Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Richard T.W. Arthur and Samuel Johnson

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
     Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
     From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
     A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
19378 Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
     A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3447 All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it [Johnson,S]
     Full Idea: All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it.
     From: Samuel Johnson (works [1770]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
19380 Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.