37 ideas
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality. |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists). |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third? | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course. |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished. |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science). | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3) | |
A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced. |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers. |
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: A semantic theory of names should deliver a specification of the conditions under which a name names an individual, and hence a specification of the conditions under which a name is empty. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Naming can be private, like naming my car 'Bertrand', but never tell anyone. I like Plato's remark that names are 'tools'. Do we specify conditions for successful spanner-usage? The first step must be individuation, preparatory to naming. |
18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: The Millian view of direct reference says that the meaning of a name is the object named. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: Any theory that says meaning somehow is features of the physical world strikes me as totally misguided. Napoleon is a man, so he can't be part of a sentence. He delegates that job to words (such as 'Napoleon'). |
18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Some empty names sentences can be understood, so appear to be meaningful ('Pegasus was sired by Poseidon'), ...some appear to be co-referential ('Santa Claus'/'Father Christmas'), and some appear to be straightforwardly true ('Pegasus doesn't exist'). | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Hang on to this, when the logicians arrive and start telling you that your talk of empty names is vacuous, because there is no object in the 'domain' to which a predicate can be attached. Meaning, reference and truth are the issues around empty names. |
18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: In Frege's account sentences such as 'Pegasus does not exist' will be neither true nor false, since the truth-value of a sentence is its referent, and the referent of a complex expression is determined by the referent of its parts. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: We can keep the idea of 'sense', which is very useful for dealing with empty names, but tweak his account of truth-values to evade this problem. I'm thinking that meaning is compositional, but truth-value isn't. |
18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: If it were possible for a definite description to be empty - not in the sense of there being no object that satisfies it, but of there being no set of properties it refers to - the problem of empty names would not have been solved. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 5) | |
A reaction: Swoyer is thinking of properties like 'is a unicorn', which are clearly just as vulnerable to being empty as 'the unicorn' was. It seems unlikely that 'horse', 'white' and 'horn' would be empty. |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus. |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2) |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |