15045
|
The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
I think the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits and dangers?
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From:
Michel Foucault (Space, Knowledge and Power (interview) [1982], p.358)
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A reaction:
One can hardly deny the fairness of the question, but I hope that won't prevent us from trying to be rational. Maybe logicians do a better job of clarifying reason than the political and historical speculations of Foucault?
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15038
|
Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
One can agree that structuralism formed the most systematic effort to evacuate the concept of the event, not only from ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in the extreme case from history.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.115)
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A reaction:
'Abstract' might be a better word than 'evacuate'. In that sense, this at least seems to have it the right way round - that structure can be abstracted, but in no way can a structure be prior to its components (pace Ladyman, Shapiro etc).
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7420
|
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286)
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A reaction:
If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer.
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15044
|
'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.132)
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A reaction:
Foucault is not absurdly relativist about this, but I don't think I agree, even in his terms. In a sexually prudish culture, blunt sexual truths are clearly true to everyone, but totally unacceptable. Society shudders when unacceptable truths are spoken.
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15042
|
Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
Truth isn't a reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.131)
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A reaction:
This obviously has a degree of truth in many areas of human belief, but I just don't buy it as an account of Newton's researches into optics, or Lavoisier's chemistry. Politics is more involved once big money is required.
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15037
|
Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.114)
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A reaction:
The answer is either in the excitement of a new motivation, which may concern power, or may concern pure understanding - or else it is just that one discovery brings a host of others along with (like discovering DNA).
|
2748
|
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
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From:
report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
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A reaction:
This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
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21941
|
Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Unlike Marxists, Foucault's project is to offer an internal account of human thinking, without assuming a privileged status for the conscious content of that thought.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (works [1978]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 4
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A reaction:
His project is historical. Personally I resent anyone who claims to understand my thought better than I do. I suppose my intellectual duty is to read Foucault, and see (honestly) whether his project applies to me.
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22235
|
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the most noble and disinterested, has a history.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971], p.86), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 5
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A reaction:
This is the sort of remark that makes me think Foucault is worth reading. Aristotle thought you could teach correct feelings. That implies that you can also teach incorrect feelings.
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22662
|
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say.
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From:
Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
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A reaction:
[He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course.
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22667
|
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled.
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From:
Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74)
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A reaction:
I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree.
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6217
|
Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
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A reaction:
I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies.
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6221
|
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
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A reaction:
A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
|
6220
|
The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
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A reaction:
I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society.
|
20585
|
If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired ...such as writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. ...Should you plug into this machine for life?
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From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], 3 'Experience')
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A reaction:
A classic though experiment which crystalises a major problem with hedonistic utilitarianism. My addition is a machine which maximises the pleasure of my family and friends, to save me the bother of doing it.
|
18643
|
A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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A reaction:
This has some plausibility for a huge modern state, where we don't know one another, but it would be a ridiculous attitude in a traditional village.
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15041
|
Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
If power was only repressive, would we obey it? What makes power accepted is the fact …that it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.
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|
From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.120)
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|
A reaction:
Once you present 'power' this way, it permeates so deeply into human activity that it is in danger of becoming a mere triviality of social analysis. Is every conversation that ever took place actually a power struggle?
|
7425
|
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
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|
Full Idea:
The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination.
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|
From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298)
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|
A reaction:
If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting.
|
22236
|
The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
How to govern was one of the fundamental question of the fifteenth and sixteenth century. ...How to govern children, the poor and beggars, how to govern the family, a house, how to govern armies, different groups, cities, states, and govern one's self.
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|
From:
Michel Foucault (What is Critique? [1982], p.28), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 9
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A reaction:
A nice example of Foucault showing how things we take for granted (techniques of control) have been slowly learned, and then taught as standard. Of course, the Romans knew how to govern an army.
|
21947
|
Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's analysis suggests that meaningful revolution, hence genuine liberation, is impossible: the only alternative to the modern net of micro-centres of power is totalitatian domination. Hence his politics, even when revolutionary, is always local.
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|
From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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|
A reaction:
It is hard to disagree with this.
|
18642
|
Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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A reaction:
This claim appears to be an axiom, but I'm not sure that the notion of 'rights' make any sense unless someone is granting the rights, where the someone is either a strong individual, or the community (perhaps represented by the state).
|
18644
|
States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
A state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purposes of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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|
A reaction:
You certainly can't apply these principles to children, so becoming an 'adult' seems to be a very profound step in Nozick's account. At what age must we stop interfering with people for their own good. If the state is prohibited, are neighbours also?
|
22661
|
My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
The political philosophy represented in Anarchy, State and Utopia ignored the importance of joint and official symbolic statement and expression of our social ties and concern, and hence (I have written) is inadequate.
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|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.32) by Robert Nozick - The Nature of Rationality p.32
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|
A reaction:
In other words, it was far too individualistic, and neglected community, even though it has become the sacred text for libertarian individualism. Do any Nozick fans care about this recantation?
|
18641
|
If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
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|
Full Idea:
If we assume that everyone is entitled to the goods they currently possess (their 'holdings'), then a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from people's free exchanges.
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|
From:
report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.b
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|
A reaction:
If people's current 'legitimate' holdings are hugely unequal, it seems very unlikely that the ensuing exchanges will be 'free' in the way that Nozick envisages.
|
21946
|
Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's thesis is that disciplinary techniques introduced for criminals became the model for other modern sites of control (schools, hospitals, factories), so that prison discipline pervades all of society.
|
|
From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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|
A reaction:
Someone recently designed Foucault Monopoly, where every location is a prison. All tightly controlled organisations, such as a medieval monastery, or the Roman army, will inevitably share many features.
|
7418
|
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
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|
Full Idea:
I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression.
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|
From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282)
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|
A reaction:
Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty.
|
20539
|
Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
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Full Idea:
Nozick identified three ways in which people can acquire a legitimate property holding: initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification (of unjust transfers).
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|
From:
report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick'
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|
A reaction:
I think it is a delusion to look for justice in the ownership of property. You can't claim justice for buying property if the money to do it was acquired unjustly. And what rights over those who live on the land come with the 'ownership'?
|
18646
|
How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
How did these natural resources, which were not initially owned by anyone, come to be part of someone's private property? ...The fact that the initial acquisition often involved force means there is no moral objection to redistributing existing wealth.
|
|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b
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|
A reaction:
[He cites G.A. Cphen 1988 for the second point] Put like this, Nozick's theory just looks like the sort of propaganda which is typically put out by the winners. Is there an implicit threat of violent resistance in his advocacy of individual rights?
|
21737
|
Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
One may acquire a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, as long as the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is not thereby worsened.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178), quoted by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
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|
A reaction:
Cohen attacks this vigorously. His main point is that Nozick has a very narrow view of what the acquisition should be compared with. There are many alternatives. Does being made unable to improve something 'worsen' a person's condition?
|
21738
|
Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
Why should we not regard land as originally collectively owned rather than, as Nozick takes for granted, owned by no one?
|
|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178) by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
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|
A reaction:
Did native Americans and Australians collectively own the land? Lots of peoples, I suspect, don't privately own anything, because the very concept has never occured to them (and they have no legal system).
|
6216
|
Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
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|
Full Idea:
Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments.
|
|
From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
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|
A reaction:
Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence.
|
15039
|
History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault]
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|
Full Idea:
History has no 'meaning', but it is not absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.
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|
From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.116)
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|
A reaction:
I take this to be an essentially Marxist view, in which one teases out the dialectical processes of any period. I can't think of a better way to approach history. The alternative is to only recount one side of the struggle, which must be bad history.
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