Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Plotinus, Bernecker / Dretske and Friedrich Jacobi

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28 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Intellectual-Principle [Nous] by its intellective act establishes Being.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.04)
     A reaction: This is a surprising view - that there is something which is prior to Being - but I take it to be Plotinus giving primacy to Plato's Form of the Good (a pure ideal), ahead of the One of Parmenides (which is Being).
The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.07)
     A reaction: The First is the One, and this explicitly denies that it has Being. This answers the self-predication problem of Forms. Plato thought the Form of the Beautiful was beautiful, but it can't be (because of the regress). The source of existence can't exist.
The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: There exists a principle which transcends Being; this the One.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10)
     A reaction: The idea that the One transcends Being is the distinctive Plotinus doctrine. He defends the view that this was also the view of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Number determines individual being [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Number is the determinant of individual being.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.05)
     A reaction: You might have thought that number was the consequence of the individualities (or units) within being, but not so. You can't get more platonic than saying that the idealised numbers are the source of the particular units.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The basic sources of knowledge and justification are perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of perceptions says that to perceive an object is to have a sense-datum caused by that object; it is not enough for the world to be the way we perceive it; the world must cause the perception.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int)
     A reaction: All causal theories seem dubious to me; what causes something is not the same was what it means, or refers to, or what justifies it. The hallmark of successful perception is truth. I would perceive a tree if God planted the perception in me.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: You can first come to know by remembering, as in learning how many windows there were in your childhood home by imagining a tour.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int)
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: There is a distinction between a person being justified in holding a belief, and the belief itself being justified.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.II Int)
     A reaction: This is the crucial and elementary distinction which even the most sophisticated of epistemologists keep losing sight of. Epistemology is about persons. All true beliefs are justified - by the facts!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The driving force behind foundationalism has always been the threat of an infinite regress.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
     A reaction: You could just live with the regress (Peter Klein), or say that the regress fades away, or that it is cut off by social epistemological convention, or the regress circles round and rejoins.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: If sense experiences are non-epistemic they may be infallible, but they are unsuitable for providing the foundations for other beliefs.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
     A reaction: If we experience flashing lights in the retina, or an afterimage, we don't think we are seeing objects, so why is normal perception different? Ans: because it is supported by judgement.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The concept of justification is absolutely central to epistemology; but this concept is normative (i.e. it lays down norms), so epistemology can't be reduced to factual cognitive psychology.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
     A reaction: A simple rejection of the 'epistemology naturalised' idea. Best to start with slugs rather than people. You can confuse a slug, so it has truth or falsehood, but what is slug normativity? This is an interesting discussion point, not an argument.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: In modern epistemology the three strategies to rebut the sceptic are 1) epistemological externalism, 2) the 'relevant alternative account of knowledge' (that scepticism is too extreme to be relevant), and 3) semantic externalism.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.IV Int)
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The new riddle of induction ('grue') seems to demonstrate that sound inductive inferences are arbitrary because they depend on the actual language people use to formulate predictions.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int)
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15
     A reaction: Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Soul maintains its unfailing movement; for not all that passes in the soul is, by that fact, perceptible; we know just as much as impinges on the faculty of the sense.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12)
     A reaction: This is a straightforward argument in favour of an unconscious aspect to the mind - and a rather good argument too. No one thinks that our minds ever stop working, even in sleep.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Man is not merely a part (the higher part) of the Soul but the total.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12)
     A reaction: The soul is psuche, which includes the vegetative soul. The higher part is normally taken to be reason. This seems pretty close to John Locke's view of the matter.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth?
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
     A reaction: The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us.
The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10)
     A reaction: You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: Semantic externalism ties our mental content down to our actual environment so there is no possibility of massive error.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int)
     A reaction: This sounds more prescriptive than descriptive. People do make massive errors in their concepts. Maybe educated people are more externalist (respectful of experts) than uneducated people?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Since there is a Soul which reasons upon the right and good - for reasoning is an enquiry into the rightness and goodness of this rather than that - there must exist some pemanent Right, the source and foundation of this reasoning in our soul.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.11)
     A reaction: This is pretty close the Kant's concept of 'the moral order within me', and Plotinus even sees it as rational. Presumably this right is 'permanent' because the revelatlons of reason about it are necessary truths.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Ecstasy or rapture is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man.
     From: report of Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §29
     A reaction: See Bernini's statue of St Theresa. Personally I find this very unappealing because of its utter irrationality, but what is the 'highest' human psychological state? Doing mental arithmetic? Doing what is morally right? Dignity under pressure?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Life and rationality are pointless if we can only contemplate the freedom of our own ego [Jacobi]
     Full Idea: If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and mere ego, with its autonomy and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for me a curse - I deplore my existence.
     From: Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799], Ch.2), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro
     A reaction: This is a rebellion against Fichte's interpretation of Kant. It is a lovely cry from the heart on behalf of everyone who resents lines of philosophical thinking that seem to imprison the mind and cut us off from the ordinary world and real life.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Jacobi was the first philosopher to talk of nihilism [Jacobi, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Jacobi was the first to philosophically employ the concept of nihilism.
     From: report of Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2
     A reaction: Critchley explains that it was Jacobi's fear that Fichte was drawing nihilist conclusions from Kant's philosophy. This fear may be seen as the beginning of what is loosely called 'continental philosophy'. A worthy subject for thinkers...
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The problem endlessly debated is how, from such a unity as we have declared the One to be, does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad or number?
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: This was precisely Aristotle's objection to the One of Parmenides, and especially the problem of the source of movement (which Plotinus also notices).
Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The soul is an utterance [logos] and act of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], as that is an utterance and act of the One.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: Being only comes into the picture at the secondary Nous stage. Nous is the closest to the modern concept of God.
Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance,
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
     A reaction: This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03)
     A reaction: It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage).