17 ideas
7911 | Theory vanishes when one has obtained wisdom [Rahulabhadra] |
Full Idea: As the drops of dew in contact/ With the sun's rays disappear,/ So all theorizings vanish,/ Once one has obtained wisdom. | |
From: Rahulabhadra (Hymn to Perfect Wisdom [c.150], v 10) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the western view is that wisdom is good theory. This sounds like the sort of thing Wittgenstein would have said. Remarks like this encourage people to skip study, with the illusion that they can go straight to wisdom. |
8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives proofs of many things which anyone would concede to him without question. ...The aim of proof is not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond doubt, but also to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §02 | |
A reaction: This connects nicely with Shoemaker's view of analysis (Idea 8559), which I will adopt as my general view. I've always thought of philosophy as the aspiration to wisdom through the cartography of concepts. |
13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
Full Idea: Euclid begins proofs about all triangles with 'let ABC be a triangle', but ABC is not a proper name. It names an arbitrarily selected triangle, and if that has a property, then we can conclude that all triangles have the property. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by E.J. Lemmon - Beginning Logic 3.2 | |
A reaction: Lemmon adds the proviso that there must be no hidden assumptions about the triangle we have selected. You must generalise the properties too. Pick a triangle, any triangle, say one with three angles of 60 degrees; now generalise from it. |
6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
Full Idea: Euclid's geometry is a synthetic geometry; Descartes supplied an analytic version of Euclid's geometry, and we now have analytic versions of the early non-Euclidean geometries. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4 | |
A reaction: I take it that the original Euclidean axioms were observations about the nature of space, but Descartes turned them into a set of pure interlocking definitions which could still function if space ceased to exist. |
9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Assume a largest prime, then multiply the primes together and add one. The new number isn't prime, because we assumed a largest prime; but it can't be divided by a prime, because the remainder is one. So only a larger prime could divide it. Contradiction. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Not only a very elegant mathematical argument, but a model for how much modern logic proceeds, by assuming that the proposition is false, and then deducing a contradiction from it. |
9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
Full Idea: A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one. | |
From: Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 7 Def 1) | |
A reaction: See Frege's 'Grundlagen' §29-44 for a sustained critique of this. Frege is good, but there must be something right about the Euclid idea. If I count stone, paper and scissors as three, each must first qualify to be counted as one. Psychology creeps in. |
8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Euclid's Postulate 2 says the geometer can 'produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line'. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: The point being that this takes infinity for granted, especially if you start counting how many points there are on the line. The Einstein idea that it might eventually come round and hit you on the back of the head would have charmed Euclid. |
22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid's axioms were insufficient to derive all the theorems of geometry: at various points in his proofs he appealed to properties that are obvious from the diagrams but do not follow from the stated axioms. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 03 'aim' | |
A reaction: I suppose if the axioms of a system are based on self-evidence, this would licence an appeal to self-evidence elsewhere in the system. Only pedants insist on writing down what is obvious to everyone! |
8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Euclid's fifth 'parallel' postulate says if there is an infinite straight line and a point, then there is only one straight line through the point which won't intersect the first line. This axiom is independent of Euclid's first four (agreed) axioms. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.2 | |
A reaction: This postulate was challenged in the nineteenth century, which was a major landmark in the development of modern relativist views of knowledge. |
10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives no principle of continuity, which would sanction an inference that if a line goes from the outside of a circle to the inside of circle, then it must intersect the circle at some point. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 n2 | |
A reaction: Cantor and Dedekind began to contemplate discontinuous lines. |
10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
Full Idea: Euclid postulates: One can join two points by a straight line; Hilbert states the axiom: Given any two points, there exists a straight line on which both are situated. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.259 |
14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
Full Idea: In descriptive geometry the first 26 propositions of Euclid hold. In projective geometry the 1st, 7th, 16th and 17th require modification (as a straight line is not a closed series). Those after 26 depend on the postulate of parallels, so aren't assumed. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §388 |
1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The best known example of Euclid's 'common notions' is "If equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal". These can be called axioms, and are what "the man who is to learn anything whatever must have". | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 72a17) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.149 |
5998 | From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ] |
Full Idea: Diodorus' Master Argument inferred that since what is past (i.e. true in the past) is necessary, and the impossible cannot follow from the possible, that therefore if something neither is nor ever will be the case, then it is impossible. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Michael J. White - Diodorus Cronus | |
A reaction: The argument is, apparently, no longer fully clear, but it seems to imply determinism, or at least a rejection of the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. (Epictetus 2.19) |
20832 | The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1 | |
A reaction: [Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible. |
14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
Full Idea: The connected (proposition) is true when it begins with true and neither could nor can end with false. | |
From: Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.4 | |
A reaction: [Mumford got the quote from Bochenski] This differs from the truth-functional account because it says nothing about when the antecedent is false, which fits in also with the 'supposition' view, where A is presumed. This idea adds necessity. |
6024 | Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius] |
Full Idea: No one says or thinks anything ambiguous, and nothing should be held to be being said beyond what the speaker thinks he is saying. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 11.12.2 | |
A reaction: A key argument in favour of propositions, implied in this remark, is that propositions are never ambiguous, though the sentences expressing them may be |