Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Andr Gallois and Leon Battista Alberti

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16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

22353	One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
	A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.

22356	An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).

22359	Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.

22360	The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.

22362	Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
	A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.

22364	Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
	A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

13437	A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
	Full Idea: At t1 there is a whole CAR, and a PART of it, which is everything except the right front wheel. At t2 the wheel is removed, leaving just PART, so that CAR is now PART. But PART was a proper part of CAR, and CAR had the front wheel. Different properties!
	From: André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998], 1.II)
	A reaction: [compressed summary] The problem is generated by appealing to Leibniz's Law. My immediate reaction is that this is the sort of trouble you get into if you include such temporal truths about things as 'properties'.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

16233	Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
	Full Idea: A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position.
	From: comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8
	A reaction: Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!)

16025	If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
	Full Idea: If things really change, there can't literally be one thing before and after the change. However, if there isn't one thing before and after the change, then no thing has really undergone any change.
	From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], Intro)
	A reaction: [He cites Copi for this way of expressing the problem of identity through change] There is an obvious simple ambiguity about 'change' in ordinary English. A change of property isn't a change of object. Painting a red ball blue isn't swapping it.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

16026	4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
	Full Idea: We have four versions of Four-Dimensionalism: the relativistic view that time is space-like; a persisting thing is identical with its history (so objects are events); past and future are equally real; or (Lewis) things extend in time, with temporal parts.
	From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §2.5)
	A reaction: Broad proposed the second one. I prefer 3-D: at any given time a thing is wholly present. At another time it is wholly present despite having changed. It is ridiculous to think that small changes destroy identity. We acquire identity by dying??

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

14755	Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Gallois's core claim is that the identity relation holds with respect to times, ...and he must claim that there is no such thing as the relation of identity simpliciter.
	From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.5
	A reaction: Gallois is essentially responding to the statue and clay problem, but it seems a bit drastic to entirely change our concept of two things being identical, such as Hesperus and Phosphorus. 'Identity' seems to have several meanings; let's sort them out.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16231	Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times.
	From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4
	A reaction: The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space.

16027	If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
	Full Idea: The necessity of identity: a=b; □(a=a); so something necessarily = a; so something necessarily must equal b; so □(a=b). [A summary of the argument of Marcus and Kripke]
	From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §3)
	A reaction: [Lowe 1982 offered a response] The conclusion seems reasonable. If two things are mistakenly thought to be different, but turn out to be one thing, that one thing could not possibly be two things. In no world is one thing two things!

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment

22357	The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

22365	The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)

21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty

18555	The beautiful is that from which nothing can be subtracted and to which nothing can be added [Alberti]
	Full Idea: The beautiful is that from which nothing can be taken away and to which nothing can be added but for the worse.
	From: Leon Battista Alberti (De Re Aedificatoria [1485]), quoted by Roger Scruton - Beauty: a very short introduction 9
	A reaction: Scruton rejects this Platonic tradition of beauty as organic wholeness, because you can't say how it would be 'worse' without invoking beauty, which makes it circular. Scruton appears to be correct.