16554
|
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
Activities can be identified spatiotemporally, and individuated by rate, duration, and types of entity and property that engage in them. They also have modes of operation, directionality, polarity, energy requirements and a range.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
This is their attempt at making 'activity' one of the two central concepts of ontology, along with 'entity'. A helpful analysis. It just seems to be one way of slicing the cake.
|
12887
|
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
|
|
Full Idea:
A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
|
|
From:
Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
|
|
A reaction:
Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
|
11842
|
If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
|
|
Full Idea:
We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
|
|
From:
C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
|
|
A reaction:
Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.
|
16562
|
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
The intelligibility of a phenomenon consists in the mechanisms being portrayed in terms of a field's bottom out entities and activities.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
|
|
A reaction:
In other words, we understand complex things by reducing them to things we do understand. It would, though, be illuminating to see a nest of interconnected activities, even if we understood none of them.
|
16555
|
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is common to speak of functions as properties 'had by' entities, …but they should rather be understood in terms of the activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the workings of a mechanism.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
I'm certainly quite passionately in favour of cutting down on describing the world almost entirely in terms of entities which have properties. An 'activity', though, is a bit of an elusive concept.
|
16528
|
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
One should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) systems.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
The difficulty seems to be that you could broaden the concept of 'mechanism' indefinitely, so that it covered history, mathematics, populations, cultural change, and even mathematics. Where to stop?
|
16553
|
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
We emphasise the activities in mechanisms. This is explicitly dualist. Substantivalists speak of entities with dispositions to act. Process ontologists reify activities and try to reduce entities to processes. We try to capture both intuitions.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
[A quotation of selected fragments] The problem here seems to be the raising of an 'activity' to a central role in ontology, when it doesn't seem to be primitive, and will typically be analysed in a variety of ways.
|
16559
|
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
Nested hierachical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. …Bottoming out is relative …the explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.1)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to me exactly the right story about mechanism, and it is a story I am associating with essentialism. The relevance is ties to understanding. The lower level is either fully understood, or totally baffling.
|
16564
|
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are four bottom-out kinds of activities: geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, electro-magnetic and energetic. These are abstract means of production that can be fruitfully applied in particular cases to explain phenomena.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
|
|
A reaction:
I like that. It gives a nice core for a metaphysics for physicalists. I suspect that 'mechanical' can be reduced to something else, and that 'energetic' will disappear in the final story.
|
16558
|
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
|
Full Idea:
The traditional notion of a law of nature has few, if any, applications in neurobiology or molecular biology.
|
|
From:
Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This is a simple and self-evident fact, and bad news for anyone who want to build their entire ontology around laws of nature. I take such a notion to be fairly empty, except as a convenient heuristic device.
|
14609
|
We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
|
|
Full Idea:
One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
|
|
From:
C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
|
|
A reaction:
This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.
|
22933
|
We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
|
|
Full Idea:
We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
|
|
From:
C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.
|