Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Proclus, Weisberg/Needham/Hendry and Pyrrho

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: He studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgement on all points.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.3
     A reaction: In what sense was Pyrrho a philosopher, then? He must have asserted SOME generalised judgments.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Sceptics say that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables).
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naïve realism is certainly worth attacking.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578).
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
     Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5
     A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
     A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
     Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55
     A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2)
     A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The idea of cause is relative to that of which it is the cause, and so has no real existence. …Also cause must either be body causing body, or incorporeal causing incorporeal, and neither of these is possible.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Motion is not moved in the place in which it is is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not, so there is no such thing as motion.
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3)
Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it.
It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6)
     A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless.
Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together.
For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2)
     A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular.
'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4)
     A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3)