9 ideas
| 10196 | The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black] |
| Full Idea: Some mathematicians seem to think that talk of an Axiom of Choice allows them to choose a single member of a collection when there is no criterion of choice. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.68) |
| 10194 | Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black] |
| Full Idea: The only way we can discover that two things exist is by finding out that one has a quality not possessed by the other, or else that one has a relational characteristic that the other hasn't. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
| A reaction: At least this doesn't conflate relations with properties. Note that this idea is clearly epistemological, and in no way rules out the separateness of two objects which none of us can ever discern. Maybe the Earth has two Suns, which imperceptibly swap. |
| 10193 | The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black] |
| Full Idea: Saying that 'a has the property of being identical with a' is a roundabout way of saying nothing - a useless tautology - and means not more than 'a is a' | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.66) | |
| A reaction: This matter resembles the problem of the number zero, and the empty set, which seem to be crucial entities for logicians, but of no interest to a common sense view of the world. So much the worse for logic, I am inclined to say. |
| 10195 | If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black] |
| Full Idea: Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? ...So two things would have all their properties in common, and this would refute the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
| A reaction: [Black is the originator of this famous example] It also appears to be naturally possible. An observer at an instant of viewing will discern a relational difference relative to themselves. Most people take Black's objection to be decisive. |
| 23226 | There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb] |
| Full Idea: Researchers have recently described a single inhibitory neuron in a region called the visual thalamus of the mouse - it has 862 input synapses and 626 output synapses. | |
| From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], 11) | |
| A reaction: This is the kind of fact which philosophers of mind must be aware of when offering accounts of thought which are in danger of being simplistic. |
| 23216 | The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb] |
| Full Idea: A number of scientists are now realising that, by viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds ot inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of the body intervening in the world. | |
| From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I like any idea which reminds us that nature is intrinsically active, and not merely passive. Laws are in nature, not imposed on it. My preferred ontology, based on powers as fundamental, applies to the brain, as well as to physics. No free will needed. |
| 14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: For Dowe physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 10.2 | |
| A reaction: [see Psillos 2002 on this] This is evidently a modification of the idea of physical causation as energy-transfer, but narrowing it down to exclude trivial cases. I guess. Need better physics. |
| 4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Dowe argues that a 'causal process' is a world line of an object with a conserved quantity (such as mass, energy, momentum, charge), and a 'causal interaction' is an exchange between two such objects. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
| A reaction: This looks very promising. Nice distinction between causal process and causal interaction. 'Conserved quantities' is better physics than just 'energy'. We can hand causation over to the scientist? |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory because it avoids any mention of counterfactuals. | |
| From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4 | |
| A reaction: Clearly the truth of a counterfactual is quite a problem for an empiricist/scientist, but one needs to distinguish between reality and our grasp of it. We commit ourselves to counterfactuals, even if causation is transfer of conserved quantities. |