Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pierre Gassendi, Ian Dunt and Irenaeus

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12 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: Modes are not nothing but something more than mere nothing; they are therefore 'res' of some kind, not substantial of course, but at least modal.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Disquisitions [1644], II.3.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 260
     A reaction: This is the great modern atomist talking pure scholastic metaphysics. He's been reading Suárez. Gassendi seems to accept more than one type of existence.
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
     A reaction: If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
     A reaction: He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: If you are no larger than a point, how are you joined to the whole body, which is so large? …and there can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of them can be intermingled.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) [1641]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.131
     A reaction: As Descartes says that mind is distinct from body because it is non-spatial, it doesn't seem quite right to describe it as a 'point', but the second half is a real problem. Being non-spatial is a real impediment to intermingling with spatial objects.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
In 1794 France all individual and legal rights were suppressed by the general will [Dunt]
     Full Idea: In the French Revolution the general will replaced democracy, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and individual rights.
     From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 03)
     A reaction: I had some sympathy with the idea of the general will, but Dunt has persuaded me otherwise. It is the embodiment of the democratic problem of the tyranny of the majority.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Over several centuries a set of eight main liberal values was established [Dunt]
     Full Idea: Over the centuries liberal values were established: freedom of the individual, reason, consent in government, individual rights, the separation of powers, protection of minorities, autonomy, and moderation.
     From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 13)
     A reaction: What's not to like? 'Moderation' might be a sticking point, for anyone who thinks that very large social changes are needed.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
No government, or the whole nation, can control an individual beyond legitimate scope [Dunt]
     Full Idea: When a government of any sort puts a threatening hand on that part of individual life beyond its proper scope, …even if it were the whole nation, except for the man it is harassing, it would be no more legitimate for that.
     From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4
     A reaction: The obvious question is what counts as 'proper scope' - and who gets to define it? If the individual can define that, then criminals can appeal to this principle. The state must be persuaded of it, then asked to stick to it during conflicts.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Laissez-faire liberalism failed to give people the protections and freedoms needed for a good life [Dunt]
     Full Idea: Laissez-faire liberalism failed, because it did not offer people protections and real freedom - against discrimination, insecure work, educational disadvantage, lack of social respect, absence of representation. It was cold, distant, and ineffective.
     From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 13)
     A reaction: A very nice summary, which I take to be correct.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Nationalism pretends that we can only have a single identity [Dunt]
     Full Idea: Nationalism pretends that there is only one identity, that we cannot be more than one thing at once.
     From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], Today)
     A reaction: Dunt is a defender of liberalism, which assumes a wide degree of pluralism. Could I be a British citizen, but love France more than Britain? I don’t see why not, but it is not an ideal situation.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
     A reaction: If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
     A reaction: This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Echoing Irenaeus, John Hick argues that the existence of evil is necessary for the perfect development of human beings. Hick understands evil in the light of God's desire not to coerce people into accepting him.
     From: report of Irenaeus (works [c.190]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Notable'
     A reaction: I don't suppose I could opt out of perfect development? If I endure the evil, can I be guaranteed that my development will be 'perfect'. Oh, and could I just check what is meant by 'development'?