30 ideas
| 9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Life will be lived all the better if it has no meaning. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: One image of the good life is that of a successful wild animal, for which existence is not a problem, merely a constant activity and pursuit. Maybe life begins to acquire meaning once we realise that meaning should not be sought directly. |
| 6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
| Full Idea: There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judgine whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.11) | |
| A reaction: What a wonderful thesis for a book. In Idea 2682 there is the possibility of life being worth living, but not worth a huge amount of effort. It is better to call Camus' question the first question, rather than the only question. |
| 9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
| Full Idea: To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
| A reaction: But there is, surely, intuition and instinct? Read Keats's Letters. There is good living through upbringing and habit. Read Aristotle. If you like Camus' thought, you will love Chuang Tzu. Personally I am a child of the Enlightenment. |
| 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Sentential logic has been proved consistent and complete; its consistency means that no contradictions can be derived, and its completeness assures us that every one of the logical truths can be proved. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: The situation for quantificational logic is not quite so clear (Orenstein p.98). I do not presume that being consistent and complete makes it necessarily better as a tool in the real world. |
| 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: In axiomatizing, we are merely sorting out among the truths of a science those which will play a special role, namely, serve as axioms from which we derive the others. The sentences are already true in a non-conventional or ordinary sense. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: If you were starting from scratch, as Euclidean geometers may have felt they were doing, you might want to decide which are the simplest truths. Axiomatizing an established system is a more advanced activity. |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The five systems of propositional modal logic contain successively stronger conceptions of necessity. In S4 'it is poss that it is poss that p' implies 'it is poss that p'. In S5, 'it is poss that it is nec that p' implies 'it is nec that p'. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: C.I. Lewis originated this stuff. Any serious student of modality is probably going to have to pick a system. E.g. Nathan Salmon says that the correct modal logic is even weaker than S4. |
| 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The incompleteness of set theory contrasts sharply with the completeness of elementary logic. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Quine's reason for abandoning the Frege-Russell logicist programme (quite apart from the problems raised by Gödel. |
| 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The theory of mereology has had a history of being exploited by nominalists to achieve some of the effects of set theory. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Some writers refer to mereology as a 'theory', and others as an area of study. This appears to be an interesting line of investigation. Orenstein says Quine and Goodman showed its limitations. |
| 9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
| Full Idea: It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end. The only problem that interests me is: is there a logic to the point of death? | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely hand grenade to lob into an analytical logic class! It is very hard to get logicians to actually ascribe a clear value to their activity. They tend to present it as a marginal private game, and yet it has high status. |
| 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: In traditional logic from Aristotle to Kant, universal sentences have existential import, but Brentano and Boole construed them as universal conditionals (such as 'for anything, if it is a man, then it is mortal'). | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I am sympathetic to the idea that even the 'existential' quantifier should be treated as conditional, or fictional. Modern Christians may well routinely quantify over angels, without actually being committed to them. |
| 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The substitution view of quantification explains 'there-is-an-x-such-that x is a man' as true when it has a true substitution instance, as in the case of 'Socrates is a man', so the quantifier can be read as 'it is sometimes true that'. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: The word 'true' crops up twice here. The alternative (existential-referential) view cites objects, so the substitution view is a more linguistic approach. |
| 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The 'natural' numbers are the whole numbers 1, 2, 3 and so on. The 'rational' numbers consist of the natural numbers plus the fractions. The 'real' numbers include the others, plus numbers such a pi and root-2, which cannot be expressed as fractions. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The 'irrational' numbers involved entities such as root-minus-1. Philosophical discussions in ontology tend to focus on the existence of the real numbers. |
| 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The question to be posed is whether is-a-member-of should be considered a logical constant, that is, does logic include set theory. Frege, Russell and Whitehead held that it did. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously the key element in the logicist programme. The objection seems to be that while first-order logic is consistent and complete, set theory is not at all like that, and so is part of a different world. |
| 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Modest ontologies are Nominalism (Goodman), admitting only concrete individuals; and Extensionalism (Quine/Davidson) which admits individuals and sets; but Intensionalists (Frege/Carnap/Church/Marcus/Kripke) may have propositions, properties, concepts. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I don't like sets, because of Idea 7035. Even the ontology of individuals could collapse dramatically (see the ideas of Merricks, e.g. 6124). The intensional items may be real enough, but needn't have a place at the ontological high table. |
| 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The principle of conservatism in choosing between theories is a maxim of minimal mutilation, stating that of competing theories, all other things being equal, choose the one that violates the fewest background beliefs held. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: In this sense, all rational people should be conservatives. The idea is a modern variant of Hume's objection to miracles (Idea 2227). A Kuhnian 'paradigm shift' is the dramatic moment when this principle no longer seems appropriate. |
| 6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
| Full Idea: There is no necessary inference, from the fact that men familiar to us die when pierced through the heart, that all men do. | |
| From: Philodemus (On Signs (damaged) [c.50 BCE], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is scepticism about the logic of induction, long before David Hume. This is said to be a Stoic argument against Epicureans - though on the whole Stoics are not keen on scepticism. |
| 9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions. |
| 9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Appendix') | |
| A reaction: Nice. It might just as much be fate that you live a happy bourgeois life, as that you inadvertently murder your own father at a crossroads. But you can't avoid the powerful awareness of fate when a road accident occurs. |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: A good part of the confidence people have that there are meanings rests on the confusion of meaning and reference. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: An important point. Everyone assumes that sentences link to the world, but Frege shows that that is not part of meaning. Words like prepositions and conjunctions ('to', 'and') don't have 'a meaning' apart from their function and use. |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: 'Socrates is human' is true if 1) subject referent is identical with a predicate referent (Nominalism), 2) subject reference member of the predicate set, or the subject has that property (Platonism), 3) predicate set a member of the subject set (Montague) | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Orenstein offers these as alternatives to Quine's 'inscrutability of reference' thesis, which makes the sense unanalysable. |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: If we can say 'there exists a p such that John believes p and Barbara believes p', logical forms such as this are cited as evidence for our ontological commitment to propositions. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Opponents of propositions (such as Quine) will, of course, attempt to revise the logical form to eliminate the quantification over propositions. See Orenstein's outline on p.171. |
| 9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
| Full Idea: There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
| A reaction: I don't agree. If someone 'behaves badly with great morality' there is something wrong with their morality, and I want to know what it is. The last part is more plausible, and could be a motto for Particularism. Rules dangerously over-simplify life. |
| 9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Don Juan') | |
| A reaction: A penetrating remark, to be placed as a contrary to the remarks of Harry Frankfurt on love. But if the absurd increases the intensity of life, as Camus thinks, then they both make love the great life-affirmation, but in different ways. |
| 9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
| Full Idea: One can be virtuous through a whim. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
| A reaction: A nice remark. Obviously neither Aristotle nor Kant would be too impressed by someone who did this, and Aristotle would certainly say that it is not really virtue, but merely right behaviour. I agree with Aristotle. |
| 22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
| Full Idea: Don't fear god, Don't worry about death; What is good is easy to get, What is terrible is easy to cure. | |
| From: Philodemus (Herculaneum Papyrus [c.50 BCE], 1005,4.9-14) | |
| A reaction: This is known as the Four-Part Cure, and is an epicurean prayer, probably formulated by Epicurus. |
| 9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
| Full Idea: What a man believes to be true must determine his action. Belief in the absurdity of existence must then dictate his conduct. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: It is intriguing to speculate what the appropriate conduct is. Presumably it is wild existential gestures, like sticking a knife through your hand. Suicide will be an obvious temptation. But bourgeois life might be equally appropriate. |
| 6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth; they are inseparable; it would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery; it happens as well that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.110) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand this, but I understand the experience of absurdity, and I can see that somehow one feels a bit more alive when one acknowledges the absurdity of it all. Meta-meta-thought is the highest form of human life, I say. |
| 9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The essential problems are those that run the risk of leading to death, or those that intensify the passion of living. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: This seems to be distinctively existentialist, in a way that a cool concern for great truths are not ranked as so important. Ranking dangerous problems as crucial seems somehow trivial for a philosopher. Intensity of life is more impressive. |
| 9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The leap of faith does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on the dizzying crest - that is integrity. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
| A reaction: I have always found that a thrilling thought. It perfectly distinguishes atheist existentialism from religious existentialism. It is Camus' best image for how the Absurd can be a life affirming idea, rather than a sort of nihilism. Life gains intensity. |
| 9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
| Full Idea: It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: Camus' whole book addresses the question of suicide. He suggests that life can be redeemed and become livable if you squarely face up to the absurdity of it, and the gap between what we hope for and what we get. |