Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Cumberland, Xunzi (Xun Kuang) and J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6222 If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: No decision can be in accord with right reason unless all can agree on it.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XLVI)
     A reaction: Personally I think anyone who disagrees with this should get out of philosophy (and into sociology, fantasy fiction, ironic game-playing, crime…). Of course 'can' agree is not the same as 'will' agree. You must have faith that good reasons are persuasive.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
8964 Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: There are two ways that entities can be multiplied unnecessarily: by multiplying the number of explanatory categories, and by multiplying the number of entities within a category.
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 4)
     A reaction: An important distinction. The orthodox view is that it is the excess of categories that is to be avoided (e.g. by nominalists). Possible worlds in metaphysics, and multiple worlds in physics, claim not to violate the first case.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
8962 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: The example which presents the most serious challenge to nominalism is 'there are shapes which are never exemplified'.
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
     A reaction: To 'exemplify' a shape must it be a physical object, or a drawing of such an object, or a description? If none of those have ever existed, I'm not sure what 'are' is supposed to mean. They seem to be possibilia (with all the associated problems).
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8961 Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: The two main motivations for nominalism are an admirable commitment to Ockham's Razor, and a queasiness about postulating entities that are unobservable or non-empirical, existing in a non-physical realm.
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
     A reaction: It doesn't follow that because the entities are unobservable that they are non-physical. Consider the 'interior' of an electron. Neverless I share a love of Ockham's Razor and a deep caution about unobservables.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
8963 Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: There are four models of the ontological status of possible worlds: conceptualist (mental constructions), combinatorial (all combinations of the actual world), abstract worlds (conjunction of propositions), and concrete worlds (collections of concreta).
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 4)
     A reaction: [the proponents cited are, in order, Rescher, Cresswell, Plantinga and Lewis] They dismiss Rescher and Cresswell, both of whom seem to me more plausible than Plantinga or Lewis. 'Possible' can't figure in the definition. Possible to us, or in reality?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
6217 Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
6221 If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
     A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
23405 Rituals escape natural chaos, and benefit everyone, by reshaping our motivations [Xunzi (Xun Kuang), by Norden]
     Full Idea: For Xunzi, everyone is better off with rituals …because they allow us to escape the chaotic state of nature. They do not merely set rules for entitlement, though. They are effective because they reshape human motivation.
     From: report of Xunzi (Xun Kuang) (The Xunzi [c.250 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 10.2
     A reaction: Rituals are a basic part of Confucianist thinking, and may be puzzling to outsiders. At there worst rituals are brain-washing, but teaching children good manners is a sort of ritual, meant to channel feelings in a healthy direction
23406 Rituals don't arise from human nature; they are the deliberate creations of a sage [Xunzi (Xun Kuang)]
     Full Idea: Rituals and standards of righteousness and proper models and measures are produced from the deliberate efforts of the sage; they are not produced from people's nature.
     From: Xunzi (Xun Kuang) (The Xunzi [c.250 BCE], 23), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 10.III
     A reaction: This is not to say that the sage is not in tune with nature. Human nature is often seen as a sprouting seed, which needs careful husbandry to bring out its best.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6218 The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The happiness of each person cannot be separated from the happiness of all, because the whole is no different from the parts taken together.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like the fallacy of composition (Idea 6219). An objection to utilitarianism is its assumption that a group of people have a 'total happiness' that is different from their individual states. Still, Cumberland is on to utilitarianism.
6220 The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
6216 Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence.