Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Cumberland, Palle Yourgrau and William Davies

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: No decision can be in accord with right reason unless all can agree on it.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XLVI)
     A reaction: Personally I think anyone who disagrees with this should get out of philosophy (and into sociology, fantasy fiction, ironic game-playing, crime…). Of course 'can' agree is not the same as 'will' agree. You must have faith that good reasons are persuasive.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: We want to know How many what? You must first partition an aggregate into parts relevant to the question, where no partition is privileged. How the partitioned set is to be numbered is bound up with its unique members, and follows from logic alone.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'New Problem')
     A reaction: [Compressed wording of Yourgrau's summary of Frege's 'relativity argument'] Concepts do the partitioning. Yourgau says this fails, because the same argument applies to the sets themselves, as well as to the original aggregates.
Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: Nothing at all is 'intrinsically' numbered.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'What the')
     A reaction: Once you are faced with distinct 'objects' of some sort, they can play the role of 'unit' in counting, so his challenge is that nothing is 'intrinsically' an object, which is the nihilism explored by Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. Aristotle disagrees...
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: The Frege-Maddy definition of number (as the 'property' of being-three) explains why the definitions of Von Neumann, Zermelo and others work, by giving the 'principle of collection' that ties together all threes.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'A Fregean')
     A reaction: [compressed two or three sentences] I am strongly in favour of the best definition being the one which explains the target, rather than just pinning it down. I take this to be Aristotle's view.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: Sets could hardly serve as a foundation for number theory if we had to await detailed results in the upper reaches of the edifice before we could make our first move.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'Two')
You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: We can address a set with any question at all that admits of a numerical reply. Thus we can ask of {Carter, Reagan} 'How many feet do the members have?'.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'On Numbering')
     A reaction: This is his objection to the Fregean idea that once you have fixed the members of a set, you have thereby fixed the unique number that belongs with the set.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
     A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The happiness of each person cannot be separated from the happiness of all, because the whole is no different from the parts taken together.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like the fallacy of composition (Idea 6219). An objection to utilitarianism is its assumption that a group of people have a 'total happiness' that is different from their individual states. Still, Cumberland is on to utilitarianism.
The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Capitalists use their exceptional power to impose their own rules, and make the state their ally [Davies,W]
     Full Idea: Capitalists exploit their unrivalled control over time and space in order to impose their rules on everyone else. …It triumphed late, only becoming dominant in the 19th century, when it had conscripted the state as its ally.
     From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
     A reaction: This so very much makes sense of the modern world. Nowadays capitalists are so wealthy that the state has largely become their pawn, rather than their ally. Populist leaders are their puppets (and are well rewarded).
Economies have material, economic and capitalist layers [Davies,W]
     Full Idea: Braudel's economic history has three layers. At the bottom is material life of consumption, production, reproduction. Next is economic life of markets, of equals in exchange and competition. Top is capitalism, of opacity, monopoly, power, high profits.
     From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
     A reaction: The point Davies emphasises here is the sharp distinction between the market economy and capitalism.
Capitalism must mainly rely either on the labour market, or on the financial markets [Davies,W]
     Full Idea: According to Marxists, the one market capitalism cannot do without is the labour market, which creates saleable things. Others, influenced by Keynes, emphasise financial markets, where pieces of paper change hands on expectation of their value.
     From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
     A reaction: Modern Britain fits the Keynesian account much better, given its low production, and very active (until recently) London financial market.
Capitalism is the anti-market, with opacity, monopolies, powers, exceptional profits and wealth [Davies,W]
     Full Idea: Braudel sees capitalism as the 'anti-market': a world of opacity, monopoly, concentration of power and wealth, and the exceptional profits that can be achieved only by escaping the norms of 'economic life'.
     From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
     A reaction: Given all the talk about the wonders of the 'free market' from right-wingers, this passage came as a revelation to me. Capitalists all dream of a monopoly, which is precisely the destruction of a market.
Markets are transparent, with known prices and activity, and minimal profits [Davies,W]
     Full Idea: Markets are characterised by transparency. Prices are public, and all relevant activity is visible to everyone. And because of competition, profits are minimal, little more than a 'wage' for the seller.
     From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
     A reaction: This account, from Braudel, is to distinguish markets from capitalism.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence.