Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Price, Albert of Saxony and John Hick

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
     A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
     A reaction: This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price.
     From: report of Richard Price (works [1760]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intuitionism
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: On one possible description, an element is what is found last when bodies are taken apart, and what is found first when bodies are generated.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1356], II.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification
Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Religion is capable of 'eschatological verification', by reaching evidence at the end of life, even though falsification of its claims is never found in this life; a prediction of coming to a Celestial City must await the end of the journey.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], III) by PG - Db (ideas)
It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Verification of religious claims after death is only possible if the concept of surviving death is intelligible, and we can understand the concept of immortality, despite difficulties in being certain that we had reached it.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], IV) by PG - Db (ideas)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / d. Religious Falsification
Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG]
     Full Idea: Falsification and verification are not logically equivalent. For example, you might verify the claim that there will be three consecutive sevens in the infinite expansion of PI, but you could never falsify such a claim.
     From: report of John Hick (Theology and Verification [1960], §II) by PG - Db (ideas)