Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, William K. Clifford and Hannah Arendt

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant).
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
     Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
     From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Modern totalitarianism results from lack of social ties or shared goals [Arendt, by Oksala]
     Full Idea: Arendt claims that modern totalitarianism's primary condition is an atomised mass society: isolated individuals who have no strong ties to communities and who are indifferent to shared political goals.
     From: report of Hannah Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism [1968]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.9
     A reaction: I think the lack of ties simply describes large modern cities. Not sure about the lack of shared goals. Hitler and Stalin rode on the back of apparent shared goals. Working classes strike me as sharing more goals than middle classes.
The ideal subject for dictators is not a fanatic, but someone who can't distinguish true from false [Arendt, by Oksala]
     Full Idea: The ideal subject of totalitarianism is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced communist, but anyone who has lost the ability to make distinctions between fact and fiction and between true and false.
     From: report of Hannah Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism [1968]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.9
     A reaction: We are currently living with an apparent attempt by Donald Trump to become a totalitarian President of the U.S.A., by constantly disseminating lies, and labelling all of his critics as 'fake news'.