Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, Fabrice Correia and Hesiod

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory

13451	The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation

13452	Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

16974	The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia]
	Full Idea: The view presented here presupposes that each logical concept is associated with some fixed and well defined collection of rules of inference which characterize its basic logical nature.
	From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 4)
	A reaction: [He gives Fine's 'Senses of Essences' 57-8 as a source] He seems to have in mind natural deduction, where the rules are for the introduction and elimination of the concepts.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification

13449	We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
	A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant).

13450	Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1)

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

13453	Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

16973	Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia]
	Full Idea: One view is that logical consequence is to be understood in terms of logical necessity (some proposition holds necessarily, if some group of other propositions holds). Alternatively, logical necessity is a logical consequence of the empty set.
	From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 3)
	A reaction: I think my Finean preference is for all necessities to have a 'necessitator', so logical necessity results from logic in some way, perhaps from logical consequence, or from the essences of the connectives and operators.

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning

13448	The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
	A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

20239	Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
	Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
	From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
	A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.