Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Duncan Pritchard and Aeschylus

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22353 One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.
22356 An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).
22359 Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.
22360 The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.
22362 Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
     A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.
22364 Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
     A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19504 My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: One philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2)
     A reaction: [Anyone know the originator of this nice thought?] You say A is true, and A proves B, so B is true. I reply that if A proves something as daft as B, then so much the worse for A. Ain't it the truth?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Low probability events such as lottery wins can occur in nearby possible worlds.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.n2)
     A reaction: This seems to ruin any chance of mapping probabilities and counterfactuals in the neat model of nested possible worlds (like an onion). [Lewis must have thought of this, surely? - postcards, please]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19505 Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
     Full Idea: The three main objections to Moore's common-sense refutation of scepticism is that it either begs the question, or it just offers a rival view instead of a refutation, or it uses 'know' in a conversationally inappropriate way.
     From: report of Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [I deserve applause for summarising two pages of Pritchard's wordy stuff so neatly]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19499 We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: The closure principle forces us to regard Zula as knowing that what she is looking at is not a cleverly disguised mule, and yet she doesn't appear to have any supporting evidence for this knowledge.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§3)
     A reaction: [Zula observes a zebra in the zoo] Entailment is a different type of justification from perception. If we add fallibilism to the mix, then fallibility can increase as we pursue a string of entailments. But proper logic, of course, should not be fallible.
19500 Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: The Favouring Principle says that if S knows two things, and that the first entails the second, then S has better evidence in support of her belief in the first than she has for denying the second.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§3)
     A reaction: [his version is full of Greek letters, but who wants that stuff?] Pritchard concludes that if you believe in the closure principle then you should deny the favouring principle.
19502 Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: According to the 'contrastivist' proposal knowledge is to be understood as essentially involving discrimination, such that knowing a proposition boils down to having the relevant discriminatory capacities.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§6)
     A reaction: Pritchard says this isn't enough, and we must also to be aware of supporting favouring evidence. I would focus on the concept of coherence, even for simple perceptual knowledge. If I see a hawk in England, that's fine. What if I 'see' a vulture?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19498 Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Typically, internal epistemic conditions are characterised in terms of a reflective access requirement.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.§6)
     A reaction: If your justification is straightforwardly visual, it is unclear what the difference would be between seeing the thing and having reflective access to the seeing.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19506 Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Standard epistemic internalism faces an uphill struggle when it comes to dealing with radical scepticism, which points in favour of epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§3)
     A reaction: I incline towards internalism. I deal with scepticism by being a fallibilist, and adding 'but you never know' to every knowledge claim, and then getting on with life.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Slogan for disjunctivism: perceptual knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief whose epistemic support is both factive (i.e. it entails the truth of the propositions believed) and reflectively accessible to the agent.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not a fan of externalism, but it could be that the factive bit achieves the knowledge, and then being able to use and answer for that knowledge may just be a bonus, and not an essential ingredient.
19497 Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical disjunctivists hold that veridical perceptual experiences are not essentially the same as the experiences involved in corresponding cases involving illusion and (especially) hallucination.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.§4)
     A reaction: Metaphysical disjunctivism concerns what the experiences are; epistemological justification concerns the criteria of justification. I think. I wish Pritchard would spell things out more clearly. Indeed, I wish all philosophers would.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19495 Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: A fundamental difficulty for epistemic externalist positions is that it is hard on this view to capture any adequate notion of epistemic responsibility.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: He never explains the 'responsibility', but I presume that would be like an expert witness in court, vouching for their knowledge.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
19501 We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: When faced with an error-possibility we can appeal to background knowledge, as long as the error-possibility does not call into question this background knowledge. The same is not true when we focus on the radical sceptical hypothesis.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§5)
     A reaction: [reworded] Doubting everything simultaneously just looks like a mad project. If you doubt linguistic meaning, you can't even express your doubts.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19507 Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: Crucially, radical sceptical error-possibilities are never epistemically motivated, but are instead merely raised.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§5)
     A reaction: In 'The Matrix' someone sees a glitch in the software (a cat crossing a passageway), and that would have to be taken seriously. Otherwise it is a nice strategy to ask why the sceptic is raising this bizzare possibility, without evidence.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22357 The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22365 The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
7810 The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus tells how the old rule of revenge and blood feud was replaced by a due process of law before a civil jury.
     From: report of Aeschylus (The Eumenides [c.458 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 1659, where this revolution is attributed to Protagoras (a little later than Aeschylus). I take the rule of law and of society to be above all the rule of reason, because the aim is calm objectivity instead of emotion.