with this. Nature offers us unities, but we ultimately select them. |
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |
A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of gold is what constitutes it and gives it the sensible qualities which let us recognize it and which make its nominal definition; but if we could explain this structure or inner constitution we would possess the real, causal definition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This is the view which I am championing, particularly in the role of explanation in the whole game. Explanation and understanding are the hallmarks of the discovery of a real essence. However, a falsehood may explain things well. Tricky. |
16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to define particulars. …The fact is that an account is general. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040a33-) | |
A reaction: Aristotle rejects attempts to define the Sun as possible counterexamples. Since this claims rests on the idea of an account [logos], I presume the point is actually that definitions are linguistic, and must use general words. |
596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Only substance admits of definition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b34) |
16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In some instances the account of the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing contains the parts of the thing defined and in others not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a22) | |
A reaction: This is helpful in understanding what an essence is supposed to be. I take it to be sometimes a structure, with parts, and sometimes more like a guiding principle, more abstract in character. |
10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We can assign a term to any 'account' whatever, so that the Iliad would be a definition! No, a definition must be of something primary. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a08) | |
A reaction: At first hearing you may doubt this claim, but Aristotle's example clinches it beautifully. Are you really going to say that The Iliad is the definition of 'Iliad'? |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although a thing has only one essence, this can be expressed by several definitions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12976 and Idea 12977 for a view which seems to conflict with this. He seemed to imply that once you identify the essence, the definitions converge, with multiple definitions being symptomatic of imperfect ideas of things. |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The result of having an imperfect idea of something is that the same subject admits of several mutually independent definitions: we shall sometimes be unable to derive one from another, or see in advance that they must belong to a single subject. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12975 for imperfect ideas of things. Obviously the idea is that perfect knowledge will converge on a single definition, which will pinpoint the essence of a thing, and then all explanations will flow. A nice addition to the Aristotelian view. |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The real definition displays the possibility of the definiendum, and the nominal definition does not. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This, I take it, is because the real definition indicates the actual powers of the thing, and not just the superficial characteristics. Is knowledge of powers identical with knowledge of possibilities? |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Definitions to my mind are real, when one knows that the thing defined is possible; otherwise they are only nominal, and one must not rely on them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 XI) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that things do not have to actual to have real definitions. For Leibniz, what is possible will exist in the mind of God. For me what is possible will exist in the potentialities of the powers of what is actual. |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Definitions are thought to be of what something is, and what something is is in every case universal and positive. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b05) | |
A reaction: This is exhibit A for those who think that Aristotelian essences concern the genus, rather than the particular. I suspect that this idea is best expressed as 'all we can say by way of definition of a particular thing involves the use of universals'. |
12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: An Aristotelian definition is causal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk II.2) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 1.5 | |
A reaction: [She refers us to Posterior Analytics II.2] This is important if we are tempted to follow a modern line of saying that we want Aristotelian essences, and that these are definitions. We ain't thinking of dictionaries. |
12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To establish a definition through division, you must aim for three things: you must take what is predicated in what the thing is; you must order these items as first or second; and you must ensure that these are all there are. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97a23) | |
A reaction: This gives an indication of the thoroughness that Aristotle expects from a definition. They aren't like dictionary definitions of words. He expects definitions to often be very lengthy (see Idea 12292). |
9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Find what is in common among items similar and undifferentiated, then do the same for items of the same kind as the first group but a different form, and so on, till you come to a single account: this will be the definition of the object. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97b07-14) | |
A reaction: [His example is distinguishing 'magnanimity' from 'indifference to fortune' among people] Presumably this process works for the formation of new concepts (e.g. in biology), as well as for the definition of familiars in terms of other familiars. |
12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Met. Z.10-11 is committed to the complexity of form and suggests that the complexity is expressed in definitions that articulate, in the case of 'man', the salient faculties and functions, and none of these need mention 'man'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b20-1037b) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.5 | |
A reaction: This is a very strong statement of the view that identifying genus and species are not at all what Aristotle wants in his final account of essence. The features mentioned here would, though, clearly count as 'differentiae'. |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Plane' is the genus of figures in the plane, and 'solid' is the genus of solids. For every figure is either a plane with abc features or a solid with xyz features, so it is the plane and solid which underlie these differentiae. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1024b01) | |
A reaction: Thus you could hardly define a square by merely mentioning that it is a 'plane figure', and you would need pretty precise differentiae before you could be certain you were only dealing with a square, and not a parallelogram. |
12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If Callias is a white man, then whiteness belongs in a way to Callias, or to man, in as much as Callias, to whom it is accidental here to be a man, is white. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b20) | |
A reaction: The point here is that 'white' can only belong to 'man' because some individual man happens to be white. |
11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is of the universal [tou katholou] and the form [tou eidous, kind, species]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036a28) | |
A reaction: [Alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] Since the essence of a thing is a particular (Idea 11382), this seems to mean that the definition is NOT giving the essence, contrary to the account of Kit Fine. I take the essence to be explanatory. |
10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The contents of definition by division are the so-called primary genus (such as 'animal') and the differentiae. ...It should always be prosecuted until the level of non-differentiation is reached, ...and the last differentia will be the substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037b30) | |
A reaction: [Second half at 1038a14] Note that this is only one type of Aristotelian definition, the 'definition by division'. The aim of this type of definition is to analyse down to substance. Presumably you can't ignore crucial features found on the way? |
12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the genus simpliciter does not exist over and above the specific forms constitutive of it, alternatively if it exists just as matter, it is evident what the definition is, the account derived just from the differentiae. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038a05-) | |
A reaction: This is how I understand an Aristotelian definition - as a lengthy and fine-grained account of the details which pick out some individual within the main genus which constitutes it. |
17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose I was trying to define you. I would say you are an animal that is lean or white or some such, all of which also apply to other things. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040a13) | |
A reaction: Commentators have taken this to mean that Aristotle is only interested in kinds and not individuals, but recent thinking says this is wrong. Universals prevent you from really getting at the thing you want to define. Definitions are limited. |
12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Species and genera are largely irrelevant to the program of 'Metaphysics'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.10 | |
A reaction: The idea seems to be that Aristotle is seeking tools for getting at the primary being of a thing, and the notion of 'form' strikes him as a better account, because it explains the genera and species, rather than just naming them. |
12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: I take Aristotle to be arguing that no definition applies uniquely to an individual - it is always potentially applicable to a range of individuals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], defs) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.2 n7 | |
A reaction: So much the worse for Aristotle, I think. Surely unique entities can be defined? No one thinks their pet dog is just any dog, even after the age and breed have been identified. |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The genus can very often be turned into the differentia, ...so that in place of saying that man is a 'reasonable animal' we could, if language permitted, say that man is an 'animable rational', a rational substance with animal nature. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This is a very telling point which rather undermines any dogmatic approach to what Aristotle says about these sorts of definitions. I don't find this account of definitions very helpful anyway. Leibniz links it to the order of cataloguing. |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1031a12) | |
A reaction: This is cited by Kit Fine, as expounding his view that essence is definition. He gives this text as "definition is the formula of the essence". Is the account the 'logos', I wonder? I like this view. |
12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What it is and why it is are the same. What is an eclipse? Privation of light from the moon by screening of the earth. Why is there an eclipse? ...What is a harmony? A numerical ratio between high and low. Why do the high and low harmonize? The ratio. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90a15) | |
A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotelian essentialism, and (I take it) modern scientific essentialism. If you fully know what cigarette tars are, and what human cell structure is, you understand immediately why cigarettes cause cancer. |
12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle never thought of an essence as comprising all the necessary properties of an object. In Met VII.4 he limits per se predication appropriate to essences to the definition, and in Topics he distinguishes definition from the 'proprium'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.1 | |
A reaction: [Topics 102a20-25] There seems to be consensus among scholars about this, and only a few misguided modern metaphysicians identify essences with the necessary properties (or maybe the non-trivial necessary properties). |
15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not right to seek a definition for everything - for some things an overview is to be had by analogy. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a33) | |
A reaction: This is what David Lewis called the 'way of example' in defining what is meant by 'abstract objects'. |
8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
Full Idea: Leibniz has an inclination to regard all truths as provable. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §15 | |
A reaction: Leibniz sounds like the epitome of Enlightenment optimism about the powers of reason. Could God prove every truth? It's a nice thought. |
574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It must be true, quite generally, that not everything can be proven, on pain of an infinite regress. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1006a09) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 1672, where the possibility of a circular set of mutual proofs is considered. Aristotle seems committed to the present idea. |
22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01) | |
A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it. |
22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36) | |
A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think. |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b16) | |
A reaction: This seems to be indicating a category mistake, as he warns us not to attribute the wrong kind of differentiae to something we are picking out. |
10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That which is as being true (and that which is not as being false) have to do with composition and division, ... (for truth involves assertion in the case of combination and denial in the case of a separation). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1027b22) | |
A reaction: This remark has the prospect of being spelled out precisely in terms of predication in modern logic |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In a true proposition the concept of the predicate is always present in the subject. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: This sounds very like the Kantian notion of an analytic truth, but Leibniz is applying it to all truths. So Socrates must contain the predicate of running as part of his nature (or essence?), if 'Socrates runs' is to be true. |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate is present in the subject; or else I do not know what truth is. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14) | |
A reaction: Why did he qualify this with "in a sense"? This is referred to as the 'concept containment theory of truth'. This is an odd view of the subject. If the truth is 'Peter fell down stairs', we don't usually think the concept of Peter contains such things. |
10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not in states of affairs that truth and falsity arise but in thinking. And for things that are simple and for essences, truth and falsity do not even arise in thinking. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1027b27) | |
A reaction: This might be viewed in the light of Tarski's theory, and the distinction between atomic sentences, which are just accepted, with a recursive account of more complex statements. Aristotle seems to have two theories of truth here (Cf. Idea 10916). |
10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Truth is either a putting-together or, if the thing has being, it has it in a certain way. Truth for these things is intuiting them. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b30) | |
A reaction: This seems to confirm what Aristotle says in Idea 10914, that there are two aspects to truth - the immediate grasp of atomic facts, and the assembling of complex facts. This resembles Tarski's construction of truth for complex sentences. |
21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: While both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a16) | |
A reaction: Interesting that 'piety' requires it. Piety doesn't figure much in Aristotle. He has just been talking about Platonic Forms. It would be an odd person who sacrificed a friendship for a trivial truth. |
19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Truth really belongs to the class of thoughts which are possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7) | |
A reaction: I like the fact that this ties truth to 'thoughts', rather than peculiar abstract unthought entities called 'propositions', but I take it that thoughts which are possible but not thought will thereby not exist, so they can't be true. |
19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: B: I concede that truth and falsity both pertain to thoughts and not to things. A: But this contradicts your previous opinion that a proposition remains true even when you are not thinking about it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7) | |
A reaction: I don't trigger the truth of a proposition by thinking about it - I see that it is true. But I dislike the idea that reality is full of propositions, which seems to be mad metaphysics. So I deny unthought propositions are true, because there aren't any. |
575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The man who mistakes a tetrad for a pentad is not as erroneous as he who takes it for a chiliad. But then, if they are not equally erroneous, this can only mean that one has less, and so one more, of the truth. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1008b32) |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true. |
13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One should choose the more intelligible hypothesis, and the truth is nothing but its intelligibility. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.91) | |
A reaction: This apparently simple observation strikes me as being rather profound. Our picture of the world is shaped entirely by what is intelligible to us. An odd notion of truth, though. The age of reason. See Idea 13158. |
15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not on account of our truly thinking that you are white that you are white; rather it is on account of your being white that we who assert as much are telling the truth. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b10) | |
A reaction: Some philosophers say this makes truth a derivative property, and is central to truth-maker theories. Kit Fine claims the reverse - that things exist because of the truths - but I don't really understand that (or agree with it). |
10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a12) | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to take 'beliefs' to be the truth-bearers. |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whereas the true statement [that there is a man] is in no way the cause of the actual thing's existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b18) | |
A reaction: Armstrong offers this as the earliest statement of the truthmaker principle. Notice the cautious qualification 'seem in some way'. The truthmaker dependence seems even clearer in falsemaking, where the death of the man falsifies the statement. |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place tomorrow - though it is necessary for one to take place OR not take place tomorrow. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a30) |
35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b12) | |
A reaction: I think being 'in harmony' is a better than 'corresponds' as an attempt at pinpointing the truth relationship. It seems impossible to pin down how 'the bus is coming' relates to the bus coming. |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Statements are true according to how things actually are. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a33) |
586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is, and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b20) | |
A reaction: It was very startling to discover Plato's Idea 13776, and realise that this famous and much-quoted idea of Aristotle's was not original to him. I find it very hard to disagree with any aspect of the idea. |
19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's formulation postulates no entities like facts. The things of which we say that they are or that they are not are the entities adverted to by the referring parts of sentences, not by sentences as wholes. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b21) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to refer to the existences or non-existences of things. Presumably this would mean referring not to an apple, but to a red apple or a green apple, seen as two different things, even though they were the 'same' apple? |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Let us be content with looking for truth in the correspondence between the propositions which are in the mind and the things which they are about. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.05) | |
A reaction: In an age when the nature of truth was hardly debated, and theories such as coherence and pragmatism, never mind semantic accounts, were unthought of, it is interesting to see that correspondence seems obvious to Leibniz. Correct! |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every body is sensitive to everything in the universe, so that one who saw everything could read in each body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and will happen. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §61) |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When Aristotle moved from basic name+verb (in 'De Interpretatione') to noun+noun logic...names had to be treated as special cases, so that 'Socrates' is treated as short for 'everything that is Socrates'. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Supp' | |
A reaction: Just the sort of rewriting that Russell introduced for definite descriptions. 'Twas ever the logicians' fate to shoehorn ordinary speech into awkward containers. |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Square of Opposition: horizontals - 'contraries' can't both be true, and 'subcontraries' can't both be false; verticals - 'subalternatives' have downwards-only implication; diagonals - 'contradictories' have opposite truth values. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12-13) | |
A reaction: This is still used in modern discussion (e.g. by Stalnaker against Kripke), and there is a modal version of it (Fitting and Mendelsohn p.7). Corners read: 'All F are G', 'No F are G', 'Some F are G' and 'Some F are not G'. |
22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
Full Idea: It was Aristotle who initiated the use of the letter of the (Greek) alphabet 'schematically', to stand for an unspecified piece of language of some appropriate grammatical type. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Aris' | |
A reaction: Did he invent it from scratch, or borrow it from the mathematicians? Euclid labels diagrams with letters. |
11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's logic is based on the triadic syllogism, the distinction between subject and one-place predicates, that universal claims have existential commitment, and bivalence, excluded middle and noncontradiction. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.2 |
18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle there are four formatives for sentences: 'belongs to some', 'belongs to every', 'belongs to no', and 'does not belong to every'. These are 'copulae'. Aristotle would have written 'wise belongs to some man'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3 | |
A reaction: A rather set-theoretic reading. This invites a Quinean scepticism about whether wisdom is some entity which can 'belong' to a person. It makes trope theory sound attractive, offering a unique wisdom that is integrated into that particular person. |
8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle identified four 'figures' of argument, based on combinations of Subject (S) and Predicate (P) and Middle term (M). The addition of 'all' and 'some', and 'has' and 'has not' got the property, resulted in 256 possible syllogisms, 19 of them valid. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: [Compressed version of Devlin] What Aristotle did was astonishing, and must be one of the key ideas of western civilization, even though a lot of his assumptions have been revised or rejected. |
13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Aristotle replaced the Platonic noun-verb account of logical syntax with a 'copular' account. A sentence is a pair of terms bound together logically (not necessarily grammatically) by one of four 'logical copulae' (every, none, some, not some). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C - Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics 8 | |
A reaction: So the four copulas are are-all, are-never, are-sometimes, and are-sometime-not. Consider 'men' and 'mortal'. Alternatively, Idea 18909. |
8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle listed a total of nineteen syllogisms involved in logical reasoning, though some of the ones on his list were subsequently shown to be invalid. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], Ch.1) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes | |
A reaction: It is quite upsetting to think that the founding genius got some of it wrong, but that just shows how subtle and complex the analysis of rational thought can be. |
13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's system accepted as correct some laws which nowadays we reject, for example |= (Some Fs are G) or (some Fs are not G). He failed to take into account the possibility of there being no Fs at all. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by David Bostock - Intermediate Logic 8.4 |
1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An axiom is a principle which must be grasped if anyone is going to learn anything whatever. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a17) |
562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Axioms are more general, and the principles of all things. If this does not belong to the philosopher, who else will have the job of considering truth and falsity in their case? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a09) |
573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A single science, that of the philosopher, also covers the axioms of mathematics. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1005a15) |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 1: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the contraries (not both true) of 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12a) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 2: 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P' are the subcontraries (not both false) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12b) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 3: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the contradictories (different truth values) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12c) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 4: 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P' are the contradictories (different truth values) of 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12d) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 5: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the subalternatives (first implies second) of 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12e) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 6: 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P' are the subalternatives (first implies second) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12f) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35) | |
A reaction: Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system. |
13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is a difficulty about part and whole, ...whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and in what way they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what way they are more than one. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 185b11), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.3 | |
A reaction: He only states the problem here, but doesn't pursue it. I take the real question of mereology to be what makes a many into a one. I don't see a problem with a many being simultaneously a one. |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10) | |
A reaction: Leibniz had a higher opinion of logic than contemporaries like Locke. The question is whether logic can actually teach us better order than we could otherwise manage, or whether it just describes what most thinkers do. |
19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Leibniz invented the concept of 'blind thought' - reasoning by a manipulation of characters without being able to recognise what each character stands for. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz |
12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Demonstrations by reduction to the impossible assume that everything is asserted or denied. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 77a23) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the lynchpin of classical logic. |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b10) |
12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 73b33) | |
A reaction: A key idea in mathematical logic, but it always puzzles me. If you snatch a random person in London, and they are extremely tall, does that prove that people of London are extremely tall? How do we know the arbitrary is representative? |
11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24b18) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is modal ('suppose', rather than 'know'), that necessity is involved, which is presumably metaphysical necessity, and that there are assumptions about what would be true, and not just what follows from what. |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: At bottom eternal truths are all conditional, saying 'granted such a thing, such another thing is'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.11.14), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4 | |
A reaction: Thus showing Leibniz to have sympathy with the if-thenist view. He cites geometry as his illustration. |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Unlike Aristotle, Stoics did not reject Bivalence for future contingencies; it is true or false that there will be a sea-fight tomorrow. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a31) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 1.2 | |
A reaction: I'd never quite registered this simple account of the sea-fight. As Williamson emphasises, one should not lightly reject the principle of bivalence. Has Aristotle entered a slippery slope? Stoics disagreed with Aristotle. |
22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle the principle of bivalence is primarily a principle of metaphysics, not logic. It applies to entities in the real order first, and to propositions in the rational order second. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5 | |
A reaction: This is because nothing is vague. Boulter says this is also the case with non-contradiction. I like this idea very much. I reject the Fregean picture of the autonomy of the rational order. Logic is powerful because it reflects reality. |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 17a01) |
12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of the fact that everything is either asserted or denied truly, we must believe that it is the case. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 71a14) | |
A reaction: Presumably this means that every assertion which could possibly be asserted must come out as either true or false. This will have to include any assertions with vague objects or predicates, and any universal assertions, and negative assertions. |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We judge to be false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §31) |
18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Aristotle often preferred to formulate predications by placing the terms at opposite ends of the sentence and joining them by predicating expressions like 'belongs-to-some' or 'belongs-to-every'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Conceptions' | |
A reaction: This is Sommers's picture of Aristotle, which led Sommers to develop his modern Term Logic. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you ask 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?', whether they are both at home or not there, the number of propositions is more than one. For if the answer is true, it does not follow that the question is a single one. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 176a08) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle is saying that some questions should not receive a 'yes' or 'no' answer, because they are equivocal. Arthur Prior cites this passage, on 'and'. Ordinary use of 'and' need not be the logical use of 'and'. |
3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Basic to Aristotle's logic is the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate, which he glosses in terms of the contrast between a substance and its properties. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro | |
A reaction: The introduction of quantifiers and 'logical form' can't disguise the fact that we still talk about (and with) objects and predicates, because no one can think of any other way to talk. |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Someone who goes wrong in relating an idea to a name will usually go wrong about the thing he wants the name to stand for. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.29) | |
A reaction: This seems to give tentative support to a Millian account of names, whose only content is just the thing which is named. Leibniz's observation certainly seems to be right. |
11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate. Belonging 'to every/to none' is universal; belonging 'to some/not to some/not to every' is particular; belonging or not belonging (without universal/particular) is indeterminate. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24a16) |
8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068. |
13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's way with axioms, rather than Euclid's, is as assumptions which we are willing to agree on while awaiting an opportunity to prove them | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 76b23-) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.07 | |
A reaction: Euclid's are understood as basic self-evident truths which will be accepted by everyone, though the famous parallel line postulate undermined that. The modern view of axioms is a set of minimum theorems that imply the others. I like Aristotle. |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To reduce the number of axioms is always something gained. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.06) | |
A reaction: This is rather revealing about the nature of axioms. They don't have any huge metaphysical status - in fact one might say that their status is epistemological, or even pedagogic. They enable us to get out minds round things. |
19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The true principle is that we can assign to every object its determined characteristic number. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677], p.18) | |
A reaction: I add this as a predecessor of Gödel numbering. It is part of Leibniz's huge plan for a Universal Characteristic, to map reality numerically, and then calculate the truths about it. Gödel seems to allow metaphysics to be done mathematically. |
11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 3: Is it the task of a single science to investigate all beings, or is it the task of fundamentally different sciences to investigate different kinds of being? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a15-25) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: One might ask whether neuroscience is entirely distinct from psychology, or partical physics from biology. |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should first address those puzzles ('aporiai') that first arise. ..Subsequent progress depends on the resolution of the first puzzles, and one cannot solve these without knowing the difficulty, and our confusion shows this to be the case. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995a27-) | |
A reaction: This stands in nice opposition to the Wittgenstein view, that confusion is largely a self-inflicted wound arising from our language, having little to do with reality. For Aristotle it is reality which is the source of our mental confusion. He's right. |
11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 4: Is the task of metaphysics only to investigate the (primary) beings or also to investigate the common characteristics of the (primary) beings? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a25-34) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Politis points out that metaphysics would then be in danger of collapsing into all sorts of special sciences. |
11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 1: Is it the task of a single science to investigate all the different causes and explanations of things, or is this the task of fundamentally different sciences? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0996a18-b26) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: [This is the 10,000th idea to be entered into this database - 1st February 2010, at 7:21pm] I think there are two sorts of philosopher - those, like myself, who cling on to the idea of one science, and the pluralists, perfectly happy with many. |
11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 2: Is it the task of a single science to investigate both the ultimate principles of being and the basic principles of reasoning (e.g. non-contradiction)? Or is this the task of fundamentally different sciences? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0996b26-997a15) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Although I favour the dream of one science dealing with everything, I hesitate over this aporia. I like the unity of modern science and metaphysics, but maybe logic precedes them both and has a different basis. Nice question! |
11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 5: Do only sense-perceptible things exist or do non-sense-perceptible things exist, too, in addition to or besides (para) sense-perceptible ones? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a34-998a19) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Nowadays we have discovered so much that is beyond our natural perceptions that it is obvious that there may be stuff we can never detect. ...And yet if 'to exist is to have causal powers' then everything would be detectable in principle. Hm. |
11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 9: Are principles one in kind, or one in number? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999b24-1000a04) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: A key aporia, which can be answered in both directions. In what respects are the essences of two different human beings identical? It is a key question for any essentialist. |
11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 6: Are the principles of a thing the kinds to which the thing belongs or are they rather the ultimate elements that are present in the thing and compose the thing? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0998a20-b13) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is the heart of the modern debate on essentialism, between sortal essentialists (Brody and Wiggins) and those basing essences on powers and basic stuff (Ellis, Fine). I say the sortal bunch are wrong, wrong, wrong. |
11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 7: If a thing's principle is its general kind, is that the most general kind to which it belongs, or the least general kind to which it belongs? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0998b13-999a23) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is a question for the sortal essentialists. I think it amounts to an argument against sortal essentialism, because there are nested kinds, and nothing to decide which one of them matters, |
11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 8: Do general kinds exist at all, in addition to the sense-perceptible particulars? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999a24-b24) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is beginning to confront the whole issue of natural kinds. It seems OK to say that the elements are natural kinds, but things get more difficult when you talk about 'planets' or 'tigers'. Aristotle decides there are natural kinds. |
11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 10: Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things the same, or different? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1000a05-1001a03) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Locke proposed that having a 'life' was an essential distinction between these two, but this has been rather undermined by modern biochemistry. Aristotle wants to know if nature is a unity. |
11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 11: Is primary being simply being itself and unity itself, or is primary being rather things that are and are one? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1001a04--b25) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: I can't make sense of 'being' in itself, though Heidegger seems to have devoted his life to the idea. It appears that Aristotle agrees with me. |
11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 12: Are numbers, solids, surfaces and points themselves the primary beings or are they primary beings only because other things (e.g. this horse) have such geometrical and in general mathematical properties? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1001b26-1002b11) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: The thinking of Pythagoras and Plato hovers behind this question. Aristotle seems to be groping for a compromise view. |
11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 13: Are there kinds ('eidé') in addition to or besides both sense-perceptible things and the entities postulated by mathematics? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1002b12-32) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This seems close to Aporia 8 (Idea 11269). I can't make sense of a kind which has no particulars, except as a fond memory, like the dodo, and a fictional entity like the gryphon. ...Or perhaps something we aim to bio-engineer. |
11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 15: Are the principles of things universals or particulars? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a05-17) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to be groping for a compromise answer. Explanations must be universal, but primary being seems to reside in the particulars. The modern idea of Aristotelianism is universals-only-in-particulars. |
11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 14: Are the elements of things potentialities and capacities for causing and generating those things or are they what actually causes and generates those things? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1002b32-1003a05) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: We would now call this a question about 'dispositions', and the consensus seems to be that they are potential rather than actual, since a vase may be fragile without having to actually break. |
560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should not see mathematical exactitude in all things, but only for things that do not have matter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995a14) |
12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is concerned with forms [eide]: its objects are not said of any underlying subject - for even if geometrical objects are said of some underlying subject, still it is not as being said of an underlying subject that they are studied. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 79a08) | |
A reaction: Since forms turn out to be essences, in 'Metaphysics', this indicates an essentialist view of mathematics. |
9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematics does not take perceptible entities as its domain just because its subject-matter is accidentally perceptible; but neither does it take as its domain some other entities separable from the perceptible ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a03) | |
A reaction: This implies a very naturalistic view of mathematics, with his very empiricist account of abstraction deriving the mathematical concepts within the process of perceiving the physical world. And quite right too. |
13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An infinite circle is impossible, since any circle is bounded by its circumference. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
A reaction: This is interesting if one is asking what the essence of a circle must be. If is tempting to say merely that the radii must be equal, but can they have the length of some vast transfinite number? The circumference must be 2π bigger. |
9790 | Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194a09) | |
A reaction: What a splendid remark. If the only specimen you could find of a very rare animal was maimed, you wouldn't be particularly interested in the nature of its injury, but in the animal. |
12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Something holds of an item in itself if it holds of it in what it is - e.g., line of triangles and point of lines (their essence comes from these items, which inhere in the account which says what they are). | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 73a35) | |
A reaction: A helpful illustration of how a definition gives us the essence of something. You could not define triangles without mentioning straight lines. The lines are necessary features, but they are essential for any explanation, and for proper understanding. |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What I value most in geometry, considered as a contemplative study, is its letting us glimpse the true source of eternal truths and of the way in which we can come to grasp their necessity, which is something confused sensory images cannot reveal. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.12) | |
A reaction: This is strikingly straight out of Plato. We should not underestimate this idea, though nowadays it is with us, but with geometry replaced by mathematical logic. |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Number we perceive by the denial of continuity. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425a19) | |
A reaction: This is a key thought. A being (call it 'Parmenides') which sees all Being as One would make no distinctions of identity, and so could not count anything. Why would they want numbers? |
10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should consider whether there is some other sort of substance, such as, perhaps, numbers. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a11) | |
A reaction: I don't think Aristotle considers numbers to be substances, but Pythagoreans seem to think that way, if they think the world is literally made of numbers. |
13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A plurality is a denumerable quantity, and a magnitude is a measurable quantity. A plurality is what is potentially divisible into things that are not continuous, whereas what is said to be a magnitude is divisible into continuous things. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1020a09) | |
A reaction: This illuminating distinction is basic to the Greek attitude to number, and echoes the distinction between natural and real numbers. |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one, whereas if there is one there is not necessarily two. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a29) | |
A reaction: The axiomatic introduction of a 'successor' to a number does not seem to introduce this notion of priority, based on inclusiveness. Introducing order by '>' also does not seem to indicate any logical priority. |
22962 | Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The least number, without qualification, is the two. …but in magnitude there is no least number, for every line always gets divided. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 220a27) | |
A reaction: Showing the geometrical approach of the Greeks to number. Two is the last number because numbers are for counting, and picking out one thing is not counting. |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A line is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b33) | |
A reaction: This appears to be the essential concept of a Dedekind cut. It seems to be an open question whether a cut defines a unique number, but a boundary seems to be intrinsically unique. Aristotle wins again. |
12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes no difference whether we speak of the particular or the one in number. For by the one in number we mean the particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999b33) | |
A reaction: This is the Greek view of 'one', quite different from the Frege or Dedekind view. I prefer the Greek view, because 'one' is the place where numbers plug into the world, and the one indispensable feature of numbers is that they can count particulars. |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Arithmeticians posit that a unit is what is quantitatively indivisible. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a22) | |
A reaction: Presumably indeterminate stuff like water is non-quantitatively divisible (e.g. Moses divides the Red Sea), as are general abstracta (curved shapes from rectilinear ones). Does 'quantitative' presupposes units, making the idea circular? |
17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The unit is stipulated to be indivisible in every respect. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052b35) |
17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose that all things that are ...were rectilinear figures - they would be a number of figures, and unity the triangle. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a03) | |
A reaction: This is how they program graphics for computer games, with profusions of triangles. The thought that geometry might be treated numerically is an obvious glimpse of Descartes' co-ordinate geometry. |
17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The original holder of the theory claimed ...that units came about when the unequals were equalised. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1081a24) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could count the things that were already equal. You can count days and count raindrops. The genius is to see that you can add the days to the raindrops, by treating them as equal, in respect of number. |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no multiplicity without true units. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30) | |
A reaction: Hence real numbers do not embody 'multiplicity'. So either they don't 'embody' anything, or they embody 'magnitudes'. Does this give two entirely different notions, of measure of multiplicity and measures of magnitude? |
9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's talk of the addition of ones cannot define number, since it cannot be specified how often they are added without using the number itself. Number must be an organic unity of ones, achieved by a single act of abstraction. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence §1 | |
A reaction: I doubt whether 'abstraction' is the right word for this part of the process. It seems more like a 'gestalt'. The first point is clearly right, that it is the wrong way round if you try to define number by means of addition. |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The definition of 'number' as a multitude of units is appropriate only for whole numbers. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.15) | |
A reaction: One can also define rational numbers by making use of units, but the strategy breaks down with irrational numbers like root-2 and pi. I still say the concept of a unit is the basis of numbers. Without whole numbers, we wouldn't call the real 'numbers'. |
17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A pair of men do not make some one thing in addition to themselves. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082a18) | |
A reaction: This seems to contrast nicely with Frege's claim about whether two boots are two things or one pair. |
646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is a vexed question whether, when we count and say 'one, two, three…', we are doing so by addition or by separate modules. We are, of course, doing both. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082b32) | |
A reaction: Note that this is almost Benacerraf's famous problem about whether or not 3 is a member of 4. |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
Full Idea: If we list the words 'bull', 'bull' and 'cow', it is often said that there are three 'word tokens' but only two 'word types', but Geach says there are not two kinds of object to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same object. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Perry - The Same F II | |
A reaction: Insofar as the notion that a 'word type' is an 'object', my sympathies are entirely with Geach, to my surprise. Geach's point is that 'bull' and 'bull' are the same meaning, but different actual words. Identity is relative to a concept. |
19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is nothing which is not subsumable under number; number is therefore a fundamental metaphysical form, and arithmetic a sort of statics of the universe, in which the powers of things are revealed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677], p.17) | |
A reaction: I take numbers to be a highly generalised and idealised description of an aspect of reality (seen as mainly constituted by countable substances). Seeing reality as processes doesn't lead us to number. So I like this idea. |
18090 | Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there is, unqualifiedly, no infinite, it is clear that many impossible things result. For there will be a beginning and an end of time, and magnitudes will not be divisible into magnitudes, and number will not be infinite. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 206b09), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 1.8 | |
A reaction: This is a commitment to infinite time, and uncountable real numbers, and infinite ordinals. Dedekind cuts are implied. Nice. |
22929 | Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle infinity is not so much a property of some set of objects - the numbers - as of the process of counting, namely of its not having a natural limit. This is 'potential' infinite | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 06 'Illusion' | |
A reaction: I increasingly favour this view. Mathematicians have foisted fictional objects on us, such as real infinities, limits and zero, because it makes their job easier, but it makes discussion of the natural world very obscure. |
13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nothing is actually infinite. A thing is infinite only potentially. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a21) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is the famous spokesman for this view, though it reappeared somewhat in early twentieth century discussions (e.g. Hilbert). I sympathise with this unfashionable view. Multiple infinites are good fun, but no one knows what they really are. |
19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I am so much for the actual infinite that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects nature everywhere in order to indicate the perfections of its author. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to Foucher [1693], p.99) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that, for Leibniz, while infinities indicate the perfections of their author, that is not the reason why they exist. God wasn't, presumably, showing off. Leibniz does not think we can actually know these infinities. |
13190 | I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus, I do not admit any real infinite numbers, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number. ..I consider infinitesimal quantities to be useful fictions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Masson [1716], 1716) | |
A reaction: With the phrase 'useful fictions' we seem to have jumped straight into Harty Field. I'm with Leibniz on this one. The history of mathematics is a series of ingenious inventions, whenever they seem to make further exciting proofs possible. |
22930 | Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle says that a length does not already contain, waiting to be discovered, an infinite number of parts; such parts only come into existence once they are defined by an act of division. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 07 'Two' | |
A reaction: If that is true of infinite parts then it must also be true of finite parts. So a cake has no parts at all until it is cut. That could play merry hell with discussions of mereology. Wholes are ontologically prior to parts. |
18833 | A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No continuum can be composed of indivisibles: e.g. a line cannot be composed of points, the line being continuous and the points indivisibles. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 231a23), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 7.4 | |
A reaction: Rumfitt observes that ' the basic problem is to say what the ultimate parts of a continuum are, of they are not points'. Early modern philosophers had lots of proposals. |
19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Leibniz said the division of the continuum should not be conceived 'to be like the division of sand into grains, but like that of a tunic or a sheet of paper into folds'. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], A VI iii 555) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: This from the man who invented calculus. This thought might apply well to the modern physicist's concept of a 'field'. |
18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nature uses the infinite in everything it does. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.1 | |
A reaction: [The quote can be tracked through Kitcher's footnote] He seems to have had in mind the infinitely small. |
18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We have only to keep in mind that to find a tangent means to draw a line that connects two points of a curve at an infinitely small distance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.1 | |
A reaction: [The quote can be tracked through Kitcher's footnote] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Far from approving the acceptance of doubtful principles, I want to see an attempt to demonstrate even Euclid's axioms, as some of the ancients tried to do. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.02) | |
A reaction: This is the old idea of axioms, as a bunch of basic self-evident truths, rather than the modern idea of an economical set of propositions from which to make deductions. Demonstration has to stop somewhere. |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is by the natural light that the axioms of mathematics are recognised. If we take away the same quantity from two equal things, …a thing we can easily predict without having experienced it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], p.189) | |
A reaction: He also says two equal weights will keep a balance level. Plato thinks his slave boy understands halving an area by the natural light, but that is just as likely to be experience. It is too easy to attribut thoughts to a 'natural light'. |
17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Number is plurality as measured by unity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1057a04) |
17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One is the principle of number qua number. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052b21) |
17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The reason for saying of each number that it is many is just that it is ones and that each number is measured by the one. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1056b16) |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous. ...Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and place. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b20) | |
A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be extremely illuminating, when comparing natural numbers with real numbers, and it is the foundation of the Greek view of mathematics. |
9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians abstract perceptible features to study quantity and continuity ...and examine the mutual relations of some and the features of those relations, and commensurabilities of others, and of yet others the proportions. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1061a32) | |
A reaction: This sounds very much like the intuition of structuralism to me - that the subject is entirely about relations between things, with very little interest in the things themselves. See Aristotle on abstraction (under 'Thought'). |
13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since there are not only separable things but also inseparable things (such as, for instance, things which are moving), it is also true to say simpliciter that the objects of mathematic have being and that they are of such a sort as is claimed. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1077b31) | |
A reaction: This is almost Aristotle's only discussion of whether mathematical entities exist. They seem to have an 'inseparable' existence (the way properties do), but he evidently regards a denial of their existence (Field-style) as daft. |
12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the de-ontologization of mathematics draws the beautiful into the place of the true. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 14 |
9974 | Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there are ten sheep and ten dogs, the number is the same (because it does not differ by a numerical difference), but it is not the same ten (because the objects it is predicated of are different - dogs in one instance, horses in the other). | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 224a2-14) | |
A reaction: Mega! Abstract objects are unique, and can't be 'added' to themselves. I think we need 'units' here, because 2+2 adds four units, so each 2 refers to something different. '2' must refer to something other than itself. |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
Full Idea: For an understanding of arithmetic the grasp of an operation's being performed 'so many times' is quite indispensable; and abstraction of a feature from groups of nuts cannot give us this grasp. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.170) | |
A reaction: I end up defending the empirical approach to arithmetic because remarks like this are so patently false. Geach seems to think we arrive ready-made in the world, just raring to get on with some counting. He lacks the evolutionary perspective. |
13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are-potentially while others are-actually. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 327b24) | |
A reaction: I've read a lot of Aristotle, but am still not quite clear what this distinction means. I like the distinction between a thing's actual being and its 'modal profile', but the latter may extend well beyond what Aristotle means by potential being. |
568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are called things that are because they are substances, other things are called things that are because they are affections of a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b07) |
12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Δ.7 Aristotle lists four kinds of being ('to on'): incidental being, per se being, potential and actual being, and being as truth. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a07-) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1 | |
A reaction: These don't seem to be mutually exclusive, though the first two are, and potential and actual are. They look like three ways of getting at being. |
11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle says there are two proper uses of the term 'being': firstly, for whatever falls into one of Aristotle's ten basic categories of thing, and secondly for whatever makes a proposition true. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a21-35) by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91 | |
A reaction: The first sounds circular, because the categories must be selected for whatever has being (see Idea 11196). The first sounds Fregean, and very congenial to modern philosophy (though you need a clear notion of 'true'). Or it is being as truth-makers. |
11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The subject [to hupokeimenon, the underlying thing] is that of which other entities are said, it itself never being said-of anything else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b36) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core or basis of being in 'Categories', which is rejected in favour of the more substantial (and determinate and explanatory) 'essence' in 'Metaphysics'. |
15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the thing has being, it has it in a certain way and, if it does not have being in a certain way, it does not have being at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b34) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a key remark in ontology, and one that may not have been sufficiently heeded by Hegel and Heidegger. The only way to investigate being qua being is to investigate ways of being, which involves identity, categories etc. |
611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Being qua being, taken universally and not in regard to some part of it, is the domain of the science of philosophy. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1060b23) |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not true to say that what is not, since it is thought about, is something that is; for what is thought about it is not that it is, but that it is not. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 21a31) | |
A reaction: At least there has been one philosopher who was quite clear about the distinction between a thought and what the thought is about (its content). Often forgotten! |
11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For something to be a primary being ('proté ousia') is for it to be a being, something that is, simply in virtue of itself ('kath' hauto') and not in virtue of its relation to other things. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: He criticises his 'Categories' view, because if primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication the primary being is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate; it would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for primary being. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: Thus, Politis argues, primary being is essence in the later work. The words 'substance' and 'ousia' cause confusion here, and must be watched closely. Wedin argues that Aristotle merely develops his 'Categories' view, but most disagree. |
11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks there are three main candidates for primary being: the particular, the universal and the essence, and Aristotle will defend the third of these. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028a33-6) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 | |
A reaction: If you really want to understand this idea, you must study this bit of the text carefully, and examine the translation of key terms like 'ousia'. Lawson-Tancred's translation gives a very different picture from Politis's commentary! |
11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle distinguishes three different answers to the question 'What is primary being?'; it is universals (which he thinks is Plato's answer); or it is the ultimate subject of predication (his answer in 'Categories'); or the essence (in 'Metaphysics'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b25-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4 | |
A reaction: I note that Michael Wedin argues that 'Metaphysics' is a development of 'Categories' rather than a change of view. The middle view has been unpacked nicely in modern discussions. The claim of essences needs more clarification. |
11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle argues that non-primary beings either do not have an essence at all, or they have an essence only in a derived way. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: While I presume that Aristotle takes 'being' to be a univocal concept, he nevertheless divides it into 'primary' (or independent) and 'non-primary' (or dependent) being. His main subject of study is the primary version. |
11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: On any interpretation, Aristotle argues that primary being with regard to each thing is both the essence of that thing and the ultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This is Politis's prelude to an account of conflicting interpretations over whether 'ousia' has one or two meanings for Aristotle. |
566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing else besides individuals, how is it possible to have a science of infinity? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999a25) |
16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle argues that the various senses of being must be understood with reference to being in one primary sense, the being of substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1 Intro) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance | |
A reaction: This I take (with limited knowledge of such things) to be the key message that needs to be grasped by the followers of Hegel and Heidegger, who seem to think you can grasp Being either directly, or through human experience of it. |
570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that one man and a man in existence and a man simpliciter are the same thing. Nothing is added by extending the expression to 'He is one man' and 'He is one man that is'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b28) | |
A reaction: A suggestion of a redundancy theory of truth. |
12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A strong case can be made for the claim that it is the primary subject (to hupokeimenon) that is substance (ousia) to the fullest extent. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a01) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that 'ousia' is best translated as 'being'. Aristotle eventually rejects the view in this idea, which is roughly the idea of that being is mainly the bare substratum. |
10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That which is means a thing with thisness, a quantity or a quality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b12) | |
A reaction: I'm happy with a 'quantity' to exist, either in countable or in non-countable form, but not totally convinced that we should treat 'qualities' as fully existing, given their dependence. |
16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The accounts of the other bearers of being depend on the account of substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b26) | |
A reaction: This is the distinctively Aristotelian approach to the problem of Being. |
11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Apparently Aristotle thinks that if something is not a determinate and well-defined thing ..then it is not a being at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics | |
A reaction: See Aristotle's account of 'matter', which seems to fit Politis's view. It is hard to go all the way with Aristotle on this, as indeterminate gunk (e.g. mud, which Plato so disliked!) seems to thoroughly exist. But for us it rests on determinate atoms. |
13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' virtually no existence questions are posed, and the whole discussion is about substances (fundamental units of being). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What 1 | |
A reaction: This means that the basic metaphysical question is actually about identity, though Schaffer claims that it is about grounding. Why would we care about grounding? Aristotle cares most about what makes a thing the thing it is. |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What is not truly one being is not truly a being either. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30), quoted by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 1 | |
A reaction: Badiou quotes this as identifying Being with the One. I say Leibniz had no concept of 'gunk', and thought everything must have a 'this' identity in order to exist, which is just the sort of thing a logician would come up with. |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I would like to know how we could have the idea of being if we did not, as beings ourselves, find being within us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: I could envisage a creature with an entirely 'externa' mind, that just focused on environment, and took its own place in it unthinkingly for granted. I suppose he's right, though. |
5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 221b36) | |
A reaction: This must make Aristotle sympathetic to Platonism in mathematics, even though he rejects the full theory of Forms. Such a view is not uncommon among modern philosophers. Presumably the incommensurability is true in all possible worlds? 'In'? |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the necessary and non-necessary are first principles of everything's either being or not being. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 23a18) |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God. |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'? |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do. |
5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We rise to metaphysics by saying 'nothing takes place without a reason', then asking 'why is there something rather than nothing?, and then 'why do things exist as they do?' | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §7) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. This is what we pay philosophers for - to attempt to go to the heart of the mystery, and then start formulating the appropriate questions. The question of 'why this?' is the sweetest question. The first one seems a little intractable. |
19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can now show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what is not active is nothing. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (True Method in Philosophy and Theology [1686], p.64) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's rebellion against the Cartesian idea that all that matters for natural existence is spatial extension. I agree (tentatively) with Leibniz's vision of nature here. Modern physics reveals a seething turmoil beneath the placid exterior. |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13) |
16115 | Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Change is the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this actuality. Thus, the actuality of a thing's capacity for alteration, in so far as it is a capacity for alteration, is alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 201a10) | |
A reaction: Not very informative, until you add Idea 16114, telling us that potentiality is best seen as 'power'. Then we have 'all change is the active expression of powers', which strikes me as rather interesting. |
16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In that which underlies a change there is a factor corresponding to the definition [logon] and there is a material factor. When a change is in these constitutive factors there is coming to be or passing away, but in a thing's qualities it is alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a24) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key summary of Aristotle's account of change, in the context of his hylomorphism (form-plus-matter). The logos is the account of the thing, which seems to be the definition, which seems to give the form (principle or structure). |
16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When a change occurs in the qualities [pathesi] and is accidental [sumbebekos], there is alteration (rather than true change). | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a27) | |
A reaction: [tr. partly Gill] Aristotle doesn't seem to have a notion of 'properties' in quite our sense. 'Pathe' seems to mean experienced qualities, rather than genuine causal powers. Gill says 'pathe' are always accidental. |
12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since we must distinguish the substratum and the property whose nature is to be predicated of the substratum,..there is alteration when the substratum persists...but when nothing perceptible persists as a substratum, this is coming-to-be and passing-away. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b08-16) | |
A reaction: As usual, Aristotle clarifies the basis of the problem, by distinguishing two different types of change. Notice the empirical character of his approach, resting on whether or not the substratum is 'perceptible'. |
16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature [phusis] is in the same genus as dunamis [power/potential], for it is an active principle of change, but not in another thing but in the thing itself qua itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1049a09) | |
A reaction: [Gill's translation; Lawson-Tancred refers to 'A nature' rather than 'nature', which implies an essence]. It seems like phusis is intrinsic, and dunamis is relational. Two sorts of power? |
22960 | The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The sophists assume that being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-marketplace. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219b19) | |
A reaction: This is what has now been called 'Cambridge change', which is merely change in relations, with no intrinsic change. It is laughed at, but it is a phenomenon worth pointing out, as long as it is not mislabelled, or misunderstood. |
13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every coming-to-be is a passing away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a07) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the closest that Aristotle gets to sympathy with the Heraclitus view that all is flux. When a sparrow dies and disappears, I am not at all clear what comes to be, except some ex-sparrow material. |
15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An actuality is thought most normally to be a process. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a30) | |
A reaction: He comments of this that he wishes to include entelechies (unified items) in the general account, and not just processes. To present everything as fundamentally a process is a hard story to tell with full coherence, I think. |
17262 | Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's distinction between four different kinds of aitia ('becauses'?) arguably involves the recognition of grounding in the formal and material aitia. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a24) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2 | |
A reaction: Insofar as the other two (efficient and final) involve explanation, one might say that they too involve a different sort of grounding. Is a statue 'grounded' in the sculptor, or in the purpose of the statue? |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32) | |
A reaction: shadows and objects |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably by called prior by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b12) | |
A reaction: Not so clear when you seek examples. The bus is prior to its redness, but you can't have a colourless bus, so being coloured is prior to being a bus. Aristotle's example is a man being prior to the truths about him. |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order … - for example, the triangle in the quadrilateral, or the nutritive part of animate things in the perceptual part. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 414a28) | |
A reaction: 'Prior' seems to be a value for Aristotle, which is never present in modern discussions of ontological relations and structure. Priority tracks back to first principles. |
11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Prior things can have being without posterior things, without the posterior being able to have being without the prior, to adopt Plato's distinction. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a04) | |
A reaction: Fine quotes this, in expounding Aristotle's account of essence. |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One thing 'expresses' another (in my terminology) when there exists a constant and fixed relationship between what can be said of one and of the other. This is the way that a perspectival projection expresses its ground-plan. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.10.09) | |
A reaction: Arnauld was puzzled by what Leibniz might mean by 'express', and it occurs to me that Leibniz was fishing for the modern concept of 'supervenience'. It also sounds a bit like the idea of 'covariance' between mind and world. Maybe he means 'function'. |
19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own viewpoint or relationship to the rest, so that all are in perfect correspondence with one another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Identity in Substances and True Propositions [1686], p.98) | |
A reaction: Thus 'expression' (something like mapping what is exterior) is the mechanism through which God achieves harmony in the universe. Instants of time are said to be successive moments of perfect harmony. |
7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: Leibniz believes in monads because it would be contrary to reason or divine wisdom if everything was compounds, down to infinity; there must be ultimate unified building-blocks; they cannot be material, for material things lack genuine unity. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.3 | |
A reaction: It is hard to discern the basis for the claim that only immaterial things can have unity. The Greeks proposed atoms, and we have no reason to think that electrons lack unity. |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A multiplicity can only be made up of true unities, ..so I had recourse to the idea of a real and animated point, or an atom of substance which must embrace some element of form or of activity in order to make a complete being. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a combination of logical atomism and panpsychism. It has a certain charm, but looks like another example of these rationalist speculators overreaching themselves. |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals. |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date. |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Even if monads are not extended, they nonetheless have a certain kind of situation in extension. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8 | |
A reaction: This is the kind of metaphysical mess you get into if you start from the wrong premisses (in this case, a dualism of the spiritual and the material). Later (Garber p.359) he says they are situated because they 'preside' over a mass. |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A monad alone is a substance; a body is substances not a substance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704.01.21), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8 | |
A reaction: So how many monads in a drop of urine, as Voltaire bluntly wondered. I take the Cartesian dualism (without interaction) that ran through Leibniz's career to be the source of most of his metaphysical problems. In late career it went badly wrong. |
5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What (in the analysis of substances) exist ultimately are simple substances - namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general terms, 'monads', which are without parts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §7) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be atomistic panpsychism. He is opposed to physical atomism, because infinite divisibility seems obvious, but unity is claimed to be equally obvious in the world of the mental. Does this mean bricks are made of souls? Odd. |
19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4) | |
A reaction: Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive. |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same universe. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], V §91), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: We can accept that the universe itself does not contain contradictions (how could it), but it is a leap of faith to say that all monads represent the universe well enough to avoid contradictions. Maps can contradict one another. |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is never clear in the 'Monadologie' how exactly the world of extended bodies is related to the world of simple substances, the world of non-extended and mind-like monads. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: Leibniz was always going to hit the interaction problem, as soon as he started giving an increasingly spiritual account of what a substance, and hence marginalising the 'force' which had held centre-stage earlier on. Presumably they are 'parallel'. |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A monad's natural changes come from an internal principle, ...but there must be diversity in that which changes, which produces the specification and variety of substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §11-12) | |
A reaction: You don't have to like monads to like this generalisation (and Perkins says Leibniz had a genius for generalisations). Metaphysics must give an account of change. Succeeding time-slices etc explain nothing. Principle and substance must meet. |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The general name 'monad' or 'entelechy' may suffice for those substances which have nothing but perception and appetition; the name 'souls' may be reserved for those having perception that is more distinct and accompanied by memory. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §19) | |
A reaction: It is basic to the study of Leibniz that you don't think monads are full-blown consciousnesses. He isn't really a panpsychist, because the level of mental activity is so minimal. There seem to be degrees of monadhood. |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If that substantial chain [vinculum substantiale] for monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, continual dreams perfectly in agreement. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: [The first appearance, apparently, of the 'susbtantial chain' in his writings] I take this to be a hugely significant move, either a defeat for monads, or the arrival of common sense. Spiritual monads must unify things, so they can't just be 'parallel'. |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they make up, not something one per se, but only a mere aggregate, unless some substantial chain is added. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.05.26) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement in the Des Bosses letters of the need for something extra to unite monads. Since the main role of monads was to replace substances, which are only postulated to provide unity, this is rather a climb-down. |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads aren't a principle of operation for things outside of themselves. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This is why Leibniz has got into a tangle, and is proposing his 'substantial chain' to join the monads together. I suspect that he would have dumped monads if he had lived a bit longer. |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Leibnizians with their monads have constructed an incomprehensible hypothesis. They have spiritualized matter rather than materialising the soul. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Julien Offray de La Mettrie - Machine Man p.3 | |
A reaction: I agree with La Mettrie. This disagreement shows, I think, how important the problem of interaction between mind and body was in the century after Descartes. Drastic action seemed needed to bridge the gap, one way or the other. |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: In the end Leibniz dethroned Aristotelian continuants, seen as imperfect from his point of view, in favour of monads. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 3.1 | |
A reaction: I take the 'continuants' to be either the 'ultimate subject of predication' (in 'Categories'), or 'essences' (in 'Metaphysics'). Since monads seem to be mental (presumably to explain the powers of things), this strikes me as a bit mad. |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Can you really maintain that a drop of urine is an infinity of monads, and that each one of these has ideas, however obscure, of the entire universe? | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Francois-Marie Voltaire - works Vol 22:434 | |
A reaction: Monads are a bit like Christian theology - if you meet them cold they seem totally ridiculous, but if you meet them after ten years of careful preliminary study they make (apparently) complete sense. Defenders of panpsychism presumably like them. |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Divide terms, objects of ideas, into abstract and concrete, then the abstract into absolute and relational, the absolute into attributes and modifications, and those two into simple and composite; the concrete are substances and their substantial things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.22) | |
A reaction: Make your tree from this: ABSTRACT{absolute[attributes(simple)(composite)][modifications(simple)(composite)],relations}CONCRETE{[substance][substantial form]} |
12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Even if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: I find this response more satisfactory than his response in Idea 12740. As a supporter of the coherence account of justification, I take the closest we get to knowledge to be when our full critical faculties and experience are brought to bear, and shared. |
12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: I would say that this is clutching at straws, as there is no reason at all to deny that dreams could be thoroughly coherent and predictable in their events. We must just live with these doubts, not try to defeat them. |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If there were no divisions of matter in nature, there would be no things that are different; just the mere possibility of things. It is the actual division into masses that really produces things that appear distinct, which presupposes simple substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
A reaction: This shows Leibniz to be a straightforward realist about the physical world, and certainly not an 'idealist', despite the mind-like character of monads. I take this to be an argument for reality from best explanation, which is all that's available. |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We don't have, nor should we hope for, any mark of reality in phenomena, but the fact that they agree with one another and with eternal truths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1706.01.19) | |
A reaction: Elsewhere he says that divisions in appearance imply divisions in matter. Now he adds two further arguments in favour of realism, but admits that nothing conclusive is available. Quite right. |
12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is a double thing, being both potential and actual. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this-such of a this-such. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1087a12) | |
A reaction: Charlotte Witt identifies this as a key idea in 'Metaphysics', since the metaphysics is built on the epistemology, and this idea justifies the claim that Aristotle gives priority to particulars. I thoroughly approve. Not all knowledge is of the universal. |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no reality in anything except the reality of unities. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704.06.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: This seems to leave indeterminate stuff like air and water with no reality, as nicely discussed by Henry Laycock. Do we just force unities on the world because that is the only way our minds can cope with it? |
11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's main objection against the materialists (such as Thales and Anaximenes) is that they cannot explain why things change as they do. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0988b23-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In actual things nothing is indefinite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1706.01.19) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the germ of the controversial modern view of Williamson, that vagueness is entirely epistemic, and that the facts of nature are entirely definite. Thus there is a tallest short giraffe, which I find a bit hard to grasp. |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's list of ten categories proved to be the most influential scheme found in his works: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Being-in-a-position, Having, Doing, Being affected. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian schedule of categories - substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, and so forth - appears to peter out inconsequentially. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 5544 for Kant's attempt to classify categories. Personally I like the way Aristotle's 'peter out'. That seems to me a more plausible character for good metaphysics. |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b25) | |
A reaction: This sums up the earlier of Aristotle's two metaphysical view, and each of this categories is discussed in the present text. |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, and there will be one science for each genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004a04) | |
A reaction: This is robustly realist, and right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophy. It explains why essences and forms must be given through genera and differentiae, even though essences are individual. Genera are the only way to identify things. |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The scheme of categories is very useful, and it might be that all that is needed are five general headings for beings - namely substance, quantity, quality, action or passion, and relation - with any formed by composition from those. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10) | |
A reaction: 'Action or passion' as a single category sounds intriguing. He is very keen on active force in the world of physical objects, which presumably falls into this category. His plan sounds, initially, as good as any I have heard. |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have worked out his list of categories by considering various questions that one might ask about a particular object, such as What is it? How big is it? How is it qualified? And Where is it? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance | |
A reaction: Of course, to think of his questions, Aristotle already had categories in his mind. How would he approach a proposal to recategorise reality more efficiently? |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It can be said that whatever we truthfully distinguish or compare is also distinguished or made alike by nature, although nature has distinctions and comparisons which are unknown to us and which may be better than ours. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.06) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be correct, though it is more like the credo of the sensible realist than it is like any sort of argument. |
16656 | The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even though two separated things have a single interval between them, still the separation from here to there is not one and the same as the separation from there to here. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 202b19) | |
A reaction: His example is the road from Athens to Thebes. Since we tend to quantify distances between places more than Aristotle did, we are less impressed by this distinction, which seems a bit subjective. Aristotle seems to be thinking of vectors. |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Aristotle categorised relations as accidents - Socrates's whiteness, the sphericity of this ball - entities dependent on substances. Relations are not substances, so they must be, if anything at all, accidents. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], §7) by John Heil - Relations 'Historical' | |
A reaction: Heil says this thought encouraged anti-realist views of relations, which became the norm until Russell. |
10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argued that relations could be reduced to monadic properties and so were dispensable, and some still agree, saying relations supervene on monadic properties of the relata, and are not actually real. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 7.4 | |
A reaction: At the very least a background of space and/or time seem required, in addition to any properties the relata may have. y only becomes 'to the left of x' when x appears to its right, so the relation doesn't seem to be intrinsic to y. |
13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The relations which connect two monads are not in either the one or the other, but equally in both at once; and therefore properly speaking, in neither. I do not think you would wish to posit an accident which would inhere simultaneously in two subjects. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G II:517), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 2.4.3 | |
A reaction: Where Russell affirms relations as universals, and scholastics make them properties of individuals, Leibniz denies their reality entirely. It seems obvious that once the objects and properties are there, the relations come for free. |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: No one can become a widower in India because of the death of his wife in Europe unless a real change occurs in him. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], GP ii 240), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz heroically denying so-called 'Cambridge Change'. It is hard to see how a widower is changed if he has not yet heard the bad news. But his situation in life has changed. Compare eudaimonia, which you can lose without realising it. |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the ratio of two lines L and M is conceived as abstracted from them both, without considering which is the subject and which the object, which will then be the subject? We cannot say both, for then we should have an accident in two subjects. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th Paper, §47), quoted by John Heil - Relations 'External' | |
A reaction: [compressed] Leibniz is rejecting external relations as having any status in ontology. It looks like a mistake (originating in Aristotle) to try to shoehorn the ontology of relations into the substance-properties framework. |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Aristotle held that there could be no uninstantiated properties. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 04) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
A reaction: This is obviously a right hook aimed at Plato. Clearly we can think about uninstantiated properties, but the literal truth of Aristotle's view I would take to be tautological. To exist is to be instantiated. |
16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: On Aristotle's new theory it is forms that exist in their own right, whereas properties merely constitute the way forms of a certain kind are realized at some point of time in their existence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.80 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that 'merely' gives us enough of a story here. I never understand the word 'realised' (or 'instantiated', come to that). What does x have to do to realise y? Is that a relation between a real and a non-real thing? |
15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle conceives of the necessary features of objects, traditionally known as the 'propria' or 'necessary accidents', as being distinct and derivate from, the essential features of objects. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1 | |
A reaction: This is a vague area, because Aristotle says very little about it. See Ideas 12266 and 12262. A particular shape of mole might be yours alone, but not part of your essence. That may be an 'idion' rather than a 'propria' (or are they the same?). |
17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That which is different is different from something under some aspect, so that there must be something the same in respect of which they differ. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054b26) |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle is taking a first step in making the distinction between objects and properties central to ontology. This plays virtually no role in Plato, and was overshadowed by the distinction between general and particular. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle I | |
A reaction: Frede says he gets in a tangle because he mixes the earlier and the new views. Because we are nowadays in a total muddle about properties, I'm thinking we should go back to the earlier view! Modern commentators make him a trope theorist. |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If, however, one is aiming at truth, one must be guided by the real connexions of subjects and attributes. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 81b22), quoted by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3 | |
A reaction: I take this to be a warning that predicates that indicate mere 'Cambridge properties' (such as relations, locations, coincidences etc) have nothing to do with ontology. See Shoemaker on properties. |
7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's metaphysics of substance, there are only as many properties as actually inhere in existent spatiotemporal particulars. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This would mean, oddly, that squareness ceased to be a property if the last square thing vanished. But then how do we establish the existence of unrealised properties? Is 'bigger than the biggest existent object' a property? |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of things there are, some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01a20) | |
A reaction: See? 'Being a man' is not a property of a man! Only the properties which are 'in' the man are properties of the man. The rest are things which are said 'of' men, usually as classifications. A classification is not a property. |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29) | |
A reaction: This is the key passage in all of Aristotle for sortal essentialists like Wiggins, especially the word 'only'. I take it that this observation is superseded by the Metaphysics. Definition is the route to substance (which involves general terms). |
10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b28) | |
A reaction: This has to be a key basic distinction in any discussion of properties. But does the difference in explanation entail a difference in fundamental nature? Femaleness is structural. |
16644 | The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to separate [affections/accidents], both in respect of quantity and of quality - of quantity, because there is no minimum magnitude, and of quality, because affections are inseparable. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 188a11) | |
A reaction: This is an aspect of his famous view that universals, if there are such, are inherent in objects, and can't float free. It was important for scholastic philosophers, who need accidents to float free for the doctrine of Transubstantiation. |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In Categories 8 there are four species of qualities: States and conditions, Natural capacities and incapacities, Affective qualities or affections, and Shape and external form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], Ch.8) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 |
10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose we only ever saw bronze circles - would that make the bronze a formal part of the circle? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036b01) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle spotting the problem of coextensionality (the renate/cordate problem) 2300 years ago. Don't underestimate those Greeks. |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
Full Idea: Attributes should not be thought of as identifiable objects. It is better to follow Frege and compare them to mathematical functions. 'Square of' and 'double of' x are distinct functions, even though they are not distinguishable in thought when x is 2. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11) | |
A reaction: Attributes are features of the world, of which animals are well aware, and the mathematical model is dubious when dealing with physical properties. The route to arriving at 2 is not the same concept as 2. There are many roads to Rome. |
5117 | Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the nature of light and heavy things to tend in certain directions, and this is what it is to be light or heavy; to be light is defined by an upwards tendency, and to be heavy is defined by a downwards tendency. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 255b14) | |
A reaction: The discredited 'teleological' view of gravity, and yet if we define 'heavy' in Newtonian terms we are in danger of circularity, and of proposing laws which are bafflingly imposed from outside. Hence the 'New Essentialists' prefer Aristotle's view. |
16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Potentiality [dunamis] is a principle of change either (a) for something else or (b) for the thing that it is in qua something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1046a10) | |
A reaction: Gill emphasises that it is partly an active principle of change. It seems like an ability to affect, or to be affected. |
16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: When Aristotle uses the word 'dunamis' in the active sense, we might prefer the translation 'power', 'ability', or 'capacity' to 'potentiality'. He uses the same word to indicate both active power and passive responsiveness. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Theta) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This gives licence to a direct link between Aristotle's account of potential and modern ascriptions of powers in scientific essentialism. |
12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The primary mechanical axiom is that the whole cause and the entire effect have the same power [potentia]. ..This depends on the definition of cause, effect and power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De arcanus motus [1676], 203), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: This is a useful reminder that if one is going to build a metaphysics on powers (which I intend to do), then the conservation laws in physics are highly relevant. |
12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'. |
12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The force or proximate cause of these changes [of position] is something more real, and there is sufficient basis to attribute it to one body more than to another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §18), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: The force is said to be 'more real' than geometry. Leibniz seems to have embraced fairly physical powers in the period 1678-1698, and then seen them as more and more like spirits. |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The clearest idea of active power comes to us from the mind. So active power occurs only in things which are analogous to minds, that is, in entelechies; for strictly matter exhibits only passive power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: If this is meant to be a precise argument, then 'so' and 'only' are blatantly unjustified. I guess that if it isn't analogous to a mind then he won't allow it to be a TRUE active power! I say mind arises from the entelechies of the physical brain. |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If 'power' is the source of action, it means more than aptitude or ability. It also includes endeavour. It is in order to express this sense that I appropriate the term 'entelechy' to stand for power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.22) | |
A reaction: An 'entelechy' is, roughly, an instantiated thing, but I like what Leibniz is fishing for here - that we will never understand the world if we think of it as passive. |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What I take to be the indivisible or complete monad is the substance endowed with primitive power, active and passive, like the 'I' or something similar. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: I love powers, so I really like this quotation. By this date even Garber thinks that he has more or less arrived at his mature view of monads. I used to think monads were mad, but I now think he is closing in on the right answer - sort of. |
11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle undoubtedly considered the central characteristic of the ultimate cause of change to be activity [energeia]. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 12) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 8.8 | |
A reaction: Aristotle identifies this, of course, with his 'God', but it strikes me that the word 'power' (as in Molnar) seems to capture Aristotle's concept. We just need some fundamental active force to get the whole shebang going. |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Over and above what can be deduced from extension, we must add and recognise in bodies certain notions or forms that are immaterial, so to speak, or independent of extension, which you can call powers [potentia], by which speed is adjusted to magnitude. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Natura Corporis [1678], A6.4.1980), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: He boldly asserts that the powers are 'immaterial', but is then forced to qualify it (as he often does) with 'so to speak'. The notion that bodies just have extension (occupy space) comes from Descartes, and is firmly opposed by Leibniz. |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Each indivisible substance contains in its nature the law by which the series of its operations continues, and all that has happened and will happen to it. All its actions come from its own depths, except for dependence on God. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1688.01.4/14) | |
A reaction: I take the combination of 'laws' and 'forces', which Leibniz attributes to Aristotelian essences, to be his distinctive contribution towards giving us an Aristotelian metaphysic which is suitable for modern science. |
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Fardella [1690], A6.4.1670), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: In all of Leibniz's many gropings towards what is at the heart of a unified object, I pounce on the phrase "the first active faculty" as the one that suits me. I take that to be a 'power'. It has two characteristics - it is active, and it is basic. |
12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Since everything that one conceives in substances reduces to their actions and passions and to the dispositions that they have for this effect, I don't see how one can find there anything more primitive than the principle of all of this, which is force. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Jacques Lenfant [1693], 1693.11.25), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to connect Aristotelian essentialism with the notion of force in the new physics, and strikes me as an improvement on the original, and as good a basis for metaphysics as any I have heard of. |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must be a case of 'action' in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs in the substance spontaneously, arising out of its own depths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, which fits in with scientific essentialism. The question is whether Leibniz has idenified the end point of all explanations. Cutting edge physics is trying to give further explanations for what seemed basic, such as mass and gravity. |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary powers are what make up the substances themselves; derivative powers, or 'faculties' if you like, are merely 'ways of being' - and they must be derived from substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.03) | |
A reaction: We might talk of 'deep' and 'surface' properties, or maybe 'powers' and 'qualities' is better. 'Primary' and 'derivative' only gives the logical relationship, but not the causal relationship. |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I relegate derivative forces to the phenomena, but I think that it is clear that primitive forces can be nothing other than the internal strivings of simple substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1705.01), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8 | |
A reaction: I like 'internal strivings', which sounds to me like the Will to Power (Idea 7140). There seems to be an epistemological challenge in trying to disentangle the derivative forces from the primitive ones. |
15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One actuality always has temporal priority over another, going back to that which always, and in a primary way, initiates process. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1050b05) | |
A reaction: I am not clear from the context whether he is referring to things which have fundamental powers, or whether he is referring to the one great First Cause. |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the eye were an animal, sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed it is no longer an eye,except in name. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b18) | |
A reaction: This is a drastic view of form as merely function, which occasionally appears in Aristotle. To say a blind eye is not an eye is a tricky move in metaphysics. So what is it? In some sense it is still an eye. |
16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who propose that a house is 'a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings', or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1043a16) | |
A reaction: This, with Idea 16752, endorses the idea that the function is the essence of something. The eye is natural, the house is an artifact. This seems different from the concept of form implied elsewhere. He says materials of a house are just potential. |
13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of substances consists in the primitive force of action, or the law of the sequence of changes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675], 1676) | |
A reaction: [a 1676 note on Foucher's reply] It take these to be the two key distinctive Leibnizian contributions to the sort of metaphysic that is needed by modern science. Nature works with intrinsic essences, which are forces determining action. |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper. |
12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's form contains both sensation and appetite, and he seems to associate appetite with the ability a body has to act on another. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: It strikes me (you may be surprised to hear) that this concept is not unlike Nietzsche's all-mastering 'will to power'. I offer Idea 7140 in evidence. |
13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In Leibniz's view, the essence of a thing is fundamentally the real possibilities of that thing. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 4.3.3 | |
A reaction: Note that the essences are individual. On the whole I would prefer Leibniz in his own words, but this is too good to lose (..but see Idea 12981). It is the aspect of Leibniz that fits perfectly with modern scientific essentialism. |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science. |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without. |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I maintain that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: Thus there could be no 'tabula rasa', because that would be an inactive mental substance. This strikes me as a nice question for modern physicists. Do they regard movement as essential, or an addition to bare particles? I'm with Leibniz. Essentialism. |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I believe that our thought is completed and terminated more in the notion of the dynamic [i.e. force] than in that of extension. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], G II 170), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: Presenting this as the place where 'our thought' is 'terminated' seems to place it as mainly having a role in explanation, rather than in speculative metaphysics. |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads. |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this? |
15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Potentiality in geometry is spoken of metaphorically. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019b31) | |
A reaction: The point here is that if one wanted to give an account of properties in an active way (perhaps in accord with causation, as Shoemaker suggests), then the properties of mathematics could also be included in this Aristotelian way. |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Powers which are not essential to substance, and which include not merely an aptitude but also a certain endeavour, are exactly what are or should be meant by 'real qualities'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.23) | |
A reaction: An important part of Leibniz's account. There are thus essential powers, in the 'depth' of the substance, and more peripheral powers, which also initiate action, and give rise to the qualities. The second must derive from the first? |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Where will one ever find in the world a faculty consisting in sheer power without performing an act? There is always a particular disposition to action, and towards one action rather than another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: This is muddled. Leibniz defends powers in the possibilities of things, but he must then accept that some possibilities may never be realised, as with two complex chemicals which never ever come into contact with one another. |
15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the Megaran view, there will be nothing cold or hot or pleasant or perceptible at all unless someone is currently observing it. So this Megaran wisdom turns out to boil down to rehashed Protagoras. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a10) | |
A reaction: I don't think you can defeat the rejection of modal features of reality that easily. The Megarans might, I suppose, be called verificationists. What is the semantic value of a statement about potential? |
15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: I take it that anything deprived of its potential lacks capacity. But then anything not currently happening will lack the capacity to happen. ...Our brilliant Megaran friends will now have done away with all process and generation! | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a15) | |
A reaction: The reply, implied in Idea 15490, is that you answer this by examining more closely exactly what is meant by a 'capacity', and showing that it can only boil to down to what is actual. |
11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is a popular view in Megara, that x is capable of being/doing the F only when it actually is/does the F. So the non-builder is no bearer of a potentiality for building - but only when the builder is engaged in his building. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1046b28) | |
A reaction: This Megaran view is the extreme denial of dispositions are real features of the world. They seem to reduce to mere descriptions, when the reality is the actual activity itself. Megarans would now be called 'actualists'. |
11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance of each thing is something that is peculiar to each thing, not pertaining to anything else, whereas the universal is something common. Indeed, a thing is said to be a universal just if its nature pertains to a plurality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b10) | |
A reaction: This should be a warning to those who talk of the 'Aristotelian' view of properties as universals instantiated in the particulars. Once one has pinpointed the substance, the subject of predication, and the essence, no room is left for universals. |
12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: The notion of generality provides an explanation for Aristotle's position that the universal - every universal - is indeterminate and, hence, the object of potential knowledge. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], univs) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.3 | |
A reaction: [See Idea 12095 for knowledge of potential and actual] Now you're talking! The idea that universals are central to true knowledge seems wildly misguided. All knowledge is rooted in particulars, where the highest certainties are to be found. |
1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There need be no forms (one item apart from the many) for demonstrations. But there must be universals, where one thing holds of the many. Without universals there are no middle terms, and so no demonstrations. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 77a05) |
649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1086b03) |
12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No universal exists over and above, and separately from, the particulars. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040b27) | |
A reaction: [At last I have found one of Aristotle's most famous ideas!] His hallmark of a universal is that it is found in many particulars, but then we ask whether they are identical (universals) or merely resembling (tropes). |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b02) | |
A reaction: This may be just a truism, or it may be the Aristotelian commitment to universals only existing if they are instantiated. |
10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose that there are certain substances to which neither other substances nor other natures are prior. It is such substances that certain philosophers assert the Forms to be. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1031a30) | |
A reaction: Then there is the difficulty of explaining 'prior', which presumably must be an objective relation, not a mere priority in human understanding or explanation or definition. |
643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How can the Forms, while being the substances of things, have being separately from them? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1080a01) |
633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you accept the theory of Forms, you must allow that there is also another more powerful principle. Only thus can you answer the question why something has come to participate, or is participating. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075b18) |
16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: On account of the difficulty [about unity] some philosophers have espoused participation, though this plunges them into difficulties about what the cause of the participation is, or indeed what participating is anyway. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b07) | |
A reaction: The target here is Plato, and I agree with the criticism. Exactly the same problems face those who talk of an object 'instantiating' a property. I have no idea what such a relationship could be. |
647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The root problem of the theory of Forms is that they posit Forms that are universal and at the same time Forms that are separable and therefore particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1086a28) |
9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Forms would have to function as paradigms not just for other entities, but also for themselves. ..But this produces an absurd fusion of the paradigm and the copy. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1079b28) | |
A reaction: A nice succinct statement of the problem of self-predication (which leads to the Third Man regress, if we posit another Form as a paradigm of the Form we are interested in). |
5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might ask: what on earth do you mean by speaking of the thing-itself? - assuming the definition of man is one and the same both in man and in man-himself; for qua man they will not differ at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a32) | |
A reaction: Effectively applies Ockham's Razor to the Forms. Do they add anything to our ability to explain? A particular man will have red hair, but a definition of man will mention properties shared by all men. But doesn't man-himself indicate what is essential? |
640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All methods employed to demonstrate the Forms either cannot be formulated validly, or produce Forms even for those things for which there are not supposed to be any Forms. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1079a04) |
641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Argument from Sciences produces Forms for every possible object of science! One-over-many arguments produce Forms for negations! The Argument from the Thought of a Perished Object gives Forms for destroyed things! | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1079a07) |
16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why is man not Animal and Biped together? Then it will not be by participating in Man (or any other unity) that men exist but by doing so in two things, Animal and Biped. Then man would not be a unity but a plurality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a17) | |
A reaction: This is perhaps Aristotle's deepest metaphysical objection to the whole Plato programme, that it blocks a decent account of the unity of particulars, on which our whole understanding of the world rests. |
4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
Full Idea: The debate between Platonists and Aristotelians about universals is not a debate about the 'location' of the properties, but about the ontological independence of the properties from their instances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082) by J.P. Moreland - Universals Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Of course, assertions about their location might have strong implications about whether they were ontologically independent. |
605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there are Forms (as the purely logical thinkers claim), there must be something which is much more knowable than the Form of Knowledge, and something more fully moved than the Form of Movement. The Forms will be mere potentialities. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1050b32) |
27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nor will the Good be any more good by being eternal, if a long-lasting white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b05) | |
A reaction: A powerful point, made with a hint of sarcasm. You can't add extra Form of White to increase the whiteness of your paint. And the paint is no whiter because it endures for years. |
1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We can say goodbye to the forms. They are nonny-noes; and if there are any they are irrelevant - for demonstrations are not concerned with them. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 83a34) |
645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: On our theory two is part of three….so it will not be possible for a number to be a Form, on pain of one Form's being present in another and all Forms turning out to be parts of some one. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082b29) |
28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How will one who has had a vision of the Idea itself become thereby a better doctor or general? | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a12) | |
A reaction: Plato might reply that it would motivate them. Why would a doctor learn of the skills of their craft if they didn't care about the end result? |
16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: None of the things predicated in common picks out a this-thing-here, but rather such-and-such a kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1039a01) | |
A reaction: He is in the process of denying that predicates pick out real substances [real being, 'ousia'], but this is clearly aimed at Plato. |
618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is no advantage at all in the admission of eternal substances, as in the Theory of Forms, unless there is among them a principle capable of moving something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071b11) |
642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1079b08) |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed of anything else is verbal and vacuous. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217b20) | |
A reaction: This is clear evidence for suggesting that Aristotle is a nominalist. Elsewhere his essentialism suggests otherwise, but clearly on grumpy days he thought that universals were mere verbal conventions. |
19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good. |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle abandons the notion of an individual which he had relied on in the 'Categories', since it presupposes that there are general things, that there are universals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Ah, very illuminating. So all the way through we have a concept of individuals, first relying on universals, and then relying on hylomorphism? I suppose a bundle theory of individuals would need universals. |
16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The concrete, particular object actually is a composite not just of matter and form, but also a large number of accidents, like size, weight, colour. So we should not assume that the composite of matter and form is identified with the concrete particular. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.74 | |
A reaction: That gives a nice well-rounded picture of how we should understand a physical object, to fit it into the rest of our conceptual scheme, and the way we think about it. |
16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With things that do not have matter, they are all unities of a kind simpliciter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b24) | |
A reaction: Are all abstract objects unities? Are all sets Aristotelian unities? Only the brackets unify a disparate bunch of things. Are the primes one object or many? If many, each one needs an intrinsic unity to pick it out. The group of primes lacks matter. |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Real (as opposed to logical) abstract terms, or at least those which are conceived as real, are either essences or parts of essences, or else accidents (i.e. beings added to a substance). | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.08) | |
A reaction: Interesting to refer to accidents as 'beings'. This seems to fit abstraction by ignoring, since you can either ignore the accidents to get the essence, or ignore the essence to get the accidents. |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Things which are uniform, containing no variety, are always mere abstractions: for instance, time, space, and the other entities of pure mathematics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: I presume that being 'mere abstractions' denies them ontological status, and makes them creations of thought. If so, I like this idea a lot. |
10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers treat that is which not by making the logical point that that which is not is - not without qualification, but just that it is a thing which is not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a22) | |
A reaction: He is mainly refer to the mature works of Plato, especially 'Parmenides', in which he seems to have been mesmerised by that problem of referring to what doesn't exist. Key question: is there more than one way to 'exist'? |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142) | |
A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects. |
12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Later in 'Metaphysics' Aristotle sees form as offering better prospects of separability and being a this, and treats separability and being a 'this' as better indicators of substancehood than not being a predicable. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.5 | |
A reaction: 'Form' will be the word 'eidos', which is also Plato's word for his 'Forms'. I'm thinking that form will bestow individual identity, as in the snubness of a particular nose, where merely being 'a nose' only gives general identity. |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for us to know individuals or to find any way of precisely determining the individuality of any thing except by keeping hold of the thing itself. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: 'The tallest woman in London' seems to determine someone perfectly well, though only by cross-referencing universal concepts like 'tall'. |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Important relations are duration (order of successive things) and position (order of coexisting things) and interaction. Position without a thing mediating is presence. Beyond these is connection when things move one another. Thus things seem to be one. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the best account I can find of his epistemological angle on the unity of things. They are symptoms of the inner power of unification, and he says that God sees these relations most clearly. |
11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each man has knowledge when we think that he knows the primary cause or explanation ('proté aitia'). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0983a25) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the best starting point for individuation. Finding the 'origin' is not quite the same as finding the cause, and finding the 'role' or 'function' is parasitic on the underlying explanation or cause. |
12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: By 1680 Leibniz had clearly abandoned the 'whole entity' conception of individuation, for a conception grounded in substantial form alone. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: In other words, Leibniz became more of an Aristotelian, and more of an essentialist. |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If two individuals were perfectly similar and equal and, in short, indistinguishable in themselves, there would be no principle of individuation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the main motive for Leibniz's unusual claim that there cannot be two indiscernible individuals, but it looks suspiciously like an a priori claim made about what should be an a posteriori discovery. Are electrons distinguishable? |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That there should be a persistent law of the series, which involves the future states of that which we conceive to be the same, is exactly what I say constitutes it as the same substance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 4 'Applying' | |
A reaction: The 'law of the series' is a bit dubious, but it is reasonable to say that a substance is individuated by its coherent progress of change over time. Disjointed change would imply an absence of substance. The law of the series is called 'primitive force'. |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is by means of things that we must distinguish one time and place from another, rather than vice versa. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: This rests on Leibniz's relative view of space (as opposed to Newton's absolute view). If you need to re-identify a thing to individuate it, re-identifying the exact place or time seems impossible, but it is usually manageable with thing. |
12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A body is defined as that which exists in space. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Confessio naturae contra atheistas [1669], A6.1.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: A very early view. Leibniz notes that this tells you nothing about shape and motion. |
16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It just is not the case that individuals are the individuals they are by virtue of some intrinsic essential distinguishing mark. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.78 | |
A reaction: That invites the question what does distinguish qualitatively identical things from one another. I'm not sure if Aristotle even bothers about that question. |
13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Leibniz takes the laws-of-the-series to play a haecceitistic role. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 7.5 | |
A reaction: Idea 13092 for law-in-the-series. He thinks that a law-in-a-series is unique to a substance, and so can individuate it. That is a pretty good proposal, if anything is going to do the job. Perhaps I do believe in haecceities, as unique bundles of powers? |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In addition to the difference of time or of place there must always be an internal principle of distinction: although there can be many things of the same kind, it is still the case that none of them are ever exactly alike. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: This rests on Leibniz's unusual view that all things (even electrons) are qualitatively distinct. Personally I disagree with that, but agree with the idea. Things have time and place because they have identity, not the other way around. |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: The reason Aristotle gives for calling species and genera substances is that of what is predicated only they reveal what the primary substance is. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29-37) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.6 | |
A reaction: Thus we should not be misled into thinking that the genus and species ARE the essence. We edge our way towards the essence of an individual by subdividing its categories. |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even things in the same species have different causes, differing not, evidently, by species but in as much as particular things have different causes. For instance, your matter, form and motive cause are all different from mine. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071a27) | |
A reaction: Yes! This is the answer to my problem of the docile tiger, which has its own character, as well as the generic form of a tiger. Aristotle is firmly committed to the priority of individual over species. |
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why will a man be a two-footed terrestrial animal and not an animal and terrestrial? Assumptions do not make it necessary that what is predicated form a unity - rather, it is as if the same man were musical and literate. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 92a30) |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Fluidity is the fundamental condition, and the division into bodies is carried out - there being no obstacle to it - according to our need. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.13) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is referring to what he usually calls 'aggregates', like piles of bricks, which are things lacking a unifying substance. There may be no true substances, in which fluidity is the order of the day. |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Geach argued that the notion of absolute identity should be abandoned. ..We can only grasp the meaning of a count noun when we associate it with a criterion of identity, expressed by a particular relative identity sortal. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Hawthorne - Identity | |
A reaction: In other words, identity needs categorisation. Hawthorne concludes that Geach is wrong. Geach clearly has much common usage on his side. 'What's that?' usually invites a categorisation. Sameness of objects seems to need a 'respect'. |
16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Z it seems that it is the form that provides the object with its identity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics | |
A reaction: See Aristotle on 'Hylomorphism' for what this means. By form he means a combination of structure, dispositions and controlling principles. |
590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are numerically one in matter, formally one in their account, generically one in their pattern of predication [genos], and one by analogy if related to a further one. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b30) | |
A reaction: Very subtle distinctions. What I like is that the notion of numerical unity is comprehensively tied to the notion of individual identity. 'To be is to be countable' may be wrong, but it is better than Quine's 'to be is to be the value of a variable' |
603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes man a unity, and not a plurality of, say, animal and biped? Especially if, as some claim, Animal Itself and Biped Itself exist. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a13) |
10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Our conclusion is as follows: with things that are primary and spoken of per se, the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing and the thing itself are one and the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a05) | |
A reaction: It is tantalizing to know whether or not Aristotle has really said anything here. It might be clearer if we said 'a thing is its essence', but that may not be quite what he is saying. [P.S. V.Politis translates as 'essence'!] |
17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Among things naturally simple those [may] have unity and priority fully whose processes are relatively indivisible and simple. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a20) | |
A reaction: This is the first of four theories of unity which he offers for discussion. If the process bestows unity, you then have to judge the process as unified. If the indivisibility bestows unity, then things other than processes can be indivisible. |
17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A thing may be formally indivisible, something cognitively and scientifically indivisible. Hence what cause substances to be single things should be thought of as the primary unity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a31) | |
A reaction: This is his fourth and final proposal for unity, and it is obviously his preferred theory, because it is the hylomorphic view, that the form or nature of the thing bestows the unity. It is sort of right, but a rather thin theory as it stands. |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Philosophy cannot be better reduced to something precise, than by recognising only substances or complete beings endowed with a true unity, with different states that succeed one another; all else is phenomena, abstractions or relations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: This idea bothers me. Has the whole of modern philosophy been distorted by this yearning for 'precision'? It has put mathematicians and logicians in the driving seat. Do we only attribute unity because it suits our thinking? |
16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: For there to be a certain persisting law which involves the future states of that which we conceive as one and the same continuant, this is what I say constitute's a substance's identity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G II:264), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 3.1 | |
A reaction: This is a key remark for those who thing 'persistence conditions' are basic to metaphysics. I'm not so sure. |
17041 | Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants and simple bodies like earth, fire, air, and water. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 192b09) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, he seems to include lives, and elements, but nothing in between, like planets or stones. |
17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: [A thing may be unified because it is] the numerically indivisible, the particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a30) | |
A reaction: One of four possible theories of unity. This one seems to beg the question, or only to offer unity as a primitive, unanalysable concept. Only abstract objects strike us as utterly indivisible. |
17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are one by contact, some by mixture, and some by position. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082a16) | |
A reaction: So if several things are stuck together, or mixed together, or in the same location, that can unify them? They sound rather weak modes of unification. |
13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In general those things that do not admit of division [diairesis] are one insofar as they do not admit of it. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b03) | |
A reaction: Aristotle gives a man, an animal and a magnitude as examples. The interesting thing here is that being 'one' seems to come in degrees, where most metaphysicians long for oneness to be an absolute. |
17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The reason why all things are unities is indivisibility. In some, it is indivisibility with regard to movement, in others with regard to thought and the account. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a35) | |
A reaction: This is puzzling, since Aristotle wasn't an atomist, and therefore thought that everything was endlessly divisible. He might better have said that unified things 'strongly resist division'. |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response. |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are degrees of accidental unity, and an ordered society has more unity than a chaotic mob, and an organic body or a machine has more unity than a society. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30) | |
A reaction: This immediately invites questions about the extremes. Why does the very highest degree of 'accidental unity' not achieve 'true unity'? And why cannot a very ununified aggregate have a bit of unity (as in unrestricted mereological composition)? |
17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Other things get to be unities by dint of the fact that the account [logos] of them is single, ...a thought about which is a single thought, ...which is an indivisible thought, ..which is a thought about a formally or numerically indivisible object. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a28) | |
A reaction: This highlights the distinction between things that seem intrinsically unified, and things on which we bestow unity. But note that towards the end of the quotation Aristotle elides the two together. |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A pair of diamonds is merely an entity of reason, and even if one of them is brought close to another, it is an entity of imagination or perception, that is to say a phenomenon; contiguity, common movement and the same end don't make substantial unity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: This invites the question of what you have to do to two objects to give them substantial unity. The distinction between unity 'of reason' and unity 'of perception' is good. |
12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
Full Idea: Leibniz is committed with apparent consistency to both a purely qualitative character of all thisnesses, and to primitiveness of individual identity. He regards thisnesses as conjunctions of simpler, logically independent suchnesses. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 5 | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz is held to say that all of the qualitative properties are 'essential' to the object, since all of them are needed to constitute its identity. Hence absolutely nothing about an object, even an electron, could be different, which is daft. |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought. |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is nothing contrary to substances,…. and a substance does not admit of a more and a less. If this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b33) |
16172 | Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The only thing which is not predicated of some underlying thing is substance, while everything is predicated of it. But the same goes for substances too: there is something underlying them too, which they come from. Plants from seeds, for example. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190b01) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I presume 'substance' here is 'ousia'. Aristotle's quest is to pin down 'that which lies under', but this shows that if he identified it, he wouldn't have located what is ultimate. The explanation of a plant extends beyond the plant. |
16623 | We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The underlying nature is an object of knowledge, by an analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, wood to a bed, or matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature of substance, the 'this' or existent. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191a08) | |
A reaction: Scholastics were perfectly aware of this cautious approach. It is only the critics who jeer at Aristotelians for claiming to know all about the essences of things. Essence is like the Unmoved Mover, inferred but unknown. |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: 'Categories' treats something's being an ultimate subject as a test for being a primary substance, but it does not treat its primary objects as complex bodies consisting of matter and form. In that case, is the composite or a feature the ultimate subject? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Gill is trying to throw light on the difference between 'Categories' and 'Metaphysics'. Once you have hylomorphism (form-plus-matter) you have a new difficulty in explaining unity. The answer is revealed once we understand 'form'. |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The cause of its being for everything is its substance. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b12) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if 'substance' here means essence. We no longer see the cause of something's being as intrinsic to the thing. Only previous causes produce things. The 'form' must be the intrinsic cause of being. |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle argues the primary being (proté ousia) is the ultimate subject of predication (to hupokeimenon, meaning 'that which lies under'), nowadays referred to as the 'particular substance' view. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4 | |
A reaction: Politis says that Aristotle shifts to the quite different view in 'Metaphysics', that primary being is essence, rather than mere subject of predication. |
12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian substance is prior in three ways: it is prior to nonsubstance in being separate, it is prior in definition, and it is prior in knowledge. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 2.4 | |
A reaction: 'Being separate' means it doesn't dependent on anything else, so it is prior because it is fundamental, in relations of ontological dependence. |
11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance', or 'proté ousia' as 'primary substance'. 'Substance' is a particular answer to the question 'What is proté ousia?' The Latin 'substantia' means 'that which lies under', translating 'to hupokeimenon'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], subst) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be rather important in the exegesis of Aristotle's metaphysics, but Politis seems to hold a minority view, even though what he says here is very persuasive. |
19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §8) | |
A reaction: This is the unusual Leibnizian view of such things, which he takes to extremes. I think it depends on whether you are talking of predicates, or of real intrinsic properties. I don't see how what happens to a substance can be contained in the subject. |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every substance is alive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: The most charitable interpretation of this is that substances are what have unity, and the best model of unity that we can grasp is the unity of an organism. The less charitable view is that he literally thinks a pebble is 'alive'. Hm. |
592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have endlessly discussed and been baffled by the question 'What is that which is?' Now this question just is the question 'What is substance (ousia)?' | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b04) | |
A reaction: Vasilis Politis says 'ousia' is 'primary being'. 'Substance' is a theory about the nature of primary being. |
11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: We choose to translate 'proté ousia' (often simply 'ousia') as 'primary being' and not as 'primary substance'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 | |
A reaction: His point, explained later, is that the idea that 'ousia' is substance is a theory being proposed by Aristotle, not the meaning of the word. |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One will never find a body of which it may be said that it is truly one substance, ...because entities made up by aggregation have only as much reality as exists in the constituent parts. Hence the substance of a body must be indivisible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.11) | |
A reaction: Leibniz rejected atomism, and he evidently believed that pure materialists must deny the real existence of physical objects. Common sense suggests that causal bonds bestow a high degree of unity on bodies (if degrees are allowed). |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Substantial unity requires a complete, indivisible and naturally indestructible entity, since its concept embraces everything that is to happen to it, which cannot be found in shape or motion. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.11.28/12.8) | |
A reaction: Hence if a tile is due to be broken in half (Arnauld's example), it cannot have had unity in the first place. To what do we refer when we say 'the tile was broken'? |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every bodily substance must have a soul, or at least an entelechy which is analogous to the soul. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.10.09) | |
A reaction: He routinely commits to a 'soul', and then pulls back and says it may only be an 'analogy'. He had deep doubts about his whole scheme, which emerged in the late correspondence with Des Bosses. This not monads, says Garber. |
12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The concept of forces or powers ..for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De primae philosophiae emendatione [1694], G IV 469), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: My own experience was that as soon as I encountered the notion of a 'power' in the metaphysics of science (see Molnar on this) the whole thing began to form a coherent picture. Powers rule. |
13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I consider the notion of substance to be one of the keys to the true philosophy. ....I imagine that philosophers will one day know the notion of substance a bit better than they do now. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699.01.20/30) | |
A reaction: This is a controversial remark at this historical moment, when the apparent Aristotelian commitment to substances was becoming discredited. Personally I would eliminate substance, but not just because physicists don't refer to it. |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Within each substance there is a perfect bond between the future and the past, which is what creates the identity of the individual. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite sure if this means anything, but the idea that a bond across time is a necessity for intrinsic identity is interesting. The 'bond' would, I take it, have to be a causal one. |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. ...For example, an individual man - one and the same - becomes pale at one time and dark at another. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04a10/20) |
569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If, in the case of things that are, the primary object is substance, then we can state the fundamental duty of the philosopher: it is to gain possession of the principles and causes of substances. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b19) |
615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The enquiries of the pre-Socratic philosophers were really into the principles, elements and causes of substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1069a20) |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In aggregates one must necessarily arrive either at mathematical points from which some make up extension, or at atoms (which I dismiss), or else no reality can be found in bodies, or finally one must recognises substances that possess a true unity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: Garber calls this Leibniz's Aggregate Argument. Leibniz is, of course, talking of physical aggregates which have unity. He consistently points out that a pile of logs has no unity at all. But is substance just that-which-provides-unity? |
599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It may well be necessary that certain unobserved substances exist as it is, even if we cannot know which they are. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a02) |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'. |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178 | |
A reaction: The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text. |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change. |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11) | |
A reaction: This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'. |
16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's mature ontology takes biological organisms as its paradigm substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1 | |
A reaction: 'Mature' is here to eliminate 'Categories' where, I take it, any coherent object counts as a substance, with the categories giving the essence. Organism are more clearly categorised, but that's all. Van Inwagen makes this idea a key one. |
16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In Categories a primary substance has ontological priority, where other things depend on its existence, ..but in Metaphysics he emphasizes conceptual priority, where the primary is what is understood through itself (a definable unity). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro | |
A reaction: Interesting for my view of essence as rooted in explanation. It is the Metaphysics version that appeals to me. A metaphysics is constructed from our modes of understanding. 'Concavity' is his example of a primary unity. |
7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686]), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro | |
A reaction: Leibniz isn't a pantheist, so he does not identify God with the universe, so it is a bit revealing that substance could reflect either one or the other, and he doesn't seem to care which. In the end, for all the sophistication, he just made it up. |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif) | |
A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz. |
600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Fire, earth, water and air, and other simple bodies are agreed to be substances, as are plants, plant parts, animals, animal parts, and the heavens and their parts. Forms and mathematicals are more controversial. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1042a07) |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A unit is a positionless substance, and a point a substance having position. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 87a36) |
7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, it is the very essence of substances to be sources of activity. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This makes the views of Leibniz sympathetic to modern essentialism (of which I am a fan), because it places active power at the centre of what it is to exist, rather than action being imposed on matter which is otherwise passive. |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The very substance in things consists of a force for acting and being acted upon. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §08) | |
A reaction: Garber places this text just before the spiritual notion of monads took a grip on Leibniz. He seems to have thought that only some non-physical entity, with appetite and perception, could generate force. Wrong. |
595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: On this account as it stands, it is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a10) |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1 | |
A reaction: Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'. |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances [ousiai] most strictly. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03a04) | |
A reaction: This points to a rather minimal account of substance, as possibly the 'bare particular' which has no other role than to have properties. This expands in 'Metaphysics' to be matter which has form, making properties possible. |
11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are said to be substance [ousia] because, far from being predicated of some subject, other things are predicated of them; in another way, for an intrinsic thing, it is the cause of being for it, as the soul is for the animal | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a13-23) | |
A reaction: This passage is used by M. Woods and others to argue that Aristotle has two different meanings for 'ousia' [substance, being]. Vasilis Politis argues against this view (pp.228). Aristotle is probably making two observations about a single thing. |
12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The essence (to ti en einai), whose account (logos) is a definition, is also said to be the substance (ousia) of the particular. So there are two accounts of 'ousia' - as ultimate subject (hupokeimenon), never predicated of others, or as a this (tode ti). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a22-) | |
A reaction: This slightly muddling assertion seems to be a report of how people use 'ousia', rather than Aristotle's theory. Attempts to translate this idea into English make fascinating reading! Hang on to the Greek, or you'll never get the hang of it! |
10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance of a particular thing is variously held to be that which it was to be that thing, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject, which is that of which other entities are said, but is never itself being said-of anything else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b30) | |
A reaction: This formulation sounds worryingly verbal to me, but I don't suppose Aristotle meant it entirely that way. |
11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It may seem that matter is substance, but this cannot be so, because what we think to be the central features of substance are separability and thisness. Then it seems more plausible to say that the form and the composite are substance than matter is. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a27) | |
A reaction: This is an important basic point, because modern materialism takes matter (of some sort) to be basic, but Aristotle seems to take identity (and form and essence) to be basic, and matter to be merely at their service. |
10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance is the form dwelling in the object, and from it the substance that is a composite of the form and of matter is said to be a substance. So concavity is a substance, the composite of which and of nose are snub nose and snubness. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a29) | |
A reaction: So there is simple substance [ousia?] and composite substance. Notice the startling example that concavity is a substance. Think hard about that. Substance, but not as we know it, Jim. |
12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle | |
A reaction: Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'? |
12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance of each thing ...is the primary cause of being for it. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b27) | |
A reaction: Wedin says that here Aristotle announces this 'with finality'. This is 'for each thing', and hence is essence at the level of the individual, not of the kind. Identifying the 'cause of being' of a thing is taken to be its best possible explanation. |
607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: None of the universals can be a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1053b13) |
12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view. |
11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The claim that 'proté ousia' is substance is a particular answer to 'What is proté ousia?', so 'substance' is not what it means. The Latin 'substantia' translates Aristotle's 'to hupokeimenon' ('that which lies under'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 | |
A reaction: It seems that in 'Categories' Aristotle identified 'primary being' with 'that which lies under', but the notion of 'essence' comes into the picture in 'Metaphysics'. Big problems of textual exegesis. |
12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle holds that substances are distinct from other beings by virtue of their high degree of unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4 | |
A reaction: It seems to me that the notion of 'substance' (translating 'ousia' thus) can't mean anything more than 'being with identity'. Then 'essence' is offered as that which bestows the identity on the being. |
13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: To the traditional idea of substance (independent, subjects of predication, active, persistent) Leibniz adds, distinctively, complete individual concept, law-of-the-series, active force, form and soul or entelechy. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.1 | |
A reaction: 'Form' seems to be Aristotelian, and 'soul' seems ridiculous. I don't think the 'complete concept' is much help. However, the 'law-in-the-series' is very interesting (Idea 13079), if employed sensibly, and 'active force' is spot-on. Powers define reality. |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I maintain that substances (material or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their bare essence devoid of activity; that activity is of the essence of substance in general | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref 65) | |
A reaction: Leibniz liked the idea that God was the source of this activity, but this remark makes Leibniz a direct ancestor of modern scientific essentialism. |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another. |
16174 | A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What it is to be shapeless is different from what it is to be bronze. …An underlying nature is related to substance as, in general, matter (which is to say, something shapeless), before it gains shape, is to something with shape. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190b39-) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting take on the modern problem that the bronze seems to be a separate 'object' from the statue. If bronze is amorphous stuff, it has no shape, presumably because it has no significant shape. |
16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The form of a statue depends upon bronze (or some similar stuff) for its existence, while the bronze has no comparable need for the form of the statue. The bronze can exist before acquiring the form, and continue after the form has been removed. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Some would cite this as precisely the modal difference between them that seems to suggest they are two objects. I would say that their different status shows that they shouldn't be thought of as two 'objects'. An object with two natures? |
10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney'. ...The building is said to be 'bricked', not 'bricks'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033a08) | |
A reaction: We have the same distinction in English (best expressed as 'made of stone'). The point is that in thought we identify a statue as primarily something other than the stone of which it is made, though that may not prove anything about reality. |
16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The last [primary] matter and the shape-form [morphe] are the same and a unity, the one in potentiality and the other in actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b19) | |
A reaction: This seems to be exactly the statue/clay problem, that they have different modal properties, although coinciding in actuality. |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We find that two shadows or two rays of light interpenetrate, and we could devise an imaginary world where bodies did the same. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: I suspect this is a case of being able to imagine something when you don't fully understand it (like a bonfire on the Moon), but when you fully understand the modern physics of it, you see the necessity of separation between objects. |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are vague and imperfect essences, as in the question of how few hairs a man can have without being bald. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.05) | |
A reaction: This example is much discussed in contemporary debate, but I now learn that it has a venerable history. The surprise here is the word 'essences', because I had taken Leibnizian essences to be 'perfect ideas', and hence precise. |
12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties. |
12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Form is not an accidental property of matter, and it is not a necessary property of matter. These considerations make it unlikely that Aristotle holds form or essence to be a property of matter in the composite substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.5 | |
A reaction: I suppose form bestows the identity, and the identity gives rise to the properties. But you don't create identity on Monday, and add the properties on Tuesday, so forming an entity and giving it properties seem to coincide. |
16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian universe is a world of tension and commotion - ordered and preserved by form, disordered by matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This connects Aristotle quite strongly with presocratic predecessors like Heraclitus and Empedocles. But then it fits perfectly with modern discussions of entropy, and the forces that hold entropy back. |
16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's earlier 'Categories' theory of substance, and his later 'Metaphysics' theory, are radically different. The first is realistic, and the second nominalistic. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Frede claims that 'Categories' is clearly earlier. It is certainly profoundly different from 'Metaphysics'. |
16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's theory a substantial form can count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form's being a property of it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand the idea of matter being the 'property' of a form, but 'matter' [hule] seems to be a particular way of thinking about stuff when it participates in an object, rather than just the amorphous stuff. Just 'predicated of'? |
12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian essentialism is not correctly portrayed as the view that an essential property is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation VII | |
A reaction: The view I am arriving at is that essences are rather fluid things, which change their balance and constitution continually. Old people differ essentially from their younger selves. Chemical natural kinds have stable essences, but that is contingent. |
11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that changing things, even if they are somehow real, do not have an essence; but Aristotle argues that changing things have a changeless essence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
17043 | Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Form is a more plausible candidate for being nature than matter is because we speak of a thing as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is potentially. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b07) | |
A reaction: Note that matter remains potential, even when it is part of an actual thing. This seems to be the obvious point that a statue isn't potentially anything else, but its clay is potentially other objects. Does Aristotle think clay is thereby less real? |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For a dialectician anger is a desire for retaliation or something like that, where for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hoot stuff around the heart. The scientist gives the matter, where the dialectician give the form and the account. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a30) | |
A reaction: A nice illumination of hylomorphism. Notice that the dialectician also give the account [logos]. |
12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy, in the guise of form, has an explanatory rather than an ontological role. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance Intro | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct way to understand Aristotle, and the correct way to understand the concept of essence. We don't observe essences, but the concept of essence is forced upon us when we seek the best explanation of things. |
16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Though he retains objects from the 'Categories', in 'Metaphysics' these yield their status as primary substances to their substantial forms. Concrete particulars are now secondary, and that which underlies everything is the substantial form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Frede says he moved from realism about substances to nominalism. Presumably substances within objects are real concreta, but forms are abstract, leaving the the object as a purely material thing. |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Matter is potentiality, whereas form is actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a09) | |
A reaction: Plato said mud has no Form. What did Aristotle think of that? I only ask because to me mud looks like unformed actuality. |
11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By form [eidos] I mean the essence [to ti en einai] of each thing and its primary being [prote ousia]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b01) | |
A reaction: [Tr. Vasilis Politis. Lawson-Tancred has 'what-it-was-to-be-that-thing' instead of 'essence', and 'substance' instead of 'being']. This may be the single most important sentence in 'Metaphysics' for understanding his theory of being. Cf. 'formal cause'. |
16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.90 | |
A reaction: Frede suggests that the form of the Unmoved Mover is the ideal case, because it is fully actual. I like the present idea, because it includes modal truths (i.e. dispositions and powers) in the form which gives a thing its nature. |
16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's theory also includes a special group of forms that can exist without matter, of which the Prime Mover is an instance, and these forms are separate not only in account but also in existence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I am curious about her other examples. This must be the closest that Aristotle gets to his teacher's view of the Forms. |
15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Only those objects are substances which are being constituted under, and by, some nature, ..so that this nature, which is a principle rather than an element, is their substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b31) | |
A reaction: My view is that Aristotle never got to the point of articulating his hylomorphism, so this is just him fishing around, and pointing to where others should investigate. What sort of 'principle'? |
16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The consideration of forms serves no purpose in the details of physics and must not be used to explain particular phenomena. …but their misuse must not lead us to reject something which is so useful to metaphysics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], 10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: This is a key test for the question of whether metaphysics is separate from science (as Leibniz and Pasnau think), or whether there is a continuum. Is 'substantial form' an illuminating way to undestand modern physics? |
16970 | A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In many cases, the last three of the causes [aition] come to the same thing. What a thing is and its purpose are the same, and the original source of change is, in terms of form, the same as these two. After all, it is a man who generates a man. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a24) | |
A reaction: One of the few illuminating remarks about what the 'form' in hylomorphism is supposed to do. This may be the key to virtue ethics - that the form of man, which we learn elsewhere is the psuché, is also man's drive and man's very purpose. |
12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: A standard criticism of the scholastic notions of matter and form is that they are obscure and unintelligible. But in Leibniz's system they are connected directly with notions of active and passive force that play an intelligible roles in his physics. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be very appealing. Aristotle was clearly on the right lines, but just ran out of things to say, once he had pointed in the right direction. Maybe 'fields' and 'strings' can fill out the Aristotelian conception of form. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The problem of unity disappears if our account is adopted. We allow a matter component and a shape/form component, one existing potentially the other in actuality. …The account is of a unity because one component is material, the other shape/form. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a24) | |
A reaction: It sounds as though the solution is that matter is material and form is abstract, so there is no rivalry. Elsewhere form seems more like a mechanism or a set of powers. |
16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The solution to the problem of unity will finally depend upon Aristotle's doctrine of form as an active cause, or, as he refers to form within his broader theory of potentiality and actuality, an active potentiality [dunamis] or nature [phusis]. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro | |
A reaction: Her intermediate proposal to the solution of the problem in Idea 16083 is that matter only survives through change potentially and not actually. |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand. |
16104 | Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Being one in form is just another way of saying one 'in definition'. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190a16) | |
A reaction: I take this to be highly significant in understanding Aristotle. The crucial notion of form is tied to the way in which we understand the world, and does not refer to some independent fact about how it might really be. |
11255 | In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: There is a fundamental distinction between feature-change and generation. ..Materials such as bronze cannot by themselves explain why they are the particular material things they are. But matter which generates things does not endure. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: This very nice distinction is rather undermined by our modern understanding of generation, but it still might work at a lower level. Transmuting an element by bombarding it is different from reshaping the stuff. |
12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Matter, in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also matter, because these substrata receive contraries. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320a03) | |
A reaction: This must be compared with his complex discussion of the role of matter in his Metaphysics, where he has introduced 'form' as the essence of things. I don't think the two texts are inconsistent, but it's tricky... See Idea 12133 on types of change. |
12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything has a sort of matter [hule], provided only that it is not a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [ti en einai] and a per se Form Itself [eidos auto kath' auto] but a possessor of thisness [tode ti]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a01) | |
A reaction: Kit Fine quotes this to support the claim that Aristotelian 'matter' is not confined to physical objects. Aristotle's essence is the form which imposes identity on the matter. |
16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word. |
12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1 | |
A reaction: My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim. |
12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1 | |
A reaction: This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life. |
12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2 | |
A reaction: We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form? |
597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is there a house over and above its bricks? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b19) |
10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: A subject which has no properties of its own at all is called by Aristotle 'ultimate matter', and it is hotly disputed whether Aristotle acknowledges that such matter exists. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.174 |
16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are two ways of being a substrate [to hupokeimenon], either as possessor of thisness (as the animal is a substrate for its properties) or as matter is a substrate for the actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b05) | |
A reaction: A bit confusing, since the possessor of thisness will obviously have what we call 'identity', whereas matter cannot have identity on its own (because it also needs form). |
16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: To avoid the outcome (possible in 'Categories') that the subject might be nothing at all, Aristotle insists that a legitimate subject must be separate and a 'this' [tode ti]. Forms and composites satisfy the revised criterion in different ways. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I take it that we would say that a 'this' is an entity which possesses 'identity', and is perhaps countable. For Aristotle being a 'this' seems to require a possibility of definition. This is a powerful Aristotelian thought, needed in modern metaphysics. |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the beginning we conceive several predicates in a single subject, and that is all there is to these metaphorical words 'support' and 'substratum'. So I do not see why it is made out to involve a problem. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.23) | |
A reaction: The question is whether the substratum is 'bare' if you remove all the predicates, and clearly Leibniz believes you are left with true essential substance (although the removal process is presumably only possible in thought, thanks to God). |
16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing existing before. Obviously then some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b30) | |
A reaction: This is arguing for a substrate on the basis of the ex nihilo principle. Creation needs raw materials as a basis. This may be the obscure 'prime matter'. |
10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you extract all other features of the object, what is revealed as being left over? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the key question in matters of identity, which leads us to talk of substrata, or essences, or substance, none of which seem graspable. |
13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The contents of the formula which explains a thing are parts of the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1023a24) | |
A reaction: This is part of a catalogue of ways in which things can be parts [1023b08-25]. I like this, because it fits my general thesis, that the desire for explanation is the driving force behind our metaphysics. |
12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Pacidius Philalethi dialogue [1676], A6.3.565-6), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: This is incipient monadology, that the bottom level of division ceases to be parts of a thing, and arrives at a different order of entity, to explain the parts of things. Leibniz denies that this subdivision comes down to points. |
15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a quantity that has a beginning, a middle and an end, there are those instances in which the order does not create a differentia, which are said to be 'sums', and those is which it does, which are said to be 'wholes'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1024a01-5) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Aristotle is so much better than the run-of-the-mill naďve modern metaphysician. |
15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The syllable is something - not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; ...that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16-19) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints the key initial question, not just about the claims of 'holism', but about the whole puzzle of what give objects their identity? |
16791 | There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is no whole over and above the parts. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 210a16) | |
A reaction: Pasnau says Aristotle contradicts this at Met. 1041b12, where the syllable is more than its elements. |
16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The syllable is something in its own right, not just a heap of vowel and consonant but something different. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16) | |
A reaction: This is the classic Greek example of a whole, and a slogan for claims that wholes are not merely collections of parts. |
9071 | We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We have to progress from the general to the particular, because whole entities are more intelligible to the senses, and anything general is a kind of whole, in the sense that it includes a number of things which we could call its parts. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 184a22) | |
A reaction: This is the first step in the process of abstraction, which Aristotle describes further in Posterior Analytics. It is common sense that a child will be aware of a horse before it is aware of its hoof, or its colour, or its strength. |
22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same). | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20) | |
A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet). |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Aristotle gives certain samples of 'hanging together', notably continuity, rigidity, uniformity, qualitative similarity, being of a like kind, being of like matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b05-) by Peter Simons - Parts 8.1 | |
A reaction: Families are scattered, lakes aren't rigid, cakes aren't uniform, complex gadgets have dissimilar parts, two kinds can be united, and only boring things are made of one sort of matter. Nice try, though. Simons rightly adds causation. |
11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle calls a substance a nature. This expresses essence as what underlies a thing's characteristic behaviour, whereas whatness expresses it as underlying the definition, and essence refers to it as that through which and in which it has existence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.92 | |
A reaction: I don't really understand the third one, unless it is what gives something its identity, which probably then reduces to the second one. The big choice is between essence explaining behaviour and essence explaining definition. Interesting. |
12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the essential properties of an object are those which are retained by it during any change through which the object remains identifiable; and they are the properties which are most important in our scientific knowledge of it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712 | |
A reaction: This pioneering thought of Copi's (at least, he was a pioneer in that he read Aristotle properly) strikes me as the key to understanding the concept of essence. |
11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle wanted to argue (against Plato) that changing, material things, and not only universals that are true of them, have an essence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This is the huge idea which Aristotle contributes to our understanding of the world, and which I take to be one of the most important ideas in philosophy (though I accept that defending essences is a little precarious). |
11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Some critics say that Aristotle conceives of essences as universals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: [He cites M.Woods for this view] Politis opposes this view of Aristotle, and I think I do (with limited scholarship!). It seems to be an unorthodox view when discussing Aristotelian essences, but a very common view when discussing properties. |
13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of a circle consists in the equality of all lines drawn from its centre to its circumference. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669) | |
A reaction: Compare Locke in Idea 13431 and Spinoza in Idea 13073 on the essence of geometrical figures. A key question is whether the essence is in the simplest definition, or in a complex and wide-ranging account, e.g. including conic sections for circles. |
13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The subject-term must always include the predicate-term, in such a way that the man who understood the notion of the subject perfectly would also judge that the predicate belongs to it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §8) | |
A reaction: Sounds as if every sentence is analytic, but he doesn't mean that. He does, oddly, mean that if we fully understand the name 'Alexander', we understand his complete history, which is a bit silly, I'm afraid. Even God doesn't learn things just from names. |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Apart from those that depend on others, one must only consider together all the basic predicates in order to form the complete concept of Adam adequate to deduce from it everything that is ever to happen to him, as much as is necessary to account for it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06) | |
A reaction: This (implausibly) goes beyond mere prediction of properties. Eve's essence seems to be relevant to Adam's life. Note that the complete concept is not every predicate, but only those 'necessary' to predict the events. Cf Idea 13082. |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Essences exist in the divine understanding before one considers will. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: This is a sort of religious neo-platonism. The great dream seems to be that of mind-reading God, and the result is either Pythagoras (it's numbers!), or Plato (it's pure ideas!), or this (it's essences!). See D.H.Lawrence's poem on geranium and mignottes. |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle. |
12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: The primary role of essences in Aristotle's theory of substance is causal, rather than classificatory. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.4 | |
A reaction: This is the nicest summary of the view which I wish to champion. Classification results from patterns of causation, just as laws of nature result from regularities in the behaviour of causal powers. |
17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai] for a single thing is what-it-was-to-be-that-thing for a particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a16) | |
A reaction: This seems to give clear support for the view I favour, that Aristotle believes in individual essences, and not just generic kinds. |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b10) | |
A reaction: The notion of 'primary' substance is confined to this earlier metaphysics of Aristotle. |
12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Particular perceptible substances are excluded from definition. ...An object that admits of being in a variety of states is an object of opinion, and thus incontrovertibly not of definition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1039b30) | |
A reaction: This more or less demolishes my original reading of Aristotle, so back to the drawing board. We need to revise Aristotle. He says differentiae home in the individual but never get there. I (now) say cross-referencing of universals gets you there. |
12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle describes form or essence as the cause of there being an actual individual substance, and as the cause of its being a unity rather than a heap. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Wiggins defends the species-essence view (Idea 12068) by preferring the 'secondary substance' account in 'Categories' to Aristotle's ideas about 'form' which emerge later in 'Metaphysics'. I prefer Witt to Wiggins. |
12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle the essences of individual substances are individual rather than universal, ...since nothing universal can be a substance, nor can it be a principle or cause of a substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: This is the second of Witt's three theses which she offers in opposition to the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle, and again I think she is right. |
12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: We should replace the traditional interpretation of Aristotelian essences - as clusters of universal properties - with an interpretation according to which an essence is an individual substance, though not a composite or sensible substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5 | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this is a growing view amongst Aristotle scholars, which really ruins a widespread view which I associate with Wiggins, that essences are to do with categories, sortals and kinds. I associate essences with explanations. |
11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Aristotle does not label 'essential' what are now called 'individual essences'. The properties which belong essentially to an individual are always general properties, capable of belonging to more than one thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: [She offers four references from 'Metaphysics' in support] I think I want to disagree with Aristotle on this one (gulp). Thus his essential properties are one-over-many - his version of universals. I say individuals explain universals, and are prior. |
12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's notion of form or essence is meant to explain why there is an individual substance there at all, not what features constitute the identity of a given individual substance within a domain of individual substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.4 | |
A reaction: I begin to think that the notion of 'essence' is extremely useful in aiding our grasp of reality, but the notion of 'substance' is not. We can just talk of 'identity', without implying some stuff that constitutes that identity. Essence is powers. |
11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: It seems that Aristotle thinks that the essence and the form is a particular, ...though a very different interpretation argues that, for Aristotle, the essence and form of a changing, material thing is a universal, namely the species of the thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: I am fairly thoroughly persuaded that Politis's view (the first half of this idea) is the correct interpretation, and it is certainly the one I find more congenial. The second one I associate with the erroneous idea of sortal essentialism, as in Wiggins. |
16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle shows that, for something to be a subject at all, it must be specifiable as something in itself, with essential properties that are mentioned in its defining account, since no subject can be the bearer of accidental properties alone. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle supporting the very modern necessary-properties view of essentialism. Notice that it emerges from being 'specifiable' - that is, from Aristotle's requirement that a logos and definition be available. He rejects bare particulars. |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The reasons for particular truths rest wholly on the more general ones of which they are mere instances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: Clearly particulars have their own distinctive truth, but the Leibniz case seems to be that a particular is a unique intersection for an array of general truths - and nothing else. Audrey Hepburn's smile has no generalities to it. |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for us to have knowledge of individuals and to find the means of determining exactly the individuality of everything. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Aristotle was clearly also tempted by this doubt (since universals are involved), though individuals are what he wanted to understand. I think they are wrong. Leibniz gives the bizarre reason that we can't know individuals as they each contain infinity. |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes that the essence of a thing is those per se features of it that are mentioned in a definition. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a02) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.177 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 11291. |
11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is what is stated in the definition of that thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], defs) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If a definition is the recognition of some essence, it is clear that such items are not essences. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b17) | |
A reaction: So definitions are not themselves essences (as some modern thinkers claim). The idea seems obvious to me, but it is a warning against a simplistic view of Aristotelian essences, and a reminder that such things are real, not verbal. |
12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: If definition is of the universal rather than of the particular, ...it begins to appear that individual material substances do not have definitions and, hence, do not have essences at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.1 | |
A reaction: This is a very challenging claim against my own defence (and Witt's) of individual essences. In switching to individual essences, one has to make them unstable and variable, and lacking necessity, and hence maybe not essential. |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Essence is fundamentally nothing but the possibility of the thing under consideration. Something which is thought possible is expressed by a definition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: It is unclear whether he means 'possible modes of existence' or 'possible actions of the thing'. Leibniz sees more clearly than Aristotle that essences extend beyond the actual thing, because Leibniz is more aware of the active powers. |
11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A what-it-was to-be-that-thing only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a06) | |
A reaction: That seems to be that 'to ti en einai' (aka essence) only has a 'logos' if it has a 'horismos'. It seems that having a definition as its account is a necessary condition for an essence, but not sufficient. It looks to me as if essence must be explanatory. |
11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian view is that essential properties sort entities in some fashion. ...Being an entity, or being self-identical, or being a unity, fail to sort Socrates from anything else, but being identical with Socrates sorted him from everything. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Essential Attribution p.196 | |
A reaction: [She cites Daniel Bennett 1969 for this] This doesn't feel right. I take it that sorting things is posterior to discovering that they have different causal powers, as with H2O and XYZ, or jadeite and nephrite. |
11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence] is, for each thing, what it is taken to be [kath' hauto, in virtue of itself] per se. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b13) | |
A reaction: [Translations is brackets from Vasilis Politis] Aristotle's other definition of essence is in terms of definition - Idea 10963 and Idea 11292. |
12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai] is a unity of a kind straight off, just as it is a being of a kind. And that is why none of these things has some other cause of their being a unity, any more than they do of their being a being of a kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b04) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the key importance of the notion of essence - it is what both bestows unity on things in the world (which is basic to ontology and epistemology), and what enables us to categorise things (basic to epistemology). |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every substance is indivisible and consequently every corporeal substance must have a soul or at least an entelechy which is analogous to the soul, since otherwise bodies would be no more than phenomena. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], G II 121), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: There is a large gap between having 'a soul' and having something 'analogous to a soul'. I take the analogy to be merely as originators of action. Leibniz wants to add appetite and sensation to the Aristotelian forms (but knows this is dubious!). |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Some realising thing must bring it about that composite substance contains something substantial besides monads, otherwise composites will be mere phenomena. The scholastics' active and passive powers are the substantial bond I am urging. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.01.13), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This appears to be a major retreat, in the last year of Leibniz's life, from the full monadology he had espoused. How do monads connect to matter, and thus unify it? He is returning to Aristotelian hylomorphism. |
10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, having an essence is the criterion of being a substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178 |
13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1 | |
A reaction: This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties. |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In this complete concept of possible Peter are contained not only essential or necessary things, ..but also existential things, or contingent items included there, because the nature of an individual substance is to have a perfect or complete concept. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of liberty, Fate and God's grace [1690], Grua 311), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 13077, where he seems to say that the complete concept is only necessarily linked to properties which will predict future events - though I suppose that would have to include all of the contingent properties mentioned here. |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That which is necessary for something does not constitute its essence. Air is necessary for our life, but our life is something other than air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Why can't modern philosophers hang on to this distinction? They seem to think that because they don't believe in traditional essences they can purloin the word for something else. Same with the word 'abstraction'. |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whatever is predicated in what something is is necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 96b03) | |
A reaction: This does NOT say that the essence is just the necessities. He goes on to say to say separately that certain properties of a triplet are part of the essence, as well as being necessary. This shows the nature of a thing is also necessary. |
15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle did not subscribe to the modal conception of essence. The essential truths are not even included among the necessary truths; and the essential features of an object are similarly not included among its necessary features. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1 | |
A reaction: I take this point to be hugely important. There is no real role for essences in metaphysics if they are not of the Aristotelian type. The necessities just lead you to trivialities, or to conventions. Aristotelian essences lead you to facts. |
16972 | The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Aristotle sees as the main types of aitia (explanation) those that are also to be construed as the main aspects of the physis (nature) of anything. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 | |
A reaction: Interestingly, this suggests that having rejected the Four Causes in favour of the Four Explanations, we might even consider them as the Four Natures, which ties explanation very closely to essence. |
5084 | A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The nature of a thing is a certain principle and cause of change and stability in the thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 192b20) | |
A reaction: A helpful contribution to the discussion, as most thinkers just boggle when asked to specify the core of something's identity. Aristotle's proposal links identity to causation, which is very appealing to a physical account of all of reality. Cf 5086. |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: The primacy of 'Categories' primary substances is a kind of ontological primacy, whereas the primacy of form is a kind of structural or explanatory primacy. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.9 | |
A reaction: 'Structural' and 'explanatory' sound very different, since the former sounds ontological and the latter epistemological (and more subjective). |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: As Aristotle uses the term 'essence', only those properties which are mentioned in or relatively close to the starting points of the science will be essential. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation II | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct way to understand Aristotelian essence - as something understood by its role in scientific explanations. We may, of course, work back to the starting point of a science, by disentangling the mess in the middle. |
11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle characterises metaphysics in three ways: as the science of the first or ultimate explanation of things; as the science of being qua being; and the science of primary being ('ousia'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: I am a bit baffled about how anything worthwhile can be said about 'being qua being', but the other two seem worth pursuing, and may boil down to the same thing. |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every time we find some quality in a subject, we ought to think that, if we understood the nature of this subject and of this quality, we should conceive how this quality could result from it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: Thus (in Kripke's analogy) God cannot make 'subjects' on Thursday and then add 'qualities' on Friday. Add the point that all subjects are physical, and I say you have the whole story. The physical entails the mental. The laws result from the qualities. |
16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it not impossible, even outrageous, that a this and a substance (even if it can be composed of constituents) should be composed not of substances and the this-thing-here but of a quality? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b25) | |
A reaction: This is to show Aristotle's deep hostility to anyone who thinks an essence is just a set of special properties (and the 'anyone' means just about anyone these days). |
13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is the same to look for perfection in an essence and in the properties that flow from an essence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wolff [1715], 1715.05.18) | |
A reaction: It is helpful to have Leibniz spelling out his commitment to the traditional view of essence, as that from which the more evident properties flow. |
11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: The view standardly attributed to Leibniz, that makes all an individual's properties essential to it should be regarded as an extreme version of essentialism, not a denial of essentialism. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.1 | |
A reaction: Wiggins disagrees, saying that Leibniz was not an essentialist, which is an interesting topic of research for those who are interested. I would take Leibniz to be not an essentialist, on that basis, as essentialism makes a distinction. See Quine on that. |
16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Man', and every generic term, denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a01) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's denial that species constitutes the essence of anything. I take 'man' to be a categorisation of individuals, and is ontologically nothing at all in its own right. |
16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man and horse and items similarly imposed on the particulars but themselves general are not substances but a kind of composite of the relevant account in the relevant matter, considered universally. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1035b27) | |
A reaction: Notice that these concepts are 'imposed' on particulars. This seems close to Locke's 'nominal' essence. It take this quotation to reinforce the priority of the particular in Aristotle's account. |
16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If 'man' and any other item similarly specified is a substance, then none of the contents of the account of man is a substance of anything. 'Animal', for instance, does not exist over and above particular animals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b31) | |
A reaction: [I think 'particular animals' refers to species, not individuals, here] I take it as self-evident that this implies that species do not exist, apart from the individuals that constitute them. |
12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Although what-is-it [ti esti] questions serve the classificatory project in 'Categories', they are no help in the causal enquiries of 'Metaphysics' Z.17. The essence of interest can't be the species or the differentia-cum-genus complex. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a05-b36) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.4 | |
A reaction: Wedin's view is that these are compatible. The implication is that the nature of essence depends entirely on what it is you want to explain. Explain the category, or explain the behaviour? |
12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: The standard interpretation holds that Aristotelian essences are species-essences, which are universal essences shared by all members of the same species. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Her aim is to refute this standard view, in defence of the view that Aristotle really wanted to pinpoint individual essences. I think Witt is correct. |
16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In the central books of 'Metaphysics' there are no longer any genera or species. In Z.13 he argues that genera and universals can't be substances. Since genera are not qualities either, they disappear completely from the ontology. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.13) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. It is so obvious to me that creatures are classified into genera, so genera can't exist separately, that I am bewildered anyone would believe or imply it. |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The concept of a species contains only eternal or necessary truths, whereas the concept of an individual contains, regarded as possible, what in fact exists or what is related to the existence of things and to time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06) | |
A reaction: This seems to be what is behind the preference some have for kind-essences rather than individual essences. But the individual must be explained, as well as the kind. Not all tigers are identical. The two are, of course, compatible. |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are sorts or species such that if an individual has ever been of such a sort or species it cannot (naturally, at least) stop being of it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.06) | |
A reaction: Note the thoughtful 'naturally, at least', which blocks genetic engineering. But natural selection is genetic engineering. Crucially, Leibniz is not attributing this to all sorts or species, and allows exceptions. |
16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: More unified is whatever is a whole with a certain shape and form, especially if it is by nature and not by force (e.g. by gluing or nailing or tying up), when, that is, it contains in itself the cause of its being continuous. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a24) | |
A reaction: [see also Phys 192b] This is about the only principle available for saying why the essence of an artefact is lesser than a natural essence. The healing of wounds shows that animals have a greater unity than tables? |
16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: There is a critical line to be drawn between those entities whose active source of maintenance is internal and those whose source is external. This is the chief line that Aristotle draws between organisms and artefacts. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Plants need water and sunlight, so I'm not sure that this marks the line quite clearly enough. |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We cannot say - with complete fidelity to the truth of things - that the same whole continues to exist if a part of it is lost. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27.11) | |
A reaction: This is the reference Simons 1987:319 gives when he claims that Leibniz accepts mereological essentialism. I think this is mereological necessity of identity, but not what I call 'essentialism'. That has to distinguish essential from non-essential. |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted by them, otherwise it would be an aggregate. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: The point is that there is more to some things than there mere parts. Only some unifying principle, in addition to the mere parts, bestows a unity. Mereology is a limited activity if it has nothing to say about this issue. |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That gold is a metal which resists cupellation and is insoluble in aquafortis is a distinct idea, for it gives us the criteria or definition of 'gold'. But it is not a perfect idea, because we know too little about cupellation and actions of aquafortis. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31) | |
A reaction: This connects the 'perfect idea' of something with knowing its active substance, and hence its essence. See Idea 12976 for the connection between perfect ideas and definitions. |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If one person applies the name 'avarice' to one resemblance, and some one else to another, there will be two different species designated by the same name. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.292), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences p.199 | |
A reaction: Part of Leibniz's sustained attack on Locke's nominal essences. There is clearly an uninteresting nominal essence, where a 'big brown bear' is necessarily brown, but in the interesting respects I think Leibniz is right. |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: Leibniz points out that it is a concealed premise of Locke's argument that if a natural kind exists it must have many instances, but there seems no a priori objection to the idea of a species with just one member. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.311) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences p.200 | |
A reaction: I can't see this bothering Locke. Generally we formulate nominal essences by induction from bundles of ideas, but we can formulate a cautious first stab at it from one instance. If you see a new creature, is it a normal one, or a 'monster'? |
12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle could have claimed that the universal is prior to the individual in the epistemic realm, but the individual is prior in the realm of being. ...Instead, he claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.1 | |
A reaction: This point strikes me as fairly self-evident. We only learn about the universal by induction from the individuals. |
12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle resolves his aporia about substances and universals by distinguishing between actual knowledge, which is of the individual, and potential knowledge, which is of the universal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], potent) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle | |
A reaction: [See Witt 145-9 for the aporia] A vital piece in the jigsaw I am assembling. I connect this way of thinking with modern modal thinking, and actual and possible worlds. It obviously results in individual essences taking priority. |
12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: (Essence) is the distinct thinkability (cogitabilitas) of anything. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on John Wilkins [1672], A6.2.487-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: A very original remark from the young Leibniz. It is neutral as to whether this is a real feature of objects, or a feature of human mental capacities. Presumably accidental features are thinkable, so 'distinct' is the key word. |
11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Leibniz was not an essentialist. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 4.2 n4 | |
A reaction: Assuming this is right, it is rather helpful, because you can read mountains of Leibniz without ever being quite sure. Mackie says he IS an extreme essentialist, treating all properties as essential. Wiggins makes more sense there. |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Everything accidental or changeable ought to be a modification of something essential or perpetual. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704.06.30) | |
A reaction: Clear evidence that Leibniz is very much a traditional Aristotelian essentialist, and not as modal logicians tend to characterise him, as a super-essentialist who thinks all properties are essential. They are necessary for identity, but that's different. |
16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: If we analyze an ordinary physical object into matter, form and properties, the only item in the case of animate objects that has to stay the same as long as we can talk about the same thing is, on his account, the form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], change) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.76 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that might work for inanimate natural things, and for artefacts, to a considerable extent. The Ship of Theseus retains its form. |
17042 | Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The obvious difference between natural and non-natural things is that each of the natural ones contains within itself a source of change and of stability, in respect of either movement or increase and decrease or alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 192b14) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Aristotle places so much emphasis on lives, though elements also have persistence in a similar way. We now have atoms and molecules as well. |
16173 | Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things that come to be without further qualification do so either by change of shape (a statue) or by addition (growing things) or by subtraction (a carving) or by composition (a house) or by alteration (things changing their matter). | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190b06) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle observes that in each case there is clearly some 'underlying thing'. |
16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When we say 'it is day' or 'it is the games', one thing after another is always coming into existence. …There are Olympic Games, both in the sense that they may occur and that they are actually occurring. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 206a22) | |
A reaction: This is, according the Pasnau, the origin of the scholastic concept of an 'entia successiva'. I haven't seen much discussion of this in modern metaphysics, but in what sense does a day exist? |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We must acknowledge that organic bodies as well as others remain 'the same' only in appearance, and not strictly speaking. It is rather like the river whose water is continually changing, or like Theseus's ship which Athenians constantly repaired. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's standard view, that something only remains the same if it has a unifying substance, and so a collection of planks is just an aggregate, and doesn't have any identity to begin with. |
16574 | Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We agree that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not, …but it may in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from a privation, which in its own nature is not-being - this not surviving as a constituent in the result. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191b13) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it seems to say that genuine creation from nothing at all is impossible. |
16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so-great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b21) | |
A reaction: This is interesting because it pulls the 'tode ti', the 'this-such', apart, showing that he does have a concept of a pure 'this', which seems to constitute the basis of being ('ousia'). We can say 'this thing', or 'one of these things'. |
16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In addition, coming-to-be may proceed out of nothing pre-existing - a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b29) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of the worry about 'ex nihilo' coming-to-be. Christians tended to say that only God could create in this way. |
13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substratum [hupokeimenon?] is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a19) | |
A reaction: Presumably Aristotle will also be seeking the 'formal' cause as well as the 'material' cause (not to mention the 'efficient' and 'final' causes). |
13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is 'alteration' when the substratum is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties. ...But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole, it is coming-to-be of a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b11-17) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Note that a substratum can be perceptible - it isn't just some hidden mystical I-know-not-what (as Locke calls it). This whole text is a wonderful source on the subject of physical change. Note too the reliance on what is perceptible. |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that the explanation of how a thing is generated does not contribute to the explanation of why the thing is the very thing it is. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: Good for him. The origin of a thing strikes me as an entirely different matter from the intrinsic nature of the thing, and I don't see how the origin of something can be necessary, if it is in any way possible that it originated differently. |
12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Properties of origin are not essential for Aristotle, because he determines what is essential not by reflecting on the identity of an individual, but by considering how to define the individual. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2 | |
A reaction: [see also Idea 12102] This spells out my intuition, or rather my understanding of the normal usage of the word 'essence'. You can fully know the essence of something (e.g. a person), while having no knowledge of the origin. |
11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If any two items have a single substance [ousia, primary being] and a single what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence], then they are themselves a single thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b14) | |
A reaction: [alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] This isn't quite the identity of indiscernibles, because it allows superficial identity along with deep difference (H2O and XYZ, for example, or jadeite and nephrite). |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Equality may be considered as an infinitely small inequality, and we may make inequality approach equality as much as we wish. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.67) | |
A reaction: An interesting response to David Lewis's brusque dismissal of the problem of identity, as all-or-nothing...end of story. |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
Full Idea: Geach's denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory. He must deny the axiom of extensionality in set theory, for example. | |
From: comment on Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6 | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think we have two entirely different concepts here - the logicians' and mathematicians' notion of when two things are identical, and the ordinary language concept of two things being 'the same'. 'We like the same music'. |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
Full Idea: Identity is relative. When one says 'x is identical with y' this is an incomplete expression. It is short for 'x is the same A as y', where 'A' represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance. | |
From: Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980], p.39), quoted by John Perry - The Same F I | |
A reaction: Perry notes that Geach's view is in conscious opposition to Frege, who had a pure notion of identity. We say 'they are the same insofar as they are animals', but not 'they are the same animal'. Perfect identity involves all possible A's. |
17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are alike if they are not just the same simpliciter, exhibiting differences in their substrate substance but being formally the same. Examples are larger and smaller quadrangles and unequal straight lines, which are alike but not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054b06) |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle denigrates the whole category of relations, but modern logical absolutists single out self-relation (in the mode of identity) as metaphysically privileged. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 | |
A reaction: I think this refers to Plantinga and Merrihew Adams, who make identity-with-itself the basic component of individual existences. |
16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To ask why a thing is identical with itself is not to ask a real question in the absence of a clear grasp of the fact ….or of the object. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a12) | |
A reaction: This seems a very nice response to Lewis's attempt to sweep difficulties of identity aside, when he rests identity on primitive self-identity. |
17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: You are one with yourself both in form and in matter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a35) |
16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It isn't possible to have two particulars that are similar in all respects - for example two eggs - for it is necessary that some things can be said about one of them that cannot be said about the other, else they could be substituted for one another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 2.2 | |
A reaction: [from a 'fragment' for which Wiggins gives a reference] This quotation doesn't rest the distinctness of the eggs on some intrinsic difference, but on the fact that we can say different things about the two eggs. |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By virtue of insensible variations, two individual things can never be perfectly alike. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit like the 'discernibility of non-identicals', except that he says that the differences may not be 'sensible'. He has to be talking of physical things, since I presume that, say, the symmetry of two circles is perfectly identical. |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Things that differ in place must express their place, that is, they must express the things surrounding, and thus they must be distinguished not only by place, that is, not by an extrinsic denomination alone, as is commonly thought. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: This is an unusual view, which has some attractions, as it enables the relations of a thing to individuate it, while maintaining that this is a real difference in character. |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In nature any straight line you may take is individually different from any other straight line you may find. Accordingly, it cannot come about that two bodies are perfectly equal and alike. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: Leibniz was very good at persuasive examples! It remains unclear, though, why he takes the Identity of Indiscernibles to be a necessary truth, when he seems to have only observed it from experience. This is counter to his other principles. |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If two bodies differ only in their position, their individual relations to the environment must be taken into account, so that more is involved in their distinguishability than just position. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: This seems to allow that two bodies could be intrinsically type-identical (though differing in extrinsic features), which is contrary to his normal view. I suppose a different location in the gravitational field will make an intrinsic difference. |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09) | |
A reaction: From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this? |
11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is only to things which are indistinguishable and one in essence [ousia] that all the same attributes are generally held to belong. | |
From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a37) | |
A reaction: This simply IS Leibniz's Law (to which I shall from now on quietly refer to as 'Aristotle's Law'). It seems that it just as plausible to translate 'ousia' as 'being' rather than 'essence'. 'Indistinguishable' and 'one in ousia' are not the same. |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Geach rejects the standard formulation of Leibniz's Law as incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6 | |
A reaction: Not many people accept Geach's premiss that identity is a relative matter. I agree with Wiggins on this, that identity is an absolute (and possibly indefinable). The problem with the Law is what you mean by a 'property'. |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's definition is as follows: Things are the same as each other, of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth ('salva veritate'). | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §65 | |
A reaction: Frege doesn't give a reference. (Anyone know it?). This famous definition is impressive, but has problems when the items being substituted appear in contexts of belief. 'Oedipus believes Jocasta (his mother!) would make a good wife'. |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
Full Idea: "The same" is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean "the same X", where X represents a general term. ...There is no such thing as being just 'the same'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §16) | |
A reaction: Geach seems oddly unaware of the perfect identity of Hespherus with Phosphorus. His critics don't spot that he was concerned with identity over time (of 'the same man', who ages). Perry's critique emphasises the type/token distinction. |
12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is necessary cannot be otherwise. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 88b32) | |
A reaction: If the next interesting question is the source of necessity, then the question seems to be 'what prevents it from being otherwise?'. |
12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Necessity is what makes it impossible for something to be other than it is. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b03) | |
A reaction: Note that necessity here seems like an active force, rather than a mere description of a logical or metaphysical state of affairs. The underlying idea seems to be that essences enforce necessities, but it doesn't say that here. |
12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every necessary proposition is demonstrable, at least by someone who understands it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De arcanus motus [1676], 203), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: This kind of optimism leads to the crisis of the Hilbert Programme in the 1930s. Gödel seems to have conclusively proved that Leibniz was wrong. What would Leibniz have made of Gödel? |
13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argued that the necessary truths are just those which can be proved from identities by pure logic in a finite number of steps. ...[232] this claim is vindicated by Gentzen's sequent calculus. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §01 | |
A reaction: This seems an odd idea, as if there were no necessary truths other than those for which a proof could be constructed. Sounds like intuitionism. |
1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are two types of necessity, one according to nature and impulse, the other by force and contrary to impulse. A stone travels upwards and downwards from different necessities. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 94b38) |
14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It sometimes results that the deduction becomes necessary when only one of the premises is necessary (not whatever premise it might be, however, but only the premise in relation to the major extreme [premise]). | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 30a15) | |
A reaction: The qualification is brackets is said by Plantinga (1969) to be a recognition of the de re/ de dicto distinction (later taken up by Aquinas). Plantinga gives two examples to illustrate his reading. |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If anything has the property of being perishable it has it of necessity, on pain of one and the same thing being perishable and imperishable. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1059a05) | |
A reaction: Of course the perishable could become imperishable over time, without contradiction. This illustrates the foundational idea that a proposition is necessary if its negation is a contradiction. [...actually this argument is invalid as it stands!] |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139) | |
A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'. |
22518 | The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Actual events are evidently possible, otherwise they would not have occurred. | |
From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b18) | |
A reaction: [quoted online by Peter Adamson] Seems like common sense, but it's important to have Aristotle assert it. |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a reason why not every possible thing exists. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of wonderful speculative metaphysical remark that we are not allowed to make any more. Needless to say, he doesn't tell us what the reason is. Overcrowding, perhaps. |
15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If what we have stated either is the possible or something connected to it, there can of course be no question of its being true to say that x is capable of being but will not be. ...What is not but is capable of being either is or comes into being. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047b05) | |
A reaction: I'm a bit startled to find the great Aristotle spouting this nonsense. It's possible that every bird in England could simultaneously land in my home town, but it ain't never going to happen. Modern women could bear 50 children, but won't. |
13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is yet unknown to me what is the reason of the incompossibility of things, or how it is that different essences can be opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G VII:194), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.4.4 | |
A reaction: Since 'heavy' seems straightforwardly opposed to 'light', we would have to ask what he means by 'positive'. The suspicion is that all things are compossible by definition, so it is not surprising that impossibilities are a bit puzzling. |
15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The potential occurs when it is not necessary that its contrary be false. For example, it is potential that a man should be seated, since it is not false of necessity that he is not seated. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019b26) | |
A reaction: This is the standard point in modal logic that possibly is equivalent to not-necessarily-not (◊p → ¬□¬p). |
15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is a principle of change or process is said to be a 'potentiality' [dunamis], whether in something else or in the thing itself qua something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a18) |
15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are broken, compressed, bent and, in a word, destroyed not by dint of having a potentiality but by dint of not having one and by missing out on something. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a27) | |
A reaction: Presumably an ontology entirely based on powers would not also need to catalogue absence of powers. The positive ones do the job. No power, no destruction. |
11254 | Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle conceives of matter (hulé) as potentiality. ...He has a process-based notion of matter. ...It is something which has the power ('dunamis') to generate a thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: Politis says that 'dunamis' is usually translated as 'potentiality', but he prefers to translate it as 'power'. I take this to be highly significant in connecting Aristotle to modern scientific essentialism. |
14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The possession of a potentiality just is the possession of a potentiality to act, and such a potentiality is not unconditional but depends on the obtaining of propitious circumstances, which includes the satisfaction of a ceteris paribus condition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a18) | |
A reaction: This seems to be pretty exactly what we mean by a 'power', as something which requires no other driving force, but which only expresses itself with the endless complexity of the rest of nature. |
15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is from the actuality that the potentiality is recognised. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051a29) | |
A reaction: I presume it is from this simple fact that Sider and others draw the mistaken inference that there are no potentialities in the actual world. |
4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) | |
A reaction: Spinoza rejects all contingency, but this seems an interesting support for it, even though we may need a reason for something where God does not because it is self-evident. |
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108) | |
A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there. |
13110 | Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A cause in its own right is prior to a coincidental cause. So spontaneity and chance are posterior to intelligence and nature. Hence however much spontaneity is the cause of the universe, intelligence and nature are more primary causes. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Aristotle's final word on chance - that it is a genuine sort of causation, but only a secondary one. I take 'nature' to refer to the powers of essences. Aristotle does not accept meetings in the market as uncaused events. |
13106 | Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some people find there is no such thing as a chance event. ..If someone chanced to come into the city square and met someone he wanted to meet but had not expected, they say the cause was his wanting to go and do business in the square. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 195b39) | |
A reaction: Aristotle spends the book discussing the problem. There is a clear candidate for an uncaused event here, in the chance meeting of two people. See Idea 13108. |
13108 | Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Clearly chance is a coincidental cause in the sphere of events which have some purpose and are the subject of choice. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 197a05) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of his discussion of going to the market place and happening to meet your debtor (196b33). We must now decide whether a 'coincidental cause' is a true case of causation. |
12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a difference between truths whose necessity is brute and geometric and those truths which have their source in fitness and final causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715.06.22/G III 645), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: The second one is a necessity deriving from God's wisdom. Strictly it could have been otherwise, unlike 'geometrical' necessity, which is utterly fixed. |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One mark of a perfect idea is that it shows conclusively that the object is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31) | |
A reaction: Subtle but nice. My favourite example would be that the perfect idea of a bonfire on the Moon shows that it is not possible. Essence reveals necessity, as Aristotle and Kit Fine claim. A perfect idea has a single definition. |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it is necessary that, if a triangle contains two right angles, that a quadrilateral has four, it is clear that the cause of this is that a triangle has two. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b31) | |
A reaction: We would not normally use the word 'cause' for this, but 'necessitates' seems to fit, and I like the word 'determines' (because it can be both physical and abstract). An example of what I think of as an Aristotelian necessity maker. |
12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For some things, the cause of their necessity is something other than themselves, whereas for others there is no such external cause, but rather they are themselves the necessary cause of other things being the case. The simple is fundamentally necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b14) | |
A reaction: What is 'simple' is what terminates an explanation, and that is what-it-is-to-be each thing (its essence). The Greek view of necessity always seems to be a power to which we submit, rather than a passive state like true-in-all-worlds. |
15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle conceives of the necessary truths as being distinct and derivative from the essential truths. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1 | |
A reaction: This is precisely the view promoted by Kit Fine in 1994. It seems to fragment necessity, because there are many different necessities based on many different foundations. |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of truths: of reasoning and of facts. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposites impossible. Facts are contingent and their opposites possible. A necessary truth is known by analysis. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §33) |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence outside us of sensible and material things. ....It is generally true that we only know necessary truths by the natural light [of reason] | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: A nice quotation summarising a view for which Leibniz is famous - that there is a tight correlation between necessary truths and our a priori knowledge of them. The obvious challenge comes from Kripke's claim that scientists can discover necessities. |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The fundamental proof of necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and other truths come from experience or from observations of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing truths of both sorts, but it is the source of the former. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: Interesting because it not only spells out that necessary truths are known a priori, but also explicitly says that the understanding is the 'source' of the truths, or at least the source of their proofs. He also says possibilities derive from essences. |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95) | |
A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth. |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby. |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible. |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
Full Idea: Leibniz sets up increasingly stringent conditions possible worlds must meet. The weakest is non-contradiction, for truths of reason; then sufficient reason, for rational worlds; then identity of indiscernibles, for duplicates; then compossibility. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 4 | |
A reaction: [my summary of a very nice two pages by Harré] God is the source of the principles which do the narrowing down. |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argued that each monad mirrors or expresses every monad with which it is compossible. Hence compossibility is an equivalence relation among monads; possible worlds may then be identified as the corresponding equivalence classes. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 6.1 | |
A reaction: [Rumfitt cites Benson Mates 1986:IV.1 for this claim] There is an analogous world of all the human minds that are in communication with one another - something like a 'culture'. |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: In his early writings the principle of sufficient reason made it difficult for Leibniz to conceive of possible things;...raising this to possible worlds means God does not choose things that are evil, but chooses a world which must have evil in it. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.14 | |
A reaction: Where we think of possible worlds as explanations for conditional and counterfactual truths (I take it), Leibniz developed the original idea as part of his huge effort to achieve a consistent theodicy. |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas. |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I can as little conceive of different varieties of myself as of a circle whose diameters are not all of equal length. These variations would all be distinct one from another, and thus one of these varieties of myself would necessarily not be me. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13) | |
A reaction: This seems to be, at the very least, a rejection of any idea that I could have a 'counterpart'. It is unclear, though, where he would place a version of himself who learned a new language, or who might have had, but didn't have, a haircut. |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the life of some person, or something went differently than it does, nothing would stop us from saying that it would be another person, or another possible universe which God had chosen. So truly it would be another individual. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.14) | |
A reaction: Plantinga quotes this as an example of 'worldbound individuals'. This sort of remark leads to people saying that Leibniz believes all properties are essential, since they assume that his notion of essence is bound up with identity. But is it? |
13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: When Leibniz has the grounds of de re counterfactuals in mind, a counterpart picture, we have argued, is at work. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.2.2 | |
A reaction: If Leibniz were a 'superessentialist', then individuals would be totally worldbound (because their relations would be essential). Cover/Hawthorne argue that he is just a 'strong' essentialist, allowing possible counterparts. Quite persuasive. |
13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Some form of haecceitism is central to the Leibnizian metaphysic. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §8) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.1 | |
A reaction: That is, there is some inner hallmark that individuates each thing (though they don't mean the Duns Scotus idea of a haecceity which has no qualities apart from the capacity to individuate). Leibniz thinks essences individuate. |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106) | |
A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked? |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, knowledge is explanatory, for to know something is to understand it, and to understand something is to grasp its principles or causes. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 1.2 | |
A reaction: Thus the kind of 'knowledge' displayed in quiz shows would not count as knowledge at all, if it was mere recall of facts. To know is to be able to explain, which is to be able to teach. See Idea 11241. |
12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, a person who has 'episteme' grasps the cause of a given phenomenon, can make a universal judgment about it, can explain it, and can teach others about it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 1.2 | |
A reaction: This I take to be the context in which we should understand what Aristotle means by an 'essence' - it is the source of all of the above, so it both makes a thing what it is, and explains why it shares features with other such things. |
12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Study of the reason why has the most importance for knowledge. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 79a24) | |
A reaction: I take the study of reasons for belief to be much more central to epistemology than finding ways to answer radical sceptics about the basic possibility of knowledge. |
547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The ability to teach is a distinguishing mark between the knowledgeable and the ignorant man. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981b04) |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 1) | |
A reaction: I would track both of these back to the concept of perfect understanding, which is admittedly a bit vague. Does a finite mind need to predict every speck of dust to have perfect knowledge? Do we have perfect knowledge of triangles? |
22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16) | |
A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge. |
12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We understand something simpliciter when we think we know of the explanation because of which the object holds that it is its explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 71b10) | |
A reaction: The second half sounds odd, since we ought to understand that something could have been otherwise, and knowing whether or not it could have been otherwise is part of the understanding. It sounds like Spinozan determinism. |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, what is this understanding which God has? What does it contain? All possibilities in all possible combinations, that is, everything which can be conceived. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: I like this, because it strikes me as essential that understanding should embrace possibilities as well as actualities. Perkins points out that the possibilities are restricted by an awareness of the limitations imposed by combination. |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We understand the things of which we are aware only when we have distinct ideas of them accompanied by the power to reflect and to derive necessary truths from those ideas. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: A rather startling way of putting it, but we also say that good understanding brings the power to predict. What must you understand in order to predict? What has to happen next! |
12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Not all understanding is demonstrative: rather, in the case of immediate items understanding is indemonstrable. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b19) | |
A reaction: These are the foundations of Aristotle's epistemology, and I take it that they can be both empiricist and rationalist - sense experiences, and a priori intuitions. |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Ordinarily, when ideas are thoroughly understood, their agreements and disagreements are apparent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.02) | |
A reaction: In other words, there is a holistic aspect of understanding, which makes us ask how understanding ever gets off the ground. Is it not possible to understand a single idea in isolation? |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Knowing and understanding is of two kinds, one having and the other using knowledge. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b11) | |
A reaction: This corresponds to potential and actual. We wouldn't say that understanding must be used, but we have some sort of distinction between knowledge as pure and theoretical, and understanding enabling good application. |
12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We only understand something when we know its explanation. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 71b30) | |
A reaction: If we believe that the whole aim of philosophy is 'understanding' (Idea 543) - and if it isn't then I am not sure what the aim is, and alternative aims seem a lot less interesting - then we should care very much about explanations, as well as reasons. |
1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No one holds something as an opinion when he thinks that it is impossible for it to be otherwise - for then he thinks he understands it. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 89a07) |
4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a07) | |
A reaction: This presumably makes Aristotle a realist, and it seems to me that the concepts of 'opinion' or 'belief' are incomprehensible without the concept of truth. |
10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a33) | |
A reaction: This resembles the legal notion of 'mens rea', the conscious intention to commit the deed. |
544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a14) |
546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The skilled know the cause, whereas the experienced do not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a29) |
1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is difficult to know whether you know something or not. For it is difficult to know whether or not our knowledge of something proceeds from its principles - and this is what it is to know something. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 76a25) |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Certainty might be knowledge of a truth such that to doubt it in a practical way would be insane; and sometimes it is taken more broadly, to cover cases where doubt would be very blameworthy. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.11) | |
A reaction: The normative aspect of the second half of this touches on a trend in recent epistemology. You have rights to believe, and duties to believe, and virtues for the justifying process. I prefer more neutral, value-free epistemology. |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I am assured that as long as I think, I am myself. For I cannot think that I do not exist, nor exist so that I be not myself. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13) | |
A reaction: Elsewhere he qualifies the Cogito, but here he seems to straighforwardly endorse it. |
2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious of our existence (for we have seen that existence is sensation or thought). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a32) | |
A reaction: A lovely glimpse of Descartes' Cogito, which was made more explicit by Augustine. Is an animal (which presumably perceives) conscious of its existence? |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is not enough for understanding the nature of myself, that I feel myself to be a thinking substance, one would have to form a distinct idea of what distinguishes me from all other possible minds; but of that I have only a confused experience. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14) | |
A reaction: Not a criticism I have encountered before. Does he mean that I might be two minds, or might be a multitude of minds? It seems to be Hume's problem, that you are aware of experiences, but not of the substance that unites them. |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Not only is it immediately evident to me that I think, but it is just as evident that I think various thoughts: at one time I think about A and at another about B and so on. Thus the Cartesian principle is sound, but it is not the only one of its kind. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.02) | |
A reaction: I don't suppose that Descartes would object to this, but he was aware that there didn't seem to be any actual introspective experience that united the various thoughts into a single thinker. Only logical connections between the thoughts does that. |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say 'I think therefore I am' is not really to prove existence from thought, since 'to think' and 'to be thinking' are one and the same, and to say 'I am thinking' [je suis pensant] is already to say 'I am' [je suis]. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.07) | |
A reaction: This is the objection which was offered by A.J. Ayer, and I take it to the one of the two principle objections to the Cogito (i.e. that it may be a tautology), along with the objection about the assumption of the continuity of the same thinker. |
12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously. |
12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds. |
5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: Leibniz held that dualism of mind and body is an illusion and that both are really the same thing, and that this thing is mind. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.22 | |
A reaction: I am puzzled by this, as Leibniz is famous for the view that mind and body are parallel. See idea 5038, and also 2109 and 2596. Monads are, of course, entirely mental, and are the building blocks of reality. Clearly I (and you) must read more Leibniz. |
7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: To say that Leibniz is an idealist is to say that simple substances, the basic building-blocks of the universe, are all mental or at least quasi-mental in nature | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is a bit different from the Berkelian type of idealism, which says that reality consists entirely of events within thinking minds. Is a monad the thinker or the thought? |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is not sufficient for Descartes to claim that he perceives something in himself clearly and distinctly, for this is to not complete the demonstration, unless he shows the method through which others can attain the same experience. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], App X) | |
A reaction: For the simplest rational insight this seems a rather tough requirement. If you say A>B, and B>C, so A>C, then once you have grasped the concept of 'greater than' I'm not sure there is a further possible demonstration. |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I would name the propositions of arithmetic and geometry as innate. ...The actual knowledge of them is not innate. What is innate is what might be called the implicit knowledge of them, as the veins of marble outline a shape for the sculptor. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: This seems to walk straight into the empiricist guns. The marble example shows the problem, because the 'veins' will hardly outline David in the block. Locke's challenge is to show that merely 'implicit' ideas have demonstrable reality. |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have sometimes been amazed that children can learn languages so early, ...considering how little trouble is taken to instruct children in their native tongue, and how little thought adults give to getting sharp definitions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10) | |
A reaction: A striking anticipation of the key observation on which Chomsky built his theories, from a philosopher who was equally concerned to defend innate ideas and innate knowledge. |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I always accepted the innate idea of God, but my new system says all the thoughts and actions of the soul come from its own depths and could not be given to it by the senses. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: It is hard to adjudicate on this one. The counterexamples would be associations. I see a face in the crowd and think of my friend. But Leibniz could be right even about that. Who cares? Externalism is designed to bypass this problem. |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The intellect is in a way potentially the object of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 429b31) | |
A reaction: This passage is referred to by Leibniz, and is the origin of the concept of the 'tabula rasa'. Aristotle need not be denying innate ideas, but merely describing the phenomenology of the moment before a train of thought begins. |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Those who hold forth about the 'blank page' cannot say what is left of it once the ideas have been taken away. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: This is a decisive criticism of the total tabula rasa idea, but empiricists responded by developing associationism - that what remains is principles of association for incoming experience. Brain mechanisms, we might say. |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: At the end of the analytical method in mathematics there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given. Moreover there are axioms and postulates, in short, primitive principles, which cannot be demonstrated and do not need demonstration. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §35) | |
A reaction: My view is that we do not know such principles when we apprehend them in isolation. I would call them 'intuitions'. They only ascend to the status of knowledge when the mathematics is extended and derived from them, and found to work. |
9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An a priori proof is a proof independent of experience. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Primary Truths [1686]) | |
A reaction: Burge says Leibniz gave the first modern account of a priori knowledge. There may be no explicit reference to experience involved, but it would beg many questions to deny that implicit experience may be at the root of the proof. |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413b23) |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A possible line of inquiry would be into the question for what purpose we have many senses and not just one. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425b04) |
19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4) | |
A reaction: The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it. |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428b19) | |
A reaction: This is, surprisingly, the view which was raised and largely rejected in 'Theaetetus'. It became a doctrine of Epicureanism, and seems to make Aristotle a thoroughgoing empiricist, though that is not so clear elsewhere. I think Aristotle is right. |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why is there not also a sense of the senses themselves? And why don't the senses produce sensation without external bodies, since they contain elements? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417a03) |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ. To suppose that it is requires the supposition that on contact with the object the sense-organ itself discerns what is doing the discerning. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 426b16) |
12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: You cannot understand anything through perception. Demonstrations are universal, and universals cannot be perceived. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 87b28) |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
Full Idea: Aristotle famously holds that in perception our minds take on the form of what is being perceived. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |
A reaction: [References in Aristotle needed here...] |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality. |
16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What sorts of contrarities, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b04) | |
A reaction: Pasnau says these pages of Aristotle are the source of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Essentially, hot, cold, wet and dry are his four primary qualities. |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not special to any one sense, but common to all. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a18) |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Now I call that sense-object 'special' that does not admit of being perceived by another sense and about which it is impossible to be deceived. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a15) |
16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge, and since we learn either by induction or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 81a37) | |
A reaction: This suggests Jackson's 'knowledge argument', that raw experience contains some genuine knowledge, for which there is no mechanistic substitute. Not that I accept…. |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We use the external senses ...to make us know their particular objects ...but they do not make us know what those sensible qualities are ...whether red is small revolving globules causing light, heat a whirling of dust, or sound is waves in air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: These seems to be exactly the concept of secondary qualities which Locke was promoting. They are unreliable information about the objects we perceive. Primary qualities are reliable information. I like that distinction. |
12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Concerning bodies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar qualities are apparent but also motion, figure, and extension. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1504), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is not consistent on this. Here he is flirting with idealism, but he often backs away from that. In Discourse §12 he makes secondary qualities certainly subjective, and primary qualities possibly so. He admits the primaries contain eternal truths. |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Ideas such as those of colour and pain are not arbitrary. ...That is not God's way ...I would say there is a resemblance of a kind, not a perfect one, but a resemblance in which one thing expresses another through some orderly relationship between them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.08) | |
A reaction: The main point of Locke's idea of 'secondary' qualities is that (unlike the 'primary' ones) they bear no resemblance to their stimuli. It's not much of an argument from Leibniz, to say that is not God's way, but he has a vast system to support his claim. |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the thinking soul, images play the part of percepts, and the assertion or negation of good or bad is invariably accompanied by avoidance or pursuit, which is the reason for the soul's never thinking without an image. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a15) |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is true that pain does not resemble the movement of a pin; but it might thoroughly resemble the motions which the pin causes in our body, and it might resemble them in the soul; and I have not the least doubt that it does. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.08) | |
A reaction: He may not have the least doubt, but the rest of us do, I should think. Try as I will, I cannot see any resemblance between pain and a motion. What feeling does a pendulum resemble? |
5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Deliberation is not concerned with particular facts, such as 'is it a loaf?' or 'is it properly cooked?'; these are matters of sense-perception. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b33) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Aristotle's commitment to direct cognition through perception, though if pressed he might concede that concepts (such as 'cooked') are involved in perception. |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The truth of sensible things is established by the links amongst them; these depend upon intellectual truths, grounded in reason, and upon observations of regularities among sensible things themselves, even when the reasons are not apparent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.11) | |
A reaction: It's not clear why regularities would establish truths, given that most hallucinations have regularities in them. I'm thinking that Leibniz is not sufficiently rationalist here, and that it is the rational coherence of experience which validates it. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: However often one experiences instances of a universal truth, one could never know inductively that it would always hold unless one knew through reason that it was necessary. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: The problem, though, is that as soon as we go beyond experience we are not very reliable, and are liable to arrogance, error and lack of imagination. |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The senses could not convince us of the existence of sensible things without help from reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.07) | |
A reaction: This nicely pinpoints the big difficulty which keeps besetting orthodox empiricism. I've been educated as an empiricist, but I prefer Leibniz to Berkeley or Hume, and even to the more sensible Locke. |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: When we expect it to be day tomorrow, we all behave as empiricists, because until now it has always happened thus. The astronomer alone knows this by reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §28) |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Intellectual ideas, from which necessary truths arise, do not come from the senses. ...The ideas that come from the senses are confused; and so too, at least in part, are the truths which depend on them, whereas intellectual ideas are distinct. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01) | |
A reaction: One might compare Descartes' example of the chiliagon, which is only grasped clearly by the intellect. However, the problem of vagueness seems to intrude as much into intellectual ideas as it does into the senses. He was a mathematician... |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perception is of particular things, but knowledge is of universals, which are in a way in the soul itself. Thus a man may think whenever he wishes, but not perceive. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417b22) |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does. |
543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By nature, all men long to understand [eidenai]; an indication is their delight in the senses. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980a21) | |
A reaction: See Idea 8331 and Idea 12038 to understand what this means. I take it to support the thesis that the aim of philosophy is explanations (at a higher level of generality than the sciences). |
5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is always false to say that all our notions come from the so-called external senses, for the notion I have of myself and of my thoughts, and consequently of being, substance, action, identity, and many others, come from an internal experience. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §27) | |
A reaction: Of course, an empiricist like Hume would not deny this, as he bases his views on 'experience' (including anger, for example), not just 'sense experience'. But Hume, famously, said he has no experience of a Self, so can't get started on Leibniz's journey. |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sensory idea of green (made of blue and yellow) is a confused idea, like the swift rotation of a cog-wheel which makes us perceive an artificial transparency, and we are not able to discern the cause, the idea of the teeth on the wheel. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.06) | |
A reaction: This is one of Leibniz's less well-known objections to empiricism. He always says that intellectual ideas are capable of a clarity which is never found in sensory experience. |
23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is a certain notion of understanding and, correspondingly, explanation which makes Aristotle think that knowledge, properly speaking, could not be a matter of mere experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.160 | |
A reaction: Frede says this means that Aristotle is a rationalist, though few empiricists think understanding is 'merely' a matter of experience. My own epistemology is Explanatory Empiricism, which I see as more empiricist than rationalist. |
1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In some animals the perception is retained, and in some not. Without retention knowledge is impossible. Some animals go further and form an account based on the perception. This leads to memory and experience, and so to either skill or understanding. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 99b35-) |
22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b05), quoted by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
A reaction: This quotation is a sacred text for philosophers who place a high value on the consensus of thinking among the majority of people. I hate it when philosophers hijack an ordinary word and assign it a different meaning. |
95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What everyone believes is so. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173a01) | |
A reaction: Would you think me terribly unfashionable if I agreed with this? Huge numbers of people can be wrong, but if 'everyone' believes something it seems crazy to go against it. |
79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Intuition apprehends the definitions which cannot be logically demonstrated. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1142a25) | |
A reaction: Nice to see that (like me) he has a positive view of intuition. I'm not sure how you would 'prove' a definition of the hidden nature of a thing (which is usually taken to be hidden). |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When it occurs often in connection with the same item, ..memories which are many in number form a single experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100a05) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle at his most empirical. He is not describing an operation of the understanding, but a process of association. The process he alludes to is at the heart of the abstractionist view of concept-formation. |
8331 | To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The point of our investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for knowing [eidenai] anything is understanding why it is as it is - in other words, grasping its primary cause. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b18) | |
A reaction: He then proceeds to identify four types of cause (Idea 8332). I can't think of a better account of knowledge. If we want to know that cigarettes cause cancer, we must get beyond the statistical correlation, and grasp the physical mechanisms. |
1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Sceptics say that there is either an infinite regress of ideas based on one another, or things come to a stop at primitives which are unknowable (because they can't be demonstrated). | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b09) | |
A reaction: This is one strand of what eventually becomes the classic Agrippa's Trilemma (Idea 8850). For Aristotle's view on this one, see Idea 562. |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30) | |
A reaction: This might leave open the option, if you were a modern 'Fallibilist', that something might lack foundations, and so not be certain, and yet still qualify as 'knowledge'. That is my view. Knowledge resides somewhere between opinion and certainty. |
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anyone who understands anything simpliciter (as basic) must be incapable of being persuaded to change his mind. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b04) | |
A reaction: A typical Aristotle test which seems rather odd to us. Surely I can change my mind, and decide that something is not basic after all? But, says Aristotle, then you didn't really think it was basic. |
5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself, or involves the concept of another. …Thus one must proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those which are conceived through themselves. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to embody the rationalist attitude to foundations. I am sympathetic. Experiences just come to us as basic, but they don't qualify as 'thoughts', let alone knowledge. Experiences are more 'given' than 'conceptual'. |
583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Who defines the healthy man, or who is awake or asleep? This is a pursuit of foundations, but this is seeking an account where there isn't one. The starting point of a proof is not a proof. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a10) | |
A reaction: a comment on Descartes |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Among the most powerful indications of truth belongs the fact that scientific propositions agree with one another as well as with phenomena. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.03.24/04.03) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the case not only with science, but with all other truths. Leibniz is particularly keen on the interconnectedness of things, so coherence justification suits him especially well. But surely all scientists embrace this idea? |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Since rays of light need time - however little - to reach us, it is possible that the object should be destroyed during the interval and no longer exist when the light reaches the eye. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.09) | |
A reaction: This is the well know 'time lag' argument. Leibniz is no sceptic, but he can hardly fail to accept the truth of this problem. It seems self-evident that stars we observe may no longer exist, although special relativity confuses that issue. |
581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it really an issue whether things are true that appear to those asleep or to those awake? No one in Libya who dreamt he was in Athens, would set out for the Odeon next morning! | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1010b09) |
19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not think it necessary to recommend to people universal doubt ...in fact, we are constantly seeking reasons for thoughts about which there is no doubt at all. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts [1680], p.34) | |
A reaction: Such confidence is, of course, asking for trouble. I prefer Peirce's fallibilism - that robust realism is the most coherent view, and the only one worth pursuing and relying on, but you never know.... |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the mutual agreement of perceivers consists the truth of the phenomena. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This remark is startling close to the 'perspectivism' that crops up in the late notebooks of Nietzsche. Leibniz was keen on relativism in many areas, starting with the nature of space. I personally think Leibniz meant 'knowledge' rather than 'truth'. |
584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The claim that all appearances are true makes all things relational. Hence the claim is shifted to all appearances being true relative to a subject, time, sense and context. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a20) | |
A reaction: applies to Epicurus |
585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If things are true relative to an individual, how can something seem honey to the sight but not to the taste, or, given that we have two eyes, things may not seem the same to the sight of both of them. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a24) |
576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When two men taste the same thing one will often find it sweet and the other bitter. Suppose all men were sick, except one or two who were healthy. It would then be the latter two who would be considered sick, and the others not! | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1009b05) |
12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is no demonstration of anything of which there is no definition. Definitions are of what something is, i.e. of its essence, but all demonstrations clearly suppose and assume what a thing is. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b30) | |
A reaction: Note that while essentialism rests on definitions, the job is not yet complete once the definitions are done. With good definitions, it should be easy to show how the pieces of the jigsaw fit together. |
12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental, ...for any field of science is either 'always' or 'for the most part'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b30-) | |
A reaction: His example of an accident (and thus outside of any science) is a cold spell in high summer. This leaves us trying to explain the unusually tame tiger. Copi comments (p.717), rightly I think, that modern science disagrees with Aristotle on this. |
11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There cannot be demonstrations that this particular triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, except that every triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, nor that this particular man is an animal, except that every man is an animal. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1086b36) | |
A reaction: Not quite the covering-law model, but well on the way. Why can't we demonstrate that this particular is different from the others? This tiger is docile; this butterfly stings. We just like generalisations because you know more with less effort. |
1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All demonstrative science [apodeiktike episteme] is concerned with three things: what it posits to exist (the kind), the axioms (primitives basic to demonstration), and the attributes. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 76b12) |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In demonstration a definition of the essence is required as starting point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously be dialectical and futile. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b25) | |
A reaction: Interesting to see 'dialectical' used as a term of abuse! Illuminating. For scientific essentialism, then, demonstration is filling out the whole story once the essence has been inferred. It is circular, because essence is inferred from accidents. |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Demonstrations are both from a starting-point and have a sort of end, namely the deduction or the conclusion. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a25) | |
A reaction: A starting point has to be a first principle [arché]. It has been observed that Aristotle explains demonstration very carefully, but rarely does it in his writings. |
24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's demonstration encompasses more than deductive entailment, in that the explanatory order of priority represented in a successful demonstration must mirror precisely the causal order of priority in the phenomena in question. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Form, Matter and Substance 4.5 | |
A reaction: Interesting. I presume this is correct, but is not an aspect I had registered. In Metaphysics his essentialist explanations are causal, so it all hangs together. |
17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's system, the relevant notion of asymmetric consequence that is operative in his model of scientific explanation is that of demonstration. ...It is a theoretical/linguistic reflection of an asymmetric real-world relation of causal priority. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Varieties of Ontological Dependence 7.3 n7 | |
A reaction: The asymmetry is required for explanation, and for grounding. |
21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is a conflict between the syllogistic theory of demonstration of the Posterior Analytics, with its austere programme of certainties, and how Aristotle actually does science. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 104 | |
A reaction: Leroi observes that there are no demonstrations anywhere in the biological writings. Biology probably lends itself least to such an approach. |
1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Demonstrative understanding must proceed from items which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar and prior to and explanatory of the conclusions. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 71b22) |
12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We know things through demonstration, by which I mean a scientific deduction, and by 'scientific' I mean a deduction by possessing which we understand something. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 71b17) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Aristotelian account of what science aims at, and which seems to have dropped out of modern accounts of science, which are still under the influence of logical positivism. Time to revive it. |
10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If demonstrative understanding proceeds from necessary principles, and whatever holds of an object in itself is necessary, then it is clear that demonstrative deductions will proceed from certain items of this sort. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 74b05-) | |
A reaction: This is the characterization of the essence of something in terms of what counts as a good explanation of that thing. Although explanation is a bit subjective, I like this approach, because you will dig down to the source of the powers of the thing. |
12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you understand something demonstratively, it must hold from necessity, so it is plain that your demonstration must proceed through a middle term which is necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 75a13) | |
A reaction: How can a middle 'term' be necessary, if it is not a proposition? Presumably Socrates is necessarily a man, and men are necessarily mortal, so it is the predication which is necessary. |
12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Demonstrations are probative deductions [sullogismos] which give the explanation [aitias] and the reason why. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 85b24) | |
A reaction: This notion seems to have slipped out of modern philosophy of science, because (while scientists have just pressed on) philosophers of science have raised so many sceptical questions that they have, I would say, lost the plot. |
1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Universal demonstrations are objects of thought, particular demonstrations terminate in perception. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 86a30) |
1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A demonstration is superior if it depends on fewer suppositions or propositions - for if these are familiar, knowledge will come more quickly, and this is preferable. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 86a35) |
1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Divide a whole into its primitives, then try to get definitions of these. Thus you establish the kind, and then study the attributes through the primitive common items. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 96b16) |
12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 73a24) | |
A reaction: Elsewhere he tells us that demonstration that brings understanding (Idea 12365), so this is an interesting gloss. He says that the middle term of the syllogism gives the understanding, but necessities reside in the whole propositions of the premisses. |
12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The principles of demonstrations are definitions. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b25) | |
A reaction: This I take to be a key idea linking Aristotle's desire to understand the world, by using demonstrations to reach good explanations. Definitions turn out to rest on essences, so our understanding of the world rests on essences. |
12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: He who can finally make predictions with success must be said to have become sufficiently proficient in nature. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Is prediction achieved by knowledge of laws, or knowledge of essences and powers? The trouble with most laws is that they permit exceptions. 'Things fall, unless prevented' etc. |
5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we have a single counter-instance, the argument is refuted as not necessary, even if more cases are otherwise or more often otherwise. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1403a07) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle (pioneering hero) pointing out what we now tend to think of as Karl Popper's falsification, the certain way to demonstrate the falseness of a supposed law of nature, by finding one anomaly from it. |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nobody is on his guard against a disease that nobody has yet caught. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1372a27) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple indication of one problem with induction. In a dangerous situation, you can't wait around for a few experiences in order to learn the regularities and rules. Either you are doomed, or you must explain using related experiences. |
19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We construct a hypothesis on the basis of an induction, that is on the basis of a comparison of experiences. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Elements of Law and Justice [1669], p.2) | |
A reaction: This fits the traditional positivist picture of science (observe-hypothesise-predict-observe). I like the definition of induction as 'comparison of experiences', because it doesn't reduce it to sequences of objects, and points to coherence. |
1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is from many particulars that the universal becomes plain. Universals are valuable because they make the explanation plain. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 88a05) |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All the instances which confirm a general truth, however numerous they may be, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of this same truth. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's standardly rationalist view of induction. We can either say that induction is therefore inadequate, or (a better option) that there isn't much evidence for claims of necessity, and they must be treated with caution. |
12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a05) | |
A reaction: This is the puzzle that bother Aristotle about explanation, that we can only grasp the universals, when we want to explain the particulars. |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Which of the middle terms is explanatory for the particulars - the one which is primitive in the direction of the universal, or the one which is primitive in the direction of the particular? | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 99b09) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear about this, but it shows Aristotle wrestling with the issue of whether explanations are of particulars or universals, and whether they employ particulars as well as employing universals. The particular must be defined! |
11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the principles are universal, they will not be primary beings [ousiai], ...but if the principles are not universal but of the nature of particulars, they will not be scientifically knowable. For scientific knowledge of any thing is universal. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a08) | |
A reaction: Part of the fifteenth aporia (puzzle) of this book. Plato goes for the universal (and hence knowable), but Aristotle makes the particular primary, and so is left with an epistemological problem, which the rest of 'Metaphysics' is meant to solve. |
12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 88a06) | |
A reaction: Everything in Aristotle comes back to human capacity to understand. There seems to be an ideal explanation consisting entirely of particulars, but humans are not equipped to grasp it. We think in a broad brush way. |
5080 | We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We think we know a thing only when we have grasped its first causes and principles and have traced it back to its elements. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 184a12) | |
A reaction: A nice Aristotelian analysis. It is hard to see what else you need to know about a thunderstorm, once you know what causes it, the principles which guide its operation, and the elements of which it is composed. But doesn't Aristotle seek its purpose…? |
1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are four sorts of explanation: what it is to be something, that if certain items hold it is necessary for this to hold, what initiated the change, and the purpose. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 94a21) | |
A reaction: This might be summed up as: 'we want to know the essence, the necessary conditions, the cause, and the purpose'. Can anyone improve on that as the aims of explanation? The second explanation (necessary preconditions) isn't in 'Physics' - Idea 8332. |
11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Understanding moves from things less intelligible by nature to things more so. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b02) | |
A reaction: The interesting phrase is 'by nature'. Whether things are intelligible or not is a feature of the natural world, and not just a feature of the mind's capacities. |
1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand: the fact, the reason why, if something is, and what something is. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 89b24) |
11250 | Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle gives us four explanations (or causes) of things: the essence (to ti estin, to ti en einai) and the form (he morphe, to eidos); the matter (hule); the source of change and generation (to kinoun); and the end (telos) at which change is directed. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: Politis presents these as primarily the Four Explanations, rather than under the better-known label of the 'Four Causes'. It is interesting that essence and form are lumped in together, under what is normally labelled the 'formal cause'. |
12045 | Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas] |
Full Idea: The four so-called 'causes' are the different types of item which figure in what Aristotle thinks are the four fundamental types of explanation of nature. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This interpretation now seems to be standard among modern scholars. The word 'aitia' translates as 'explanation', but it is important to remember that it also translates as 'cause'. Aristotelian explanations are essentially causal. |
16969 | Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the natural scientist refers the question 'Why?' to this set of four causes [aition] - matter, form, source of change, purpose - he will be explaining things in the way a natural scientist should. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a23) | |
A reaction: This is even more conclusive than Idea 16968 in showing that we have the Four Modes of Explanation, not the so-called Four Causes. |
16968 | There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are causes [aition] and there are as many of them as we have been saying, since there are just as many different kinds of question covered by the question 'Why?'. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a16) | |
A reaction: He goes on to split the questions into 'what is it?' and 'what initiated the change?'. This, along with Idea 16969, is Exhibit A for saying Aristotle has the Four Explanations, not the Four Causes (which are so famous). |
11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The search for explanation as Aristotle conceives it is the search for the correct way to distinguish things into natural kinds, which may involve revising our initial conceptions. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.2 | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would make the huge addition of objects and processes which are invisible to the naked eye, which Aristotle probably never envisaged. He is interested in categories, but we are also interested in mechanisms. |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One must always explain nature along mathematical and mechanical lines, provided one knows that the very principles or laws of mechanics or of force do not depend upon mathematical extension alone but upon certain metaphysical reasons. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: I like this, and may even use it as the epigraph of my masterwork. Recently Stephen Hawking (physicist) has been denigrating philosophy, but I am with Leibniz on this one. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
13109 | Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Chance is inexplicable, because explanations can only be given for things that happen either always or usually, but the province of chance is things which do not happen always or usually. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 197a19) | |
A reaction: This seems wrong. We can explain perfectly well a chance meeting in the market place - it is just that the explanation is not of much use in making future predictions. But we may avoid the market place because of the danger of chance meetings. |
12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, explanation and generality are fellow-travellers. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.11 | |
A reaction: This isn't 'lawlike' explanation, but it is interestingly close to it. It seems to be based on the fact that predicates are universals, so we can only state truths in general terms. |
1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Something always holds better because of that because of which it holds - e.g. that because of which we love something is better loved. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a30) |
19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whatever concerns reasonable substances (the minds of men) is more naturally explained by the consideration of ends, whereas other substances (bodies) are better explained by efficient causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Geometrical Method and Metaphysics [1712], p.89) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that the type of causal explanation considered most appropriate is the one that leads to the greatest understanding. So there is no absolute or correct answer as to which type of causation is the more important. |
22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24) | |
A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good. |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Final causes not only advance virtue and piety in ethics and natural theology, but also help us to find and lay bare hidden truths in physics itself. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §04) | |
A reaction: This rearguard action against the attack on teleology is certainly aimed at Spinoza. The notion of purpose still seems to have a role to play in evolutionary biology, but probably not in physics. |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255) | |
A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs. |
12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That thing from whose state a reason for the changes is most readily provided is adjudged to be the cause. ...Causes are not derived from a real influence, but from the providing of a reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Specimen inventorum [1689], A6.4.1620), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is not denying that there are real influences. He seems to be offering the thesis which I am pursuing, that the need for explanation is the crucial factor in shaping the structure of our metaphysics. |
13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of substance consists in ...the law of the sequence of changes, as in the nature of the series in numbers. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], A 6.3.326), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.2 | |
A reaction: Thus we might say, in this spirit, that the essence of number is the successor operation, as defined by Dedekind and Peano (and perhaps their amenability to inductive proof). I like this. Metaphysicians rule - they penetrate the heart of nature. |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can define gold as the heaviest metal, or by assaying procedures, but only when men have penetrated more deeply into the nature of things will they be able to see why one belongs with the other. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31) | |
A reaction: He mentions that geometry is different, because we do have perfect ideas of things. This is part of Leibniz's optimism about the future of science, in comparison with the surprising pessimism of the empiricists. See Idea 12976 and Idea 12975. |
15119 | Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: From Aristotle's biology we learn that a successful scientific explanation of the necessary (but non-essential) features of one type of phenomenon (e.g. camels) my require appeal to facts about the essences of other types of phenomena (stomachs). | |
From: report of Aristotle (The History of Animals [c.344 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.4 |
22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32) | |
A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'. |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b18) | |
A reaction: Although Aristotle was cautious about this, he clearly endorses here the idea that essences play an explanatory role in geometry. The caution is in the word 'useful', rather than 'vital'. How else can we arrive at this result, though? |
11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is when we know what a man is or what fire is that we reckon that we know a particular item in the fullest sense, rather than when we merely know its quality, quantity or location. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028a36) | |
A reaction: The word 'what' should usually be taken to indicate that Aristotle is talking about essence (as V. Politis confirms of this passage). This idea is a key one for the claim that Aristotelian essences are essentially (sic) explanatory. |
16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Real enquiries stand revealed as causal enquiries (and the cause is the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai]). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a28) | |
A reaction: As good a quotation as any for showing that Aristotelian essences exist entirely by their role in explanation. |
16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We have knowledge of each thing when we grasp the what-it-was-to-be [to ti en einai] that thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1031b08) | |
A reaction: This is a key remark in my understanding of the whole business of essentialism. It really concerns the way in which we are able to grasp reality, rather than how it is in itself. It is not mere convention, because the grasping responds to the reality. |
11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The explanation [aition - cause] that is the object of enquiry is that by virtue of which the matter is in the state that it is in. And this cause [explanation] is the form, and the form the substance [ousia]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b08) | |
A reaction: A key sentence, I think, for understanding Aristotle's whole enterprise. The explanation is the essence; the essence is what explains. |
11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Aristotle makes it clear that properties which belong essentially to anything have explanatory power vis-ŕ-vis the other properties of things of that kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: This means that explanation will always occur at the level of generalisation, leading to what we call 'laws', but some events are only explicable at the level of the individual. |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Even in the most contingent truths, there is always something to be conceived in the subject which serves to explain why this predicate or event pertains to it, or why this has happened rather than not. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06) | |
A reaction: The last bit, about containing what has happened, seems absurd, but the rest of it makes sense. It is just the Aristotelian essentialist view, that a full understanding of the inner subject will both explain and predict the surface properties. |
1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Universals are more explanatory (for something which holds in itself is itself explanatory of itself; and universals are primitive; hence universals are explanatory) - so universal demonstrations are better. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 85b25) |
13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Copernican account is the truest theory, that is, the most intelligible theory and the only one capable of an explanation sufficient for a person of sound reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.92) | |
A reaction: The word 'intelligible' here seems to be linked to the notion of a best explanation. |
12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that. |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Minds are substances which think, and are capable of knowing God and of discovering eternal truths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.10.09) | |
A reaction: 'God' is there because the ability to grasp the ontological argument is seen as basic. Note a firm commitment to substance-dualism, and a rationalist commitment to the spotting of necessary truths as basic. He is not totally wrong. |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b12) | |
A reaction: 'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'? |
5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One can assume a vegetative part of the soul in everything that receives nourishment, even in embryos; thus the excellence of this faculty is common and not confined to man; ...because of its nature it has no part in human goodness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a33) | |
A reaction: Presumably the excellences of this part of the soul would be strength, health and appropriate size. If plants have psuché, then neither 'soul' nor 'mind' seem very good translations. 'Vitality' seems a possibility - humans having it in a conscious form. |
5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One element of the soul is irrational but receptive to reason; it struggles and strains against reason. ...In the continent (controlled) man it is obedient to reason, and is more amenable in the virtuous man, as it is in harmony with rational principle. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b16) | |
A reaction: The very core of Aristotle's theory, with an image of psychic harmony derived from Plato (who likens in to a well-tuned musical instrument). Aristotle's merely controlled man ('enkrateia') sounds like Kant's truly moral man, following duty. |
5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That the irrational part of the psuché is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated by our use of admonition, and of reproof and encouragement of all kinds. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b33) | |
A reaction: These attempts to influence people include disapproval of people's feelings, as well as their principles, or their interpretation of the facts. This doesn't prove that feelings can be changed, but it certainly shows that we sometimes want to change them. |
5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In an irrational being the appetite for what gives it pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminate, and the exercise of the desire increases its innate tendency; and if these appetites are strong and violent, they actually drive out reason. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1119b09) | |
A reaction: The end-result of this would be a person Aristotle describes as 'brutish'. The remark seems significant because, even though man is essentially a 'rational animal' (man's 'proper function'), it is actually possible to annihilate our reason. |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17 | |
A reaction: Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular. |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Three ways have been handed down in which people define the soul: what is most capable of moving things, since it moves itself; or a body which is the most fine-grained and least corporeal; or that it is composed of the elements. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 409b19) | |
A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle beginning an investigation by idenfying the main explanations which have been 'handed down' from previous generations. These three aren't really in competition, and might all be true. |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Soul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a20) | |
A reaction: To understand what Aristotle means by 'form' you must, I'm afraid, read the 'Metaphysics'. Form isn't shape, but rather the essence which bestows the individual identity on the thing. 'Psuche is the essence of man' might be a better slogan. |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09) | |
A reaction: 'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature. |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How could a spatial understanding understand anything? Wiil it do so with parts, seen as magnitudes or as points? If it is points, the understanding will never get through them all. If magnitudes, it will understand things an unlimited number of times. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a09) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a strong commitment to the idea that the mind is not physical because it is necessarily non-spatial. |
5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either separate like parts of the body, or are distinguishable only in definition and thought, like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a27) | |
A reaction: Whether or not the soul is unified was a clear issue for Aristotle, explored further in De Anima (408a15 and 411b10). He appears to say the soul is not a unity, thus disagreeing with Descartes (Med. 6). |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15) | |
A reaction: We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave. |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is it that holds the soul together, if it by nature has parts? For surely it cannot be the body. For it seems on the contrary that it is rather the soul that holds the body together? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b05) | |
A reaction: This is the hylomorphic view of a human, that the soul is the form that give unity to the matter. To do the job, presumably the form or soul need an intrinsic unity of its own, and hence cannot have parts. Apart from the need for unifying glue. |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10) | |
A reaction: You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child. |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which is called the 'I' in us; a thing which could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organised it may be. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.120) | |
A reaction: I think the unity of consciousness and the unified Self are different phenomena. A wonderful remark about artificial intelligence for 1696! Note the idea of functionalism contained in 'organised'. Personally I see the brain as a 'mass of matter'. |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul is in a way all the things that exist, for all the things that exist are objects either of perception or of thought. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431b20) | |
A reaction: Sounds very like Berkeley's empirical version of idealism. It also seems to imply modern externalist (anti-individualist) understandings of the mind (which strike me as false). |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sequences of the brutes are but a shadow of reasoning, that is to say, they are but connexions of imagination, transitions from one image to another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: This account of animal thought cannot capture the fact that they are motivated by their images, and obviously make decisions based on them. Externally, there is usually an obvious reason why even an insect does something. |
5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5) | |
A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived. |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It appears probable that the brutes have souls, though they are without consciousness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.12.08) | |
A reaction: This will be a response to Descartes, who allowed animals sensations, but not minds or souls. Personally I cannot make head or tail of Leibniz's claim. What makes it "apparent" to him? |
23218 | The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: And of course, the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations at all. The correct view is that the seat and source of sensation is the region of the heart. | |
From: Aristotle (The Parts of Animals [c.345 BCE]), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
A reaction: [Need a reference] Hippocrates's assertion a century earlier made no impression on the great man. I wish he had been a little more circumspect with his own view. |
19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: The designation of degrees of conscious awareness is one of Leibniz's most significant innovations, and it is fundamental to almost every aspect of his account of monads. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.I | |
A reaction: A very important development, which seems to have been ignored by philosophers for three hundred years, since they usually treat consciousness as all-or-nothing. Introspection makes degrees obvious, and I suspect sparrows are down the scale. |
19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Our great perceptions and our great appetites of which we are conscious, are composed of innumerable little perceptions and little inclinations of which we cannot be conscious. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715 §2) | |
A reaction: I think this is a wonderfully accurate report of how the mind is, in comparison with the much more simplistic views presented by most philosophers of that era. And so much understanding flows from Leibniz's account. |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Many errors can flow from the belief that the only perceptions in the soul are the ones of which it is aware. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: What a perceptive remark, for its time! I took it that it was only modern neuroscience and psychology which had woken us up to how much non-conscious activity is central to the mind. |
19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The soul does many things without knowing how it does them - when it does them by means of confused perceptions and unconscious inclinations or appetites. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L]) | |
A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as a wonderful and important insight for its time. He's really paid attention to his own mind, and given up the simplistic view that derives from Descartes. Are birds conscious? Yes or no! Silly. |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If a conscious machine were increased in size, one might enter it like a mill, but we should only see the parts impinging on one another; we should not see anything which would explain a perception. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §17) | |
A reaction: A wonderful image for capturing a widely held intuition. It seems to motivate Colin McGinn's 'Mysterianism'. The trouble is Leibniz didn't think big/small enough. Down at the level of molecules it might become obvious what a perception is. 'Might'. |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The courage of spirit is the most natural kind; for spirit is unconquerable, which is why the young are the best fighters. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a27) | |
A reaction: [thumos, presumably, as in Plato] I suppose Aristotle knows better than me, but I suspect the young are just the quickest and strongest. I'd rather be led by someone with experience than by someone who is young. |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes no difference if the soul is divided into parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct capacities. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219b32), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 3.1 | |
A reaction: I take this to endorse my view that the mind-body problem is of limited interest to philosophers. The focus should be on what the mind does, not how it is constructed. But then I presume the latter issue is revealed by neuroscience. |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For those who divide the soul into parts, and divide and separate them in accord with their capacities, the parts turn out to be very many. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a32) | |
A reaction: I accept the warning. The capacities which interest me are those which seem to generate our basic ontology, but if the capacities become fine-grained, they are legion. |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If an animal has a desiring part, it is capable of moving itself. A desiring part, however, cannot exist without an imagination, and all imagination is either rationally calculative or perceptual. Hence in the latter the other animals also have a share. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b27) | |
A reaction: Maybe if you asked people whether other animals are imaginative they would say no, but this argument is strong support for the positive view. |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
Full Idea: A big flea or rat is a small animal, and a small elephant is a big animal, so there can be no question of ignoring the kind of thing to which 'big' or 'small' is referred and forming those concepts by abstraction. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9) | |
A reaction: Geach is attacking a caricature of the theory. Abstraction is a neat mental trick which has developed in stages, from big rats relative to us, to big relative to other rats, to the concept of 'relative' (Idea 8776!), to the concept of 'relative bigness'. |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
Full Idea: Abstractionists are unaware of the difficulty with relations - that they neither exist nor can be observed apart from the converse relation, the two being indivisible, as in grasping 'to the left of' and 'to the right of'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how a rival account such as platonism could help. It seems obvious to me that 'right' and 'left' would be quite meaningless without some experience of things in space, including an orientation to them. |
18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the terms of a language form a finite hierarchy, where the higher terms are predicable of more things than are lower terms. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3 | |
A reaction: I would be a bit cautious about placing something precisely in a hierarchy according to how many things it can be predicated of. It is a start, though, in trying to give a decent account of generality, which is a major concept in philosophy. |
9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Primitive immediate principles ...come about from perception - as in a battle, when a rout has occurred, first one man makes a stand, then another, and then another, until a position of strength is reached. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100a12) | |
A reaction: Philosophers don't create imagery like that any more. This empiricist account of how concepts and universals are created is part of a campaign against Plato's theory of forms. [Idea 9069 continues his idea] |
9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When one undifferentiated item in perception makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals - e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. One animal makes a stand, until animal does. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100a15-) | |
A reaction: This is the quintessential account of abstractionism, with the claim that primitive universals arise directly in perception, but only in repeated perception. How the soul does it is a mystery to Aristotle, just as associations are a mystery to Hume. |
9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A skill arises when from the many cases of thinking in experience a single general assumption is formed in connection with similar things. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a04) | |
A reaction: [He gives the administration of appropriate medicine as the example of a 'skill'] Note that it is 'thinking in' experience, rather than just the raw having of experiences. This is the intellectualist version of empirical abstractionism. I like it. |
16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle counts as general not only properties but also the kinds, into which objects fall, i.e. the genera, species, and differentiae of substances; and these are to be differentiated strictly from properties. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: I take properties to be prior, since the kind of a thing is presumably decided by its properties. I'm increasingly thinking that 'general', 'generality' and 'generalisation' are far more useful words in philosophy than other words in that area. |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Beasts recognise whiteness, but this does not amount to abstraction, which requires attention to the general apart from the particular, and consequently involves knowledge of universal truths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.11) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure where 'truth' creeps into this. I might hallucinate pink elephants, and abstract the general notion of pink from them. Nevertheless, the features picked out in abstraction tend to be the shared features. |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
Full Idea: If concepts were nothing but recognitional capacities, then it is unintelligible that I can judge that cats eat mice when neither of them are present. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.164) | |
A reaction: Having observed the importance of recognition for the abstractionist (Idea 10731), he then seems to assume that there is nothing more to their concepts. Geach fails to grasp levels of abstraction, and cross-reference, and generalisation. |
9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A scientific subject will possess more accuracy (i.e. simplicity) the more that it is about conceptually prior and simpler things, and so it will be more accurate without than with magnitude being involved, and above all being without movement. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a10) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is especially concerned to show how we can achieve accuracy, even while abstracting away from the details of the objects we are studying. Frege should have studied Aristotle more closely. |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds). |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Volition is the effort or endeavour ('conatus') to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad, the endeavour arising immediately out of one's awareness of those things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: Modern neuroscience seems to confirm that there is a chicken-and-egg problem here. Is the moment of perception as good or bad itself an act of volition, or is it neutral? |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primitive forces can be nothing but the internal strivings [tendentia] of simple substances, striving by means of which they pass from perception to perception in accordance with a certain law of their nature. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
A reaction: 'Perception' sounds a bit crazy, but he usually qualifies that sort of remark by saying that it is an 'analogy' with conscious willing souls. The 'internal strivings of substances' is a nice phrase for the basic powers in nature where explanations stop. |
22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28) | |
A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control. |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstraction that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called "I" and enable us to consider that this or that is in us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §30) | |
A reaction: For Leibniz, necessary truth can only be known a priori. Sense experience won't reveal the self, as Hume observed. We evidently 'abstract' the idea of 'I' from the nature of a priori thought. Animals have no self (or morals) for this reason. |
571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Who, except the philosopher, is going to ask whether Socrates and Socrates seated is the same thing? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004b01) |
5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If someone were suddenly to become the King of China, forgetting what he has been, as if born anew, is this not as if he were annihilated, and a King of China created in his place at the same moment? | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §34) | |
A reaction: Strikingly, this clearly endorse the view of the empiricist Locke. It is a view about the continuity of the self, not its essence, but Descartes must have turned in his grave when he read this. When this 'King of China' introspects his self, what is it? |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If a man were made young again, and learned everything anew - would that make him a different man? So it is not memory that makes the very same man. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: Leibniz takes this as a foregone conclusion. If you flipped to a possible world where someone you know well, as a physical being, has been brought up entirely differently (new language, culture, ethics etc), is it really the same person? |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To discover one's own moral identity unaided, it is sufficient that between one state and a neighbouring (or just a nearby) one there be a mediating bond of consciousness, even if this has a jump or forgotten interval mixed into it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
A reaction: Leibniz appears to accept the psychological continuity view of personal identity (which was probably a new problem to him), even though he rightly rejects the account based purely on memory. |
5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It would seem that the thinking part is, or most nearly is, the individual self. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1166a25) | |
A reaction: It seems that where Socrates identifies the self with the whole of the psuché (and hence is interested in its immortality, in 'Phaedo'), Aristotle considers the self to be merely the thinking and rational part of the psuché. |
5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between what is certain and what is necessary; everyone agrees that future contingents are certain, since God foresees them, but it is not thereby admitted that they are necessary. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §13) | |
A reaction: An interesting point, since there is presumably a difference between God foreseeing that future squares will have four corners, and His foreseeing the next war. It seems to me, though, that 'certainty' is bad enough news for free will, without necessity. |
8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Aristotle never gets involved in the riddles of later philosophers about free will. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Note that this is a very great philosopher who was intensely interested in the well-springs of human action. 'Free will' never crossed his mind. This is because free will is nonsense. Owen Flanagan is best on this subject (Ideas 5345 and 5332). |
12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Aristotle has rightly noted that we are not prepared to call an action 'free' unless as well as being unconstrained it is also deliberate. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b06) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 2.21 | |
A reaction: This is quite an important message for David Hume. I love the respect which Leibniz accords Aristotle, at a time when he was becoming thoroughly unfashionable. This is the nearest Aristotle gets to discussing so-called 'free will'. |
4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113b18) | |
A reaction: Ultimately Aristotle believes that free will is an absolute fact, once influences are stripped away. He should have questioned more deeply. |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All those things that are in man's power either to do or not to do he himself is the cause of, and all those things that he is the cause of are in his own power. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1223a08) | |
A reaction: This is the step which allows us to abandon free will, and replace it with the question of whether a person is the 'cause' of an action. Aristotle carefully delineates the criteria for when an action is within a person's power. Includes failures to act? |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A human being is a starting point of some actions, and he alone of animals; for of nothing else should we say that it acted. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b19) | |
A reaction: It is a standard dogma that the idea of free will does not occur in Plato or Aristotle, but this looks awfully like it. I don't agree about animals. You watch them judging whether they can make a leap, and then doing it. |
20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Aristotle makes the concept of moral responsibility more fundamental than the concept of the voluntary, the reverse of the typical contemporary approach. Given that we hold persons responsible, such acts must be voluntary. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110-ish) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind 4.2 | |
A reaction: Good for Aristotle. Whether we hold people responsible or not is widely understood, but whether they are 'free' to act is obscure, and may even be incoherent. We should look at praise and blame, and (above all) excuses. |
19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The more perfect one is, the more one is determined to the good, and so is more free at the same time. ...Our power and knowledge are more extended, and our will much the more limited within the bounds of perfect reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Pierre Bayle [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: I like this idea, which seems to me to derive from Aquinas. When I choose to eat and drink each day, or agree that 7+5 is 12, I don't complain about my lack of freedom in the choices. Goodness and reason are constraints I welcome. |
19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As for volition itself, to say that it is the object of free will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will, else we should still say we will to have the will to will, and that would go on to infinity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.151), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an elementary difficulty which most fans of free will appear to evade. Thoughts just arise in us, and some of them are volitions. We can say there is then a 'gap' (Searle) where we choose, but what happens in the gap? |
2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: People try to safeguard God's freedom, as though it were not freedom of the highest sort to act in perfection following sovereign reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §03) |
7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The will has its causes, but since we are ignorant of them, we believe ourselves independent. It is this chimera of imaginary independence which revolts us against determinism, and which brings us to believe there are difficulties where there are none. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]), quoted by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.16 | |
A reaction: It seems that in his notebooks Leibniz was actually a (Spinozan) determinist. So he should have been, given his view that we live in the best of all possible worlds, and his claim that mind and brain run like two clocks. (Ideas 2114 and 2596) |
13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The ancient Sloth's Syllogism says that if something is foreseen and infallible, it will happen without my effort, and if it is not foreseen, it will not happen, even though I am able to do it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.113) | |
A reaction: Presumable the foreseeing is to be done by the oracle, and not by the slothful person. |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is not the case that everything which happens is necessary; rather, everything which happens is certain after God made choice of this possible universe, whose notion contains this series of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05) | |
A reaction: I think this distinction is best captured as 'metaphysical necessity' (Leibniz's 'necessity'), and 'natural necessity' (his 'certainty'). 'Certainty' seems a bad word, as it is either certain de dicto or de re. Is God certain, or is the thing certain? |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Choice, however much the will is determined to make it, should not be called absolutely and strictly necessary: a predominance of goods of which one is aware inclines without necessitating, though this is determining and never fails to have its effect. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: Something like seeing that 7+5 equals 12 makes you say '12', but it doesn't actually necessitate your saying '12'? Certain facts seem determined by nature, but not necessitated. Or not necessarily necessitated? |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Most affections (like anger) seem to involve the body, but thinking seems distinctive of the soul. But if this requires imagination, it too involves the body. Only pure mental activity would prove the separation of the two. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a08-) | |
A reaction: What an observant man! Modern neuroscience is bringing out the fact that emotion is central to all mental life. We can't recognise faces without it. I say imagination is essential to pure reason, and that seems emotional too. Reason is physical. |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of the soul is to represent bodies. ...The soul and the idea of the body do not signify the same thing. For the soul remains one and the same, while the idea of the body perpetually changes as the body itself changes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.03.24/04.03) | |
A reaction: This seems to rest on the Cartesian Ego, as the essence of mind which does not change. And yet elsewhere he describes the Ego as a mere abstraction from introspected mental life. |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That the soul is not separable from the body - or that certain parts of it are not, if it naturally has parts - is quite clear. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413a04) | |
A reaction: This doesn't make him a physicalist. I've seen him described in modern terms as a functionalist, but that makes the mind abstract and the body concrete. Perhaps he is an 'Integrationist' (as Descartes might be in his 'pilot' passage). |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The affections of the soul - spiritedness, fear, pity, confidence, joy, loving, hating - would all seem to involve the body, since at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a16) | |
A reaction: Aristotle was not a physicalist, but this resembles the pilot-in-the-ship passage in Descartes, accepting the very close links. |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nor is there any reason why souls or things analogous to souls should not be everywhere, even if dominant and consequently intelligent souls, like human souls, cannot be everywhere. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12) | |
A reaction: He is always flirting with panpsychism, though he doesn't seem to offer any account of how these little baby souls can be built up to create one intelligent soul, the latter being indivisible. 'Souls' are very different from things 'analous to souls'! |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism. |
5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In Leibniz's panpsychism, the so-called 'physical' points are souls or spiritual 'monads'. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.23 | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that 'panpsychism' is the right description for Leibniz's theory of monads. I take panpsychism to be either a dualist or a dual aspect (or property dualism) view. Leibniz seems to believe there is strictly one substance. |
5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is inconceivable that mind and body should have any influence on one another, and it is unreasonable simply to have recourse to the extraordinary operation of the universal cause in a matter which is ordinary and particular. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §33) | |
A reaction: Leibniz was the ultimate intellectual contortionist! Here he is rejecting Cartesian interactionism, and also Malebranche's Occasionalism (God bridges the gap), in order to prepare for his own (daft) theory of what is now called Parallelism. |
7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's three objections to occasionalism are: it disturbs the concept of laws of nature used in physics; it introduces perpetual miracles; and it doesn't recognise activity of substances (leading to the Spinozan heresy that God is the only substance). | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I wonder what would happen if, within the viewpoint of occasionalism, God suddenly packed up and abandoned his job? Presumably the world wouldn't disappear, so there would still be substances, but passive ones, in chaos. |
5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Two clocks in perfect agreement must be by natural influence, or the control of a craftsman, or their perfect construction at the beginning. Only the third way (of "preestablished harmony" by God) is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Nature and Communication of Substance [1690], p.121) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'natural influence' would cover the possibility that (unnoticed by you, apparently) one clock is attached to the other clock at the relevant points. If they are unconnected, presumably they are quite unaware of one another's existence. |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not admit that the soul does not know bodies, although this knowledge arises without their influencing one another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], Reply 11) | |
A reaction: He couldn't very well admit this without moving into pure idealism. Presumably it is like "I know her - she'll be in Harrods this morning". I wonder if Satan could steal my body, but my mind continue to believe it was still there? |
19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C]) | |
A reaction: This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong. |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that? |
19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Insofar as the soul has perfection ...God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders. Insofar as it is imperfect and confused, God accommodates soul to body, swayed by passions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.159), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 3.IV | |
A reaction: Perkins says this is the nearest Leibniz gets to the idea of interaction between body and soul. Perfection and confusion are on a continuum for Leibniz. With such speculations I always wonder how these things can be known. How perfect is my mind? |
12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If it could be supposed that a body exists without a mind, then a man would do everything in the same way as if he did not have a mind, and men would speak and write the same things, without knowing what they do. ...But this supposition is impossible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Paper of December 1676 [1676], A6.3.400), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
A reaction: This is clearly the zombie dream, three centuries before Robert Kirk's modern invention of the idea. Leibniz's reason for denying the possibility of zombies won't be the modern physicalist reason. |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is another absurdity which follows, …since they attach the soul to a body, and place it in the body, without further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about. …Yet this seems necessary, because this association produces action. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b14) | |
A reaction: A clear statement of the interaction objection to full substance dualism. Critics say that dualists have to invoke a 'miracle' at this point. |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Early thinkers try only to describe the soul, but they fail to go into any kind of detail about the body which is to receive the soul, as if it were possible (as it is in the Pythagorean tales) for just any old soul to be clothed in just any old body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b20) | |
A reaction: Precisely. Anyone who seriously believes that a human mind can be reincarnated in a flea needs their mind examined. Actually they need their brain examined, but that probably wouldn't impress them. I can, of course, imagine moving into a flea. |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the soul is something distinct from the mixture, why then are the being for flesh and for the other parts of the animal destroyed at the same time? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a25) | |
A reaction: An obvious response to this reasonable question is to say that we see the body die, but not the soul, so the soul doesn't die. The problem is then to find some evidence for the soul's continued existence. |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
Full Idea: We can't take a statement that two men, whose overt behaviour was not actually different, were in different states of mind as being really a statement that the behaviour of one man would have been different in hypothetical circumstances that never arose. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §3) | |
A reaction: This is the whole problem with trying to define the mind as dispositions. The same might be said of properties, since some properties are active, but others are mere potential or disposition. Hence 'process' looks to me the most promising word for mind. |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
Full Idea: Is there any behaviour characteristic of a given belief? | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §4) | |
A reaction: Well, yes. Belief that a dog is about to bite you. Belief that this nice food is yours, and you are hungry. But he has a good point. He is pointing out that the mental state is a very different thing from the 'disposition' to behave in a certain way. |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33 | |
A reaction: A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions. |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perhaps it would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does in virtue of the soul. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408b12) | |
A reaction: This can be seen as incipient behaviourism in Aristotle's view. It echoes the functionalist view that what matters is not what the mind is, or is made of, but what it does. |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should not enquire whether the soul and the body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b06) | |
A reaction: This is his hylomorphist view of objects, so that the soul is the 'form' which bestows identity (and power) on the matter of which it is made. This remark is thoroughly physicalist. |
4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The attainment of truth is the task of both the intellectual parts of the soul (calculation and deliberation). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139b10) | |
A reaction: Obviously true, I would have thought, and equally true of the evolved brain, though there are plenty of people out there who try to deny it. |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Thinking, then, is something other than perceiving, and its two kinds are held to be imagination and supposition. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 427b28) |
19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The passions of monads reside in their confused perceptions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715) | |
A reaction: He thinks perceptions come in degrees of confusion, all the way up to God, who alone has fully clear perceptions. He blames in on these confused perceptions. |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Many classify even love as involuntary, and certain cases of anger and certain natural states as being too strong for human nature; and we regard them as being pardonable, as being of such a nature as to be constrained by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b20) | |
A reaction: Blind terror would presumably count as another such state. An interesting aspect of Aristotle's picture - that human nature contains ingredients that are not part of a natural harmonious whole. |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every feeling is the perception of a truth. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I wouldn't say feelings ARE perceptions of truths, but I might say that every experience we have has an intellectual dimension as well as an emotional one. Our beliefs drift and solidify in just the same way that feelings do. |
5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are mean states also in the sphere of feelings. …The man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, but the envious man is distressed at any good fortune, and the spiteful man rejoices at bad fortune. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a29) | |
A reaction: This example captures nicely the crucial point that Aristotle wants our actions and responses to be appropriate, rather than just restrained. The disciple of Aristotle does not conduct himself like a cold Stoic, but has lively responses to situations. |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Pretty much all of the praiseworthy or blameworthy states concerned with character are either excesses, deficiencies, or medial conditions in feelings. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1233b16) | |
A reaction: Suggests that the ideal state of character is the result of long and careful tuning of the feelings - insofar as we can control them. Presumably we can train feelings of hatred or compassion, by appropriate exposures. These states are NOT virtues. |
4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle gives a superior account of human rationality, because he allows emotions to participate in reason, rather than being mere animal, non-rational impulses. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Intro | |
A reaction: This is obviously helpful in virtue ethics, but it is a bit questionable, if the core of rationality is 'giving reasons'. A feeling might be a reason, but only once it has been conceptualised. "For RLS, his feelings were his reasons", said Henry James. |
72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Assume the rational soul has two parts, one to contemplate things with invariable first principles, one to contemplate variable things. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a06) | |
A reaction: 'Assume' is interesting. He presumably isn't asserting this division as a fact. So his methodology is make assumptions - probably as aids to clear thinking. |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
A reaction: So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief. |
23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems that Aristotle does not associate reason primarily with ordinary, everyday thought and reasoning, as we do, but with a much more specific function of reason. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980b) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.163 | |
A reaction: Although Aristotle is naturalistic, he is also a bit of a dualist, and so is less keen than I am to connect human reason with sensible behaviour in animals. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others; therefore the former are more intelligent. …Animals live by appearances and memories, with little connected experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980a28-) | |
A reaction: I assume that larger animals make judgements, which have to rely on previous experiences, so I think he underestimates the cleverest animals. We now know about Caledonian Crows, which amaze us, and would have amazed Aristotle. |
11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Many recollections of the same thing perform the function of a single experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980b28) | |
A reaction: This beautifully simple remark seems to me to be extremely important if we are going to understand the nature of thought. Personally I think it endorses the 'database' view of how the mind works (as a set of labelled 'files'). See Fodor's 'LOT2'. |
19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What I mean by an idea is not a certain act of thinking, but a power or faculty such that we have an idea of a thing even if we are not thinking about it but know that we can think it when the occasion arises. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (What is an Idea? [1676], p.281) | |
A reaction: 'Idea' tends to be used in the seventeenth century to mean an actual mental event. It is because Leibniz believes in the unconscious mind that he can offer this rather different, and probably superior, notion of an 'idea'. |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is an immediate inner object, which expresses the nature or qualities of things, ..but since it is the object of thought it can exist before and after the thoughts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: This sounds something like Frege's 'third realm' between mind and world (Idea 7740). Notice that Leibniz is also using the word 'object' in this context. Leibniz doesn't make the mistake of confusing concepts and images, as many did. |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is essential to distinguish images from exact ideas which are composed of definitions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.09) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12615, which is attacking Descartes and Locke, I think, but fails to register that Spinoza and Leibniz had got the notion of an 'idea' much more clearly. |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I distinguish ideas from thoughts. For we always have all our pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses, but thoughts always correspond to some sensation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: Leibniz's concept of an 'idea' is quite different from the empiricist notion of them, and strikes me as being much closer to Frege's notion of a concept. On the whole I like the Leibniz account best. |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that green comes from a mixture of blue and yellow; which makes it credible that the idea of green is composed of the ideas of those two colours, although the idea of green appears to us as simple as that of blue. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.07) | |
A reaction: This shows the use of 'idea' at that time for non-verbal mental events and concepts. Ideas are not, then, just undestood as phenomena, but can be analysed and explained more deeply. |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The name 'gold' signifies not merely what the speaker knows of gold , but also what he does not know, which may be known by someone else: an inner constitution from which flow colour and weight, and generates other properties. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.11) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Thus in the course of defending true essences of gold (against Locke's claim that we are stuck with the nominal essence), Leibniz drifts into an externalist account of meaning. He mentions experts, as so often does Putnam. |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The name 'gold' signifies not only what he who pronounces it knows about it, for example, something very heavy and yellow, but also what he does not know, and that another can know about it, its internal constitution from which colour and weight flow. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.354), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences | |
A reaction: Leibniz goes on to use the word 'expert'. This isn't just a hint of Putnam's externalism about concepts like 'water' - it is a clear spelling out of the full idea. Locke would have been astounded by 'atomic number 79', and Leibniz would be, like, 'yeah'. |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There must always be some basis for the connexion between the terms of a proposition, and it is to be found in their concepts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: We face the problem that bothered Russell, of the unity of the proposition. We are also led to the question of HOW our concepts connect the parts of a proposition. Do concepts have valencies? Are they incomplete, as Frege suggests? |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
Full Idea: Having a concept is not recognizing a feature of experience; the mind makes concepts. We then fit our concepts to experience. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that we create concepts ex nihilo, which is a rather worse theory than saying that we abstract them from multiple (and multi-level) experiences. That minds create concepts is a truism. How do we do it? |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Leibniz understood concepts as corresponding to eternal possibilities, with both concepts and their ordering having their foundation in the divine mind. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 2 'Nominalism' | |
A reaction: It is is no longer the fashion to think of concepts as 'ordered', and yet there is a multitude of dependence relations between them. |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: You assert that the notion of substance is formed from concepts, and not from things. But are not concepts themselves formed from things? | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.06.23), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 5.7 | |
A reaction: A nice remark, which is true even of highly abstruse, abstract or fanciful concepts. You are still left with the question of how far away from reality you have moved when you construct things from your reality-based concepts. |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
Full Idea: For abstractionists, concepts are essentially capacities for recognizing recurrent features of the world. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.163) | |
A reaction: Recognition certainly strikes me as central to thought (and revelatory of memory, since we continually recognise what we cannot actually recall). Geach dislikes this view, but I see it as crucial to an evolutionary view of thought. |
10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose parts are prior to the whole - then, since the acute angle is a part of the right angle, and a finger is part of an animal, this would mean the acute angle and the finger were prior, but received opinion says otherwise. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b24) |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
Full Idea: If a man struck with aphasia can still play bridge or chess, I certainly wish to say he still has the concepts involved in the game, although he can no longer exercise them verbally. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §5) | |
A reaction: Geach proceeds thereafter to concentrate on language, but this caveat is crucial. To suggest that concepts are entirely verbal has always struck me as ridiculous, and an insult to our inarticulate mammalian cousins. |
9789 | You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who say there are Forms abstract natural properties, even though they are less separable than mathematical properties. This is clear if you try to define both the objects themselves and their attributes. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b36) | |
A reaction: (Compare Idea 9788) This is Frege's black and white cats, where you cannot abstract the black without thinking of the cat, but Aristotle thinks mathematical abstraction is more feasible. |
9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must get to know the primitives by induction; for this is the way in which perception instils universals. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 100b04) | |
A reaction: This statement is so strongly empirical it could have come from John Stuart Mill. The modern post-Fregean view of universals is essentially platonist - that they have a life and logic of their own, and their method of acquisition is irrelevant. |
9788 | Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians abstract properties which are conceptually separable from the world of change. It makes no difference if you treat them as separate, in the sense that it does not result in error. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b33) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a crucial point to make against Frege (if Aristotle is right). Frege hates abstractionism precisely because it is psychological, and hence admits subjective error, instead of objective truth. Does 'pure' abstraction avoid error? |
9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The mathematician conducts a study into things in abstraction (after the removal of all perceptible features, such as weight and hardness, leaving only quantity and continuity). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1061a26) | |
A reaction: Frege complained that there is nothing left if you remove the perceptible features, but clearly Aristotle is not an empiricist in this passage, and it is doubtful if even Mill can be totally empirical in his account. We have relations of ideas. |
9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Study things as mathematicians do. Suppose what is not separable to be separable. A man qua man is an indivisible unity, so the arithmetician supposes a man to be an indivisible unity, and investigates the accidental features of man qua indivisible. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a19) | |
A reaction: This is the abstractionist view of mathematics. Qua indivisible, a man will have the same properties as a toothbrush. Aristotle clearly intends the method for scientists as well. It strikes me as common sense, but there is a lot of modern caution. |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In forming universals the soul only abstracts certain circumstances by concealing innumerable others. ..A spherical body complete in all respects is nowhere in nature; the soul forms such a notion by concealing aberrations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's affirmation of traditional 'abstraction by ignoring', which everyone seems to have believed in before Frege, and which I personally think is simply correct, even though it is deeply unfashionable and I keep it to myself. |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
Full Idea: I call 'abstractionism' the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience - abstracting it - and ignoring the other features simultaneously given - abstracting from them. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §6) | |
A reaction: Locke seems to be the best known ancestor of this view, and Geach launches a vigorous attack against it. However, contemporary philosophers still refer to the process, and I think Geach should be crushed and this theory revived. |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
Full Idea: Nowhere in the sensible world could you find anything to be suitably labelled 'or' or 'not'. So the abstractionist appeals to an 'inner sense', or hesitation for 'or', and of frustration or inhibition for 'not'. Personally I see a threat in 'or else'! | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §7) | |
A reaction: This is a key argument of Geach's against abstractionism. As a logician he prefers to discuss connectives rather than, say, colours. I think they might be meta-abstractions, which you create internally once you have picked up the knack. |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
Full Idea: The number-concepts just cannot be got by concentrating on the number and abstracting from the kind of things being counted. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: This point is from Frege - that if you 'abstract away' everything apart from the number, you are simply left with nothing in experience. The objection might, I think, be met by viewing it as second-order abstraction, perhaps getting to a pattern first. |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
Full Idea: The way counting is learned is wholly contrary to abstractionist preconceptions, because the series of numerals has to be learned before it can be applied. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: You might learn to parrot the names of numbers, but you could hardly know what they meant if you couldn't count anything. See Idea 3907. I would have thought that individuating objects must logically and pedagogically precede counting. |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
Full Idea: The pattern of the numeral series that is grasped by a child exists nowhere in nature outside human languages, so the human race cannot possibly have discerned this pattern by abstracting it from some natural context. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: This is a spectacular non sequitur, which begs the question. Abstractionists precisely claim that the process of abstraction brings numerals into human language from the natural context. Structuralism is an attempt to explain the process. |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
Full Idea: It is not true that men born blind can form no colour-concepts; a man born blind can use the word 'red' with a considerable measure of intelligence; he can show a practical grasp of the logic of the word. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: Weak. It is obvious that they pick up the word 'red' from the usage of sighted people, and the usage of the word doesn't guarantee a grasp of the concept, as when non-mathematicians refer to 'calculus'. Compare Idea 7377 and Idea 7866. |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
Full Idea: Since we can use the terms 'black' and 'cat' in situations not including any black object or any cat, how could this part of the use be got by abstraction? | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: [He is attacking H.H. Price] It doesn't seem a huge psychological leap to apply the word 'cat' when we remember a cat, and once it is in the mind we can play games with our abstractions. Cats are smaller than dogs. |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to form the concept of 'chromatic colour' by discriminative attention to a feature given in my visual experience. In seeing a red window-pane, I do not have two sensations, one of redness and one of chromatic colour. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: Again Geach begs the question, because abstractionists claim that you can focus on two different 'aspects' of the one experience, as that it is a 'window', or it is 'red', or it is not a wall, or it is not monochrome. |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
Full Idea: The abstractionist cannot give a logically coherent account of the features that are supposed to be reached by discriminative attention, corresponding to the words 'some' and 'not'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.167) | |
A reaction: I understand 'some' in terms of mereology, because that connects to experience, and 'not' I take to derive more from psychological experience than from the physical world, building on thwarted expectation, which even animals experience. |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
Full Idea: To understand the verb 'to strike' we must see that 'striking' and 'being struck' are different, but necessarily go together in event and thought; only in the context of a judgment can they be distinguished, when we think of both together. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.168) | |
A reaction: Geach seems to have a strange notion that judgements are pure events which can precede all experience, and are the only ways we can come to understand experience. He needs to start from animals (or 'brutes', as he still calls them!). |
9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we have a science of the healthy, and the healthy happens to be white, the science of the healthy does not deal with the white. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1077b30) | |
A reaction: Given this point, we certainly cannot think of Aristotle as believing in simple abstractionism. The problem of the coextension of renates and cordates looms here (Idea 7317). 'Relevant' similarities require extensive cross-referencing. |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: In 'De Interpretatione' Aristotle laid out an enduring theory of reference and meaning, in which we understand a word or any other sign by associating that word with a concept. This concept determines what the word refers to. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE]) by Hilary Putnam - Representation and Reality 2 p.19 | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me, despite all this Wittgensteinian stuff about beetles in boxes. When you meet a new technical term in philosophy, you must struggle to fully grasp the concept it proposes. |
13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Leibniz seems to be the first modern philosopher to focus on sentence-sized units that he called propositions. The Empiricists among the moderns focused on word-sized units like ideas. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: Historically, the sentential logic of the Stoics has a claim to have started this one. I find my initial sympathies to be with the empiricists. |
5107 | Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The categories of predication are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 225b06) | |
A reaction: A note says this omits time from the 'familiar list' of eight predicates. |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle reminds us that nothing is to count as predicable that cannot be said-of many things. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1 | |
A reaction: Thus there wouldn't be any predicates if there were not universals. Could we have proper names for individual qualities (tropes), in the way that we have them for individual objects? |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'White' signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species ('man') and the genus ('animal') mark off the qualification of substance - they signify substance of a certain qualification. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b18) | |
A reaction: This is making a fundamental distinction between two different types of predication. I would describe them as one attributing a real property, and the other attributing a category (as a result of the properties). I don't think 'substance' helps here. |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, ...and just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of - affections of the soul - are the same for all. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 16a03-08) | |
A reaction: Loux identifies this passage as the source of the 'conceptualist' view of propositions, which I immediately identify with. The view that these propositions are 'the same for all' is plausible for normal objects, but dubious for complex abstractions. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and of the study of ethics, and is quite properly categorized as political. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1356a25) | |
A reaction: Aristotle gives a higher status to rhetoric than Socrates and Plato did - and rightly, in my view. We have lost sight of it as a vital part of politics, and philosophers must fight for virtue in rhetoric, which requires right reason and fine principles. |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a39) | |
A reaction: Thus even if Bivalence holds, and the only truth-values are T and F, it doesn't follow that Excluded Middle holds, which says that every proposition must have one of those two values. |
12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The part of a contradictory pair which says something of something is an affirmation; the part which takes something from something is a negation. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a14) | |
A reaction: So affirmation is predication about an object ['Fa'], and negation is denial of predication. We have a scope problem: there is nothing which is F [¬∃x(Fx)], or there is a thing which is not-F [∃x(¬Fx)]. Aristotle seems to mean the latter. |
1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you should not argue in metaphors, it is plain too that you should neither define by metaphors nor define what is said in metaphors; for then you will necessarily argue in metaphors. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97b37) | |
A reaction: Impeccable logic, but seeing a similarity can be a wonderful shortcut to seeing a great truth. |
4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle does not fully endorse the famous first sentence of the 'Ethics'; he does not think every action aims at some good - for one thing akratic action does not. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a03) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.91 n25 | |
A reaction: Nice point. Aristotle's claim never sounded right, and yet vice presumably aims at what it perceives as good. Socrates presumably endorses the opening sentence, though Aristotle wouldn't. |
23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle choices are not explained in terms of a will, but in terms of the attachment of reason to the good, however conceived, and the exercise of reason to determine how the good might best be obtained. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b11-24) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
A reaction: I am personally happy to use the concept of the 'will', as the faculty which makes the final arbitration between competing mental drives, but this idea shows that the whole issue could be managed without it. |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The idea of the will includes that of the understanding. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.06) | |
A reaction: A nice remark, although I am not sure that I agree with it. The understanding (if we allow such talk of faculties, with which I have no problem) sometimes lags behind and sometimes forges ahead of the will. What else is weakness of the will? |
19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One may say that 'will' consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it contains. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: This emphasises that the will is faced with options, rather than generating the options. The context is a discussion of the nature of God's will. I think 'will' is a really useful concept, and dislike the Hobbesian rejection of will. |
5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In cases where the movement of the limbs that are the instruments of action has its origin in the agent himself, it is in his power either to act or not, and therefore such actions are voluntary. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a15) | |
A reaction: He asserts this to show that an action is voluntary even under extreme compulsion or pressure. This seems right, and moves the focus to the concept of an 'excuse', which covers forgivable voluntary actions. |
5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In every case a man stops inquiring how to act when he has traced the starting-point of action back to himself, i.e. to the dominant part of himself; for it is this that makes the choice. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a06) | |
A reaction: A footnote says the 'dominant part' of the soul is reason. If we dispense with 'free will' (and we should), this is the core of moral responsibility. Responsible actions are those caused by the dominant part of the mind. |
4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of akrasia seems to leave the vital point unexplained, which is why the better syllogism is overcome. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b14) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.85 | |
A reaction: The problem is where exactly the action originates within us - is it sometimes from deliberation, and sometimes from some irrational force? Either akrasia is easy and action baffling, or vice versa. |
22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17) | |
A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain. |
68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The incontinent man (weak-willed, 'akrates') acts from desire but not from choice, but the continent man (controlled, 'enkrates') acts from choice but not from desire. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b14) | |
A reaction: These two categories are contrasted with the truly wicked and the truly good, in both of whom choice and desire work together. The akrates and the enkrates include most people, hovering in the middle ground of moral apprenticeship. |
4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Morality rises from vice (bad reason, bad feeling, bad action), to akrasia ('no control', but get the reason right), to enkrateia (wrong feeling, but right reason and action), culminating in virtue (right feeling, as well as right reason and action). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
A reaction: Very illuminating, especially for showing the importance of feeling in Aristotle's account. True virtue is effortless, not steely control. This has to be right, and seems to differ from Kant. |
4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the incontinent person never acts against active knowledge of particulars, but either acts against knowledge that is possessed but not exercised, or knowledge that is not fully possessed, or against knowledge of universals alone. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1 | |
A reaction: This comments aims to bring Aristotle closer to Socrates (who says virtue IS reason), and it certainly fits with the high value which Aristotle normally places on reason. |
5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some thinkers say that when some people are unable to resist pleasures then what they have is not knowledge but only opinion. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b33) | |
A reaction: You would have thought that people take their own opinions for knowledge, but Aristotle seems to refer to weakly held beliefs. Aristotle allows that this might excuse mild misbehaviour, but not true vice. |
5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is quite possible for a person who has knowledge of both universal and particular to act inconsistently with his knowledge, if he is exercising knowledge of the universal but not of the particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1147a01) | |
A reaction: In this way Aristotle says (at 1147b15) that he can agree with Socrates about akrasia. I.e. that the evil deed does indeed arise from some sort of ignorance (perhaps of the relevant particular), and not just from desire. |
23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle explicitly characterises akrasia cases as ones in which one acts against one's choices [prohairesis], rather than as cases in which one chooses to act against reason. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a09) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
A reaction: The point is that Socrates and Plato give reason top authority, and Aristotle is not undermining that. Akrasia is a mistake at a lower level. Frede's discussion is subtle! |
23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is past failures (of training, discipline, reflection…), rather than a specific mental event, a choice or a decision, which in Aristotle accounts for akratic action. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a10) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
A reaction: This is to demonstrate that Aristotle has no concept of a 'will' which arbitrates over difficult choices. What we call 'willing' he applies only to choices which are rational. |
5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The licentious man is unrepentant, because he abides by his choice; but the incontinent (weak-willed) man is always capable of repentance. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1150b28) | |
A reaction: This is the very important feature of virtue theory - that what happens AFTER the action is almost as important as what happens before and during it. Character can be revealed just as much by pride or regret for an action. |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The discord between the good and the pleasant in one's feelings is lack of self-control. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237a08) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of his view, which opposes the view of Socrates that akrasia is a failure of reason or judgement. Goodness seems to be treated here as a feeling, which is unusual. |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Self-controlled people, even when they desire and have an appetite for things, do not do these things for which they have the desire, but instead follow the understanding. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a06) | |
A reaction: If modern discussions would stop talking of 'weakness of will', and talk instead of 'control' and its lack, the whole issue would become clearer. Akrasia is then seen, for example, as an action of the whole person, not of some defective part. |
19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, while the limits of our knowledge explain why we sometimes choose things we think are good but which turn out to be bad, the force of minute perceptions explains why we sometimes choose things that we know are bad. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV | |
A reaction: To be overwhelmed by selfish greed doesn't sound like a 'minute perception'. Leibniz thinks all desires are reactions to perceptions. Observing our degrees of knowledge is an interesting response to the intellectualist view of weakness of will. |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but opinion together with inclination, whenever as a result of deliberation they are brought to a conclusion. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227a04) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the earliest appearance of the belief-plus-desire theory of action, which is often associated with Hume. A choice does not necessarily result from having the inclination and the appropriate opinion. Laziness! |
5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Prudence ('phronesis') is not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1141b14) | |
A reaction: Note that 'phronesis' is partly concerned with universals, although it is crucial to Aristotle's theory that each particular situation is different, and so no rules can actually dictate moral action. |
80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a07) | |
A reaction: I'm not wholly clear about how virtue identifies correct aims. Virtue finds the mean, but how? Prudence is busy with strategy. Theoretical reason stands back from the world. A gap in the theory? |
5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One cannot be prudent (have practical reason) without being good. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a33) | |
A reaction: I suspect that for Aristotle this is more of a tautology than an observation. We might think of a very clever criminal as having 'phronesis' (practical reason), but Aristotle simply wouldn't, though he has no simple explanation for his view. |
82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The possession of the single virtue of prudence will carry with it the possession of them all. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a02) | |
A reaction: Prudence is phronesis, of which I prefer the translation 'common sense', thought he scholars call it 'practical wisdom'. People can be sensible in one are, and stupid in another. |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In inanimate things the starting-point is single, in animate things there is more than one; for inclination and reason are not always in harmony. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a24) | |
A reaction: It is important that this seems to include non-human animals. We see animals avoid something which they desire, presumably because they detect a danger. They may be conflicting desires, but it is rational to prioritise dangers. |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26) | |
A reaction: I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes. |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill. |
69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We deliberate not about ends, but about means. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b12) | |
A reaction: A young person choosing a career path probably ought to deliberate about ends, as well as means. Is he implying at ends are irrational? That sounds unlikely. |
20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Practical reason [phronesis] is a truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing, and with the things that are good for human beings. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1140b21) | |
A reaction: [tr. Greenwood] That sounds suspiciously like wisdom to me. Or maybe wisdom also has a contemplative aspect. |
4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, practical perception is perception of particulars as parts of larger wholes, which involves the perception of their value (as in seeing my food as part of bodily health, and all action as part of a flourishing life). | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
A reaction: An appealing idea. Hume (who separates facts from values) would call it rubbish, but with the addition of a premiss like "life is good", this seems plausible and appealing. |
73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The function of practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds to right appetite. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a28) | |
A reaction: And right appetite may well have to be educated by theoretical intellect. |
67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every bad man is ignorant of what he ought to do and refrain from doing. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b29) | |
A reaction: This sounds more like the view on akrasia of Socrates than that of Aristotle. Aristotle thinks bad people can also know what is good, but be pulled away from it by strong desires. |
5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems that the same people are not equally good at choosing the best actions and forming the best opinions; some are comparatively good at forming opinions, but through a moral defect fail to make the right choices. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a09) | |
A reaction: It is not enough to say that they CAN be separate. What type of opinions? Wise actors rarely have stupid opinions, and the opinions of bad actors usually contain error. See Jane Austen. |
81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whereas Socrates thought that the virtues are principles (because they are forms of knowledge), we say they imply a principle (practical reason). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b30) | |
A reaction: It is hard to pin down how rational an Aristotelian virtue is supposed to be. Is a virtue a quasi-platonic vision of 'the good', but in each specific area, rather than in general? |
20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why is he going for a walk? We say 'to be healthy', and having said that we have assigned the cause. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b33-5) | |
A reaction: Stout gives this as the predecessor of Anscombe's account of intentions. The thought is that the explanation of the act is its purpose. Such teleology is more plausible than the Aristotelian teleology about non-human events. |
5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is our reasoned acts that are held to be in the fullest sense voluntary and our own doing. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a01) | |
A reaction: This seems to me crucial in morality. Morality concerns important decisions made by the core of a person. If we ask how 'core decisions' are known, their hallmark will be reasons, because reasons are the peak of human awareness. |
5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When a man repents of an act done through ignorance, he is considered to have acted involuntarily; but a man who does not repent of such an act is another case, so he may be said to have acted non-voluntarily. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b22) | |
A reaction: It strikes me as crucial to virtue theory that how you acted could be partly decided by your attitude AFTER the event. There is a 'residue' (Hursthouse) to every action, of guilt, pride etc. 'Voluntary' evidently has internal/external components. |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The voluntary consists in action accompanied by thought of some kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a06) | |
A reaction: This is thought as opposed to inclination or choice. The controlled person [enkrateia] voluntarily acts against inclinations. The appropriate thought receives carefull analysis in NE 1109b30-1111b4. |
4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to define responsibility negatively: I am responsible for an action if and only if I do it neither by force nor because of ignorance. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b13) by Terence Irwin - Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle p.117 | |
A reaction: Reminiscent of David Hume, suggesting that Aristotle may at heart be a determinist, because he lacks any positive notion of free will? |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, for us to be responsible for what we do, our action has to somehow reflect our motivation. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a07) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
A reaction: This sounds like 'mens rea' in law - meaning to do the thing you did. But we can obviously be responsible for things through neglect, for example. |
5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Presumably there are some things such that a man cannot be compelled to do them - that he must sooner die than do, though he suffer the most dreadful fate. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a27) | |
A reaction: This is a central concept for virtue theory - that no possible 'utilitarian calculation' could allow a virtuous person to do some awful thing because of a cool assessment that it will eventually add up to increased happiness. |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If someone acquired a taste for poisons which would kill him or make him wretched, it would be absurd to say that we ought not to argue with him about his tastes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a first step in any discussion of taste on which you would hope that sensible persons would agree. 'It is just a matter of taste' is definitely not the end of discussion. Aesthetic taste is important, just as values are important. |
52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: (roughly) Three pairs of factors cause choice or avoidance: fine/base, advantageous/harmful, pleasant/painful. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b29) | |
A reaction: I love the Greek idea that we choose actions for their 'fineness' [kalos, nobility, beauty]. We sometimes celebrate fine deeds in the media, and even award honours for them, but we don't talk about them much. |
8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 1.2.1 | |
A reaction: Well he would, wouldn't he? Swots like Leibniz are inclined to value things which only they can fully appreciate. There may be intellectual subject matter in the study of a rose, but I do not believe that it is needed to appreciate the beauty. |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The more one is familiar with things, the more beautiful one finds them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1688.01.4/14) | |
A reaction: This is always the reply given to those who say that science kills our sense of beauty. The first step in aesthetic life is certainly to really really pay attention to things. |
5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The pentathletes are the most beautiful, being at the same time naturally suited to both speed and force. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1361b09) | |
A reaction: This is still true. Watch the Olympics. The bodies we envy most belong to those who do a variety of disciplines. The most beautiful music fulfils a variety of functions (structure, as well as melody, drama, rhythm, harmony, novelty). |
2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09) | |
A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'. |
636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The major Forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry and delimitation, and these are very much objects of the proofs of the mathematical sciences. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a31) |
5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §17) | |
A reaction: 'Only'! This is a super-pythagorean view of music, as you might expect from a great mathematician. Did he understand the horrible compromises that had just been made to achieve even-tempered tuning? Patterns are the key, as always. |
16566 | Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. | |
From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b05) | |
A reaction: Hm. Characters in great novels achieve universality by being representated very particularly. Great depth of mind seems required to be a poet, but less so for a historian (though there is, I presume, no upward limit on the possible level of thought). |
2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08) | |
A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain. |
635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The good is always in some action, whereas the beautiful can also be in things without movement. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a26) |
2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type). | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20) | |
A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why. |
5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is for lack of reflection on themselves that beasts have no moral qualities. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §34) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but I think this is false. I would say animals do have a sense of their self, because that is the most basic feature of any mind, but what they lack is second-order thought, that is, ability to reflect on and judge their own beliefs and acts. |
45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We are studying not to know what goodness is, but how to become good men. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b27) | |
A reaction: How can a philosopher not want to know what goodness is? Can you fail to be good if you know what goodness is? Can you be a good man without understanding goodness? |
5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Questions of conduct do not fall under any art or professional tradition, but the agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand, just as happens in the arts of medicine and navigation. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a08) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that some areas of medicine, and a lot of navigation, have become much more precise in modern times. His thought sounds pessimistic, but it is a lynchpin of virtue theory. 'Have the right disposition, then attend to the details'. |
46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That we should act according to the right principle is common ground and may be assumed as a basis for discussion. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b31) | |
A reaction: Hume grumbles that we can't prove values from facts, but Aristotle that is an absurd aspiration. His 'Ethics' is simply a handbook for people who wish to be good human beings. |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08) | |
A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do? |
7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, it is by virtue of possessing memory and self-consciousness that human minds are moral beings, capable of reward and punishment. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.4 | |
A reaction: I like this because it makes no mention of free will (though Leibniz struggled to defend free will). I would add meta-thought (the ability to ponder and evaluate our own thinking), which makes a change of mind possible. |
5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The body is in its prime from the ages of thirty to thirty-five, and the soul around the age of forty-nine. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390b09) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully specific! It is important that Aristotle is interested in these questions. The good for man follows the path laid out by nature, in which a man rises to his highest good in maturity, and then declines from it into old age. |
5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Just saying that man's happiness is the supreme good seems a platitude, and some more distinctive account of it is still required. This might perhaps be achieved by grasping what is the function of man. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b22) | |
A reaction: Notice the 'perhaps', right at the heart of Aristotle's theory. The connection between happiness and function is not obvious. The connection is, of course, areté (virtue/excellence), which is known by the function, and generates the happiness. |
31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: As we see that eye, hand and foot have some function, should we not assume a human being has a function over and above these? | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b30) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a case of the fallacy of composition - you can't infer the function of the whole from the function of the parts. This error by the great man smacks of desperation, but it leaves untouched his general claim that man has a function. |
5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To eat or drink indiscriminately until one is full to bursting is to exceed in quantity one's natural limit, since the natural desire is merely a replenishment of the deficiency. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1118b21) | |
A reaction: This illustrates nicely Aristotle's need for a concept of 'unnatural' to support his theory of virtues. A glutton could claim to have an enormous deficiency, and to counter that we must say that being overweight is unnatural. Etc. |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32) | |
A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For the magnanimous or great-souled man there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1124b08) | |
A reaction: He is not talking of suicide here, but of risking one's life. This seems to be a hallmark of the normally virtuous person, as well as of someone exceptional. Most people would agree with this, but for Aristotle it is a central issue. |
5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is something of which we all have an inkling, being a naturally universal right and wrong, even if there should be no community between the parties or contract. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1373b07) | |
A reaction: This is the strongest assertion I know of in Aristotle of an absolute moral standard, independent of natural function. It makes Aristotle an intuitionist, and is strikingly opposed to contracts as the most basic aspect of morality. |
5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Conventional virtue was not dismissed by Aristotle, as it had been by some of the Socratic schools, nor seen as the substance of virtue, as it was by Protagoras. Instead Aristotle distinguished two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.9 | |
A reaction: On balance I think Taylor is wrong about this. Aristotle is never going to concede a fully relativist view of social morality. Some things are 'just wrong', and the basis is the function of man as a political animal. Good citizenship is not conventional. |
21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Morally fine and just conduct…involves so much difference and variety that they are widely believed to be such only by convention and not by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094b14) | |
A reaction: Relativists about morality do typically point to the very diverse standards in different cultures. Critics can point to the huge similarities, when basic human issues are concerned. |
2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In my view, 'good' for Aristotle means 'telos', and value is real, but relational. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
A reaction: Interesting. Hence Aristotle is pursuing a naturalist project in ethics, since he connects purpose to function, which is natural and self-evident. |
18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a30), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: This is such a simple and neat test for dividing what you value into two groups. You end up with things like art, philosophy, gardening, sipping wine, looking at beautiful views, talking to friends. |
4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A question for Aristotle is, how can an action be good in itself if it is valued as a means to 'eudaimonia'? | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a15) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Action p.93 | |
A reaction: A good question, but one which shouldn't trouble Aristotle. There is no short cut to eudaimonia (e.g. a pill); it is a state of accumulated good actions. |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery. |
398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08) | |
A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life. |
15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A thing's active function is its end. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1050a16) | |
A reaction: This sort of remark is the basis of modern teleological functionalism about the mind. I think that is misguided. Don't define things by their function. They have functions because of intrinsic character. |
33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An individual distinctive excellence is attached to the name of the function (e.g. a good 'harpist'). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098a09) | |
A reaction: This is the core idea of Aristotle's metaethics. It seems hard to deny that a function implies the values of success and failure. The debate is likely to focus on the exact meaning of 'distinctive'. |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe). | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37) | |
A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe. |
5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Excessive and insufficient exercise or food destroy one's strength or health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases and preserves them. It is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a15) | |
A reaction: An example of Aristotle's philosophy originating in his biological background. This appears to be true of health, but he notes exceptions in morality. Adultery has no mean. In health a middle way is needed, but in morality it is what is 'appropriate'. |
5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value? |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval. |
5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The more completely a man possesses virtue, and the happier he is, the more he will be distressed at the thought of death, for to such a man life is supremely worth living. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b11) | |
A reaction: Virtuous people are also, of course, brave. There is a horrible logic which says that you try to be less happy as death becomes more probable. Maybe happy people should pretend they are immortal. |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing. |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that. |
19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil, provided that it were not the same kind. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.130), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV | |
A reaction: Nice challenge. People who refuse the offer are not necessarily suicidal. He's probably right, but Leibniz doesn't recognise the factor of boredom. Look up the suicide note of the actor George Sanders! One life may be enough. |
90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All friendly feelings for others are extensions of a man's feelings for himself. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1168b06) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what his evidence is for this. The love of parents for their children doesn't seem to be based on self-love. |
22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To love is to be disposed to take pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of the object of one's love. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.20) | |
A reaction: I suppose so, though one might love a pathetic little plant that hangs on in the corner of the garden, just for its fighting qualities. He goes on to deny that we can truly love something that is incapable of happiness. Hm. |
5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Most people seem to want to be loved rather than to love, the reason being their desire for honour. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1159a13) | |
A reaction: The footnote says 'honour' here is 'esteem'. In other words, wanting to be loved is a type of vanity, which sounds right. Most people would like being loved from afar, by a person who could do nothing to benefit or please them. |
5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is generally accepted that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable; and that this is either good, or pleasant, or useful. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155b16) | |
A reaction: It needs the great analyst himself to explain to us the ingredients of love. He, of course, goes on to say that good things are the most lovable. It is hard to disagree. |
2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The good man, qua good, takes pleasure in morally virtuous actions and dislikes vicious ones, just as a musician enjoys beautiful melodies and is pained by bad ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a09) | |
A reaction: This is the best illustration of the Greek love of 'fine' [kalon] actions. 'That was a beautiful thing you just did'. |
101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nobody attributes happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a life of his own. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a08) | |
A reaction: Give them freedom then! In 'Politics' he allows a degree of friendship between masters and slaves, and recognises that not all slaves are stupid. |
5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We do not speak of an ox or a horse as happy, because none of them can take part in fine deeds; similarly, no child is happy, because its age debars it as yet from such activities. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b32) | |
A reaction: This is a place where 'happy' is not a very good translation for 'eudaimon', as we universally acknowledge a 'happy childhood'. We can have a 'successful' life, but not a successful childhood. I'm not convinced that even Greeks understood 'eudaimonia'. |
5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The best person is not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who exercises it towards another, because this is a difficult task. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1130a07) | |
A reaction: This is an importance counterbalance to the view that Greeks are concerned with self-development, and we are concerned with altruism. Above all, Aristotle wants us to be good citizens, and this implies a great deal of altruism. |
92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a12) | |
A reaction: This is the simple and correct defence of self-love. If everyone develops their own character and abilities, we all benefit. Selfishness is the excess, not the mean. |
2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that those who think self-love is bad are identifying the self with the lower, irrational parts of the soul. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 12.1 | |
A reaction: That seems to imply love of (and developmen of) one's intellect, but surely the less bookish person can develop their social virtues in a self-loving way? |
19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically, and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil is suffering, and moral evil is sin. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV | |
A reaction: There seem to be plenty of imperfections in the world which don't look like evil. Or do you only declare it to be an imperfection because it seems to be evil (by some other standard)? Human evil comes from ignorance, so metaphysical explains moral. |
629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The good is a principle for all things, and is so in the very highest degree, but in what way? As a purpose, as a source of movement, or as a form? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a32) | |
A reaction: I tend to think of it as an 'ideal', whatever that is, and hence an inspiration, but a rather vague one. Beauty, goodness and truth. Surely not a source of movement? |
5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist (e.g. substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time); clearly, then, there cannot be a single universal common to all cases. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a23) | |
A reaction: It doesn't follow that because you can divide the substratum, that therefore the superstructure lacks unity. One tree has many roots. We must ask whether a good substance and a good quantity have anything in common. |
5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of things that come under one Idea there is one single science, so there should be some one science of all good things; but in fact there are more than one science even of those that fall under one category (e.g. opportunity in medicine and in war). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a27) | |
A reaction: The reply might be that there are many sciences because humans are confused. A truly wise person would see that the science of opportunity is the same in medicine and war. If the good was pleasure, or the glory of God, this would be obvious. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Good has rightly been defined as 'that at which all things aim'. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a02) | |
A reaction: So it is logically impossible to aim at evil? Maybe in practice people always aim for what they take to be good, but it must be possible to deliberately do evil, just to prove a point. |
5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Goodness is a kind of completion: it is when something becomes as good as it may be that we say that it is complete, because that is when it pre-eminently conforms with its nature. A circle is complete when it is as good a circle as there could be. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 246a12) | |
A reaction: This, in turn, is said by Aristotle to result from the telos (purpose) of the thing. This won't eliminate the problem of relativism, unless we say that something cannot have an evil 'nature'. Was the Black Death good, by this definition? |
5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What sort of things can one posit as good in themselves? Everything that is pursued even when considered in isolation - intelligence, for example, and sight, and some pleasures and honours? | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b15) | |
A reaction: He means good-for-man, of course. If only 'some' pleasures are good, that implies a further good which is used to judge the pleasures. For Aristotle what is 'fine' (kalon) is the ultimate self-evident good. |
5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Goods have been classified (by Plato) under three heads, as external, or of the soul, or of the body; of these we say that goods of the soul are good in the strictest and fullest sense, and we rank actions as goods of the soul. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b13) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is famous (or notorious) for allowing external goods in his theory, but it is important that he always makes them subordinate to the central goods. Wealth and glamour could never compensate for vice. |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The good is divided into the virtuous, the pleasing, and the useful. ..The good is either pleasing or useful; and virtue itself consists of a pleasure of the mind. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.20) | |
A reaction: I presume that the useful could be reduced to the pleasing. It strikes me as quite bizarre to define virtue as merely a pleasure of the mind. Aristotle says true virtue must also please the mind, but that is a different idea. |
5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is clear, then, that pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a08) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of a length discussion. Despite all of Aristotle's efforts, it may well be impossible to demonstrate that pleasure is not the Good. All the rivals, such as knowledge, intelligence, sight, excellence etc. give great pleasure. |
23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The masses…seem - not unreasonably - to believe that the Good or happiness is pleasure. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b15) | |
A reaction: Since Aristotle seems to see the pursuit of understanding, through various types of philosophy, as the supreme good, then this is 'understandable' because the masses lack the education for such a thing. |
109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is disputed whether the intentions or the actions have greater importance; …clearly the perfection of conduct will involve both. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a32) | |
A reaction: This seems right, so choosing one or the other as prior seems misguided. What to make of attempted murder? What of moral luck? |
19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: One is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled by one's evil qualities; assessing actions without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.426), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV | |
A reaction: Mill tries to separate judgement of the agent from judgement of the consequences of the action, but I think Leibniz has spotted that just judging outcomes ceases to be a 'moral' judgement. |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wealth is obviously not the good we are seeking, because it serves only as a means. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a06) | |
A reaction: So what are we to say to someone who considers wealth to be an end? Someone who has no desire to spend their horde. |
5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Candidates for the required constituents of happiness are said to be virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom; others say it is these with the addition of pleasure, and others include favourable external conditions. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b21) | |
A reaction: Characteristic of Aristotle to start from what both ordinary people and philosophers have previously said. By the end of his book (remarkably) wisdom is the only one of these which is excluded from normal human happiness. Wisdom transcends life. |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Happiness, or lasting contentment, consists of continual advancement towards a greater perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1690.03.23) | |
A reaction: To the modern mind this smacks of the sort of hubris to which only the religious mind can aspire, but it's still rather nice. The idea of grubby little mammals approaching perfection sounds wrong, but which other animal has even thought of perfection? |
25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The possession of goodness is thought to be compatible with being asleep, or…with inactivity, or…with atrocious suffering. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a02) | |
A reaction: This helps to distinguish eudaimonia from the pleasant view of happiness. Pain probably annuls most immediate happiness, but has little to do with long-term flourishing. |
18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, what sets eudaimonia apart from things like reason and virtue is that it is exclusively finally valuable; ...reason and virtue are valuable also for contributing to other things, such as happiness. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.2 | |
A reaction: This makes it sound as if eudaimonia is a super-value, and superior to virtue, but I don't think that is right. Eudaimonia just seems to be success in the areas that matter. |
5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish at least two possible interpretations of Aristotle's thesis that eudaimonia is the chief good: either eudaimonia is that for the sake of which all action IS undertaken, or that for which all action OUGHT to be undertaken. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b22) by John McDowell - Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics §1 | |
A reaction: It seems to me Aristotle is describing how people DO behave (they all want ot flourish), and then goes on to describe how they OUGHT to behave to achieve the end they all want. His theory does not describe convention, which mostly concerns pleasure. |
5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is popularly believed that some good and evil, such as honours, or disasters of children, can happen to a dead man, inasmuch as they can happen to a live one without his being aware of them. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a17) | |
A reaction: This suggests 'internalist' and 'externalist' accounts of happiness, with eudaimonia being the externalist view. If an architect designs a spectacular building, and it collapses the day after they die, that has to be a disaster for the architect. |
2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle shows an indecision between an intellectualist and a comprehensive account of eudaimonia. …It is because he is not sure who we are that he finds it difficult to say unequivocally in what our eudaimonia consists. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Thomas Nagel - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.8 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is quite right to be unsure about what people are, given the fluidity of human nature, in comparison with other animals. He needs a stable core to human nature, and I think that exists. |
5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Happiness more than anything else is thought to be a final end without qualification, because we always choose it for itself, and not for any other reason. Pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally we choose partly for the sake of our happiness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a32) | |
A reaction: The obvious reply is that happiness might be chosen because it gives us pleasure. Imagine if a sense of happiness resulted in an instant feeling of guilt. If we could ONLY have intelligence, we would choose that just for itself. |
30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Happiness is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b21) | |
A reaction: This will be eudaimonia, so while this sounds like an announcement of the secret of life, eudaimonia is only really a placeholder for things going very well, in some way or other. |
5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The supreme happiness of man consists in the greatest possible increase of his perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
A reaction: I fear that (being a great intellectual) he had a rather intellectual interpretation of 'perfection'. This is in danger of being a tautology, but if the proposal is given an Aritotelian slant I am sympathetic. |
5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The elements of happiness are: gentle birth, many virtuous friends, wealth, creditable and extensive offspring, a comfortable old age; also health, beauty, strength, size and competitiveness, reputation, status, luck and the virtues. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1360b18) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's pluralism, and his commitment to 'external goods' (rather than the inner good of pure virtue, which the Stoics preferred). 'Gentle birth' might turn out to mean good upbringing and education. Who was the most 'beautiful' philosopher? |
39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Happiness demands not only complete goodness but a complete life (e.g. final misfortune of King Priam of Troy). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a05) | |
A reaction: Eudaimonia may be ruined if a serious defect of character emerges near the end, but surely not if they are merely the victim of misfortune? |
5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If happiness is not a divine gift, it will be something widely shared; for it can attach, through some form of study or application, to anyone who is not handicapped by some incapacity for goodness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b17) | |
A reaction: This is a non-elitist view, even though he is saying that study and effort are needed. The explanation of this is that happiness is not achieved through wisdom, but through practical reason (phronesis), which does not require advanced education. |
5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We define the happy man as 'one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is adequately furnished with external goods, and that not for some unspecified period but throughout a complete life'. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a13) | |
A reaction: The only plausible objection to this definition is that it sounds worthy but dull. There is some exciting, romantic, Nietzschean ingredient missing - but the happy man will routinely perform 'fine deeds', and these may involve novelty and boldness. |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The best and most pleasant life is the life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a08) | |
A reaction: He would say that, wouldn't he? He's Aristotle, after all. The question of what is a human's essential nature is the nub of the Aristotelian project. |
100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The happy life seems to be lived in accordance with goodness, and such a life implies seriousness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a03) | |
A reaction: There are far more jokes in the talk of Socrates than in the writings of Aristotle. Presumably seriousness is required by anything which turns out to be difficult. |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Fundamentally, pleasure is a sense of perfection, and pain a sense of imperfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: A bit odd, but I like the idea that there is an intellectual aspect to even the most visceral feelings. |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |
A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 5.6 | |
A reaction: This never strikes me as very plausible. Pleasure may be a side-effect of the perception of value, but we can experience pleasure (e.g. a taste) without even knowing what the cause is, let alone whether we value it. |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish pleasures of the soul from pleasures of the body; examples of the former are love of civic distinction and love of learning. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b28) | |
A reaction: An example of where enthusiasm for analysis leads to oversimplification, and of how dualism about mind can colour the rest of one's views. There is a physical pleasure in learning something, and some physical pleasures are almost spiritual. |
383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: God feels one simple pleasure forever. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154b25) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 382. |
5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176a02) | |
A reaction: This claim, for which he here offers no support, depends on the idea that pleasure can have a value, as well as an intensity. Mill agreed with him, but Bentham disagreed (Idea 5271) |
5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who hold that bodily pleasures, which are the concern of the licentious man, are not desirable, ought to consider why in that case the pains that are contrary to them are bad. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154a08) | |
A reaction: This seems a simple and effective argument against 'puritanical' views, which sometimes appear in Plato, and in the Stoics (where bodily pleasures are 'indifferent'). Still, I think most people overvalue bodily pleasure. |
96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nobody would choose to live his life with the mentality of a child, even if he continued to take the greatest pleasures in the things that children like. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a02) | |
A reaction: This seems absolutely right, but I'm not sure why. Presumably we are strongly attached to our own nature, but what if we could start again with a different nature? |
97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are many things which we should be eager to have even if they brought no pleasure with them, e.g. sight, memory, knowledge, and several kinds of excellence. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a06) | |
A reaction: I think he suggests eyesight, which implies that we want the knowledge that brings. Many things we want give us security, which seems to be an unconscious pleasure. |
98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is reasonable that people should be eager for pleasure; because it perfects life for each individual, and life is a thing to choose. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1175a15) | |
A reaction: It is so nice to hear that pleasure is a good thing. Compare Socrates in 'Gorgias', who tries to prove that pleasure is not at all what we want. Life with no pleasure is not much of a thing. |
99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Happiness is not amusement; it would be paradoxical if we toiled and suffered all our lives just for that. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176b28) | |
A reaction: So he promotes contemplation above pleasure as the end of life, on the grounds that it motivates a lifetime of effort? Maybe happiness is quite easy for a lot of people. |
5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are not naturally pleasant but become so, either through injury, or through habit, or through congenital depravity. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148b16) | |
A reaction: We might say that there are indeed 'unnatural pleasures' (e.g. sadism?), but still have to admit that we have no clear way of distinguishing the natural from the unnatural. What about gambling? Or watching horror films? |
5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: People do not enjoy the same things while their natural state is being replenished as they do when it is complete; in the restored state they enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but while it is being replenished they enjoy even unpleasant things. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152a03) | |
A reaction: This is a nice distinction, which ties in with the dictum "never go to the supermarket when you are hungry". It is also a nice illustration of Aristotle's vital moral view that there is a 'natural state' for a human being. |
49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The pleasure or pain that accompanies people's acts should be taken as a sign of their dispositions. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b04) | |
A reaction: Nice. Nothing reveals a person quicker than their apparently finding rather strange sources for pleasure or dislike. A nice short cut for novelists wanting to reveal character. |
53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To feel pleasure or pain rightly or wrongly affects our conduct, so our whole enquiry must be concerned with them. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a07) | |
A reaction: Apparently the Nazi staff at Auschwitz said that they all felt largely 'indifferent' to what they were doing. Aristotle hopes you can teach these right feelings, but children can develop very unpredictably. |
84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Pleasures are a hindrance to thinking, and the more enjoyable the greater the hindrance (e.g. sex). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152b15) | |
A reaction: The intellectual's objection to excessive pleasure. He means practical thought, as well as theorising. |
88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nobody would choose to have all the good things in the world at the price of becoming somebody else. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1166a23) | |
A reaction: This now looks like a particularly good objection to utilitarianism, which aims to promote pleasure, no matter what the cost. |
5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One's own interest is a relative good, nobility a good absolutely. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1389b37) | |
A reaction: The key idea in the whole of Greek moral theory is the concept of what we can call a 'beautiful' action. Such things, or course, tend to be visible in great actions, such as sparing an enemy, rather than the minutiae of well-mannered daily life. |
91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1168b09) | |
A reaction: Both halves of this sound odd. Being your own best friend has all the oddness of self-identity. Maybe this sort of self-love should be resisted. Altruistic people are lovely. |
71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Licentiousness is concerned with such pleasures as are shared with animals (hence thought low and brutish). These are touch and taste. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1118a25) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche is the best opponent of this view, when elevates purely physical pleasures such as dancing to a supreme status. It must be possible to give a justified account of 'high' and 'low' activities, perhaps related to increased generality + universals. |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We would wish for more than our share if we had our own way; so do we also owe to others more than their share? If the rule applies only to a just will, the rule will need a standard. The rule means that to judge fairly we must adopt others' viewpoints. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.02) | |
A reaction: The first part of this is moving towards Kant's rational overview of ethics. Leibniz is wholly right here. All ethics faces the problem that initial values are needed to get it off the ground. What's wrong with pain, or unfairness, or hatred? |
5111 | All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 247a08) | |
A reaction: Not to be misunderstood. The 'intellectual virtues' are different, for one thing. And he is not implying hedonism, but that moral virtue concerns our judgements and habits in relation to pleasure and pain. What do we count as acceptable pleasures? |
34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098a13) | |
A reaction: Although an 'activity of the soul' sounds like a mere state of mind, he emphasises that virtue requires action. 'Soul' here is more like 'the life' than the consciousness. |
5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The greatest virtues must be those most useful to others. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1366b02) | |
A reaction: I wonder if this applies to the intellectual virtues, as well as to the social virtues? Is this virtue theory's answer to utilitarianism, or utilitarianism's answer to virtue theory? Personally I think good persons are prior to benefits. |
5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If one used strength, health, wealth and strategic expertise well, one might do the greatest possible good and if badly the greatest possible harm; this is a problem common to all good things, except virtue. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355b04) | |
A reaction: Of course, this may just be a tautology about virtue, rather than an empirical observation. However, in 'Ethics' he tries to describe a state of mind (essentially one of harmony) which could never result in misuse. |
5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Lovers of beauty find pleasure in things that are pleasant by nature, and virtuous actions are of this kind, so that they are pleasant not only to a particular type of person but also in themselves. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099a14) | |
A reaction: An optimistic but crucial claim that virtue is dictated by nature, and so can't just be relative to individuals. The claim that some things are 'pleasant by nature', rather than just being liked by some individuals, is controversial but appealing. |
4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In discussing Priam, Aristotle, I take it, would allow that the virtuous person's life can be marred, but not, I think, ruined. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a14) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.3 n11 | |
A reaction: This seems right. At first it seems that Aristotle is saying that Priam's eudaimonia was utterly lost, but elsewhere he implies that this is impossible if the disaster is external to his character. |
4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems perplexing in Aristotle that he apparently claims that virtues involve choice, while feelings do not. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b10) by L.A. Kosman - Being Properly Affected p.110 | |
A reaction: This captures the Kantian unease about Aristotle's theory. Presumably the answer is that choice comes into the training of the feelings, including self-training. Is choice involved in a dog trained to beg? |
54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtuous acts are not done justly or temperately because of their quality, but because they are done in a certain way. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a29) | |
A reaction: These seems to be the contrast between correct behaviour because of a cold sense of duty (sometimes associatied with Kant), and the pleasure of acting with true virtue. |
58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If virtues are neither feelings nor faculties, it remains that they are dispositions. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a10) | |
A reaction: Makng virtues into dispositions connects his moral theory to his accounts of potentialities and powers in his physics. |
4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle virtue is the acquisition of a developed capacity or tendency to experience emotion and desire accordantly with one's cognition of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b16) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.2 | |
A reaction: Leaving still the problem of the criminal whose emotions correctly follow their warped values. An interesting point, nevertheless. |
63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a01) | |
A reaction: Presumably the last two are getting both the theory and the practice right. Are saying that virtues finds the appropriate mean, or that virtue IS the mean? Of what? |
5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in the choice (which is a cause of wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal principle (which is blameable), but particular ignorance, of circumstances and objects. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b31) | |
A reaction: The point here has to be that particular facts are much more significant in moral decisions than principles. This is the whole key to virtue theory - that principles are overruled by the facts of a situation, and only virtue can see you through. |
107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Life in conformity with moral virtue will be happy in a secondary degree, because such activities are human (not divine). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a10) | |
A reaction: It seems a bit silly for a human being to aspire to 'divine' happiness. If contemplation is the eudaimonia of the gods, why does that mean that humans should aspire to it. Should cats try to play chess? |
5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Particular circumstances of an action can involve 1) the agent, 2) the act, 3) the object, and also sometimes 4) the instrument, 5) the aim, and 6) the manner. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a04) | |
A reaction: 'Particular circumstances' are a crucial ingredient in virtue theory. It is interesting that 'the aim' (no.5) is only 'sometimes' a factor. Odd for a teleologist. Aristotle is interested in factors affecting decisions, and also excuses afterwards. |
5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anyone who is ignorant of any of the six factors affecting an action is considered to have acted involuntarily (especially the circumstances of the act, and its effect). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a17) | |
A reaction: This seems to concede that 'moral luck' may be an excuse. Cf. Idea 269. The big problem here is when someone offers one of the six types of ignorance as an excuse, and we feel they should have made the effort to know the facts. |
55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some people who perform just acts are still not just (for example, if the good act is done unwillingly or ignorantly). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a10) | |
A reaction: This is because virtue must be an 'activity of the soul'. The thought seems to be that the truly good action involves the commitment of the whole agent, not just a part of them. |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is different from continence. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b17) | |
A reaction: Basic to Aristotle - in that continence leads to right action, but that is not enough for virtue, which requires inner harmony, reason, and pleasure in doing what is right. Hence Aristotle is quite distinct from deontological or consequentialist views. |
591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Excellence is a sort of completion. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1021b19) |
5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is divided into classes in accordance with differentiations of the soul. Some are called 'intellectual' (e.g. wisdom, understanding, practical reason), others are called 'moral' (e.g. liberality or temperance). The latter are virtues of character. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a04) | |
A reaction: Aristotle arrives at a rather sharp division, and hence a sharp division between two virtuous lifestyles, the social and the intellectual. His only overlap is practical reason ('phronesis'). My vision of the good life (and the soul) is more integrated. |
5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A difficulty with saying that people must perform just actions if they are to become just is that if they do what is just they must be just already, as they are already musical if they play music correctly. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a19) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is himself voicing a charge often made against him (by Kantians and utilitarians). He goes on to rebut the charge, but there is still a problem (despite the benign circle of virtue-and-good-action), which is the familiar one of relativism. |
625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Does the universe possess goodness and excellence as something separated and by itself, or because of its arrangement? But why should it not be both ways? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a14) |
5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any kind of excellence renders that of which it is the excellence good, and makes it perform its function well; thus the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its function good. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a17) | |
A reaction: To say that a thing's excellence makes it good seems tautological to us, but Aristotle perceives a family of concepts (such as good, fine, excellent, and functioning well) which capture different psychological states. We need 'good', as well as 'right'. |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Excellence is the best disposition, state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function; this is evident from induction. For example, a cloak has an excellence - and a certain function and employment also; its best state is its excellence. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a02) | |
A reaction: 'Employment' will be an assigned function, and 'function' will be a natural or intrinsic function, I presume. This is a nice clear illustration of the fact that for Aristotle virtue runs continuously from people to cloaks. See Idea 1663, though. |
4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes cognition of particulars is more important for virtue than cognition of universals, ..and I would add that it is cognition not just of particulars, but of their value, that is, perception of them as good or beautiful. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
A reaction: This gets quickly to the heart of the problem, which is what fact about the particular is perceived which makes it good. Utilitarians are queueing up to answer this question. Interesting, though. |
5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When we are discussing actions, although general statements have a wider application, particular statements are closer to the truth. This is because actions are concerned with particular facts, and theories must be brought into harmony with these. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a29) | |
A reaction: This implies criticism of Kant's whole theory, suggesting that there cannot be a universal law for most given situations. I take Aristotle's view to be (in modern terms) that a key virtue is sensitivity, taken as acute awareness of detail in a situation. |
5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126b04) | |
A reaction: This is a key objection to Kantian approaches to morality. Aristotle does not flatly deny the role of rules (indeed, he is a great endorser of the law), but this shows why virtues of character are a better guide than rules can ever be. |
3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle has not thought through the place of rules in the virtuous person's thought. He moves from the problem-solving of the learner to the immediate sensitivity of the fully virtuous without explaining the structure of the latter's thinking. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4 | |
A reaction: Good point. If Kantians are all rules, then Aristotle is a very good corrective, but the fact is that many people live well by following good rules, or at least good guidelines. They can be taught (or written on a poster). |
5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Our virtues are voluntary, because we ourselves are in a sense partly responsible for our dispositions. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b21) | |
A reaction: This seems half way to what we would now call existentialism. See Aristotle's other comments on natural virtue. The opposing view is Heraclitus's remark that "character is fate". |
4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: None of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be habituated to rise. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a19) | |
A reaction: Not much of an argument. Training a flower to grow up a drainpipe is not unnatural, but then the whole notion of 'unnatural' is hard to justify these days. |
4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is universally believed that we have a disposition for justice or temperance or courage from birth, but moral qualities are acquired in another way; natural dispositions are found in children and animals, but without intelligence they can be harmful. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b04) | |
A reaction: An interesting argument, supporting the idea that moral virtue is not only teachable, but has to be taught, because it has an intellectual component. |
5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The end of virtue is what is right and honourable ('kalon'). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b14) | |
A reaction: This wretched word 'kalon' (fine/beautiful/honourable) is at the heart of Aristotle's account, but many people think it is 'fine' for your family to avenge a murder, or to fearlessly commit a dangerous crime, or to be brazenly rude. |
22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38) | |
A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person. |
56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A person is a good man when he does the acts from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a19) | |
A reaction: Not sure about 'for the sake of the acts themselves'. A good deed might be something unpleasant, in order to achieve a generally desired end. An action might be right but not good. |
93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes existence desirable is the consciousness of one's own goodness, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170b09) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we are much more conscious than Aristotle was of vanity as a vice, probably thanks to Christianity. The smugness of virtue signalling is especially annoying. But you see his point. |
2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38) | |
A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine. |
44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b01) | |
A reaction: This is the circularity which is sometimes criticised, but seems to be benign. When two good things reinforce one another, that is not a vicious circle. |
51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The importance of having been trained in some way from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things; true education is precisely this. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b14) | |
A reaction: I love this. I suspect the majority of parents neglect this, and allow children to indulge in feelings (both pro and anti) which will diminish them in later life. |
43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Moral virtues are neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted to receive them, but their full development is due to habit. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a21) | |
A reaction: The notion of the habit of virtue is hugely important, precisely because such an idea is missing in Hobbes, Bentham and Kant. The concept of a true 'lady' or 'gentleman'. |
5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Like activities produce like dispositions; hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b22) | |
A reaction: Who doubts that a child brought up working for a charity would tend to be charitable, and one brought up amidst crime would tend to criminality? I just wish Aristotle could pin down the 'certain quality' the acts are supposed to have. 'Fine', I suppose. |
4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is not giving us a bland reminder that virtue takes practice; rather, practice has cognitive powers, in that it is the way that we learn what is noble and just. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b02) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.73 | |
A reaction: Interesting. This seems right about Aristotle, and suggests that we come to appreciate the arts (for example) by doing them rather than studying them. (NE 1147a21) |
6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is possible to get started in virtuous action without being virtuous, just as it is in the arts; it is possible to put a few words together correctly by accident, or at the prompting of another person. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a24) | |
A reaction: This is a crucial idea, applicable in many areas. Philosophers love to say that it is logically impossible to get started in something (e.g. scientific theory and scientific observation) because of circularity. But they are wrong. |
57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is from the repeated performance of just and temperate acts that we acquire virtues. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105b04) | |
A reaction: Presumably one can endlessly compel a child or an employee or a slave to perform just and temperate acts, but still not generate the actual virtue. |
2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A sort of training in virtue may result from associating with good people. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a12) | |
A reaction: Aristotle doesn't say much about role models, but they strike me as basic to moral education. Good habits are largely acquired by copying. Teach the young to admire the right people. Not media celebrities! |
5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes the man of good character stand out furthest is the fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a32) | |
A reaction: A question for Aristotle seems to be whether practical reason ('phronesis') is sufficient to enable one to see what is truly fine and pleasant. Phronesis must crucially involve perception of values, and not just of what is expedient. |
4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In every sphere of conduct people develop qualities corresponding to the activities that they pursue. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114a07) | |
A reaction: Correct. Hence the crucial thing for a good human life is the choice of activity when young. We can impose activity on the young, but the top aim of education is to teach people how to make good choices. ('Fat chance!' I hear you say..) |
5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When people speak of justice we see that they all mean that kind of state of character that disposes them to perform just acts, and behave in a just manner, and wish for what is just. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a07) | |
A reaction: No remark shows more clearly that for the Greeks morality is a matter of character, rather than of actions or rules. This doesn't totally disagree with Plato's 'Republic', where justice turns out to be harmony in an individual person. |
4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1179b18) | |
A reaction: True, and a strong justification for Aristotle's approach, that the crucial element in morality is the early creation of character. But teachers can argue about what to teach. |
4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle there are six possible states of character: heroic excellence, excellence, self-control, lack of self-control, badness of character, and brutishness. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a15) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.158 | |
A reaction: The two extremes are odd, but the distinction between bad and brutish is interesting, and the distinction between control and true excellence is vital (pace Kant). |
5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are three kinds of states of character to be avoided: vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a16) | |
A reaction: The three are distinguished by the state of their reason: vice exhibits bad reason, akrasia exhibits right reason (but no control), and brutishness exhibits an absence of reason. A good distinction, which should be used to judge criminals. |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11) | |
A reaction: In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part. |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is that state of character which chooses the mean, relative to us, in things pleasant and unpleasant, all those in respect of which a man is said to have a certain sort of character according as he enjoys or suffers pain from them. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b08) | |
A reaction: The 'mean' should be understood as what is appropriate, rather than the mere average. Strong anger, for example, is sometimes appropriate. Does Aristotle rule out wild laughter, or frenetic dancing? Is a state of ecstasy wicked? |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is from his choosing that we judge what sort of person someone is; that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a03) | |
A reaction: Not entirely true. It can be sufficient to reveal their character that a person does some particular thing, as novelists know. When Hud parks his car in her flowerbed, we don't need to enquire about his reason. But see 1228a16! |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Character (éthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos). | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a36) | |
A reaction: Aristotle goes in for dubious etymologies, but this one sounds quite significant, and supports his view that habit is central to virtue. We would lose nothing in English if we said 'what are her habits?' instead of 'what is her character?'. |
3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean claims that virtues are not the polar opposites of vices, but rather stand between two vices which are opposed. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a13) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.2 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about that. If the two extremes of courage are cowardice and recklessness, how are those two opposed to one another? |
47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the mean. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a23) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if drifting off into an excess, like binge drinking, is not just having a bad day, but actually 'destroys' the virtue. Presumably it permanently diminishes the good habit. |
4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Moralities which aim at the promotion of individual 'happiness' do it with recipes to counter the passions….such as the depression of emotions to a harmless mean at which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a24) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §198 | |
A reaction: A serious error by Nietzsche, in which he confuses the mean with the virtue of temperance. The mean aims at appropriate emotion, not suppression. Extreme anger might be appropriate. What does Nietzsche think about inappropriate emotions? |
60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The mean is relative to US (as an average diet is too small for Milo the wrestler). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a32) | |
A reaction: Does that mean that if I am a dreadful coward, then achieving a tiny bit of courage will enough to qualify me as courageous? Surely there is something absolute (or external) about the required courage? |
61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every science performs its function well only when it observes the mean. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b09) | |
A reaction: Hm. Not sure what he has in mind. Most people aspire to perfection in their skills. The mean needs a continuum between two obvious extremes. |
4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean does not require the doctrine of moderation: if I say we should drink lots of alcohol once a week, but you propose a little each day, your view is more in line with moderation, but we can agree on the doctrine of the mean. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b16) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.162 | |
A reaction: So two people could agree on the doctrine, but end up behaving differently. This is important for virtue theory. In a moral dilemma there might be several right things that could be done. |
4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In a normal context, if you invite me to dinner the appropriate amount of anger, pity, fear and confidence I should feel is none. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b17) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.160 | |
A reaction: Not an objection to Aristotle, but an important point towards clarifying the doctrine of the mean, which is more to do with appropriateness than with having middling feelings. |
62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must have feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b18) | |
A reaction: And you thought feelings were just whatever comes naturally! We sometimes talk now of 'emotional intellgence', but we should talk more of 'educated emotions'. |
2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The law is the mean. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04) | |
A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean. |
5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In all things the mean is to be commended, while the extremes are neither commendable nor right, but reprehensible. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a16) | |
A reaction: This is the aspect of Aristotle which Nietzsche hated, as a stultifying conservativism seems to be implied. Elsewhere, though, Aristotle emphasises what is 'appropriate' (e.g. in anger) which allows the possibility of bolder and more exciting actions. |
65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the things towards which we have the stronger natural inclination that seem to us more opposed to the mean….(e.g. pleasure). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a12) | |
A reaction: Trying to identify these might lead to a circularity (if strong opposition can only be identified by strong pull). If the pull varies with individuals, that implies that the opposition is also relative. |
5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is easy to get angry - anyone can do that - but to feel or act towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for the right reason in the right way - that is not easy, and it is not everyone that can do it. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a26) | |
A reaction: This shows clearly that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is NOT the same as the virtue of temperance (as Nietzsche seemed to think). Appropriate anger could be very forceful indeed, and bravery might be quite extreme in a particular crisis. |
5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Patience is commended, because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by his feelings, but indignant only in the way and on the grounds and for the length of time that his 'logos' prescribes. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1125b33) | |
A reaction: Because the word 'logos' is used here, this strikes me as Aristotle's best statement of his doctrine of the mean (which is never the middle way, but always the appropriate way). |
5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Falsehood is bad and reprehensible, while the truth is a fine and praiseworthy thing; accordingly the sincere man, who hold the mean position, is praiseworthy, while both the deceivers (the boaster and the ironist) are to be censured. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1127a29) | |
A reaction: An interesting and surprising claim - that truth is not an abstract Platonic absolute, but a human virtue seen as a mean between two extremes of falsehood (excessive assertion and excessive denial). Truth is a human value. |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33) | |
A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two. |
5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are some things at which we actually ought to feel angry, and others that we actually ought to desire - health, for instance, and learning. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a29) | |
A reaction: This is obviously an important part of virtue theory. Other theories are inclined to take our feelings as a given, and then offer rules for controlling and directing them. Emphasis on character can involve re-educating bad desires. |
5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who do not get angry at things that ought to make them angry are considered to be foolish. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126a05) | |
A reaction: This remark most clearly shows that Nietzsche did not understand Aristotle, as he seemed to think that Aristotle was recommending bland restraint. Aristotle loves reason, but that does not mean that he admires boring tedium. |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each virtue makes its possessor tend to despise great things that are contrary to reason - for example, courage does this of dangers, …a temperate person of many pleasures, and a generous one of many sorts of wealth. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a37) | |
A reaction: I like the observation that the generous tend to despise wealth, implying that those who love wealth tend to lack generosity. Christianity has encouraged us to reject the idea of despising anything - but that seems to iron out common sense values. |
22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14) | |
A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings. |
64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No matter whether a man commits adultery with the right woman or at the right time or in the right way, because anything of that kind is simply wrong. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a18) | |
A reaction: It would be nice if he gave a reason or a criterion for this opinion. Kekes says this points to something even more morally basic than virtue. Some acts should not even be considered. |
4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We accept, indeed regard as a platitude, an idea that Aristotle rejected, that someone can have one virtue while lacking others. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Probably because we don't think as hard about it as Aristotle did. What are the prerequisites of even a single virtue? Distinguish a true virtue from an accidental good quality. |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All the virtues will follow along with greatness of soul, or it will follow along with all of them | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a36) | |
A reaction: This is obviously similar in some respects to Nietzsche's 'higher' man, though that suggests greater independence, rather than being an ideal citizen. |
5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A god has no virtue or vice, any more than a brute has; the goodness of a god is more to be esteemed than virtue. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a24) | |
A reaction: A very interesting comment, implying how very human the virtues are, with all the implied limitations. The virtues are just the natural excellences for a human, but this leaves open how naturally excellent the human race is. |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32) | |
A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas. |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If someone looks at a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or listens to someone singing …just to look at or listen to beautiful things, he would not be thought to be intemperate, any more than those beguiled by the Sirens would. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1230b31) | |
A reaction: He says that intemperance mainly concerns taste and touch, rather than mere looking or listening. I think obsessive collectors of beautiful objects might drift into intemperance. |
4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle notoriously has difficulty in finding the specific emotion that is displayed in just and unjust actions, and equal difficulty in distinguishing the two errors of deficiency and excess required by the doctrine of the mean. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a03) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.164 | |
A reaction: Not a criticism of Aristotle, but it opens up the complexity of his view. It seems to make justice a super-virtue, a combination of lesser sets of combined mean and right feeling. Maybe. |
23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Beside universal justice there is particular justice, with the same name. ...Particular injustice concerns honour or money or security, and is actuated by the pleasure that the advantage offers, but universal justice has the same field as the good man. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1130b01) | |
A reaction: Miranda Fricker finds this distinction in testimonial justice, and implies that most virtues divide in this way. |
5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us just or unjust. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b16) | |
A reaction: This makes clear that 'justice' for the Greeks concerns what we think of as basic morality, rather than legal distribution of pleasure or pain. It will be the Greek word 'dikaiosuné', which is the main topic of Plato's 'Republic'. |
5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We call 'just' anything that tends to produce or conserve the happiness of a political association. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129b18) | |
A reaction: This is closer to a modern view, though we probably think that some societies might flourish while being unjust, while others might be very just but disintegrate. We are more cynical than Aristotle. |
22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38) | |
A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution. |
5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The word 'unjust' is considered to describe both one who breaks the law and one who takes advantage of another, i.e. acts unfairly. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a32) | |
A reaction: Roughly, injustice is bad dealings with fellow citizens. We have 'distributive justice', and justice in keeping contracts. Our central meaning, of giving each citizen what they deserve, doesn't seem to be here. |
5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Between friends there is no need for justice. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155a26) | |
A reaction: This is something like Aristotle's distinction between 'enkrateia' (control) and true virtue. It is an important point for those (usually on the left wing) who think that justice is the highest aim of a society. |
5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The man who faces or fears the right things for the right reason and in the right way and at the right time is courageous. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b18) | |
A reaction: This is the consistent view of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Their concept is much broader and more value-laden than ours. We are inclined to see courage as simply being undeterred by pain, and place the morality elsewhere. |
5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the strict sense of the word the courageous man will be one who is fearless in the face of an honourable death, or of some sudden threat of death. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115a33) | |
A reaction: I.e. one is rightly afraid of a DIShonourable death. This seems to be more of a touchstone than a definition. Presumably one can show true courage in the face of pain as well as of death. |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Courage is a following of reason, and reason orders us to choose what is noble. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a01) | |
A reaction: This sounds right to me. Courage, in all sorts of contexts, seems to arise in people who sustain their focus on what is the right thing to do. |
5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Honour is clearly the greatest external good. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1123b20) | |
A reaction: Honour was earlier dismissed as 'the good', largely because it depended on other people. It is not far off to say that the aim of Aristotle's theory is to achieve genuine and justified honour. One's 'eudaimonia' is judged by others too. |
4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
Full Idea: People who aim at political honour tend to defeat themselves by making themselves dependent on those to whom they aim to be superior (what might be called the 'Coriolanus Paradox'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b25) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This brings out Aristotle's point nicely. This is why aristocrats withdraw behind their fences, among small coteries of accolytes. |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes a difference whether the honour comes from many random people or from those worthy of note, and again so does by whom and for what the honor is conferred. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232b18) | |
A reaction: He tends to play down honour because of its relativism, but this quotation implies that if an honour was bestowed by the worthy, for something of agreed high value, then it would be at quite a different level from mere popular esteem. Celebrity v peerage? |
24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Honour is felt to depend more on those who confer than on him who receives it. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b22) | |
A reaction: That presumably means that honour is not only highly relative (much more so than a society's other virtues), but that the persons awarding the honours are highly biased. See the absurd UK House of Lords. |
5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Old men are prone to pity, but where the young are so from philanthropy, the old are so from weakness, for they think all these things are near for themselves to suffer. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390a18) | |
A reaction: I am shocked to find Aristotle being so cynical. I see no reason why the old should not be as philanthropic as anyone else, and they clearly are so, as when they plant trees for future generations to enjoy. |
110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The lower animals have no share in happiness, being completely incapable of contemplation. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b25) | |
A reaction: I've heard it suggested that the recipe for human happiness is to be good looking and rather dim. Very few people can be seriously good at contemplation. |
104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Contemplation (with enough self-sufficiency, leisure and energy) is the perfect happiness for man. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b17) | |
A reaction: I assume this is successful and elevating contemplation, rather than sinking into depression as one contemplates human folly and wickedness. Stick to anodyne contemplations? |
18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: This activity [contemplation] alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the activity. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: Not true. Gardening, walking, travelling, chatting with friends, reading. I'm shocked that he should say this. |
5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the intellect is divine compared with man, the life of the intellect must be divine compared with the life of a human being. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b31) | |
A reaction: This raises an interesting question: what, for Aristotle, was the value of a human life? This raises a meta-question for virtue theory, because the latter only concerns itself with excellence for humans? What is the value of a slug? |
18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. ...Still, everyone supposes that they live and are therefore active. ...Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: Is the ideal life for a human being to be paralysed by injury, and hence capable of nothing except godlike contemplation? |
621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072b22) |
105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b33) | |
A reaction: This high/low picture should be treated with caution. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self', says a D.H. Lawrence character. Why aspire to what is unattainable? |
111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The more people contemplate, the happier they are. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b29) | |
A reaction: On the other hand he regularly says that virtues concern actions, not thoughts. He sees slavery as essential to allow others to contemplate, but feeling guilty about that would ruin it. |
5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems clear that happiness needs the addition of external goods, for it is difficult if not impossible to do fine deeds without any resources; many can only be done by the help of friends, or wealth, or political influence. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099a32) | |
A reaction: One should ask what fine deeds can be done without external resources, and also what corruptions of virtue result from the pursuit of external goods (esp. political influence!). Aristotle wants to DO good, where Stoics want to BE good. |
38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A man is scarcely happy if he is very ugly to look at, or of low birth, or solitary and childless. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b03) | |
A reaction: This seems a bit shocking for us, when none of these setbacks is the person's fault. Socrates was said to be ugly, and Plato seems to have had no children. |
1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who say that a man who is being tortured and has suffered terrible calamities is happy if he is a good man are willy-nilly talking nonsense. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1153b19) | |
A reaction: Someone expressed this extreme idea, and the Stoics sympathised with it. Happiness is life going well. Making a supreme sacrifice for an enormous good seems like life going well. |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All goods are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice; for wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to be an end for everyone. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218b34) | |
A reaction: An interesting reason for this assertion - that it is true because everybody agrees on it. See Idea 95. I would think that he might claim that our soul is our essence, whereas external goods pander to the non-essential in us. |
108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The liberal man will need money to perform liberal acts. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a28) | |
A reaction: The sort of thing Margaret Thatcher used to say, with a passive aggressive tone. The virtue also needs someone to be short of money. The paradox of virtue - that bad situations are needed, to give them opportunities. |
22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit. |
5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The character of the rich man is that of the mindlessly happy one. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1391a12) | |
A reaction: Very nice. It is hard to deny that the rich tend to be happy (in some sense of the word), and recent sociological research has tended to demonstrate this, but the pursuit of wealth must inevitably take the focus away from key intellectual pursuits. Yeh? |
2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12) | |
A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city. |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where the object is pleasure or utility friendship is possible between bad men,…but obviously only good men can be friends for their own sakes. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1157a16) | |
A reaction: If bad men try to be friends, they presumably become aware of the vices in the other person, and vices are usually fairly unfriendly. |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is possible for a decent person to be friends with a base one. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1238b01) | |
A reaction: This is on the basis of being useful, or of having something in common. Presumably friendship can come in degrees, as well as being of different kinds. Even the finest people can differ a lot, and only have a limited friendship. |
2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: I argue that Aristotle does not make friendship of the central kind the exclusive preserve of moral heroes, and that he does not maintain that friendships of the derivative kinds are wholly self-centered. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155a03-) by John M. Cooper - Aristotle on Friendship p.305 | |
A reaction: Glad to hear it. Though he does seem to think that only virtuous people can have true friendships. He sees friendship as the cement of a good society, so it has to be fairly widespread. |
2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle what makes a friendship a virtue-friendship is the binding force within it of some - perhaps for all that partial and incomplete - excellence of the character. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1156b10) by John M. Cooper - Aristotle on Friendship p.308 | |
A reaction: It is certainly hard to imagine a really good friendship that doesn't involve mutual respect, and possibly even mutual admiration. |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Just as if people wish to be healthy they do not become healthy, so if they wish to be friends they are not immediately in fact friends. …[1237b40] For a friend is not to be had without a test or in a single day, but needs time. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237b21) | |
A reaction: The voice of experience, I think. Obviously trust is basic, and it would be unwise to trust a possible friend on the first day. Since politics aims at friendship, I presume the support of the rule of law helps to achieve trust. |
19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The true practical philosophy consists in good rules for education, intercourse and sociability among men, rather than in general precepts on virtues and duties. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Bouvet [1697], p.165) | |
A reaction: I would interpret that as saying that the main aim of morality is to enable people to hold a good conversation. I've heard worse theories of morality. The remark shows why Leibniz has little to say explicitly about morality. |
5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The continent man (controlled, 'enkratic') is identical with one who tends to abide by his own calculation. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b09) | |
A reaction: The point is that this is NOT virtue, even though it results in doing the right thing. In such an 'enkratic' (controlled) person the reason is in a healthy state, but the desires, emotions and pleasures are badly trained. |
5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: People expect either to return evil for evil, or good for good, and if this is impossible no exchange can take place, and it is exchange that holds people together. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1132b34) | |
A reaction: This is not far from a Thomas Hobbes contract view of society, with someone being needed to enforce the justice of contracts. Many societies, though, seem to have survived despite being riddled with injustices. |
5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man is by his nature a pairing rather than a social creature, inasmuch as the family is an older and more necessary thing than the state. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1162a20) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 5133. It seems that the family fulfils the most basic human function, but that political life arises from the next level of function, which is a combination of friendship and the wider needs of a family. |
2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01) | |
A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human. |
2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20) | |
A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human. |
22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The human being alone has reason. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04) | |
A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them. |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
5133 | Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man is by nature a social being. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b10) | |
A reaction: A famous idea traditionally translated (e.g. by Irwin) as "man is a political animal", but Thomson's translation seems better. Aristotle presumably means that man lives in a 'polis'. This is the natural function that gives the moral virtues.Cf Idea 5265. |
22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27) | |
A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists. |
2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17) | |
A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration. |
22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27) | |
A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient. |
22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07) | |
A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?). |
22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14) | |
A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse. |
22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27) | |
A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains? |
22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23) | |
A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size. |
22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38) | |
A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities? |
86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In societies with perverted political constitutions friendship is little found; in a tyranny there is almost no friendship. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1161a29) | |
A reaction: See 'Politics' for more on this. He wants a benign circularity between friendship and the good society. Friendship facilitates the good society, which in turn fosters friendship. I like it. |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems to be most of all the function of politics to produce friendship. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b22) | |
A reaction: Lovely! Most people would probably cite wealth and security as the main aims. This function seems to require quite a high degree of equality, though Aristotle doesn't think it essential. |
5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The end of political science is the highest good, and the chief concern of this science is to endue the citizens with certain qualities, namely virtue and readiness to do fine deeds. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b29) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core of modern communitarianism, which is much more paternalistic than is normally acceptable in a liberal democracy. Freedom is downgraded, and there is an assumption that legislators are generally wiser than citizens. |
22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in. |
22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33) | |
A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader. |
2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01) | |
A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure. |
22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29) | |
A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does. |
2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25) | |
A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity. |
2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy). | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04) | |
A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'. |
22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17) | |
A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values. |
2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35) | |
A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable. |
22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23) | |
A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity…. |
5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are four types of constitution: democracy (whose purpose is freedom), oligarchy (for wealth), aristocracy (for education and customs), and monarch or tyranny (for security). | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1365b28-37) | |
A reaction: An aristocracy seems to be the guardians of tradition and culture (as in an English public school education). The tyranny of Hitler and Stalin did not exactly lead to security. Democracy and aristocracy are the front-runners. Compare Idea 2821. |
21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b03), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 08 | |
A reaction: I always admired the UK Race Relations Act, which made certain sorts of racism illegal, quite a long time before many of the population grasped the point. The legislation educated the citizens. |
2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14) | |
A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide. |
22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15) | |
A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population. |
22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law. |
22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12) | |
A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices. |
2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28) | |
A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function. |
22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33) | |
A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39). |
22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18) | |
A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right. |
22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20) | |
A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected. |
2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27) | |
A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not. |
22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01) | |
A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure. |
22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32) | |
A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point. |
22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers. |
5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is prescribed by legislation is lawful, and we hold that every such ordinance is just. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129b12) | |
A reaction: This sounds astonishingly conservative, and doesn't seem to allow for the possibility of bad laws (even those made by tyrants, let alone those made by a misguided democracy). The basis is, presumably, society as a 'natural' institution. |
22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11) | |
A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard. |
22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25) | |
A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics. |
22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33) | |
A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case). |
87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendships are most commonly found in democracies, because the citizens, being equal, have much in common. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1161b09) | |
A reaction: He also implies that friendship promotes democracy, presumably because friends prefer to be equals. |
2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30) | |
A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity. |
22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28) | |
A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom. |
22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07) | |
A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes. |
22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07) | |
A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short. |
2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01) | |
A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea. |
22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38) | |
A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible. |
2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back. |
22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42) | |
A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants. |
22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18) | |
A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated. |
22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts. |
22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest. |
5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendship seems to be the bond that holds communities together, and lawgivers seem to attach more importance to it than to justice. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155a23) | |
A reaction: An interesting aspect of the Aristotelian view of society which we now call 'communitarian'. Even lawgivers should be concerned with friendship (how?). There is 'such a thing as society', because friendship networks overlap. |
5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The proverb 'friends have all things is common' is quite right, because friendship is based on community. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1159b30) | |
A reaction: Thus communism is a kind of sentimental dream that everybody will be friends. The aspiration of all good people should be to spread the boundaries of the networks of friends to be ever more inclusive. This is the new left-wing of politics. |
22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24) | |
A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships. |
22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22) | |
A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants. |
22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34) | |
A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'? |
22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27) | |
A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way. |
22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33) | |
A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS. |
22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23) | |
A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'. |
22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02) | |
A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops. |
22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14) | |
A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent. |
21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099 | |
A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists? |
21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
Full Idea: For slavery to be just, according to Aristotle, two conditions must be met: it must be necessary, and it must be natural. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 08 | |
A reaction: Aristotle thought it met both conditions, but no one now thinks it meets either condition. |
20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1) | |
A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone. |
2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14) | |
A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities. |
22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28) | |
A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen. |
22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30) | |
A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom. |
2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38) | |
A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter. |
22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02) | |
A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income. |
2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31) | |
A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason. |
22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38) | |
A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners. |
22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37) | |
A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony? |
22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36) | |
A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community. |
22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11) | |
A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality? |
21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes that debates about justice are, unavoidably, about honour, virtue and the nature of the good life. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 08 | |
A reaction: Nozick cannot deny that his desperate attachment to freedom is a vision of the good life, and social contract theories start from the ideal of equality, which is a vision of right living. |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If one wishes to make it so that people do not commit injustices to each other, it is enough to make them friends; for true friends do not commit injustice. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b28) | |
A reaction: This, along with Idea 23915, offers a beautiful vision of what a society should try to achieve. There can be duplicitous apparent friends, but on the whole the best way to cure unjust relations is friendship. Imagine Jews and Arabs being friends (2023). |
2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment. |
2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23) | |
A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results. |
2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31) | |
A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this. |
22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05) | |
A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits. |
2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19) | |
A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela. |
22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01) | |
A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers. |
22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10) | |
A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application. |
7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: Leibniz rejects Hobbes's legal positivism in favour of the older natural law theory associated with Aquinas (which says nothing can be a law unless it derives from natural justice). The older view was revived at Nuremberg, to prosecute Nazis. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that Hobbes and co were using Ockham's Razor to eliminate morality from the law, but that the Nuremberg situation (and modern trials in The Hague) show that there is a necessity for natural law in international situations. |
5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of political justice, one natural and the other legal; the natural is that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon acceptance. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1134b18) | |
A reaction: This I take to be the germ out of which Aquinas developed more fully the idea of 'natural law'. This remark is strong counterevidence that Aristotle was not merely describing convention in his theory of the virtues. |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There can be natural rewards and punishments without a law-maker; intemperance, for instance, is punished by illness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.02) | |
A reaction: Hm. Maybe if it didn't result in illness it wouldn't be labelled as 'intemperance'. Why isn't studying philosophy all day long classed as intemperance? |
1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies and not to come to terms with them. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1367a19), quoted by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.189 |
2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08) | |
A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks? |
2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33) | |
A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity. |
22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21) | |
A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good. |
2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30) | |
A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important. |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10) | |
A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece. |
5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Intellectual virtue owes both its inception and its growth chiefly to instruction, and so needs time and experience; moral goodness, on the other hand, is the result of habit. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a15) | |
A reaction: If one adds to this his idea of practical reason as the intellectual virtue that makes the moral virtues possible, one has a good formula for running a school. The formula: 1) instruction about theory, 2) practical experience, 3) drilling good habits. |
11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The wise man should not be instructed, but should instruct. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a20) | |
A reaction: I take this to refer to the duties of a wise man, as well as to his (or her) superior rights. |
2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24) | |
A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle. |
5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It shows weakness of character to run away from hardships, and the suicide endures death not because it is a fine thing to do but in order to escape from suffering. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1116a14) | |
A reaction: It is easy to construct a situation where suicide IS a fine deed. And when I put on a warm coat I am running away from hardships rather than pursuing fine deeds. He does have a point, though. |
5092 | Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature is the subject of our enquiry, and nature is a principle of change, so if we do not understand the process of change, we will not understand nature either. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 200b12) | |
A reaction: This is a very distinctively Greek attitude which doesn't seem to concern us much, but perhaps it should. Movement is just as fundamental as forces, particles and the rest that physicist talk about. Why do particles respond to forces? |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature does nothing in vain. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a31) |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |
5113 | Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nothing natural - nothing due to nature - is disorderly, because in all things nature is responsible for order. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 252a11) | |
A reaction: This sounds dangerously tautological. What is responsible for disorder? If a forest is smashed up by an earthquake, 'order' doesn't sound like a good description of the result. It is certainly no more orderly than if people smash the forest. |
632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A basic principle of things has to explain why some things are destructible and others are not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075b15) |
5085 | 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Nature' refers to two things - that is, both to form and to matter. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194a12) | |
A reaction: The 'New Essentialism' (e.g. book by Brian Ellis) seems to imply that matter is basic, and that form is the result of the essence of matter. They seem to have parted company with Aristotle. Does he think matter is created on Thursday, and form on Friday? |
2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20) | |
A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose. |
5089 | Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is wrong with the idea that nature does not act purposively, and does not do things because they are better? The proper analogy is the idea that it is sheer coincidence that the crops grow when it rains. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198b16) | |
A reaction: In this context, it simply never occurred to Aristotle to give a causal explanation instead of a purposive one. Or that he had got it the wrong way round - growth of crops is 'for the better' only because we eat them, but are we 'for the better'? |
396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26) |
394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33) |
626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All things are arranged around a single purpose. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a18) |
5087 | A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: From one point of view we too are ends. What a thing is for is ambiguous. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194a35) | |
A reaction: A really interesting concession from the great teleologist. This opens up what I think of as the 'existentialist' possibility - that we can invent our own purposes. If there are two types of 'telos', which one matters for morality? |
5091 | Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things such as teeth and crops turn out as they do either always or usually, whereas no chance or spontaneous event does. ..So, given that these things cannot be accidents or spontaneous events, they must have some purpose. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 199b33) | |
A reaction: This is a good argument, and Darwin's theory does not destroy it. We have no idea why there is order, regularity and pattern in nature. Aristotle does not leap to a divine explanation. The 'purpose' of things might be non-conscious. |
2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle does not distinguish teleological description and teleological explanation, or not as clearly as he should. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Terence Irwin - Metaphysical and psych. basis of 'Ethics' p.40 | |
A reaction: I assume the explanation has to be factual and true, but the description might be a convenient way of focusing our view of something. |
5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The nature of any given thing is determined by its end. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b23) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the essence of the teleological view. A counterexample might be something which had a very unimpressive end, but was incidentally rather wonderful, like being a perfectionist about a menial task. |
2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03) | |
A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper. |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Not to have ordered one's life in relation to some end is a mark of extreme folly. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214b10) | |
A reaction: A most interesting claim, not found in the Nichomachean Ethics. There the teleology is descriptive, but here it is prescriptive. It is tempting to rebel against Aristotle's injuncture. He was a driven workaholic. Why not float through life like gossamer? |
19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Any machine ...is best defined in terms of its final cause, so that in the description of the parts it is therefore apparent in what way each of them is coordinated with the others for the intended us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Human Body is a sort of Machine [1683], p.290), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 3 'Machines' | |
A reaction: We would use the 'function', an inherently teleological concept, and a concept which is almost indispensable for giving an illuminating description of the world. If nature is dispositional, it points towards things. Leibniz views persons as machines. |
5086 | The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The nature of a thing is its end and purpose. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194a29) | |
A reaction: Cf 5084. This is the teleologists' manifesto, but it is very hard to find out why Aristotle took this view. He seems to offer it as self-evident. What would he have made of the proposal that there is no ultimate purpose to anything? |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might wonder if it is possible to use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise - and that as itself or incidentally. E.g. twisting an eye so that one thing appears two, but also using an eye as something to sell or eat. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1246a26) | |
A reaction: The important idea here is the core notion that there is a 'natural' purpose. Sceptics might say that all purposes derive from how a mind wishes to use something; otherwise there would be processes, but no 'functions' or 'purposes'. |
5108 | Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If what happens by force is unnatural, then forced ceasing-to-be is unnatural, and is opposed to natural ceasing to be. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 230a29) | |
A reaction: This is an important matter for Aristotle, who needs a concept of 'unnatural' behaviour for his ethics. Our law enshrines the idea of 'death by natural causes'. But 'force' needs discussion. Why is a hitman unnatural, and lightning natural? |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each thing's function is its end. | |
From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a08) | |
A reaction: Function and end are not the same, but this confirms how closely related they are for Aristotle. Can an inanimate object have an end, without having any apparent function? Could I construct a set of cogwheels which each had a function, but no end? |
19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In music, the soul counts the beats of the vibrating object which makes the sound, and when these beats regularly coincide at short intervals, it finds them pleasing. Thus it counts without knowing it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L]) | |
A reaction: Only a mathematician would see music this way! He is defending his account of the unconscious mind. The proposal that we unconsciously count sounds highly implausible. He needs to recognise the patterns that ground mathematics. |
17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Pythagoreans the entire universe is constructed from numbers. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1080b16) | |
A reaction: The original view seems to have been more extreme than the mere idea that mathematics is the guide to nature, or the language of God. Stones are made of numbers. Aristotle was unimpressed. |
5093 | Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In defining continuity one is almost bound to rely on the notion of infinity; it is because the continuous is what is infinitely divisible. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 200b18) | |
A reaction: Parmenides and the Achilles Paradox lie behind this view, and the fact that Aristotle was opposed to the view that some things are indivisible ('atomism'). Nice point, though - that space and time immediately imply the infinite. |
5095 | The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The region beyond the heavens seems to be infinite because it does not give out in our thoughts. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 203b25) | |
A reaction: An interesting case of inconceivability (of a limit) implying impossibility. But it is undeniable that the outer limit of the cosmos is unimaginable for us. Is there a 'Road Closed' sign? |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a20) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the classic definition of matter in Aristotle. He doesn't say here that matter has an inferior mode of existence, but elsewhere he says that it is potential rather than actual, which seems to confiscate its passport. |
12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics Z.3, often read as denying that matter is a substance, can more plausibly be interpreted as claiming that matter cannot be the only and not a first-rank substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation VI | |
A reaction: This certainly sounds a more plausible view, and in modern understanding some kind of elemental matter is our best candidate for what could be meant by 'substance'. Perhaps the 'fields' of modern physics play that role. |
10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Matter divides into that which is perceptible and that which is intelligible: the former comprises bronze, wood and all process-apt matter, the latter matter is present in the perceptibles but not qua perceptible, e.g. the mathematicals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036a09) |
601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There can be no doubt that matter is a substance. Consider all changes between opposites. In all of them there is something that underlies the change. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1042a30) |
13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The matter is that of which points and lines are limits, and it is something that can never exist without quality and without form. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320b16) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a contradiction here somewhere. Matter has to be substantial enough to have a form, and yet seems to be the collective 'limit' of the points and lines. I wonder what 'limit' is translating? Sounds a bit too modern. |
17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must reckon as an 'orginal source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from the contrary qualities: for 'the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'cold' for 'hot', but the substratum is matter for them both. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329a30) | |
A reaction: A much discussed passage. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter; what is matter may itself have matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1 | |
A reaction: This shows that Aristotle's 'hule' is not like our word 'matter' so a real effort must be made to grasp how he is conceptualising it. |
16762 | Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What desires the form is matter, as the female the male, and the ugly the beautiful. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 192a22) | |
A reaction: Wow! This is a very active view of matter. The drive in nature (the 'conatus' in Spinoza) can be discerned in all sorts of levels. It is Nietzsche's will to power. It seems to be the opposite of entropy. |
15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If earth is air-esque and earth is (not fire but) fire-esque, then it is fire that is primary matter. Such matter is not a this-something. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1049a25) | |
A reaction: For being a 'this-something' read 'having determinate identity'. Aristotle's account of 'primary matter' is controversial and much discussed. |
12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The idea of ultimate matter is discredited philosophically because of the version of the doctrine found in Aristotle, who ran together the two notions of being a substratum of change on the one hand, and being the bearer of properties on the other. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 06.6) by Peter Simons - Parts 6.6 | |
A reaction: This is an illuminating comment on Aristotle. The substratum of change seems to be a fairly substantial essence, while the bearer of properties seems to shrivel to minimal size because it can't have properties of its own. |
15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: It has been held that Aristotle needed the conception of prime matter only because he held that the transmutation of one element into another is impossible. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 01.2 |
16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since antiquity prime matter has enjoyed a hallowed place in the Aristotelian system, which displays an awesome completeness, with God (pure form and actuality) at the top, and prime matter (pure matter and potentiality) at the bottom. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Gill suggests that actually the four elements should be at the bottom, with matter only coming into it when distinct objects are in the offing. The Great Chain of Being emerged as the story between the two extremes. |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90) | |
A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings. |
13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No one supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other element) at the same time. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 332a09) | |
A reaction: Of course, we now think that oxygen is a key part of both water and of air, but Aristotle's basic argument still seems right. How could multiplicity be explained by a simply unity? The One is cool, but explains nothing. |
616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nor is it a sufficient explanation of the world to say just that all things were originally together. For things differ in matter. Indeed, why otherwise did an infinity of things come-to-be, and not just one? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1069b25) |
17464 | When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to understand what would induce a compound to dissociate into its elements on Aristotle's theory, which seems entirely geared to showing how a stable equilibrium results from mixing. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1 |
16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve. |
17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1 | |
A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms. |
16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: These bodies (Fire, Water and the like) change into one another (and are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible). | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b1) | |
A reaction: This is why Aristotle proposes that matter [hule] underlies the four elements. Gill argues that by matter Aristotle means the elements. |
13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four couples of elementary qualities attach themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Earth, Water). Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (being a sort of aqueous vapour); Water is cold and moist, and Earth is cold and dry. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 330b02) | |
A reaction: This is the traditional framework accepted throughout the middle ages, and which had a huge influence on medicine. It all looks rather implausible now. Aristotle was a genius, but not critical enough about evidence. |
16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Tradition holds that prime matter, a subject exhausted by its potentialities, lies at the foundation. I argue that Aristotle's system is instead grounded in the four simple bodies, earth, water, air and fire, as ultimate objects. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a controversial view of Gill's, though I found her case persuasive. Those seeking an Aristotelianism that fits with modern science should like her reading. However, physical fields may be seen as pure potentiality. |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], (opening)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: Thus in one sentence Leibniz gives us a theory of natural elements, and an account of atoms. This kind of speculation got metaphysics a bad name when science unravelled a more accurate picture. The bones must be picked out of Leibniz. |
13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Bodies are divisible through and through. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 326b27) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's flat rejection of atomism, arrived at after several sustained discussions, in this text and elsewhere. I don't think we are in a position to say that Aristotle is wrong. |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I still subscribe fully to the corpuscular theory in the explanation of particular phenomena; in this sphere it is of no value to speak of forms or qualities. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 14.07.1686) | |
A reaction: I am puzzled by Garber's summary in Idea 12728, and a bit unclear on Leibniz's views on atoms. More needed. |
12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: Leibniz held that there can be no atoms in nature, nothing perfectly solid and hard, since elasticity entails the existence of smaller parts that can move with respect to one another. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
A reaction: Thus, I suppose, we discover that atoms have mercurial electron shells. Are quarks or electrons elastic? The debate about true atoms is not over, and probably never will be. Leibniz's point is a good one. |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04) |
19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Micrographers observe qualities of larger things found in smaller things. And if this proceeds to infinity - which is possible since the continuum is divisible to infinity - any atom will be an infinite species, and there will be worlds within worlds. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], A VI ii 241) | |
A reaction: [a work of the 1670s] The microscope had a huge impact on Leibniz, much more than the telescope. |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk [moles], that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §11) | |
A reaction: Leibniz has a constant battle for the rest of his career to explain what these 'atoms of substance' are, since they have location but no extension, they are self-sufficient yet generate force, and are non-physical but interact with matter. |
13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If having divided a piece of wood I put it together, it is equal to what it was and is one. This is so whatever the point at which I cut the wood. The wood is therefore divided potentially through and through. So what is in the wood besides the division? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b11) | |
A reaction: Part of a very nice discussion of the implications of the thought experiment of cutting something 'through and through'. It seems to me that the arguments are still relevant, in the age of quarks, electrons and strings. |
13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Dividing a body at all points might actually occur, so the body will be both actually indivisible and potentially divided. Then nothing will remain and the body passes into what is incorporeal. So it might be reassembled out of points, or out of nothing. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b24) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed] This sounds like an argument in favour of atomism, but Aristotle was opposed to that view. He is aware of the contradictions that seem to emerge with infinite division. Graham Priest is interesting on the topic. |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24) |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS) |
7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Leibniz seems never to have made up his mind completely on how to accommodate bodies within a metaphysic which recognises only soul-like entities as fully real. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro | |
A reaction: [The soul-like entities are his 'monads']. His choice must be to either say they are unreal, or that they are real and separate from the monads, or that they are a manifestation of the monads. His problem, not mine. |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance. So we must add a soul or form... | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: It sounds as if primary matter is redundant, but Garber suggests that secondary matter is just the combination of primary matter with form. |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190) | |
A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422. |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert. |
19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The active principle is not attributed by me to bare or primary matter, which is merely passive ...but to clothed or secondary matter which in addition contains a primitive entelechy, or active principle. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wagner [1710], 1710 §2) | |
A reaction: Secondary matter contains monads. The puzzling question is what primary matter consists of. It is not atoms, because it is infinitely divisible, and it seems to be composed of corpuscles. But what is it made of? Just gunge? He says it is 'flux'. |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Even if we grant impenetrability is added to extension, nothing complete is brought about, nothing from which a reason for motion, and especially the laws of motion, can be given. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
A reaction: When it comes to the reasons for the so-called 'laws of nature', scientists give up, because they've only got mathematical descriptions, whereas the philosopher won't give up (even though, embarassingly, the evidence is running a bit thin). |
16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Leibniz eventually rejected extension altogether as part of the essence of body, and replaced it with resistance. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5 | |
A reaction: This makes body consist of active force, rather than mere geometry. Much better. |
10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The kind that is common to both horse and ass and which most nearly comprises them happens not to have a name, but can safely be presumed to be both, i.e. the horse-ass or 'mule'. ...A mule does not come from a mule. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b32) | |
A reaction: [second part at 1034b04] Does ancient Greek have a word for 'mule' - it sounds as if it doesn't. Nice chicken-and-egg problem. Must a natural kind be derived from a natural kind? No. Gold does not derive from gold. |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In each kind, whatever holds of something in itself and as such holds of it from necessity. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 75a30) | |
A reaction: This seems to confirm the view that essential properties are necessary, but it does not, of course, follow that all necessary properties are essential properties (e.g. trivial necessities are not essential). |
11252 | The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: By the form of a thing, such as a changing human being, Aristotle means that which explains why the matter of this particular thing constitutes the thing that it constitutes: a particular human being. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: If Politis is right then clearly the so-called 'formal cause' is much better understood as the 'formal explanation'. The Greek word for cause/explanation is 'aitia'. |
11253 | A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: In the 'material cause/explanation', it is especially important to emphasise Aristotle's view that it is not simply the parent that generates the offspring, but the form of the parent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
13107 | Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A cause may be a cause either in its own right or coincidentally. The cause in its own right of a house is house-building ability, but a house may coincidentally be caused by something pale or educated. ..There could be infinite coincidental causes. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 196b25) | |
A reaction: If we seriously want to identify THE cause of an event, this distinction seems useful, even though a cause 'in its own right' is a rather loose locution. It leads on to analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions. |
5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The accepted types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and also mind and human agency. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a28) | |
A reaction: Aristotle accepts this traditional analysis, but also has his own four types (material, formal, efficient and final). Presumably 'nature' would be contingent causes. 'Chance' seems the odd one out. 'Mind' seems to imply free will. |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |
8332 | The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The first type of cause is that from which a thing is made (bronze of a statue); the second type is the form or pattern (ratio 2:1 for the octave); the third is the source (the deviser of a plan); the fourth type is the end (as health causes walking). | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b23-) | |
A reaction: [Compressed quotation] These four became known as the Material Cause, the Formal Cause, the Efficient Cause, and the Final Cause. For a statue they are the bronze, the shape, the sculptor, and the beauty. We now focus on the Efficient Cause. |
5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5) | |
A reaction: Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes. |
561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must especially inquire and investigate whether there is any cause beyond matter in itself or not, and whether this is separable or not, and whether it is one or many in number. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995b28) |
5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Men take its occurring after as its occurring because. | |
From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1401b30) | |
A reaction: The Latin is 'post hoc propter hoc' - after this so because of this. It is quite a good inductive rule, but obviously open to abuse, as in legal cases, as when someone happens to acquire a lot of money just after a crime. |
588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Exercise is the cause of fitness, but fitness is also the cause of exercise. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1013b10) |
634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we allow Forms or numbers, they will not be the cause of anything, or, if that is too strong, they will at any rate not be the cause of any movement. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075b23) | |
A reaction: This is Benacerraf's famous observation (1973) that we can't accept a platonic account of numbers because, lacking causal powers, they are unknowable. |
14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whenever the potential active and the potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious to the potentiality, the former must of necessity act and the latter must of necessity be affected. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a08) | |
A reaction: Of course the world could end between the two happenings, so this can't be full-scale metaphysical necessity. That point is not enough, though, to get rid of Aristotle's intuition here. |
2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675]) |
12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whoever understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge of its cause. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Meditatio de principio individui [1676], A6.3.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: This sounds highly improbable, given that you would have thought that there could be lots of ways to bring about the same effect. Predicting effects is rather more plausible. I suppose if you can record all the ripples in the pond before they fade... |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As there exist an infinite number of possible worlds, there exists also an infinite number of laws, some peculiar to one world, some to another, and each individual of any one world contains in the concept of him the laws of his world. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06) | |
A reaction: Since Leibniz's metaphysics is thoroughly God-driven, he will obviously allow God to create any laws He wishes, and hence scientific essentialism seems to be rejected, even though Leibniz is keen on essences. Unless the stuff is different... |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant. |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I recognize a primitive entelechy in the active force found in motion, something analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain law of the same series of changes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.03.24) | |
A reaction: This is his 'law-of-the-series', which is a speculative attempt to pin down the character of the active essence of things which gives rise to activity. The law of such activity is within the things themselves, as scientific essentialists claim. |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the law of God does indeed leave some vestige of him expressed in things...then it must be granted that there is a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force such as we usually designate by the name of nature, from which the phenomena follow. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §06) | |
A reaction: I wouldn't rate this as a very promising theory of powers, but it seems to me important that Leibniz recognises the innate power in things as needing explanation. If you remove divine power, you are left with unexplained intrinsic powers. |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref 66) | |
A reaction: This is the idea that powers are prior to properties, which seems right to me. I take essence to be something like the best explanation of qualities. |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The complex idea of gold includes its being something which has a real essence whose detailed constitution is unknown to us, except for the fact that such qualities as malleability depend upon it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10) | |
A reaction: This is precisely the view of modern scientific essentialism. The underlying idea I take to be the conception of essence as the thing which explains the properties. |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is very true that it is part of the complex idea of gold that it is a thing which has a real essence, the constitution of which is not otherwise known to us in detail. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.345), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences p.201 | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12807. This is the clearest possible statement of Leibniz's clear-cut scientific essentialism, here presented in opposition to Locke (thought I take the latter to be only bothered by our inability to know the hidden constitution). |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 12b01) |
19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95) | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world? |
12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
Full Idea: Leibniz seeks the big picture: the nature of body as a grounding for an account of motion and its laws. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: Garber is contrasting this with Newton's approaches, who just pleads ignorance of the bigger picture. Essentialists must beware of inventing a bigger picture simply because they desperately want a bigger picture. |
16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in a substance except the law itself which determines the continuous succession of its states and accords within the individual substance with the laws of nature that govern the whole world. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G II:263), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 3 epig | |
A reaction: An interesting link between the law-of-series within a substance, and the broader concept of laws outside it. |
11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205) | |
A reaction: Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job. |
13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I believe that both gravity and elasticity are in matter only because of the structure of the system and can be explained mechanically or through impulsion. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699 draft) | |
A reaction: The significance of this remark is that gravity is held (in full knowledge of Newton's work) to be within matter, and not imposed from the outside. I believe we now postulate a particle as part of the explanation. |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in things except the law itself, which involves a continuous succession ...The fact that a certain law persists ...is the very fact that constitutes the same substance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704) | |
A reaction: Aristotle and Leibniz are the very clear ancestors of modern scientific essentialism. I've left out a few inconvenient bits, about containing 'the whole universe', and containing all 'future states'. For Leibniz, laws are entirely rooted in things. |
9787 | Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It would be strange for a natural scientist to know what the sun and the moon are, but to be completely ignorant about their necessary attributes. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b27) | |
A reaction: This nicely captures the common sense idea of essentialism - that we must know the essential features of things, and ignore the incidental ones (like sunspots, or phases of the moon). |
7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Unlike most philosophers prior to the twentieth century, Leibniz was committed to the causal completeness of physics. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: It has been suggested that Leibniz was actually, in private, a determinist (see Idea 7841), which would fit. Leibniz is enigmatic, but he may have proposed the closure of physics to glorify God, only to find that God was beginning to look irrelevant. |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every movement being either a push or a pull, there must be a still point as with the circle, and this will be the point of departure for the movement. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b26) |
5114 | If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Movement can arise within a motionless animal out of the object itself, rather than being due to some external agent. But why should this not also be true of the universe? | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 252b24) | |
A reaction: A nice objection to the Unmoved Mover concept of God. Unfortunately it is ruined by the modern realisation that an animal is never 'motionless', because brain activity is continuous, and ceases only with death. |
5116 | When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Examples of unnatural movements are something earthy moving upwards and fire moving downwards. …When they are moved unnaturally it is obvious what they are moved by, but this is not obvious in the case of their natural movements. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 254b21) | |
A reaction: Aristotle always struggles when he tries to give an account of 'unnatural' events. It is hard to see how it is unnatural when a wind blows a flame down, or volcanoes blow earth up. There is hardly a natural distinction of causes which are 'obvious'. |
399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move? | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12) |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There a four sorts of movement - spatial movement, alteration, withering and growth. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a12) | |
A reaction: Large parts of Aristotle's writings attempt to explain these four. |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There seem to be two producers of movement, either desire or practical intellect, but practical reason begins in desire. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a16) |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary for what moves things to be itself moving. For a thing can be moving in two ways - with reference to something else, or intrinsically. A ship is moving intrinsically, but sailors move because they are in something that is moving. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a03) | |
A reaction: I love the way that Aristotle is desperate to explain the puzzle of movement, yet we just take it for granted. Very illuminating about puzzles. Newton's First Law of Motion. |
12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'. |
19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As for motion, what is real in it is force or power; that is to say, what there is in the present state which carries with it a change in the future. The rest is only phenomena and relations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], §13) | |
A reaction: This presumably contradicts Newton's concept of inertia, which allows constant motion without force. I always like a reference to powers. What is 'kinetic energy' in this context? |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I believe 'motion' to be definable, and the definition which says that it is 'change of place' deserves respect. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.04) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the 'at-at' view of motion, championed by Bertrand Russell. (At p1 at t1, at p2 at t2...). Leibniz's version only mentions space and not time, and it includes 'change', which would need definition without mentioning motion. |
20063 | Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Motion is the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 201a10-11), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Two' | |
A reaction: We might put that as 'all motion is the fulfilment of a natural power'. But that gives the source of motion, and not its intrinsic nature. |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What has pushed something else makes the latter push as well. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 435b30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to have spotted that this is intrinsic to massive bodies, and is not just friction etc. Newton adds a vector to Aristotle's insight. |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Motion in itself separated from force is merely relative, and one cannot establish its subject. But force is something real and absolute. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1688.01.4/14) | |
A reaction: The striking phrase here is that force enables us to 'establish its subject'. That is, force is at the heart of reality, and hence, through causal relations, individuates objects. That's how I read it. |
15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: At this early period exegetical problems abound, since Leibniz uses 'force' both for actually acting forces and for potentials or powers. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], 9.II), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B | |
A reaction: I take Leibniz to be a key figure in the development of the Aristotelian approach, because he connected Aristotelian potential and essence with 'force' in the new physics. This is helpful in reading him correctly. |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence. |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139) | |
A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive. |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256) | |
A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right. |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If we attribute an inherent force to our mind, a force acting immanently, then nothing forbids us to suppose that the same force would be found in other souls or forms, or, if you prefer, in the nature of substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §10) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of bizarre idea that you are driven to, once you start thinking that God must have a will outside nature, and then that we have the same thing. Why shouldn't such a thing pop up all over the place? Only Leibniz spots the slippery slope. |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul. |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I recognise, in the active force which exerts itself through motion, the primitive entelechy or in a word, something analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain perpetual law of the same series of changes through which it runs unhindered. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3 | |
A reaction: This is a hugely metaphysical account of force, contrasting with Newton's largely mathematical account. He very often says that force is 'analogous' to the soul, rather than that it actually is a soul. He never quite believes that monads are real minds. |
13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By the force I give to substances, I understand a state from which another state follows, if nothing prevents it. ...I dare say that without force, there would be no substance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Lelong [1712], 1712), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 7.1 | |
A reaction: [the whole quote is interesting] This remark, more than any other I have found, places force at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. He is using it to resist Spinoza's one-substance view. |
16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It pleases others to return to occult qualities or scholastic faculties, but since these crude philosophers and physicians see that those terms are in bad repute they change their name, calling them 'forces'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Against Barbaric physics [1716], A&G:313), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.7 | |
A reaction: Deceptive, because Leibniz embraced forces in his revised Aristotelian essentialism. Leibniz placed forces within essences, and he is worried about forces as separate entities, unsupported by any substance. |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2 | |
A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance. |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13a35) | |
A reaction: Although this seems like an insight into entropy, it isn't an accurate observation, since trees lose their leaves, and then regain them in spring. Maybe somewhere men regrow their hair each spring. |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity. |
20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus. |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Extension is the order of coexisting possibles. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: [In his next letter he uses the word 'space' instead of 'extension'] This is a rather startling different and modal definition of space. Cf Idea 13181. |
5097 | If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If place is an existing thing, then it will exist somewhere. For Zeno's puzzle needs explaining: if every existing thing is in place, an infinite regress occurs, because there will clearly have to be a place for place. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 209a23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the basic dilemma with space. If it exists independently, it requires a location, but if it doesn't exist, how can anything have a location? Neither Newton, Leibniz nor Einstein seem to have solved the dilemma. |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14) |
5099 | The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The universe as a whole is not anywhere. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 212b14) | |
A reaction: This is what we pay philosophers for! Point out all the things which are staring us in the face, but we have never actually noticed. 'Everything that exists must have a location'? Can this truism really be false? |
5098 | Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Place must be one of four things: shape, or matter, or some kind of extension between the limits of the container, or the limits themselves. …The first three can evidently be ruled out…so it must be the limit of the containing body. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 211b06) | |
A reaction: As it stands this doesn't have much intuitive appeal. It is rather difficult to define a 'limit' without making some reference to 'space' and 'place'. One must read this chunk of Aristotle to see his drift. |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Space is a relationship: an order, not only among existents, but also among possibles as though they existed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.13) | |
A reaction: The modal end to this idea is a bit puzzling. Would there be any space if there were only possibles, and nothing yet existed, as in God's mind the instant before he got to work? |
20920 | If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there were a plurality of heavens, in the same way the movement of each of them would be a time, so that many times would coexist. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218b3) | |
A reaction: I take it that for Aristotle this is an absurdity, but for a modern cosmologist this is a real possibility. So which one is fastest? Can God rank them according to speed? |
19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Space and time taken together constitute the order of possibilities of the one entire universe, so that these orders relate not only to what actually is, but also to anything that could be put in its place. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to 'Rorarius' 2nd ed [1702], GP iv 568), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Space and Time' | |
A reaction: A very nice idea. Rather like the 'space of reasons', where all rational thought must exist, space and time are the 'space of existence and action'. Their concepts involve more than relations between what actually exists. |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 13180. This sounds wonderfully bold and interesting, but I can't make much sense of it. One might say it is 'an' order for such things, but 'the' order is weird. |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4) |
13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There can be no time without movement. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 337a24) | |
A reaction: See Shoemaker's nice thought experiment as a challenge to this. Intuition seems to cry out that if movement stopped for a moment, that would not stop time, even though there was no way to measure its passing. |
22967 | It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might find it a difficult question, whether if there were no soul there would be time or not. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 223a22) | |
A reaction: If only we could arrange a meeting with Kant. Personally I take it to be simple - obviously time passed before minds emerged in the universe. Our whole modern account of reality realies on it. His problem is that only souls count things. |
5106 | Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered whether or not there would be time if there were not mind. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 223a21) | |
A reaction: I like his caution. Some people leap to the conclusion that time is a product of mind. Personally (with my strongly realist tendencies) I don't believe it. |
22885 | For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle time is not a process: It is a kind of 'number' or unit that can be used to describe processes in nature, analagous to the way ordinary numbers can be used to count things. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Aristotle's' | |
A reaction: Bardon cites this when discussing Aristotle on Zeno's paradoxes. If the equivalent idea of length is that length is merely rulers for measuring it, this sounds like a bad idea. But if processes occur in time, how could time be a process? |
8590 | Time does not exist without change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time does not exist without change. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218b32) | |
A reaction: His reasons are epistemological, and are nicely attacked by Shoemaker, in 'Time without Change'. There is something intuitively wrong about Aristotle's claim. If reality freezes, then 'how long was it frozen?' is a quite reasonable question. |
5104 | Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time is not change, but it is an aspect of change. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219a09) | |
A reaction: I can't think of a better definition of time. Intuition says that time could continue when all change stopped (the 'frozen worlds' thought experiment), so that we can distinguish time from the change that gave rise to it (or the idea of it). |
22965 | Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since time is the measure of change, it will be measure of rest also. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 221b07) | |
A reaction: The thought seems to be that change leads us to a system of temporal measurement, which is then available fro measurement periods of rest. But totally eventless time would be a problem. Aristotle had no clocks. |
22959 | Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time is a number of change in respect of the before and after. So time is not change but in the way in which change has a number. We discern the greater and the less by number, and greater and less change by time. Hence time is a kind of number. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219b01) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's firmest assertion of the nature of time. It seems to be false to say that we need number in order to discern size (e.g. seeing who was given the biggest slice of cake). Surely we discern time before we measure it? |
22964 | Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time measures at once the change and the being of change, and this is what it is, for the change, to be in time, viz. its being's being measured. …This is what it is to be in time: their being's being measured by time. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 221a05) | |
A reaction: Among other things, this would presumably mean that animals are unaware of change, which seems unlikely. He may have a relaxed and intuitive (rather than precise) concept of 'measured'. |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If there were a vacuum in space, one could establish its size. But if there were a vacuum in time, i.e. a duration without change, it would be impossible to establish its length. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.15) | |
A reaction: See Idea 4226 for Shoemaker's wonderful counterproposal to this apparently unanswerable claim. I suppose Leibniz is right, but it just might be possible to bring induction to bear on the problem. |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a25) |
22956 | How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some of time has been and is not, some of it is to be and is not yet. …But it would seem to be impossible that what is composed of things that are not should participate in being. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 217b33) | |
A reaction: This is his opening remark in the discussion of time, and he seems to be endorsing it, since he thinks of time as a form of measurement of change. |
5102 | If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some suspicion arises that time does not exist, since some of it has happened and does not exist, and some of it is in the future and does not yet exist. It appears impossible for anything that consists of things that do not exist to exist itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 217b34) | |
A reaction: This generates the popular paradox that Socrates cannot die, because no moment exists when his death could occur. It may be (as David Marshall has pointed out) that we do not experience the present, but only a vivid memory of the immediate past. |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'. |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49) |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6) |
5103 | Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time is not change … but time is not without change, for without any change (or any noticeable change) in our minds, time does not seem to pass. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218b19) | |
A reaction: Aristotle has spotted what seems to be a key problem in understanding time, which is disentangling what occurs in nature from what occurs in our consciousness. The extreme views (naďve realism about time, or the view that it is imaginary) both seem wrong. |
22961 | The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is manifest that if time were not, the now would not be either, and if the now were not, time would not be. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219b33) | |
A reaction: I take this to be Aristotle's commitment to the A-series view, which needs a moving present moment. Despite Einstein and B-series eternalism, I remain in agreement with Aristotle. B-series fans struggle like theologians to explain 'now'. |
22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: When one of two non-contemporaneous elements contains the grounds for the other, the former is regarded as the antecedent, and the latter as the consequence | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics [1715], p.201) | |
A reaction: Bardon cites this passage of Leibniz as the origin of the idea that time's arrow is explained by the direction of causation. Bardon prefers it to the psychological and entropy accounts. |
22916 | Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle says time could not be the same thing as change, for first change can go at different rates, but not so time, and secondly change is confined to a part of space whereas time is universal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218b11-) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 02 'As Change' | |
A reaction: The observation that the speed of change varies seems to need a belief in uniform time. Le Poidevin doubts Aristotle's objections, because the theory concerns change in general, and not particular instances of it. |
617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that movement should either come-to-be or be destroyed. The same can be said for time itself, since it is not even possible for there to be an earlier and a later if time does not exist. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071b06) |
16693 | Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Time has parts, some of which have been, others of which are going to be, but no part of it is. The now is not a part, because a part is a measure of the whole, which must be composed of parts. Time, however, does not seem to be composed of nows. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218a05), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1 | |
A reaction: As good an expression as you will ever find of the baffling nature of time. Only the past and the future seem substantial enough to exist. Only the now can be real, and yet it seems to be a nothing. In Phys IV.14 time is mind-dependent. |
22958 | Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We take it that it is impossible for the nows to be adjoining one another, as it is for a point to be adjoining a point. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218a18) | |
A reaction: This implies that instants are abstractions, rather than physical realities. Aristotle rejects atoms, so presumably sees prime matter as the underlying uniter of matter. Insistence on linking the smallest parts leads to modern physics. |
22968 | Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Uniform circular motion is most of all a measure, because the number of this is most easily known. …This is why time is thought to be the motion of the [celestial] sphere, because the other changes are measured by this one. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 223b14) | |
A reaction: This makes the year the basic unit of time for the human race. Apparently minutes only became of interest when railway timetables appeared in the 1850s. |
22963 | We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Not only do we measure change by time, but time by change also, because they are defined by one another. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 220b14) | |
A reaction: He defends the idea that time is the 'number' of change, but this idea should sound a warning bell. He rejects the idea that time IS change. It is seems instrumentalist to make the existence of time depend on its measurement. |
22957 | We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to see whether the now, which appears to be the boundary between past and future, remains always one and the same or is different from time to time. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 218a08) | |
A reaction: [also 219b13] Presumably the A-series view suggests that each present moment is different, but Broad's moving spotlight analogy gives the impression of a single present instant moving through time. If the present is one, what sort of thing is it? |
22966 | The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The now is a link of time, for it links together past and future time, and is a limit of time, since it is a beginning of one and an end of the other. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 222a10) | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a limit (such as the boundary between two overlapping bits of paper) can also be a 'link'. He noticed the problem in Idea 22958. |
403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30) |
402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29) |
5083 | Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Early thinkers made the mistake of claiming that nothing comes to be or ceases to be, on the grounds that for anything to come to be it would have to come either from what is or from what is not, but that neither of these is possible. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191a27) | |
A reaction: Nothing in modern physics has (I think) solved this problem. On the one hand we have the conservation of energy, and on the other the Big Bang. Some talk of 'quantum fluctuations' triggering coming-to-be. Hm. |
16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If some one of the things 'which are' is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away - assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was infinite? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a17) | |
A reaction: This thought is the basis of Aquinas's Third Way for proving the existence of God (as the force which prevents the vicissitudes of nature from sliding into oblivion). |
619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since that which is moved and which also moves is an intermediate, it follows that there must be something that moves without being moved. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072a19) |
613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even if luck or the automatic are the cause of the world, mind and nature are prior causes still. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b03) |
1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12) |
620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The existence of the first mover is necessary, and in that it is necessary it is good. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072b10) | |
A reaction: This is the direct antithesis of David Hume's is/ought distinction (that the universe is value-free). |
395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26) |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What has been born must have growth, a prime of life, and a time of withering away. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a23) | |
A reaction: Modern biologists don't seem much interested in the 'prime of life', but for Aristotle it is crucial, as the fulfilment of a thing's essential nature. Nietzsche would probably agree with Aristotle on this. We dread seeing one period of life as 'superior'. |
23302 | Plants have far less life than animals, but more life than other corporeal entities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The genus of plants, whilst it is devoid of life compared with an animal, is endowed with life as compared with other corporeal entities. In the sea there are certain objects which one would be at a loss to determine whether they be animal or vegetable. | |
From: Aristotle (The History of Animals [c.344 BCE], 588b09) | |
A reaction: It seems that Aristotle takes life to come in degrees, assessed by the amount of physical vitality observed. This seems to make lambs more alive than sheep, which isn't very plausible. This is part of his 'gradualist' view of nature. |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the opinion of those who transform or degrade the lower animals into mere machines, although it seems possible, is improbable, and even against the order of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.116) | |
A reaction: His target is Descartes. 'Against the order of things' seems to beg the question. What IS the order of things? Only a thorough-going dualist would worry about this question, and that isn't me. |
23301 | There is a gradual proceeding from the inanimate to animals, with no clear borderlines [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life so that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side an intermediate form should lie. ...In plants there is a continuous ascent towards the animal. | |
From: Aristotle (The History of Animals [c.344 BCE], 588b04) | |
A reaction: This in itself should have alerted medieval Christians to the problematic nature of the idea that animal species were divinely created. |
19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Men are related to animals, these to plants, and the latter directly to fossils which will be linked in their turn to bodies which the senses and the imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and formless. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Varignon [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Leibniz would be a bit surprised to find the way in which this has turned out to be largely true, since he is basing it on his picture of a hierarchy of monads. Nevertheless, the idea that we are all related wasn't invented in 1859. |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God is the source of possibilities and of existents alike, the one by his essence and the other by his will. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.15) | |
A reaction: Every now and then I rebel against metaphysics, and think 'how do these people know all this great things about which they make these dogmatic claims?' And this is one of those occasions. I get the idea, though... |
19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The cause of the world must be intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of worlds being equally possible, with equal claim to existence, the cause of the world must have regarded all of these worlds to fix on one of them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II | |
A reaction: A wonderfully Leibnizian way of putting what looks like the design argument. |
5119 | The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We proved that there cannot be an infinite magnitude, and that it is impossible for something finite to have infinite power, but the first agent of movement causes eternal movement for an infinite time, so it must be indivisible and have no parts or size. | |
From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 267b19) | |
A reaction: Note that Aristotle is already attributing 'infinite power' to this special thing. It is more than just a first domino to fall over. Its having no size quickly takes it outside of space, and makes it a 'spirit'. We are watching the construction of God. |
2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24) | |
A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance. |
19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God is the source of possibilities and consequently of ideas. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715 §8) | |
A reaction: A wonderfully individual conception of the nature of God. He produces the possibilities from which creation is chosen, and ideas and concepts are of everything which is non-contradictory, and thus possible. It all makes lovely sense! |
622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There exists an eternal unmoved substance separate from sensible things. It can have no magnitude, and is without parts and indivisible. As the source of movement for infinite time, it must itself be infinite. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1073a05) |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From all the possible universes God chooses this one to obtain as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible; that is, it is the means of obtaining the greatest perfection possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §58) |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The universe contains everything that its perfect harmony could admit. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.06) | |
A reaction: This sort of Leibnizian remark leaves most modern readers, including me, totally bewildered. The claim depends entirely on the perfect nature of God. |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109) | |
A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident. |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I call every simple quality which is positive and absolute, or expresses whatever it expresses without any limits, a perfection. But a quality of this sort, because it is simple, is therefore irresolvable or indefinable. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], App X) | |
A reaction: I don't think this definition of perfections would have occurred to anyone who wasn't planning to prove that perfections cannot be incompatible (as Leibniz is about to do). |
19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Also, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.128), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II | |
A reaction: Notice that Leibniz's possible worlds seem to be all connected together, unlike David Lewis's worlds, which are discrete. Personally I suspect that all perfections will lead to contradiction, though Leibniz strongly argues against it. |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If two propositions (about perfections) are incompatible, that cannot be demonstrated without a resolution of the terms, for otherwise their nature would not enter into the ratiocination. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], App X) | |
A reaction: If God is omnipotent and wholly free, these appear to be fully separate perfections. But it is their implications (can God decide to do otherwise, given His foreknowledge?) which lead to a problem. So this analyis of contradiction is wrong. |
7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's god had not created the world, since this would involve an inappropriate change and temporal activity; everything yearns towards god, but god remains indifferent, since he cannot contemplate anything inferior to himself. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Trust Aristotle to come up with the only rational and consistent account of a deity anyone has ever offered. Endless paradoxes and inconsistencies arise if god steps into time, makes things, changes, and responds to prayers. |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argues that if time is a thing in itself, and God is 'in' time, then God would be dependent for His existence on the existence of time. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Newton' | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz says time is merely relations between events. Not sure what he thinks an event is. What is God made of? Is there some divine matter upon which God's existence must depend? |
19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is certain that God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be said with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.189), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV | |
A reaction: Lovely problems arise when you guess at God's values! We have the same problem. Would you kill a poacher who was wiping out the last remaining lions? How many lions would you kill to save a human? |
19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The three dogmas (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) it is fixed, but not certain God will observe it, or (3) the justice we know is not that which God observes, destroy our confidence in the love of God. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.237), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: Leibniz proceeds to carefully refute these three responses to the dilemma about how justice relates to God. |
16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is committed to the view that strictly speaking there is no proof of the essence and existence of God. There will be a real definition of him as an axiom of special theology, and then a deduction of theological theorems. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.94 | |
A reaction: The cynical response would be 'why not start with a Great White Rabbit, then?', but I presume one must read what Aristotle says (late in 'Metaphysics') to understand why this particular axiom is chosen. Economy, power etc.? |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a fundamental axiom that 'nothing happens without reason', without which the existence of God and other great truths cannot be properly demonstrated. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21.13) | |
A reaction: I'm rather drawn to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but also to John Keats's 'negative capability'. Belief that there must be a reason in each case is not a justification for inventing a reason every time. There may be a reason for the universe.... |
3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Leibniz said that the ontological argument does not prove God's existence, but only the God's existence is either necessary or impossible. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 13.5 |
19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God is the first reason of things: all that we see and experience is contingent and nothing in them renders their existence necessary. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II | |
A reaction: Perkins presents this as the first step in one of Leibniz's arguments for God. They all seem to be variants of the ontological argument. [His 'Theodicy' is the Huggard translation, 1985] This resembles Aquinas's Third Way. |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God alone (or the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §45) |
13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Being is better than not-being. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b29) | |
A reaction: [see also Metaphysics 1017a07 ff, says the note] This peculiar assumption is at the heart of the ontological argument. Is the existence of the plague bacterium, or of Satan, or of mass-murderers, superior? |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Principles of Indiscernibles [1696], p.134) |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |
1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything which a thing is must be proved through a demonstration - except its essence. But existence is not the essence of anything; for the things that exist do not constitute a kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 92b14) |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By this principle alone, that there must be a sufficient reason why things are thus rather than otherwise, I prove the existence of the Divinity, and all the rest of metaphysics or natural theology. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover? |
13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is an Order controlling all things. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b13) | |
A reaction: Presumably the translator provides the capital letter. How do we get from 'there is an order in all things' to 'there is an order which controls all things'? |
610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How is there to be an arrangement of the world at all, in the absence of something eternal, separable and permanent? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1060a21) |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192) | |
A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation. |
19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: These admirable laws [of physics] are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato and Spinoza. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.332), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II | |
A reaction: Note the swipe at Spinoza. Leibniz defends the absolute necessities residing in God, but is too polite to call those 'brute', though personally I can't see the difference. But he says the laws arise from 'perfection and order', not from God's necessity. |
2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The perfect agreement of so many substances which have no communication whatever with each other can only come from a common source. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Nature and Communication of Substance [1690], p.120) |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Everything, even miracles, belongs to order. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: This is very reminiscent of Plato, for whom there was no more deeply held belief than that the cosmos is essentially orderly. Coincidences are a nice problem, if they are events with no cause. |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Miracles should not be increased beyond necessity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Leibniz defends miracles (where Spinoza dismisses them). This remark is, of course, an echo of Ockham's Razor, that 'entities' should not be multiplied beyond necessity. It is hard to disagree with his proposal. Zero might be result, though. |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Miracles, or the extraordinary operations of God, none the less belong within the general order; they are in conformity with the principal designs of God, and consequently are included in the notion of this universe, which is the result of those designs. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05) | |
A reaction: Some philosophers just make up things to suit themselves. What possible grounds can he have for claiming this? At best this is tautological, saying that, by definition, if anything at all happens, it must be part of God's design. Move on to Hume… |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that nature itself or the substance of all things is God is a pernicious doctrine, recently introduced into the world or renewed by a subtle or profane author. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], 8) | |
A reaction: The dastardly profane author is, of course, Spinoza, whom Leibniz had met in 1676. The doctrine may be pernicious to religious orthodoxy, but to me it is rather baffling, since in my understanding nature and God have almost nothing in common. |
2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men. | |
From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26) | |
A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets. |
7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: Leibniz sailed closer to the winds of unbelief than Spinoza did. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.16 | |
A reaction: This is an unusual view, but Stewart's view is that whereas Spinoza is always sincere in his writings, Leibniz is inclined to put a very conservative spin on his opinions. A key question for Leibniz is "Is God merely a monad?" |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |
12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is clearly necessary that the number of substances eternal in their nature and intrinsically unmovable (and without magnitude) should equal that of the movements of the stars. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1073a34) | |
A reaction: There are many unmoved movers! This is an important corrective to those who think Aristotle was endorsing one great Unmoved Mover, and thus founding monotheism. He was agreeing with Plato's account in 'The Laws'. |
19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Not only cares and labours but also prayers are useful; God having had these prayers in view before he regulated things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], Abridge III) | |
A reaction: Hm. I'm struggling with this one. So I can't skip prayers today, because God has foreseen them and included them in his great plan? Hard to motivate yourself, like starting a game of chess after you've already been declared the winner. |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Immortality without memory would be useless. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: I would say that having a mind of any sort needs memory. The question for immortality is whether it extends back to human life. See 'Wuthering Heights' (c. p90) for someone who remembers Earth as so superior to paradise that they long to return there. |
24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We do not wish for impossible things - for immortality, for instance. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b22) | |
A reaction: Obviously this primarily means physical immortality, in contrast to the immortal gods, though Aristotle doesn't seem to believe that humans have an immortal part. |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Not only is the soul indestructible, but it always knows itself and remains self-conscious. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.11) | |
A reaction: Personally I am not even self-aware during much of my sleeping hours, and I would say that I cease to be self-aware if I am totally absorbed in something on which I concentrate. |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I hold (against the Cartesians) that brutes also have thought, and hold that they have sensation, and souls which are, properly speaking, immaterial, and as incapable of perishing as the atoms of Democritus or Gassendi. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: Insect heaven will be a bit crowded. I can never grasp why theologians would claim that souls are 'indestructible', when they are held to come into existence at a particular moment in space-time. Transmigration of souls is a much more rational belief. |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It appears probable that animals have souls although they lack consciousness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.11) | |
A reaction: Personally I would say that they lack souls but have consciousness, but then I am in no better position to know the answer than Leibniz was. Arnauld asks what would happen to the souls of 100,000 silkworms if they caught fire! |
19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The cause of good is positive, but evil is a defect, that is, a privation or negation, and consequently, it arises from nothingness or nonbeing. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
A reaction: He goes on to illustrate his idea from mathematics. He is modifying Augustine's view that evil is an absence of good, by adding nonbeing as the driving force behind it. Doesn't sound very persuasive to me. |
13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We must believe that God would not have allowed sin nor would he have created things he knows will sin, if he could not derive from them a good incomparably greater than the resulting evil. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.115) | |
A reaction: Why 'must' we believe this? Do we have to imagine all the genocides shrinking to insignificance once we grasp the wonderful goods that can be derived from them? The end justifies the means. Genocide is actually a good thing. Hm. |
19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is this question of natural theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy? | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.098), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV | |
A reaction: His answer is, roughly, that there is an unavoidable trade-off, which humans cannot fully understand. Personally I would say that if there is a God, the evidence for his benevolence towards humanity is not encouraging. |
19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and justice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our gaze. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.120), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV | |
A reaction: Hm. If this locality is full of evils, and the rest of it is much better, how come we are stuck in this miserable corner of things? God is obliged to compromise, but did he select us to get the worst of it? |
5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |