7 ideas
| 8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
| Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set? | |
| From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1') | |
| A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious? |
| 9413 | An event is a change in or to an object [Lombard, by Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Lombard holds that an event is a change in or to an object. | |
| From: report of Lawrence B. Lombard (Events [1986]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as more plausible than Davidson's view that events are primitive, or Kim's that they are exemplifications of properties. Events then exist just insofar as we wish to (or are able to) discriminate them. |
| 8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
| Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness. | |
| From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2') | |
| A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification. |
| 8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
| Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified. | |
| From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated. |
| 8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
| Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens. | |
| From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137) | |
| A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion. |
| 6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
| Full Idea: There is no necessary inference, from the fact that men familiar to us die when pierced through the heart, that all men do. | |
| From: Philodemus (On Signs (damaged) [c.50 BCE], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is scepticism about the logic of induction, long before David Hume. This is said to be a Stoic argument against Epicureans - though on the whole Stoics are not keen on scepticism. |
| 22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
| Full Idea: Don't fear god, Don't worry about death; What is good is easy to get, What is terrible is easy to cure. | |
| From: Philodemus (Herculaneum Papyrus [c.50 BCE], 1005,4.9-14) | |
| A reaction: This is known as the Four-Part Cure, and is an epicurean prayer, probably formulated by Epicurus. |