Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Phil Dowe, Paul M. Pietroski and Richard Sorabji

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6 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
     A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.
Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
     A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]
     Full Idea: For Paul Pietroski no expression in natural language is semantically referential. ....Reference to objects occurs not at the level of semantics, but at the level of thought or utterance.
     From: report of Paul M. Pietroski (Events and Semantic Architecture [2004]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.2
     A reaction: Love this. It has always struck me that reference is what speakers do. Try taking any supposedly referential description and sticking 'so-called' in front of it. That seems to leave you with the reference even though you have denied the description.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Dowe argues that a 'causal process' is a world line of an object with a conserved quantity (such as mass, energy, momentum, charge), and a 'causal interaction' is an exchange between two such objects.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4
     A reaction: This looks very promising. Nice distinction between causal process and causal interaction. 'Conserved quantities' is better physics than just 'energy'. We can hand causation over to the scientist?
Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: For Dowe physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 10.2
     A reaction: [see Psillos 2002 on this] This is evidently a modification of the idea of physical causation as energy-transfer, but narrowing it down to exclude trivial cases. I guess. Need better physics.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory because it avoids any mention of counterfactuals.
     From: report of Phil Dowe (Physical Causation [2000]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.4
     A reaction: Clearly the truth of a counterfactual is quite a problem for an empiricist/scientist, but one needs to distinguish between reality and our grasp of it. We commit ourselves to counterfactuals, even if causation is transfer of conserved quantities.