Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Weisberg/Needham/Hendry and Juan Comesaa

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15 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
     Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
     From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
     A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa]
     Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough.
     From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4)
     A reaction: This is Comesaņa's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa]
     Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem').
     From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1)
     A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge.
How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa]
     Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified.
     From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3)
     A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
     A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later.
Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2)
     A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3)
Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it.
It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6)
     A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless.
Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together.
For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2)
     A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4)
     A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3)