19 ideas
| 5953 | For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really. |
| 19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: One robust feature of our intuitions about whether we know things is that they tend to vacillate. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as important. If we were tacit invariantists (Idea 19557) we should be able to ask ourselves whether we 'really and truly' know various things, but we can't decide. I know lots about Nietzsche in a pub, and very little in a university. |
| 19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: Maybe contextualists are too quick to appeal to our conflicting intuitions regarding knowledge. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
| A reaction: An important point (from Earl Conee). I thoroughly approve of contextualism, but the whole status of whether a witness or a teacher knows what they are talking about is in danger of collapsing into relativism. This is what peer review is all about. |
| 19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: On my own view, the context sensivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
| A reaction: That sounds right, and it reinforces the idea that 'justification' is a more important epistemological concept than 'knowledge'. 'Am I justified in believing p?' Answer: 'it depends how well you have researched it'. |
| 19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: Contextualism is a 'good news, bad news' theory. The good news is that we have lots of knowledge and many surfaces are 'flat'; the bad news is that knowledge and flatness are not all they were cracked up to be. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 3) | |
| A reaction: That is exactly my position. I lost all interest in whether someone precisely 'knows' or 'does not know' something a long time ago (even in scientific or forensic contexts). In the case of flatness the case is even more obvious. |
| 12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: Contextualism explains the appeal of sceptical arguments by allowing that the claims of the sceptic are true, relative to the very strict context in which they are made. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.57) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me a right. I've always thought that global scepticism must be conceded if we are being very strict indeed about justification, but also that it is ridiculous to be that strict. So the epistemological question is 'How strict should we be?' |
| 12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68) | |
| A reaction: I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification. |
| 12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: The problem for invariantism is that competent speakers, under sceptical pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories etc. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.58) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Idea 12892. This seems to me a strong response to the rather weak invariantist case (that there is 'really and truly' only one invariant standard for knowledge). Full strength scepticism about everything demolishes all knowledge. |
| 19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
| Full Idea: Contextualism concedes that there is some truth to skepticism, but contains the damage by holding that skeptical claims are true only relative to atypically strict contexts. | |
| From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
| A reaction: My attitude to scepticism is that everything we ever affirm should have a footnote saying '...but you never know...', and it should then be ignored. In the strictest context everything is doubted simultaneously (including language), and that is paralysis. |
| 3023 | Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
| 3026 | Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 | |
| A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'. |
| 3024 | Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 | |
| A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'. |
| 3025 | For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 |
| 3019 | No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
| 3021 | The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
| 3027 | Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13 |
| 4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Dowe argues that a 'causal process' is a world line of an object with a conserved quantity (such as mass, energy, momentum, charge), and a 'causal interaction' is an exchange between two such objects. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
| A reaction: This looks very promising. Nice distinction between causal process and causal interaction. 'Conserved quantities' is better physics than just 'energy'. We can hand causation over to the scientist? |
| 14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: For Dowe physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 10.2 | |
| A reaction: [see Psillos 2002 on this] This is evidently a modification of the idea of physical causation as energy-transfer, but narrowing it down to exclude trivial cases. I guess. Need better physics. |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory because it avoids any mention of counterfactuals. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
| A reaction: Clearly the truth of a counterfactual is quite a problem for an empiricist/scientist, but one needs to distinguish between reality and our grasp of it. We commit ourselves to counterfactuals, even if causation is transfer of conserved quantities. |