Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for R Feldman / E Conee, Monroe Beardsley and David Robb

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7 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb]
     Full Idea: A substance is a basic being, something at reality's foundation. What exactly this means is a matter of some controversy. Some philosophers think of substance as an ultimate subject, something that has properties but isn't a property.
     From: David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Intro')
     A reaction: This seems to capture the place of 'substance' in contemporary metaphysics. I think of 'substance' as a placeholder for some threatened account, even in Aristotle.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb]
     Full Idea: Sometimes a whole can survive a loss of parts: the chair would still exist if it lost one of its legs. This seems to give complex objects a sort of autonomy over their parts.
     From: David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Ident')
     A reaction: There is then a puzzle as to how much loss of parts the whole can survive, and why. The loss of a major part could be devastating, so why do all wholes not exhibit this relation to all their parts? I demand rules, now!
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II)
     A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I)
     A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence?
Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III)
     A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III)
     A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Art leads to mental health, and mental clarity [Beardsley,M, by Carroll,N]
     Full Idea: Beardsley says aesthetic experience relieves tensions and quiet destructive emotions. It also aids us in sorting out the jumble in the flow of consciousness, by virtue of its tendencies toward heightened clarity and coherence.
     From: report of Monroe Beardsley (Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism [1958]) by Noël Carroll - Monroe Beardsley p.162-3
     A reaction: I find this claim highly implausible. I like art, but I feel neither healthier nor clearer after experiencing it.