Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Posidonius, PG and Peter Geach

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240 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
     Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01)
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
     Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02)
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03)
     A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense.
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
     Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04)
     A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation.
Aletheia: truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Aletheia: truth
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05)
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
     Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06)
     A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives.
Ananke: necessity [PG]
     Full Idea: Ananke: necessity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07)
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
     Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08)
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
     Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09)
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
     Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10)
     A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element.
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
     Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11)
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
     Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12)
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
     Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13)
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
     Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14)
     A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical.
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
     Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'.
Chronismos: separation [PG]
     Full Idea: Chronismos: separation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16)
Diairesis: division [PG]
     Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17)
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
     Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18)
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
     Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21)
Diaphora: difference [PG]
     Full Idea: Diaphora: difference
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22)
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
     Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation.
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
     Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24)
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
     Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25)
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
     Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26)
     A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
     Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27)
Empeiron: experience [PG]
     Full Idea: Empeiron: experience
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28)
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
     Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power?
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31)
Enkrateia: control [PG]
     Full Idea: Enkrateia: control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled.
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
     Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33)
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34)
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35)
     A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'.
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
     Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36)
Ergon: function [PG]
     Full Idea: Ergon: function, work
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37)
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
     Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly?
Eros: love [PG]
     Full Idea: Eros: love, desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41)
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
     Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42)
     A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure.
Genos: type, genus [PG]
     Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43)
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
     Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44)
Horismos: definition [PG]
     Full Idea: Horismos: definition
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45)
Hule: matter [PG]
     Full Idea: Hule: matter
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46)
     A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'!
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
     Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47)
     A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'.
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
     Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48)
     A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects.
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
     Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51)
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
     Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52)
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
     Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53)
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
     Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54)
Meson: the mean [PG]
     Full Idea: Meson: the mean
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55)
     A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
     Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56)
     A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic.
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
     Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57)
Morphe: form [PG]
     Full Idea: Morphe: form
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58)
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
     Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59)
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
     Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61)
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62)
     A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19
Orexis: desire [PG]
     Full Idea: Orexis: desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63)
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
     Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia']
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer.
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
     Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65)
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
     Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66)
Philia: friendship [PG]
     Full Idea: Philia: friendship
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67)
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68)
     A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise.
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English.
Physis: nature [PG]
     Full Idea: Physis: nature
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72)
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
     Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73)
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
     Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74)
     A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem.
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
     Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75)
     A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too.
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76)
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77)
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
     Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78)
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
     Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81)
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82)
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
     Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83)
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
     Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84)
Theos: god [PG]
     Full Idea: Theos: god
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85)
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
     Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86)
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
     Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87)
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory.
To ti estin: essence [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti estin: essence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91)
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
     Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
     Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030])
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001)
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250)
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415)
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430)
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437)
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460)
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471)
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500)
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
     Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504)
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528)
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550)
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
     Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557)
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564)
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
     Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573)
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601)
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633)
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640)
347: death of Plato [PG]
     Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653)
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657)
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665)
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670)
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
     Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678)
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693)
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699)
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739)
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771)
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843)
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915)
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922)
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940)
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
     Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065)
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080)
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170)
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200)
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263)
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
     Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310)
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387)
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
     Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523)
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
     Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622)
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642)
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910)
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015)
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
     Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090)
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115)
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166)
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266)
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280)
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328)
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347)
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470)
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513)
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543)
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580)
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619)
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620)
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633)
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641)
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650)
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651)
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
     Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662)
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665)
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676)
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687)
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690)
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
     Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697)
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713)
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734)
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739)
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762)
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781)
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785)
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789)
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807)
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818)
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840)
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843)
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848)
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
     Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859)
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861)
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882)
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884)
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885)
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888)
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890)
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895)
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900)
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903)
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904)
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908)
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910)
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912)
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921)
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927)
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930)
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
     Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931)
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933)
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942)
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943)
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
     Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945)
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947)
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950)
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953)
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956)
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962)
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967)
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971)
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972)
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
     Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
     Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
     Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
     Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
     Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
     Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said".
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
     Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
     Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect!
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
     Full Idea: If we list the words 'bull', 'bull' and 'cow', it is often said that there are three 'word tokens' but only two 'word types', but Geach says there are not two kinds of object to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same object.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Perry - The Same F II
     A reaction: Insofar as the notion that a 'word type' is an 'object', my sympathies are entirely with Geach, to my surprise. Geach's point is that 'bull' and 'bull' are the same meaning, but different actual words. Identity is relative to a concept.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
     Full Idea: For an understanding of arithmetic the grasp of an operation's being performed 'so many times' is quite indispensable; and abstraction of a feature from groups of nuts cannot give us this grasp.
     From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.170)
     A reaction: I end up defending the empirical approach to arithmetic because remarks like this are so patently false. Geach seems to think we arrive ready-made in the world, just raring to get on with some counting. He lacks the evolutionary perspective.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
     Full Idea: Attributes should not be thought of as identifiable objects. It is better to follow Frege and compare them to mathematical functions. 'Square of' and 'double of' x are distinct functions, even though they are not distinguishable in thought when x is 2.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11)
     A reaction: Attributes are features of the world, of which animals are well aware, and the mathematical model is dubious when dealing with physical properties. The route to arriving at 2 is not the same concept as 2. There are many roads to Rome.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Geach argued that the notion of absolute identity should be abandoned. ..We can only grasp the meaning of a count noun when we associate it with a criterion of identity, expressed by a particular relative identity sortal.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Hawthorne - Identity
     A reaction: In other words, identity needs categorisation. Hawthorne concludes that Geach is wrong. Geach clearly has much common usage on his side. 'What's that?' usually invites a categorisation. Sameness of objects seems to need a 'respect'.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
     Full Idea: Geach's denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory. He must deny the axiom of extensionality in set theory, for example.
     From: comment on Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think we have two entirely different concepts here - the logicians' and mathematicians' notion of when two things are identical, and the ordinary language concept of two things being 'the same'. 'We like the same music'.
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
     Full Idea: Identity is relative. When one says 'x is identical with y' this is an incomplete expression. It is short for 'x is the same A as y', where 'A' represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance.
     From: Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980], p.39), quoted by John Perry - The Same F I
     A reaction: Perry notes that Geach's view is in conscious opposition to Frege, who had a pure notion of identity. We say 'they are the same insofar as they are animals', but not 'they are the same animal'. Perfect identity involves all possible A's.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
     Full Idea: Geach rejects the standard formulation of Leibniz's Law as incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6
     A reaction: Not many people accept Geach's premiss that identity is a relative matter. I agree with Wiggins on this, that identity is an absolute (and possibly indefinable). The problem with the Law is what you mean by a 'property'.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
     Full Idea: "The same" is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean "the same X", where X represents a general term. ...There is no such thing as being just 'the same'.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §16)
     A reaction: Geach seems oddly unaware of the perfect identity of Hespherus with Phosphorus. His critics don't spot that he was concerned with identity over time (of 'the same man', who ages). Perry's critique emphasises the type/token distinction.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
     Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
     Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
     Full Idea: A big flea or rat is a small animal, and a small elephant is a big animal, so there can be no question of ignoring the kind of thing to which 'big' or 'small' is referred and forming those concepts by abstraction.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9)
     A reaction: Geach is attacking a caricature of the theory. Abstraction is a neat mental trick which has developed in stages, from big rats relative to us, to big relative to other rats, to the concept of 'relative' (Idea 8776!), to the concept of 'relative bigness'.
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
     Full Idea: Abstractionists are unaware of the difficulty with relations - that they neither exist nor can be observed apart from the converse relation, the two being indivisible, as in grasping 'to the left of' and 'to the right of'.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9)
     A reaction: It is hard to see how a rival account such as platonism could help. It seems obvious to me that 'right' and 'left' would be quite meaningless without some experience of things in space, including an orientation to them.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
     Full Idea: If concepts were nothing but recognitional capacities, then it is unintelligible that I can judge that cats eat mice when neither of them are present.
     From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.164)
     A reaction: Having observed the importance of recognition for the abstractionist (Idea 10731), he then seems to assume that there is nothing more to their concepts. Geach fails to grasp levels of abstraction, and cross-reference, and generalisation.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
     Full Idea: We can't take a statement that two men, whose overt behaviour was not actually different, were in different states of mind as being really a statement that the behaviour of one man would have been different in hypothetical circumstances that never arose.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §3)
     A reaction: This is the whole problem with trying to define the mind as dispositions. The same might be said of properties, since some properties are active, but others are mere potential or disposition. Hence 'process' looks to me the most promising word for mind.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
     Full Idea: Is there any behaviour characteristic of a given belief?
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §4)
     A reaction: Well, yes. Belief that a dog is about to bite you. Belief that this nice food is yours, and you are hungry. But he has a good point. He is pointing out that the mental state is a very different thing from the 'disposition' to behave in a certain way.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
     Full Idea: Having a concept is not recognizing a feature of experience; the mind makes concepts. We then fit our concepts to experience.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that we create concepts ex nihilo, which is a rather worse theory than saying that we abstract them from multiple (and multi-level) experiences. That minds create concepts is a truism. How do we do it?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
     Full Idea: For abstractionists, concepts are essentially capacities for recognizing recurrent features of the world.
     From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.163)
     A reaction: Recognition certainly strikes me as central to thought (and revelatory of memory, since we continually recognise what we cannot actually recall). Geach dislikes this view, but I see it as crucial to an evolutionary view of thought.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
     Full Idea: If a man struck with aphasia can still play bridge or chess, I certainly wish to say he still has the concepts involved in the game, although he can no longer exercise them verbally.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §5)
     A reaction: Geach proceeds thereafter to concentrate on language, but this caveat is crucial. To suggest that concepts are entirely verbal has always struck me as ridiculous, and an insult to our inarticulate mammalian cousins.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
     Full Idea: I call 'abstractionism' the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience - abstracting it - and ignoring the other features simultaneously given - abstracting from them.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §6)
     A reaction: Locke seems to be the best known ancestor of this view, and Geach launches a vigorous attack against it. However, contemporary philosophers still refer to the process, and I think Geach should be crushed and this theory revived.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
     Full Idea: Nowhere in the sensible world could you find anything to be suitably labelled 'or' or 'not'. So the abstractionist appeals to an 'inner sense', or hesitation for 'or', and of frustration or inhibition for 'not'. Personally I see a threat in 'or else'!
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §7)
     A reaction: This is a key argument of Geach's against abstractionism. As a logician he prefers to discuss connectives rather than, say, colours. I think they might be meta-abstractions, which you create internally once you have picked up the knack.
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
     Full Idea: The number-concepts just cannot be got by concentrating on the number and abstracting from the kind of things being counted.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8)
     A reaction: This point is from Frege - that if you 'abstract away' everything apart from the number, you are simply left with nothing in experience. The objection might, I think, be met by viewing it as second-order abstraction, perhaps getting to a pattern first.
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
     Full Idea: The way counting is learned is wholly contrary to abstractionist preconceptions, because the series of numerals has to be learned before it can be applied.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8)
     A reaction: You might learn to parrot the names of numbers, but you could hardly know what they meant if you couldn't count anything. See Idea 3907. I would have thought that individuating objects must logically and pedagogically precede counting.
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
     Full Idea: The pattern of the numeral series that is grasped by a child exists nowhere in nature outside human languages, so the human race cannot possibly have discerned this pattern by abstracting it from some natural context.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8)
     A reaction: This is a spectacular non sequitur, which begs the question. Abstractionists precisely claim that the process of abstraction brings numerals into human language from the natural context. Structuralism is an attempt to explain the process.
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
     Full Idea: It is not true that men born blind can form no colour-concepts; a man born blind can use the word 'red' with a considerable measure of intelligence; he can show a practical grasp of the logic of the word.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10)
     A reaction: Weak. It is obvious that they pick up the word 'red' from the usage of sighted people, and the usage of the word doesn't guarantee a grasp of the concept, as when non-mathematicians refer to 'calculus'. Compare Idea 7377 and Idea 7866.
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
     Full Idea: Since we can use the terms 'black' and 'cat' in situations not including any black object or any cat, how could this part of the use be got by abstraction?
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10)
     A reaction: [He is attacking H.H. Price] It doesn't seem a huge psychological leap to apply the word 'cat' when we remember a cat, and once it is in the mind we can play games with our abstractions. Cats are smaller than dogs.
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to form the concept of 'chromatic colour' by discriminative attention to a feature given in my visual experience. In seeing a red window-pane, I do not have two sensations, one of redness and one of chromatic colour.
     From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10)
     A reaction: Again Geach begs the question, because abstractionists claim that you can focus on two different 'aspects' of the one experience, as that it is a 'window', or it is 'red', or it is not a wall, or it is not monochrome.
The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
     Full Idea: The abstractionist cannot give a logically coherent account of the features that are supposed to be reached by discriminative attention, corresponding to the words 'some' and 'not'.
     From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.167)
     A reaction: I understand 'some' in terms of mereology, because that connects to experience, and 'not' I take to derive more from psychological experience than from the physical world, building on thwarted expectation, which even animals experience.
Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
     Full Idea: To understand the verb 'to strike' we must see that 'striking' and 'being struck' are different, but necessarily go together in event and thought; only in the context of a judgment can they be distinguished, when we think of both together.
     From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.168)
     A reaction: Geach seems to have a strange notion that judgements are pure events which can precede all experience, and are the only ways we can come to understand experience. He needs to start from animals (or 'brutes', as he still calls them!).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
     Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
     Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God)
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
     Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])