31 ideas
6675 | The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal] |
Full Idea: The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 423 (277)) | |
A reaction: This romantic remark has passed into folklore. I am essentially against it, but the role of intuition and instinct are undeniable in both reasoning and ethics. I don't feel inclined, though, to let my heart overrule my reason concerning what exists. |
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
Full Idea: C.I.Lewis constructed five axiomatic systems of modal logic, and named them S1 to S5. It turns out that the simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is the same as Lewis's S5. | |
From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 2.1 | |
A reaction: Nathan Salmon ('Reference and Essence' 2nd ed) claims (on p.xvii) that "the correct modal logic is weaker than S5 and weaker even than S4". Which is the greater virtue, simplicity or weakness? |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366) | |
A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all. |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365) | |
A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it. |
10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the lack of contradiction a sign of truth. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (works [1660]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: [Quoted in Auden and Kronenberger's Book of Aphorisms] Presumably we would now say that contradiction is a purely formal, syntactic notion, and not a semantic one. If you hit a contradiction, something has certainly gone wrong. |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians. |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
Full Idea: C.I.Lewis's S4 system develops a sense of necessity as 'provability' in some fairly informal sense. | |
From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch. 4 |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth. |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
Full Idea: C.I.Lewis began his groundbreaking work in modal logic because he was concerned about the unreliability of the material conditional as a translation of 'If ... then' conditionals. | |
From: report of C.I. Lewis (Symbolic Logic (with Langford) [1932]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 12.3 | |
A reaction: Compare 'if this is square then it has four corners' with 'if it rains then our afternoon is ruined'. Different modalities seem to be involved. We even find that 'a square has four corners' will be materially implied if it rains! |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible... |
22011 | The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal] |
Full Idea: We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart. It is through that latter that we know first principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to refute them. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 110 p.58), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04 n4 | |
A reaction: This resembles the rationalist defence of fundamental a priori principles, needed as a foundation for knowledge. But the a priori insights are not a feature of the 'natural light' of reason, and are presumably inexplicable (of the 'heart'). |
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: When the whole range of empirical beliefs is taken into account, all of them more or less dependent on memorial knowledge, we find that those which are most credible can be assured by their mutual support, or 'congruence'. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 334), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.1 | |
A reaction: Lewis may be over-confident about this, and is duly attacked by Olson, but it seems to me roughly correct. How do you assess whether some unusual element in your memory was a dream or a real experience? |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: To doubt our sense of past experience as founded in actuality, would be to lose any criterion by which either the doubt itself or what is doubted could be corroborated. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 358), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.3.1 | |
A reaction: Obviously scepticism about memory can come in degrees, but total rejection of short-term and clear memories looks like a non-starter. What could you put in its place? Hyper-rationalism? Even maths needs memory. |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 186), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Intro | |
A reaction: Lewis makes this comment when facing infinite regress problems. It is a very nice slogan for foundationalism, which embodies the slippery slope view. Personally I feel the emotional pull of foundations, but acknowledge the very strong doubts about them. |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be congruent if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 338), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2 | |
A reaction: This thesis is vigorously attacked by Erik Olson, who works through the probability calculations. There seems an obvious problem without that. How else do you assess 'congruence', other than by evidence of mutual strengthening? |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: "The denotation or extension of a term is the class of all actual or existent things which the term correctly applies to or names; the connotation or intension of a term is delimited by any correct definition of it." ..And intension determines extension. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946]), quoted by Stephen P. Schwartz - Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds §II | |
A reaction: The last part is one of the big ideas in philosophy of language, which was rejected by Putnam and co. If you were to reverse the slogan, though, (to extension determines intension) how would you identify the members of the extension? |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view. |
6681 | We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal] |
Full Idea: We usually only want to know something so that we can talk about it. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 77 (152)) | |
A reaction: This may be right, but I wouldn't underestimate it as a worthy end (though Pascal, as usual, calls it 'vanity'). Good talk might even be the highest human good (how many people like, more than anything, chatting in pubs?), and good talk is knowledgeable. |
6676 | Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal] |
Full Idea: How vain painting is, exciting admiration by its resemblance to things of which we do not admire the originals. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 40 (134)) | |
A reaction: A lesser sort of painting simply depicts things we admire, such as a nice stretch of landscape. For Pascal it is vanity, but it could be defended as the highest achievement of art, if the purpose of artists is to make us see beauty where we had missed it. |
6680 | It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal] |
Full Idea: It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river; true on this side of the Pyrenees, false on the other. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 60 (294)) | |
A reaction: Pascal gives nice concise summaries of our intuitions. Legal justice may be all we can actually get, but everyone knows that what happens to someone could be 'fair' on one side of a river, and very 'unfair' on the other. |
6677 | Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Imagination decides everything: it creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the world's supreme good. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 44 (82)) | |
A reaction: Compare Fogelin's remark in Idea 6555. I see Pascal's point, but these ideals are also responses to facts about the world, such as human potential and human desire and successful natural functions. |
6678 | We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Our thoughts are wholly concerned with the past or the future, never with the present, which is never our end; thus we never actually live, but hope to live, and since we are always planning to be happy, it is inevitable that we should never be so. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 47 (172)) | |
A reaction: A very nice expression of the importance of 'living for the moment' as a route to happiness. Personally I am occasionally startled by the thought 'Good heavens, I seem to be happy!', but it usually passes quickly. How do you plan for the present? |
20732 | If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Let man consider what he is in comparison with what exists; let him regard himself as lost, and from this little dungeon the universe, let him learn to take the earth and himself at their proper value. Anyone considering this will be terrified at himself. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], p.199), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction Pref 'What? | |
A reaction: [p.199 of Penguin edn] Cited by Aho as a forerunner of existentialism. Montaigne probably influenced Pascal. Interesting that this is to be a self-inflicted existential crisis (for some purpose, probably Christian). |
6682 | Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal] |
Full Idea: Majority opinion is the best way because it can be seen, and is strong enough to command obedience, but it is the opinion of those who are least clever. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 85 (878)) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the classic dilemma faced by highly educated people over democracy. Plato preferred the clever, Aristotle agreed with Pascal, and with me. Politics must make the best of it, not pursue some ideal. Education is the one feeble hope. |
21131 | Democracy is competition for support of the people, guided by self-interest on all sides [Posner] |
Full Idea: Democratic politics is a competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people, also assumed to be self-interested, and none too interested or well informed about politics. | |
From: Richard Posner (Law, Pragmatism and Democracy [2003], p.144), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 05 | |
A reaction: This articulates the 'competitive' view of democracy, as simply a technique for establishing legitimacy. Posner is also an economist, and they also assume that everyone is wholly self-interested, which may be why they are so frequently wrong. |
6679 | It is not good to be too free [Pascal] |
Full Idea: It is not good to be too free. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 57 (379)) | |
A reaction: All Americans, please take note. I agree with this, because I agree with Aristotle that man is essentially a social animal (Idea 5133), and living in a community is a matter of compromise. Extreme libertarianism contradicts our natures, and causes misery. |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time. |
7455 | Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Pascal knows that one cannot decide to believe in God, but he thinks one can act so that one will very probably come to believe in God, by following a life of 'holy water and sacraments'. | |
From: report of Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 418 (233)) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This meets the most obvious and simple objection to Pascal's idea, and Pascal may well be right. I'm not sure I could resist belief after ten years in a monastery. |
7457 | Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal] |
Full Idea: Pascal's argument is valid, but it is presented with a monstrous premise of equal chance. We have no good reason for picking a half as the chance of God's existence. | |
From: comment on Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 418 (233)) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8 | |
A reaction: That strikes me as the last word on this rather bizarre argument. |
7456 | The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal] |
Full Idea: The libertine is giving up something if he chooses to adopt a pious form of life. He likes sin. If God is not, the worldly life is preferable to the cloistered one. | |
From: comment on Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 418 (233)) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This is a very good objection to Pascal, who seems to think you really have nothing at all to lose. I certainly don't intend to become a monk, because the chances of success seem incredibly remote from where I am sitting. |
6684 | If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal] |
Full Idea: How will you wager if a coin is spun on 'Either God is or he is not'? ...If you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing. | |
From: Blaise Pascal (Pensées [1662], 418 (233)) | |
A reaction: 'Sooner safe than sorry' is a principle best used with caution. Do you really 'lose nothing' by believing a falsehood for the whole of your life? What God would reward belief on such a principles as this? |