82 ideas
| 6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything? | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562) | |
| A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth. |
| 6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672) | |
| A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense. |
| 23122 | Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik] |
| Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne. | |
| From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1 | |
| A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?). |
| 6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive mark of the Truth we hold ought to be virtue, which is the most exacting mark of Truth, the closest one to heaven and the most worthy thing that Truth produces. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0493) | |
| A reaction: A long way from Tarski and minimalist theories of truth! But not so far from pragmatism. Personally I think Montaigne is making an important claim, which virtue theorists should be attempting to incorporate into their theory. Aristotle would sympathise. |
| 10073 | There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: By Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, there cannot be a negation-complete set theory. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This means that we can never prove all the truths of a system of set theory. |
| 10616 | Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Going second-order in arithmetic enables us to prove new first-order arithmetical sentences that we couldn't prove before. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 23.4) | |
| A reaction: The wages of Satan, perhaps. We can prove things about objects by proving things about their properties and sets and functions. Smith says this fact goes all the way up the hierarchy. |
| 10075 | A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A 'partial function' is one which maps only some elements of a domain to elements in another set. For example, the reciprocal function 1/x is not defined for x=0. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1 n1) |
| 10074 | A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A 'total function' is one which maps every element of a domain to exactly one corresponding value in another set. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1) |
| 10612 | An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: If a function f maps the argument a back to a itself, so that f(a) = a, then a is said to be a 'fixed point' for f. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 20.5) |
| 10076 | The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set that are values of the function for elements in the original set. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: In other words, the range is the set of values that were created by the function. |
| 10605 | Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: We count two functions as being the same if they have the same extension, i.e. if they pair up arguments with values in the same way. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 11.3) | |
| A reaction: So there's only one way to skin a cat in mathematical logic. |
| 10615 | The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The so-called Comprehension Schema ∃X∀x(Xx ↔ φ(x)) says that there is a property which is had by just those things which satisfy the condition φ. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 22.3) |
| 10595 | A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: 'Theorem': given a derivation of the sentence φ from the axioms of the theory T using the background logical proof system, we will say that φ is a 'theorem' of the theory. Standard abbreviation is T |- φ. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) |
| 10602 | A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A 'natural deduction system' will have no logical axioms but may rules of inference. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 09.1) | |
| A reaction: He contrasts this with 'Hilbert-style systems', which have many axioms but few rules. Natural deduction uses many assumptions which are then discharged, and so tree-systems are good for representing it. |
| 10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: No nice theory can define truth for its own language. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 21.5) | |
| A reaction: This leads on to Tarski's account of truth. |
| 10078 | An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: An 'injective' function is 'one-to-one' - each element of the output set results from a different element of the original set. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, two different original elements cannot lead to the same output element. |
| 10077 | A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A 'surjective' function is 'onto' - the whole of the output set results from the function being applied to elements of the original set. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1) |
| 10079 | A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A 'bijective' function has 'one-to-one correspondence' - it is both surjective and injective, so that every element in each of the original and the output sets has a matching element in the other. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'injective' is also one-to-one, but only in the one direction. |
| 10070 | If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: If everything that a theory proves must be true, then it is a 'sound' theory. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 01.1) |
| 10086 | Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Soundness is normally a matter of having true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) | |
| A reaction: The only exception I can think of is if a theory consisted of nothing but the axioms. |
| 10596 | A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem of it is true (i.e. true on the interpretation built into its language). Soundness is normally a matter of having true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) |
| 10598 | A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A theory is 'negation complete' if it decides every sentence of its language (either the sentence, or its negation). | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) |
| 10597 | 'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: There is an annoying double-use of 'complete': a logic may be semantically complete, but there may be an incomplete theory expressed in it. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) |
| 10069 | A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Logicians say that a theory T is '(negation) complete' if, for every sentence φ in the language of the theory, either φ or ¬φ is deducible in T's proof system. If this were the case, then truth could be equated with provability. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: The word 'negation' seems to be a recent addition to the concept. Presumable it might be the case that φ can always be proved, but not ¬φ. |
| 10609 | Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: There are two routes to Incompleteness results. One goes via the semantic assumption that we are dealing with sound theories, using a result about what they can express. The other uses the syntactic notion of consistency, with stronger notions of proof. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 18.1) |
| 10080 | 'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: An 'effectively decidable' (or 'computable') algorithm will be step-by-small-step, with no need for intuition, or for independent sources, with no random methods, possible for a dumb computer, and terminates in finite steps. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.2) | |
| A reaction: [a compressed paragraph] |
| 10087 | A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A theory is 'decidable' iff there is a mechanical procedure for determining whether any sentence of its language can be proved. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.4) | |
| A reaction: Note that it doesn't actually have to be proved. The theorems of the theory are all effectively decidable. |
| 10088 | Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 03.6) |
| 10081 | A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A set is 'enumerable' iff either the set is empty, or there is a surjective function to the set from the set of natural numbers, so that the set is in the range of that function. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.3) |
| 10083 | A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A set is 'effectively enumerable' if an (idealised) computer could be programmed to generate a list of its members such that any member will eventually be mentioned (even if the list is empty, or without end, or contains repetitions). | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.4) |
| 10084 | A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (for example, the prime numbers). | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.4) |
| 10085 | The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers (i,j) is effectively enumerable, as proven by listing them in an array (across: <0,0>, <0,1>, <0,2> ..., and down: <0,0>, <1,0>, <2,0>...), and then zig-zagging. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 02.5) |
| 10601 | The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The theorems of any properly axiomatized theory can be effectively enumerated. However, the truths of any sufficiently expressive arithmetic can't be effectively enumerated. Hence the theorems and truths of arithmetic cannot be the same. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 05 Intro) |
| 10600 | Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Whether a property is 'expressible' in a given theory depends on the richness of the theory's language. Whether the property can be 'captured' (or 'represented') by the theory depends on the richness of the axioms and proof system. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 04.7) |
| 10599 | For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: For prime numbers we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))). That is, the only way to multiply two numbers and a get a prime is if one of them is 1. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 04.5) |
| 10610 | The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: It has been proved (by Tarski) that the real numbers R is a complete theory. But this means that while the real numbers contain the natural numbers, the pure theory of real numbers doesn't contain the theory of natural numbers. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 18.2) |
| 10619 | The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The truths of arithmetic are just the true equations involving particular numbers, and universally quantified versions of such equations. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 27.7) | |
| A reaction: Must each equation be universally quantified? Why can't we just universally quantify over the whole system? |
| 10618 | All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 23.5) | |
| A reaction: The successor relation only ties a number to the previous one, not to the whole series. Ancestrals are a higher level of abstraction. |
| 10608 | The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the number of Gs if there is an object which is an F, and the remaining things that are F but not identical to the object are equinumerous with the Gs. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 14.1) |
| 10849 | Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Baby Arithmetic 'knows' the addition of particular numbers and multiplication, but can't express general facts about numbers, because it lacks quantification. It has a constant '0', a function 'S', and functions '+' and 'x', and identity and negation. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 08.1) |
| 10850 | Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Baby Arithmetic is negation complete, so it can prove every claim (or its negation) that it can express, but it is expressively extremely impoverished. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 08.3) |
| 10852 | Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 08.4) |
| 10851 | Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: We can beef up Baby Arithmetic into Robinson Arithmetic (referred to as 'Q'), by restoring quantifiers and variables. It has seven generalised axioms, plus standard first-order logic. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 08.3) |
| 10068 | Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The sequence of natural numbers starts from zero, and each number has just one immediate successor; the sequence continues without end, never circling back on itself, and there are no 'stray' numbers, lurking outside the sequence. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: These are the characteristics of the natural numbers which have to be pinned down by any axiom system, such as Peano's, or any more modern axiomatic structures. We are in the territory of Gödel's theorems. |
| 10603 | The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: If the logic of arithmetic doesn't have second-order quantifiers to range over properties of numbers, how can it handle induction? | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 10.1) |
| 10848 | Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Multiplication in itself isn't is intractable. In 1929 Skolem showed a complete theory for a first-order language with multiplication but lacking addition (or successor). Multiplication together with addition and successor produces incompleteness. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 10.7 n8) |
| 10604 | Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Putting multiplication together with addition and successor in the language of arithmetic produces incompleteness. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 10.7) | |
| A reaction: His 'Baby Arithmetic' has all three and is complete, but lacks quantification (p.51) |
| 6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0666) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as simple, straightforward common sense, and right. I cannot make sense of the claim that reality really is just the way it appears. We do not have a built-in neutrino detector, for example. |
| 10617 | The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The 'ancestral' of a relation is that relation which holds when there is an indefinitely long chain of things having the initial relation. | |
| From: Peter Smith (Intro to Gödel's Theorems [2007], 23.5) | |
| A reaction: The standard example is spotting the relation 'ancestor' from the receding relation 'parent'. This is a sort of abstraction derived from a relation which is not equivalent (parenthood being transitive but not reflexive). The idea originated with Frege. |
| 6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Pyrrhonians say that truth and falsehood exist; within us we have means of looking for them, but not of making any lasting judgements: we have no touchstone. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0564) | |
| A reaction: This states the key difference between sceptics and relativists. The latter are more extreme as they say there is no such thing as truth. The former concede truth, and their scepticism is about the abilities of human beings. I am an anti-relativist. |
| 6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: The seat of the powers of the soul is in the brain, as is clearly shown by the fact that wounds and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0614) | |
| A reaction: At last someone has finally got the facts clear. It seems surprising that the Greeks never clearly grasped this piece of irrefutable evidence - even those Greeks who speculated that the brain was the key. Here we have a fixed fact of philosophy of mind. |
| 7496 | Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Since actions and performances are not wholly in our power and since nothing is really in our power but our will - it is on the will that all the rules and duties of Man are based and established. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (I.7 Our deeds are judged by intention [1580], p.0028) | |
| A reaction: This is almost Kant's claim that the only truly good thing is a good will (e.g. Idea 3711). Aristotle disagrees, because a virtuous person should also have good desires. We may will to have good desires, but virtue requires actually having them. |
| 7495 | Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: If our fears did not lend it weight, dying would be one of our lighter duties. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.12 On physiognomy [1580], p.1191) | |
| A reaction: An Epicurean thought. 'Duties' is nice - presumably death qualifies as a duty, because Nature requires it of us (we each of us 'owe nature a death'). The remark appears to me to be true. |
| 22269 | We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: I am training and sharpening my appetite for those pleasures that are left. ...We must cling tooth and claw to the use of the pleasures of this life which the advancing years, one after another, rip from our grasp. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (I.39 On Solitude [1580], p.276) | |
| A reaction: That may be one of the most inspiring ideas I have read about pleasure. |
| 20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation. |
| 20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142) | |
| A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential. |
| 20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Forcing people to do what is rational involves a lack of respect, a failure to respect the value of her living her life in her own (irrational) way. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Resisting' 6) | |
| A reaction: Up to a point. Irrationally eccentric is one thing, and irrationally self-destructive is another. You can sit back and watch your children embrace a life less happy than the one you wanted for them - but not a life of utter misery. |
| 20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Nationalist movements seeking to throw off the yoke of colonial rule are often motivated by a sense that their 'people' have the right to self-determination. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Intrinsic 1') | |
| A reaction: In 2017, Basques, Catalans and Kurds come to mind. The whole of Africa was an example of this c.1950-80, but there was uncertainty about states, tribes and language groups. |
| 20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Wouldn't it be more rational to choose principles that would maximize the average position, perhaps subject to some 'floor' level beneath which they would not want to take the risk of sinking? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: The criticism is that Rawls's prediction is over-cautious, and that people will take mild risks in what they choose, as long as there is no danger of disaster. (Just as you should allow small children to risk injury, but not death). |
| 20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
| Full Idea: A common objection to Rawls is that hypothetical contracts, unlike real ones, have no binding force. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: [I think Dworkin made this point] 'Contract' may be metaphorical. Perhaps it is just an 'initial agreement' or a 'working arrangement', |
| 20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Cosmopolitans who claim that the same distributive principles should apply to all human beings seem to be denying that different states may make different judgements about how they want to allocate resources among their members. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Social') | |
| A reaction: If you want to be a citizen of the world, you have to face up to the pluralistic character of cultures. Do you thereby want to be a citizen of both California and Saudi Arabia? Or are you actually just becoming a citizen of nowhere? |
| 20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
| Full Idea: During WW2 Winston Churchill famously said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
| A reaction: [Actually a speech in 1947, which began 'it has been said that....'] Aristotle thought an intelligent and benevolent dictatorship was the best form, but held little hope of achieving it. Getting rid of bad rulers is the big virtue. |
| 20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If there were moral knowledge about political matters, democracy would be a very strange way of reaching it. Democratic law-making means treating each person's view as equally good, which only makes sense if there is nothing to be right or wrong about. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Subjectivism') | |
| A reaction: Ah, I suddenly grasp that the modern fad for a rather gormless blanket relativism is rooted in the modern desire to take democracy really seriously. Important to remember Condorcet's point here. |
| 20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If your main reason for being a democrat is that democratic procedures respect citizens equally, then you may want a different kind of democracy from those who favour it because they think it tends to produce better citizens? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
| A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20563] |
| 20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If you value democracy because it yields political stability, then you will probably worry about different aspects of the procedure from those who care about its producing good decisions. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
| A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20562] Surely the primary aim must be good decisions? The other three options are the result of pessimism about any method achieving that. Instability, inequality and dud citizens are bars to good decisions. |
| 20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
| Full Idea: We are averse to teledemocracy because it misses out some important parts of a good decision-making procedure, such as debate and deliberation. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
| A reaction: Perhaps you should be sent a short info pack, and only allowed to vote when you have passed a factual multiple choice test about the topic. Or one pack from each political party. Maybe compulsory online discussion as well. |
| 20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: For those wanting to regard the state itself as a community, multiculturalism can be a problem. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
| A reaction: A very important idea. A certain type of aggressive patriot passionately wants the whole country to be a close-bound community, and becomes deeply frustrated by the impossibility of this in a complex and fluid modern world. |
| 20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The two core liberal mistakes (according to communitarians) are that people choose their values, and that they do so in some way detached from their communities. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Correcting') | |
| A reaction: I think I might be a communitarian liberal, meaning that extreme individualism is both incorrect and pernicious, but that communities should only exist to promote the varied lives of individuals within them. |
| 20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing like a war to build a sense of common purpose, of being in the same boat, and to generate the kind of interaction between people that breaks down divisive social boundaries. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014]) | |
| A reaction: A nice warning to those who over-do or simplify communitarianism. Alternatively, the greatest sign of health in a community is that citizens have almost no interest in one another? |
| 20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Community is about membership and inclusion. But that means it is also about non-membership and exclusion. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Conc') | |
| A reaction: I'm a fan of communitarianism (focused on Aristotle's life of individual virtue for each citizen), but I'm beginning to see that it has a poisonous cousin travelling under the same name. The cousin's rallying cries focus on aliens and enemies. |
| 20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community - from practices that stifle the individual's freedom to choose for herself how she lives her life. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
| A reaction: The phrase 'too much community' is an excellent warning to communitarians. I'm happy to be enmeshed in a community, as long as it is composed of highly liberal and easy-going individuals. Avoid too much bad community. |
| 20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Treating people as means seems like a fairly accurate description of what is involved when the state coercively redistributes resources from some to others. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: The objection comes from Nozick, and alludes to Kant's desire to treat everyone as an end in themselves. Personally I don't mind at all being treated as a means, when my wife asks me to make her a cup of tea. Or paying my taxes to help the community. |
| 20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The problem for feminists is that men have had the power to structure all our social institutions - family, economy, polity - in ways that suit them. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Gender') | |
| A reaction: An interesting question is whether masculine domination runs even deeper than that, into our value system, our metaphysics, our science, our epistemology, our language. How do you tell? If women take over half the masculine roles, does that solve it? |
| 20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
| A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up. |
| 20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Maybe freedom is a triadic relation, involving an agent, freedom from a contraint, and in order to act towards some goal. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Two') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Gerald MacCallum for this thought] The point is that this makes freedom both negative and positive, contrary to Isaiah Berlin's claim. But on the first day of the school holidays you are 'free', with nothing in particular in mind. |
| 20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The minimal conception of equality of opportunity is that race or gender or religion should not affect chances of a good job or education. The conventional conception needs equality in acquiring competences. Radical views ignore inborn disadvantages. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: [my summary of Swift] The strong version only says the less talented should have access to large rewards. The whole idea has strong capitalist assumptions. |
| 20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Without inequalities, people will have no incentive to do one job rather than another - to do the kind of work which is most useful. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: The reality is that the lowest pay goes to the jobs that no one wants to do, and all the really nice jobs are usually well paid. Which is a conspiracy, because all the salaries are set by the people with the nice jobs. |
| 20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Someone who rejects equality can care passionately that resources should be transferred from the rich to the poor. They are just rejecting a particular reason that might be offered to justify the redistribution. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: For example, it might be for utilitarian reasons, which usually only seek maximised happiness, not equal happiness. And one may love many forms of equality, without economic equality being one of them. |
| 20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Ownership is a complicated idea. I have a right to the office photocopier, but I can's sell the right to others. If people have absolute rights over what they produce, why can't parents sell their children into slavery? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: If I make a car from stolen parts, does constructing it make it mine? Etc. Do birds own their nests? Swift goes on to ask if we 'own' our bodies. |
| 20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Libertarians say that they care about freedom, and argue for private property rights on freedom grounds. But they don't sem to care about, or even notice, the unfreedom implied by the existence of private property rights. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Freedom') | |
| A reaction: When I pass some vast country estate totally surrounded by a high wall, I certainly don't think how wonderful it is that someone has the right to own this property as private land. On the contrary.... |
| 20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The three influential conceptions of justice are as fairness (Rawls), as entitlement (Nozick), and as desert. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Concept') |
| 20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139) | |
| A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat. |