13 ideas
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
Full Idea: A model of a language assigns values to non-logical terms. If a sentence is true in every model, its truth doesn't depend on those non-logical terms. Hence the validity of an argument comes from its logical form. Thus models explain logical validity. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Thus you get a rigorous account of logical validity by only allowing the rigorous input of model theory. This is the modern strategy of analytic philosophy. But is 'it's red so it's coloured' logically valid? |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
Full Idea: Natural language includes connectives that are not truth-functional. In order for 'p because q' to be true, both p and q have to be true, but knowing the simpler sentences are true doesn't determine whether the larger sentence is true. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 2) |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
Full Idea: To get any advantage from moving to second-order logic, we need to assign to second-order variables a role different from merely ranging over collections made up of things the first-order variables range over. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 7) | |
A reaction: Thus it is exciting if they range over genuine properties, but not so exciting if you merely characterise those properties as sets of first-order objects. This idea leads into a discussion of plural quantification. |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
Full Idea: We can get a less ontologically perilous presentation of the semantics of the predicate calculus by using sets instead of concepts. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: The perilous versions rely on Fregean concepts, and notably Russell's 'concept that does not fall under itself'. The sets, of course, have to be ontologically secure, and so will involve the iterative conception, rather than naive set theory. |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
Full Idea: Logically valid sentences are a species of analytic sentence, being true not just in virtue of the meanings of their words, but true in virtue of the meanings of their logical words. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: A helpful link between logical truths and analytic truths, which had not struck me before. |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
Full Idea: Soundness theorems are seldom very informative, since typically we use informally, in proving the theorem, the very same rules whose soundness we are attempting to establish. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Quine 1935] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
Full Idea: One of the culminating achievements of Euclidean geometry was categorical axiomatisations, that describe the geometric structure so completely that any two models of the axioms are isomorphic. The axioms are second-order. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Veblen 1904 and Hilbert 1903] For most mathematicians, categorical axiomatisation is the best you can ever dream of (rather than a single true axiomatisation). |
22626 | Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher] |
Full Idea: Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things. | |
From: Nicholas Rescher (Process Metaphysics [1996]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7 | |
A reaction: [No page cited - nr start?] Ingthorsson quotes this in order to challenge it, and says that substances are also processes, because change is essential to them. |
10650 | In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher] |
Full Idea: In military usage, persons can be parts of small units, and small units parts of large ones; but persons are never parts of large units. | |
From: Nicholas Rescher (Axioms for the Part Relation [1955]), quoted by Achille Varzi - Mereology 2.1 | |
A reaction: This much-cited objection to the transitivity of the 'part' relation seems very odd. There could hardly be an army or a regiment if there weren't soldiers to make up parts of it. |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles. | |
From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5 | |
A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction. |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason. | |
From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55 | |
A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths. |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
Full Idea: If our linguistic conventions entitle us to assert a sentence, they thereby make it true, because of the maxim that 'truth is the norm of assertion'. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 8) | |
A reaction: You could only really deny that maxim if you had no belief at all in truth, but then you can assert anything you like (with full entitlement). Maybe you can assert anything you like as long as it doesn't upset anyone? Etc. |
20365 | We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher] |
Full Idea: We perceive motion only as isolated points, and then infer it without actually seeing it. | |
From: Nicholas Rescher (Scepticism [1980], §112) | |
A reaction: Note how writing suddenly becomes readable as you slow down on entering a railway station. Is that points suddenly becoming unified? This is an empiricist endorsement of Russell's 'at-at' account of motion. |