Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Proclus, Dean W. Zimmerman and David Hildebrand

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
     Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5
     A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
     Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55
     A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 13. Green Politics
Should we value environmental systems for human benefit, or for their own sake? [Hildebrand]
     Full Idea: There is a long-running debate between anthropo-centrists and eco-centrists. The latter believe that humans must protect environmental systems because they have intrinsic value; the former argue that human interests are the root of all value.
     From: David Hildebrand (Dewey [2008], 8 'Environ')
     A reaction: How many tigers would you kill to save a human life? Would you allow a human to die in order to save a species from extinction? It is very hard to think that the Earth has great value if humans are removed from it!
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3)
     A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
     A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).