42 ideas
| 2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Carneades said the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetition. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.09.29 | |
| A reaction: Nice, but I would want to emphasise the distinction between truth and its criterion. Admittedly we would have no truth without a good criterion, but the truth itself should be held in higher esteem than our miserable human means of grasping it. |
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 3) |
| 21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
| Full Idea: We call those past events true of which at an earlier time this proposition was true: 'They are present now'; similarly, we shall call those future events true of which at some future time this proposition will be true: 'They are present now'. | |
| From: Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice way of paraphrasing statements about the necessity of true future contingent events. It still relies, of course, on the veracity of a tensed assertion |
| 21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Just as we speak of past things as true that possessed true actuality at some former time, so we speak of future things as true that will possess true actuality at some following time. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.27 | |
| A reaction: This ducks the Aristotle problem of where it is true NOW when you say there will be a sea-fight tomorrow, and it turns out to be true. Carneades seems to be affirming a truth when it does not yet have a truthmaker. |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20)) | |
| A reaction: There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted. |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
| From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
| A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Diversity is born of the development of the power of unity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 42) | |
| A reaction: I doubt whether even Porphyry understood this, but we might say that once the principle of unification enters into nature, it will inevitably result in diversity. One all-embracing unity would be indiscernible. |
| 15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
| Full Idea: Carneades denied the principle of the transitivity of identity. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE], fr 41-42) by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Chisholm calls this 'extreme', but I assume Carneades wouldn't deny the principle in mathematics. I'm guessing that he just means that nothing ever stays quite the same. |
| 21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
| Full Idea: From 'E will take place is true' it follows that E must take place. But 'must' here is logical not causal necessity. It is a considerable achievement of Carneades to have distinguished these two senses of necessity. | |
| From: comment on Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 3 | |
| A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think 'necessity' is univocal, and does not have two senses. What Carneades has nicely done is distinguish the two different grounds for the necessities. |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is a faculty of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn6 25(2)) |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible. |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: This is the rather bewildering phenomenology of consciousness which persuaded Descartes of dualism. |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded? |
| 21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Voluntary motion possesses the intrinsic property of being in our power and of obeying us, and its obedience is not uncaused, for its nature is itself the cause of this. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.25 | |
| A reaction: To say that actions arise from our 'intrinsic power' is not much of an explanation, but it is still informative - that you should study the intrinsic powers of humans if you want to explain it. |
| 21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Now something is in our power; but if everything happens as a result of destiny all things happen as a result of antecedent causes; therefore what happens does not happen as a result of destiny. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.31 | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of whether some things really are 'in our power'. Carneades (as expressed by Cicero) takes that for granted. Our 'power' may be antecedent causes in disguise. |
| 21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could tell any future events except those whose causes were so held together that they must necessarily happen. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.32 | |
| A reaction: Carneades is opposing the usual belief in divination, where even priests can foretell contingent future events to some extent. Careneades, of course, was defending free will. |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the soul is boss over the matter, and yet the soul is 'made' to choose union with matter. The Universal Soul is seen by Porphyr as the controller of the situation. |
| 8239 | If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If the King has a great fondness for music, then perhaps there is hope for the state of Ch'i. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Shakespeare's attitude to music as well. The general idea must be that love of music requires a selfless state of mind, where the mind revels in the beauty of something outside of itself. Respect is the desirable result. |
| 23398 | Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden] |
| Full Idea: Mengzi does not claim that humans are innately good; he claims that human nature is innately good. …He says that 'the heart of compassion' (manifested when anyone sees a child about to fall into a well) is the 'sprout of benevolence'. | |
| From: report of Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.II | |
| A reaction: There is a nice distinction here between the 'sprout' of human nature and the finished product. Seeds have the potential to produce tall healthy plants, but circumstances can warp them. |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories. |
| 23400 | Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: People all have things they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 7B31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.IV | |
| A reaction: Very nice! Kekes points out the enormous importance of unthinkable deeds. Depravity is when the unthinkable gradually begins to look possible, which is probably a social phenomenon, a creeping cancer in a culture. |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism. |
| 7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Carneades argued forcefully that in the event of a shipwreck, the wise man would be prepared to seize the only plank capable of bearing him to shore, even if that meant pushing another person off it. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: [source for this?] This thought seems to have provoked great discussion in the sixteenth century (mostly sympathetic). I can't help thinking the right answer depends on assessing your rival. Die for a hero, drown a nasty fool. |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the civil virtues is to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, and are so-called because they unite citizens. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.1) | |
| A reaction: Modern commentators underestimate the close link between ancient virtue and citizenship. It is hard for one person to have much of a notion of virtue if they live on a desert island, beyond caring for personal health. |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.2) | |
| A reaction: The link with human nature is basic to virtue theory, but this proposal is rather too vague. Are passions not part of the laws of human nature? |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the 'purificatory' virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: This is an aspect of virtue theory which doesn't appear in Aristotle. He is in favour of rational control of the passions, but not of totally abandoning them. The neo-platonists are much more puritanical. They seem to go against human nature. |
| 23399 | Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 6A6), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.III | |
| A reaction: 'Disdain' seems to be the response to anyone who is disrespectful. Note that wisdom concerns judgements. Respect seems to be more of a social convention than an actual concern for others. |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine....; the contemplative virtues defiy; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: I like the idea of the 'exemplary' virtues. I think an entire theory of morality could be built on the notion that we are all role-models for one another. |
| 8235 | Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If two soldiers were fleeing from a battle, and one stopped after a hundred paces and the other stopped after a fifty paces, what would you think if the latter, as one who only ran fifty paces, were to laugh at the former who ran a hundred? | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration, in my view, of the universality of truths about human virtue. In no culture would this laughter be appropriate. Nevertheless, there must be degrees of dishonour. Better to flee than join in with the likely winners. |
| 8240 | A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If you shared your enjoyment of music or of hunting with the people, you would be a true King. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is a great truth for dictators and traditional monarchs. One pictures the successful ones attending public entertainments, and allowing the public to see their own. Tyrants keep entertainment private. Nero is a counterexample! |
| 8237 | Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families. Treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age, and extend this to the young of other families. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to articulate the ideal of communitarianism very nicely. Morality is not just about healthy adults in war and peace. It must include the children and the old. The values of the family are above the values of contracts and calculations. |
| 21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |
| Full Idea: The same people often changed laws according to circumstances; there is no natural law. There is no such thing as justice or, if there is, it is the height of folly, since a man injures himself in taking thought for the advantage of others. | |
| From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Lactantius - Institutiones Divinae 5.16.4 | |
| A reaction: [An argument used by Carneades on his notorious 156BCE visit to Rome, where he argued both for and against justice] This is probably the right wing view of justice. Why give other people what they want, if it is at our expense? |
| 8241 | Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: When close attendants say a man deserves death, do not listen; when all the councillors say so, do not listen; when everyone says so, have the case investigated. If he is guilty, put him to death; he was put to death by the whole country. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.7) | |
| A reaction: The jury system is a gesture in this direction. Compare Idea 95. In Mencius's time, no doubt, everyone believed that capital punishment was sometimes right. Nowadays, when many people (e.g. me) reject it, the procedure won't work. |
| 8238 | Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Your desire to extend your territory by war, in order to bring peace, is like looking for fish by climbing a tree. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: Mencius had a flair for analogies. Just occasionally I suppose he might be wrong on this point, but I would think that experiments in the laboratory of history have shown that he is right in nearly all cases. |
| 8236 | Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Once a gentleman has seen animals alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman keeps his distance from the kitchen. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: If you applied this to a Gestapo officer and his victims, it would obviously be the epitome of wickedness. But it is complex. Compassion is expected when we encounter suffering, but we are not obliged to seek out suffering. Or are we? |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5)) | |
| A reaction: Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it. |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: It is the circular movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes eternity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: Plato loved circles. If you think time is subjective, this is trying to express your intuition. Personally I think it is nonsense |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: If you like this idea, you should see Shoemaker's lovely three-worlds thought experiment. |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The divinity is everywhere because it is nowhere. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: Nice to see Porphyry endorsing Meinongian objects. I doubt whether he counts as a pantheist, but this is a very pantheistic remark. |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2) | |
| A reaction: Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree? |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism. |