Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roderick Firth, Lawrence Kohlberg and Jenny Teichmann

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
     Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks.
     From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7
     A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Avoid punishment, then get rewards, avoid rejection, avoid guilt, accept contracts, follow conscience [Kohlberg, by Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: Kohlberg's six stages of ethical development are: 1) avoid punishment, 2) obtain rewards, 3) avoid rejection, 4) avoid censure and guilt, 5) recognise contracts, 6) individual conscience.
     From: report of Lawrence Kohlberg (works [1969]) by Edmund O. Wilson - On Human Nature p.166
     A reaction: This doesn't throw much light on philosophical problems, but the order of the six stages is interesting. Beware of oversimplification, because a situation can put pressure on any one of these six aspects of morality.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1)
     A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture.
No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition.