36 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
| 1553 | No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: No perceptible object is geometrically straight or curved; after all, a circle does not touch a ruler at a point, as Protagoras used to say, in arguing against the geometers. | |
| From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B07), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a1 |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| 1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Everything that exists consists in being perceived. | |
| From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]), quoted by Didymus the Blind - Commentary on the Psalms (frags) | |
| A reaction: A striking anticipation of Berkeley's "esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived). |
| 1545 | Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything. | |
| From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], A01) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.51 |
| 1547 | Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: He began one of his books as follows: 'Man is the measure of all things - of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not'. | |
| From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B01), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.51 |
| 3305 | There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: No purer metaphysical doctrine can possibly be found than the Protagorean thesis that to be (anything at all) is to be relative ( to something or other). | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.3 |
| 3317 | You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Only if the thing that is cold to me is precisely identical with the thing that is not cold to you can Protagoras launch his argument, but then it is seen to be the thing in itself that exists absolutely speaking. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 |
| 3313 | If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Because the wind is cold to me but not you, Protagoras takes it to in itself neither cold nor not-cold. Accordingly, I very much doubt that he can allow the wind to be exactly as cold as itself. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 |
| 247 | God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: In our view it is God who is pre-eminently the "measure of all things", much more so than any "man", as they say. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Plato - The Laws 716c |
| 606 | Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: When Protagoras quipped that man is the measure of all things, he had in mind, of course, the knowing or perceiving man. The grounds are that they have perception/knowledge, and these are said to be the measures of objects. Utter nonsense! | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1053b |
| 612 | Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: In fact there is no difference between Protagoreanism and saying this: if you stick your finger under your eyes and make single things seem two, then they are two, just because they seem to be two. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1063a06 |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This observation of Lukes is seen as important in the understanding of social power, but it is also significant for the understanding of the theory of action. Small racial slights by individuals can indicate institutional racism. |
| 6016 | Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD] |
| Full Idea: Protagoras and Hippias evidently believed that convention was an improvement on nature, whereas later sophists such as Antiphon, Thrasymachus and Callicles seemed to contend that conventional morality was undermined because it was 'against nature'. | |
| From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Fred D. Miller jr - Classical Political Thought | |
| A reaction: This gets to the heart of a much more interesting aspect of the nomos-physis (convention-nature) debate, rather than just a slanging match between relativists and the rest. The debate still goes on, over issues about the free market and intervention. |
| 1580 | For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik] |
| Full Idea: For Protagoras the only constraint on human behaviour is that it not interfere with social harmony, the essential condition for human survival. | |
| From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.63 |
| 205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Protagoras claimed that virtue was teachable, but now tries to show it is not knowledge, which makes it less likely to be teachable. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Plato - Protagoras 361b |
| 22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but also by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: The classic modern instances of this are advertising and control of the media. This was apparently a new idea from Lukes, but it seems fairly obvious now. This is his third dimension of power. |
| 22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Power is at its most effective when it is least observable. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Kind of common sense, though his account has been very influential. We must be cautious about asserting the existence of powers which are massive but totally undetectable. |
| 22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: In the 1950s 'pluralism' was a common idea about power - that the concentration of power in America is not excessive because one group always balances the power of others. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Alan Wolfe's 2000 intro to C. Wright Mills] There must be something to this idea. In the UK we encourage the existence of an official opposition to the government for that reason. |
| 22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: A school teacher could, in extremis, bring in the army to control a wildly anarchic class of kids. You control kids by making them want to do what you want them to do. |
| 22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: The two-dimensional view of power is a major advance over the one-dimensional view. It incorporates the question of the control of the agenda in politics. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: So One-D is controlling what happens in conflicts, and Two-D is controlling the nature of the conflicts. If we keep digging we may come to the power which no one knows exists. |
| 22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: The one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, revealed by political participation. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: It seems unbalanced to give this the pejorative label 'one-dimensional', as if it wasn't really power at all. Watching police beating demonstrators looks like real power to me. His point that power runs deeper is, of course, a good one. |
| 22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Schattschneider 1960] This is what Lukes calls the two-dimensional theory of power. The point is that students of power should observe what does not happen, as well as what does. |
| 22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: It is inadequate to insist that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: A simple example would be where they tricked you into thinking you couldn't vote in an election, or where the women didn't realise the men were paid more. Part of his third dimension of power. |
| 22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: I assume he is not referring to when I accidentally spill your beer. His point is, I think, that neither A nor B may be fully, or even partly, aware of what is going on. Presumably A can also exert power over B which is in B's interests. Dentists. |
| 22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Poulantzas (1968) defined his concept of power as the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: Lukes offers this as an account of power in terms of structures, rather than of the actions of individuals. Lukes says that power must include the ability of the agent to act differently. Power must involve responsibility. Power is not fate. |
| 21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], p.27), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be beyond dispute. When the operation is successful, those under your power not only do not need to be intimidated, but they don't even need to be guided. But if two people are in perfect harmony, which one has the power? |
| 22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: In the 1950s there was talk of the 'end of ideology' - that grand passions over ideas were exhausted, and in future problems would be solved by technical expertise. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: An understandable thought, once fascism and communism seemed to have burned themselves out. Political commentators always try to grip the crowds with simplistic labels, but fewer people will now read up an ideology. Tacit ideology. |
| 22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Liberals take people as they are, and relates their interests to what they actually want or prefer. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: He contrasts this with 'reformists' and 'radicals'. I don't see why liberals should be so uncritical of people's desires. Liberals aren't going to implement harmful policies, simply because people want them. He treats liberals as one-dimensional. |
| 22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Wage earners consent to capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He is citing Przeworski 1985] Not plausible as it stands. Does a prisoner who tries to improve their life within a hideous prison thereby endorse the prison system? In Auschwitz? Slaves can go along with the system for years, then suddenly rebel. |
| 1659 | Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos] |
| Full Idea: The distinction of punishment from revenge must be regarded as one of the most momentous of the conceptual discoveries ever made by humanity in the course of its slow, tortuous, precarious, emergence from barbaric tribalism. Protagoras originated it. | |
| From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.187 |
| 532 | Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Education does not take root in the soul unless one goes deep. | |
| From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B11), quoted by Plutarch - On Practice 178.25 |
| 1552 | He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily] |
| Full Idea: He used legislation to improve the condition of illiterate people, on the grounds that they lack one of life's great goods, and thought literacy should be a matter of public concern and expense. | |
| From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Diodorus of Sicily - Universal History 12.13.3.3 |
| 1551 | He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: He said that he did not know whether there were gods - but this is the same as saying that he knew there were no gods. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], A23) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 11 Chil 2 |