Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pittacus, G.H. von Wright and Roger Bacon

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9 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity

3016	Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Even the gods cannot strive against necessity.
	From: report of Pittacus (reports [c.610 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.5.4

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

8361	What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: It is not very natural to say of that which is true that it is also possible. ...What is true was possible - but whether it still is a potency of the world is not certain.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §5)
	A reaction: A simple and rather important distinction. Before encountering this, I would certainly have been happy to affirm that the actual is possible, but actually it may not be. The power to create differs from the power to sustain. Could God re-create the world?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8363	p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: What makes p a cause-factor relative to the effect-factor q (rather than vice versa) is the fact that by manipulating p, producing changes in it 'at will', we could bring about changes in q.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
	A reaction: As a solution to the direction-of-causation problem, I suspect that this proposal is begging the question. Will a causal explanation be offered of the action of manipulation? If he mistook his manipulation for a cause when it is actually an effect...

8364	We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
	A reaction: Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation

8366	The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10)
	A reaction: This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that.

8362	We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: What confers on observed regularities the character of causal or nomic connections is the possibility of subjecting cause-factors to experimental test by interfering with the 'natural' course of events.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §7)
	A reaction: This is von Wright's distinctive proposal, making causation a feature of the culture of science, rather than of ordinary life. But see Idea 2461. Causation is becoming too epistemological for my taste. Either it is a feature of reality, or forget it.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8360	We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
	A reaction: [very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws

8365	Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
	A reaction: An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences

16745	No one even knows the nature and properties of a fly - why it has that colour, or so many feet [Bacon,R]
	Full Idea: No one is so wise regarding the natural world as to know with certainty all the truths that concern the nature and properties of a single fly, or to know the proper causes of its color and why it has so many feet, neither more nor less.
	From: Roger Bacon (Opus Maius (major works) [1254], I.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: Pasnau quotes this in the context of 'occult' qualities. It is scientific essentialism, because Bacon clearly takes it that the explanation of these things would be found within the essence of the fly, if we could only get at it.