3 ideas
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics. | |
| From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2 | |
| A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases. |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?' | |
| From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I) | |
| A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose. |
| 15194 | Time, as it appears in standard modern science, is bad verificationist metaphysics [Smith,Q, by Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: Smith argues that the theories of time which appear in the Special and General Theories of Relativity and in orthodox quantum mechanics are false metaphysical theories, based on verificationist assumptions. | |
| From: report of Quentin Smith (Absolute Simultaneity and Infinity of Time [1998]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' 4 | |
| A reaction: I wouldn't have to confidence to stand up to the panoply of modern scientists, but I am glad Quentin Smith is having a go. I love Shoemaker's three worlds example, which defies all physics. |