11 ideas
16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4 |
16672 | Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi] |
Full Idea: Quantity refers to nothing other than the parts of the thing quantified, together with their location or position, being extrinsically coordinated with each other. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Treatise on Quantity [1286], f. 49vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand 'extrinsically'. Is there some external stretching force? God spends his time spreading out his stuff? It is nice that being spread out isn't taken for granted. We take much more for granted than they did. Motion, for example. |
16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1 | |
A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given. |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: Where the idealist says that to be (i.e. to exist) is to be perceived, the phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is a nice phenomenalist slogan to add to Mill's well known one (Idea 3583). Expressed in this form, it looks false to me. What about neutrinoes? They weren't at all perceivable until recently. Maybe some physical stuff can never be perceived. |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: Linguistic phenomenalism argues that it is possible to remove all talk of physical objects from our speech with no loss of meaning. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I find this proposal unappealing. My basic objection is that I cannot understand why anyone would refuse to even contemplate the question of WHY I am having a given group of consistent experiences, of (say) a table kind. |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: The problem with taking sense-data as basic is that some data can appear indeterminate. If we can't discern the colour of someone's eyes, or the number of sides of a complex figure, are we to say that there is no fact about those things? | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I like that. How many electrons are there in the sun? Such things cannot just be reduced to talk of sense-data, as there is obviously a vast gap between the data and the facts. As usual, ontology and epistemology must be kept separate. |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: All the primary qualities lend themselves readily to mathematical or geometric description. ...but it seems that secondary qualities are less amenable to being represented mathematically. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: As a believer in the primary/secondary distinction, I welcome this point. This is either evidence for the external reality of primary qualities, or an interesting observation about maths. Do we make the primary/secondary distinction because we do maths? |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: An object cannot lack shape, size, position or motion and remain an object. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This points towards the essentialist view (see Idea 5453). This does raise the question of whether an object could lose its colour with impugnity, or the quality of sound that it makes when struck. |
6493 | We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth] |
Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks. | |
From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7 | |
A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'. |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: My beliefs could be well justified in coherentist terms, while not accurately representing the world, and my system of beliefs could be completely free-floating. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This nicely encapsulates to correspondence objection to coherence theory. One thing missing from the coherence account is that beliefs aren't chosen for their coherence, but are mostly unthinkingly triggered by experiences. |
16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |
Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2 | |
A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example. |