Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philodemus, Charlotte Witt and Ori Simchen

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formula and its converse gives expression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical quantification.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formulas are a threat to 'actualism' in modal metaphysics, which seems regrettable since the Formulas are validated by standard modal logics, but clash with the plausible and attractive actualist view (that there are no merely possible things).
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
     A reaction: He notes that the Barcan Formulas 'appear to require quantification over possibilia'. So are you prepared to accept the 'possible elephant in your kitchen'? Conceptually yes, but actually no, I would have thought. So possibilia are conceptual.
BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
     Full Idea: In accordance with the Barcan Formula we assume that if it is possible that Wittgenstein should have had a child, then something or other is possibly Wittgentein's child.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §5)
     A reaction: Put like this it sounds unpersuasive. What is the something or other? Someone else's child? A dustbin? A bare particular? Wittgenstein's child? If it was the last one, how could it be Wittgenstein's child while only possibly being that thing?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
     Full Idea: The differences between Aristotelian essentialism and Kripke's essentialism are so fundamental and pervasive that it is a serious distortion of both views to think of essentialism as a single theory.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be very important, because there is a glib assumption that when essentialism is needed for modal logic, that we must immediately have embraced what Aristotle was saying. Aristotle was better than Kripke.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
     Full Idea: An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro)
     A reaction: This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
     Full Idea: By holding that the most unified beings have essences in an unqualified sense, while allowing that other beings have them in a qualified sense - we can think of unity as a matter of degree.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.3)
     A reaction: This is Witt's somewhat unorthodox view of how we should read Aristotle. I am sympathetic, if essences are really explanatory. That means they are unstable, and would indeed be likely to come in degrees.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
     Full Idea: The central function of essence is to explain the actual existence of a unified substance.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 5 n1)
     A reaction: She is offering an interpretation of Aristotle. Since existence is an active and not a passive matter, the identity of the entity will include its dispositions etc., I presume.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
     Full Idea: The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 6.2)
     A reaction: Nevertheless, Aristotle believes in individual essences, though these seem to be fixed by definitions, which are composed of combinations of universals. The uniqueness is of the whole definition, not of its parts.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
     Full Idea: Serious Actualism is the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it of any kind, including its very non-existence
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1 n4)
     A reaction: He suggests that the Converse Barcan Formula implies this view. It sounds comparable to the view of Presentism about time, that no future or past truthmakers exist right now. If a new square table were to exist, it would have four corners.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
     Full Idea: There is no necessary inference, from the fact that men familiar to us die when pierced through the heart, that all men do.
     From: Philodemus (On Signs (damaged) [c.50 BCE], 1.3)
     A reaction: This is scepticism about the logic of induction, long before David Hume. This is said to be a Stoic argument against Epicureans - though on the whole Stoics are not keen on scepticism.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus]
     Full Idea: Don't fear god, Don't worry about death; What is good is easy to get, What is terrible is easy to cure.
     From: Philodemus (Herculaneum Papyrus [c.50 BCE], 1005,4.9-14)
     A reaction: This is known as the Four-Part Cure, and is an epicurean prayer, probably formulated by Epicurus.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Reality is directional [Witt]
     Full Idea: Reality is directional.
     From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.5)
     A reaction: [Plucked from context! She attributes the view to Aristotle] This slogan beautifully summarises the 'scientific essentialist' view of reality, based not on so-called 'laws', but on the active powers of the stuffs of reality.