Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Phil Dowe, Henri Poincar and Roger Bacon

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


10 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Poincaré rejected the actual infinite. He viewed mathematics that is apparently concerned with the actual infinite as actually concerning the finite linguistic definitions the putatively describe actually infinite objects.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning [1894]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects; it is a matter of indifference if the objects are replaced by others, provided the relations do not change. They are interested in form alone, not matter.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Hypothesis [1902], p.20), quoted by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths §6
     A reaction: This connects modern structuralism with Aritotle's interest in the 'form' of things. Contrary to the views of the likes of Frege, it is hard to see that the number '7' has any properties at all, apart from its relations. A daffodil would do just as well.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam]
     Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality
     A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: Never consider any objects but those capable of being defined in a finite number of word ...Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions.
     From: Henri Poincaré (The Logic of Infinity [1909], p.63), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: For Dowe physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 10.2
     A reaction: [see Psillos 2002 on this] This is evidently a modification of the idea of physical causation as energy-transfer, but narrowing it down to exclude trivial cases. I guess. Need better physics.
Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Dowe argues that a 'causal process' is a world line of an object with a conserved quantity (such as mass, energy, momentum, charge), and a 'causal interaction' is an exchange between two such objects.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4
     A reaction: This looks very promising. Nice distinction between causal process and causal interaction. 'Conserved quantities' is better physics than just 'energy'. We can hand causation over to the scientist?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
No one even knows the nature and properties of a fly - why it has that colour, or so many feet [Bacon,R]
     Full Idea: No one is so wise regarding the natural world as to know with certainty all the truths that concern the nature and properties of a single fly, or to know the proper causes of its color and why it has so many feet, neither more nor less.
     From: Roger Bacon (Opus Maius (major works) [1254], I.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
     A reaction: Pasnau quotes this in the context of 'occult' qualities. It is scientific essentialism, because Bacon clearly takes it that the explanation of these things would be found within the essence of the fly, if we could only get at it.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory because it avoids any mention of counterfactuals.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4
     A reaction: Clearly the truth of a counterfactual is quite a problem for an empiricist/scientist, but one needs to distinguish between reality and our grasp of it. We commit ourselves to counterfactuals, even if causation is transfer of conserved quantities.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
     Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
     A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.