Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rüdiger Safranski, Einstein,A/Infeld,L and Mark Steiner

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy

20110	Hegel, Fichte and Schelling wanted to know Kant's thing-in-itself, as ego, or nature, or spirit [Safranski]
	Full Idea: The 'thing in iself' acted on Kant's successors like a hole in the closed world of knowledge...Hegel, Fichte and Schelling wanted to penetrate into what they presumed to be the heart of things, by the invention of means of 'ego', or 'nature', or 'spirit.,
	From: Rüdiger Safranski (Nietzsche: a philosophical biography [2000], 07)
	A reaction: [a bit compressed] Although no scientist claims to know the ultimate essence of matter, the authority of science largely comes from persuasively moving us several steps closer to the thing in itself (more persuasively than these three).

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

13230	Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36)
	A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?).

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations

13229	Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32)
	A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof

13231	Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34)
	A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields

18202	The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
	Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
	From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
	A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.