13 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, or at least one large part of it, is subsequent to science; it begins where science leaves off. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxi) | |
A reaction: In some sense this has to be true. Without metaphysics there couldn't be any science. Rationalists should not forget, though, the huge impact which Darwin's science has (or should have) on fairly abstract philosophy (e.g. epistemology). |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
Full Idea: The traditional conception of philosophy is that it is an a priori enquiry into the most general facts about reality. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xi) | |
A reaction: I think this still defines philosophy, though it also highlights the weakness of the subject, which is over-confidence about asserting necessary truths. How could the most god-like areas of human thought be about anything else? |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
Full Idea: Three objections to realism in philosophy of mathematics: mathematical objects have no space/time location, and so no causal role; that such objects are determinate, but reference to numbers aren't; and that there is no abstract/concrete distinction. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxix) |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
Full Idea: Linguistic meaning is not rich enough to show either that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless or that all alleged synthetic a priori propositions are just analytic a priori propositions. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xx) |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
Full Idea: The Leibniz-Kant criticism of empiricism is that experience cannot teach us why mathematical and logical facts couldn't be otherwise than they are. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxxi) |
7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property. | |
From: report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii | |
A reaction: It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking. |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
Full Idea: In linguistics there are two schools of thought: Bloomfieldian structuralism (favoured by Quine) conceives of sentences acoustically and meanings behaviouristically; and Chomskian generative grammar (which is silent about semantics). | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxiv) | |
A reaction: They both appear to be wrong, so there is (or was) something rotten in the state of linguistics. Are the only options for meaning either behaviourist or eliminativist? |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
Full Idea: There is virtually universal acceptance of Frege's definition of sense as the determiner of reference. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: Not any more, since Kripke and Putnam. It is one thing to say sense determines reference, and quite another to say that this is the definition of sense. |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
Full Idea: Pace Frege, sense determines sense properties and relations, like meaningfulness and synonymy, rather than determining referential properties, like denotation and truth. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: This leaves room for Fregean 'sense', after Kripke has demolished the idea that sense determines reference. |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
Full Idea: Sentences are types, not utterance tokens or mental/neural tokens, and hence sentences are abstract objects (like musical scores). | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: If sentences are abstract types, then two verbally indistinguishable sentences are the same sentence. But if I say 'I am happy', that isn't the same as you saying it. |
14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: For Dowe physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities. | |
From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 10.2 | |
A reaction: [see Psillos 2002 on this] This is evidently a modification of the idea of physical causation as energy-transfer, but narrowing it down to exclude trivial cases. I guess. Need better physics. |
4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Dowe argues that a 'causal process' is a world line of an object with a conserved quantity (such as mass, energy, momentum, charge), and a 'causal interaction' is an exchange between two such objects. | |
From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
A reaction: This looks very promising. Nice distinction between causal process and causal interaction. 'Conserved quantities' is better physics than just 'energy'. We can hand causation over to the scientist? |
4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory because it avoids any mention of counterfactuals. | |
From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
A reaction: Clearly the truth of a counterfactual is quite a problem for an empiricist/scientist, but one needs to distinguish between reality and our grasp of it. We commit ourselves to counterfactuals, even if causation is transfer of conserved quantities. |